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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
Coeurd'Aiene,
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Phone (208) 664-8115
FAX (208) 664-6338
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P. 0.
O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, 10
ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-5117
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV:'09-1
001 0
cv:.o9-1 0010

JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
V~
v~

SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)
)
>
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT
IN
RESPONSE
TO
KENNEDY
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REFUSE
THE APPLICATION OF DEFENDANT
KENNEDY
FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IRCP Rule
56 (f)

From at least the voluntary dismissal by plaintiff of Kootenai County as
defendant, this case has been carried on in disregard of the law in the election statutes
and appellant opinions and upon erroneous assumptions not founded upon fact and, in
most instances, immaterial. The plaintiffs Motion to Refuse is just one more waste of
the time of Court and counsel.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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Rule 56 (f), I.R.Civ.P. reads as follows:

Rule 56 (t).
(f). When affidavits are unavailable in summary judgment
proceedings.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion
that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as is just.
The motion purports to be supported by affidavit of plaintiff's attorney Starr Kelso
expressing opinions and making assumptions totally without factual foundation.
As set forth in the rebuttal affidavit of undersigned counsel, there was only one
conversation with potential witness Monica Paquin. Undersigned counsel's only legal
opinion was the obvious shared by plaintiff's attorney that an Idaho court cannot compel
a person in Canada to come to Coeur d'Alene to trial. The refusal to pass on her
telephone number which plaintiff's investigator already had or her home address which
defendants' counsel did not have resulted in an e-mail to plaintiff's counsel on February
th
ath as follows:
8

Feb. 8,201004:23:55
8, 2010 04:23:55 P.M. scottwreed@verizon.net wrote:
Oliveria's
31 st I read in Dave Oliveria'S
Starr: In the Sunday Spokesman of January 31st
column that Monica Pacquin lived in Canada, that she had been contacted
by one of your investigators and asked about her vote and that she thought
such an inquiry about a vote in a city election rather than U.S. Senator or
President was ridiculous. I sensed from her comment that she did not want
to be bothered any more. I respect her wish for privacy. Pacquin is a legal
vote, that is all I have to say.
See Affidavit of Starr Kelso, page A-6.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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The only other contact with plaintiffs target list of witnesses was a call on
Tuesday, August 1ih, the day after plaintiff filed his pleading from Tammy Currie
Farkes who was frightened by receipt of a "Notice of Testimony" from attorney Kelso.
counselor
There has been no other contact by undersigned counsel
or anyone else
representing defendant Kennedy with any of plaintiffs listed witnesses.
There are no facts in the record to support anything in plaintiffs motion. It is
hardly surprising that out-of-state residents after initially replying to questions from a
private investigator, decided that they did want to become involved in a city council
election of no importance to them nor in a trial that might require them to travel
hundreds or thousands of miles at their own expense.
So much for paragraphs 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Motion to Refuse. Paragraph 3
explains how the deposition of Susan Harris and Ronald Prior failed to elicit under oath
an indication as for whom either voted.
In paragraph 4, plaintiffs attorney identifies two persons whom he believes to be
ineligible voters in the city election whom he intended to depose, but did not. The
record at the time of summary judgment motion does not provide any admissible
evidence as to how either Nancy White or Dustin Ainsworth voted. By not deposing
either, plaintiff forfeited the opportunity to establish either a vote for Kennedy or that
such voter was not eligible.
The tape recordings as summarized on pages 3 to 5 are all inadmissible
hearsay to be stricken. So much for allegations that go nowhere.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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The amended complaint was filed December 10, 2010. As will be noted
hereinafter, attorney Kelso in an affidavit filed February 28, 2010 averred that affidavits
or depositions of all witnesses would be completed within two to three months.
On page 6 of the Motion to Refuse ten persons are named as "... identified as
probable material witnesses" probably to be called at trial. As to each, the pleading
only states that each may testify for whom he or she voted with no indication that any of
them was an ineligible voter.
This scant identification is made 249 days after the filing of the Amended
Complaint, 15 days before hearing on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
a month before trial.
In the last paragraph of the Motion to Refuse, plaintiff argues that summary
judgment is not allowable in an election contest. Idaho Code §34-2013, selectively
cited in plaintiffs motion, commences:

34-2013. Procedure in general. - The proceedings shall be held according
to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure so far as practicable...
Further reference to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is made in Idaho Code
34-2010, 34-2014, 34-2030 and 34-2033. The unchallenged Scheduling
Sections 34-2010,34-2014,34-2030
Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pre-Trial Order makes specific provision for
motions for summary judgment.
So much more time and space continues to be devoted to rebutting
unsupportable arguments by plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
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Plaintiff is not following proper procedure in Rule 56 (f) I,R.Civ.P.
I.R.Civ.P. Of even more
importance and further indication that this suit has been brought and pursued
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation is to be found in plaintiffs own
pleadings.
When the case was before Judge Simpson on a track on the city's motion to
nd

2"d,, counsel for plaintiff filed on Sunday (!) February
dismiss set for hearing on March 2
th
28
28th
his own affidavit captioned: "Affidavit in Support of Motion for Extended Time for

Trial."
Discovery and Depositions and To Vacate and Reschedule TriaL"
A duplicate of that affidavit is filed with this response. Under oath, counsel
represented as follows:
§7, 8 and 9: Subpoenas would be obtained through Canadian counsel to
depose Paquin, Farkes and Friend.
§10
§1 0 Three other non-residents who voted absentee would provide affidavits
establishing ineligibility and that they voted for Kennedy.
§12. Plaintiff is to take affidavits and depositions of those ineligible voters
within two or three months.

§18. Plaintiff would depose Deputy Secretary of State Tim Hurst, other out-ofstate voters and Mike Kennedy.
The affidavit concludes in paragraphs 19 and 20.

19. . . With the schedules of the attorneys for the parties hereto, and the
schedules of the witnesses, it is my opinion that this process will take two
or three months beyond the date of the scheduled trial in this matter.
20.
In my opinion, based upon my investigation so far, it is necessary
that this discovery be completed prior to the trial in this matter so that the
facts regarding the election can be properly presented by the Court for a
fair and complete evaluation.
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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Plaintiff has not deposed anybody. The only affidavit he has obtained and not
Proft, a soldier in the army in Iraq alleged by plaintiff to be
filed is of Gregory A. Profi,
ineligible who voted absentee for Brannon.
As with many other pleadings of plaintiff in this case, this motion and supporting
affidavit do not follow the proper procedure for invoking the rules, this time Rule 56 (f)
I.R.Civ.P. The proper Rule 56 (f) motion is to assert in a timely fashion discoverable
facts essential to the party's opposition and seek a continuance for depositions or other
discovery.
By agreement of all parties and at the express request of attorney Starr in court
th
was set overriding the request of
conference in June the trial date of September 13
13th

defendant Kennedy for a much earlier trial date.
Plaintiffs motion and affidavit do not assert any effort to obtain affidavits or
th

16th and trial. For good and sufficient reason, plaintiff dare
depositions between August 16
not seek a continuance.
Instead, plaintiff asserts that Monica Paquin, Denise Dobslaff, Alan Friend,
Tammy Currie Farkes and Kimberly Gagnon will appear at commencement of trial on
th
13th
September 13
and testify that each has an ineligible voter and that each voted for

Kennedy.
And how does plaintiff believe these five persons will be compelled to appear?
Not subpoena served in Idaho nor by subpoenas in Canada and California under the
Uniform Intestate Depositions and Discovery Act (Rule 45 (I),
(1), I.R.Civ.P.).

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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Counsel for plaintiff would have this Court believe that these five persons living in
three provinces in Canada and in Petaluma, California will appear after this Court
grants plaintiffs Motion to Compel Witness to attend trial with what plaintiff proposes as
the Court's order:

Compelling the following persons who cast ballots in the 2009 City of
Coeur d'Alene General Election to attend the trial in this matter and testify:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Monica Paquin - Boucherville, Quebec, Canada
Denise DobslaffDobslaff - Vernon, British Columbia, Canada
Tammy Farkes - Edmondton, Alberta, Canada
Alan Friend - Nelson, British Columbia, Canada
Kimberly Gagnon - Petaluma, California

Motion to Compel Witnesses to Attend Trial, p.. 1.
And what representations does plaintiff make that these five persons will, upon
th
13th
receipt by mail of the Court's order, voluntarily appear on September 13
in the

courthouse in Coeur d'Alene? Plaintiffs affidavit in support of his Motion to Compel
th
28th
affidavit total
Witnesses to Attend Trial represents just as did plaintiffs February 28

lack of interest and/or cooperation by any out-of-state potential witnesses.
Finally, plaintiff has not identified any witness nor set forth any law that is
contrary to this conclusion of Chief Deputy Secretary of State Timothy A. Hurst in his
letter to Dan English dated December 18, 2009 attested to in his affidavit of January 14,
2010 filed herein:

I am in receipt of your letter dated December 16,2009,
16, 2009, regarding the
eligibility of a certain overseas citizen and military personnel to vote in the
City of Coeur d'Alene election.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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It appears from the information that was entered into the statewide voter
registration system that Tammy Farkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory Proft and
Alan Friend registered to vote in accordance with state law.
More than likely the same ruling would also apply to Kimberly Gagnon whose
name did not appear in the Amended Complaint.
It is tempting to say three strikes and plaintiff is out but as a matter of law,
plaintiff did not come to bat as to the five witnesses as supporting his case.
While plaintiff has not made a proper pleading to invoke Rule 56 (f), the record
establishes abundance of reasons why any reliance upon any Rule 56 {f),
(f), motion must
nd

2 "Summary Judgment" the following
be rejected. In 73 American Jurisprudence 2"d
applicable comment is made.
For example, a party is entitled to a receive a continuance for additional
discovery if he or she makes the request before the court's ruling on the
summary judgment, places the court on notice that further discovery
pertaining to summary judgment motion is being sought, and
demonstrates to the court with reasonable specificity who the requested
discovery pertains to the pending motion. However, Rule 56 (f) cannot be
relied on if the result of the continuance to obtain further information
would be wholly speculative.
72 Am. Jur. 2d. 928, p. 673.
The result of continuance would be to let plaintiff unsuccessfully try to obtain
information that is wholly speculative.
Five and one half months (270 days) have passed since counsel for plaintiff
under oath stated that all discovery would be completed in two to three months. Lack
of diligence is the most frequent reason given by courts in denying a Rule 56 (f) motion.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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If a party opposing a motion for summary judgment has not been diligent to
obtain affidavits or take depositions or have discovery, and seeks more
time to obtain materials in opposition, or asserts or appeal that he or she
should have been granted more time to do so, his or her claim of
insufficient opportunity is not reason enough to require the application of
Rule 56 (f).
nd
2"d,
73 Am.Jur. 2
, §30, p. 673.

The few reported appellate cases in Idaho in which opinions cite Rule 56 (f) are
not relevant. The Federal Rule 56 f) is identical so the following opinions are
instructive.
th
(5th
Cir. 2001) was a
Beattie v. Madison County School District, 1254 F.3d 595 (5

suit brought by a school secretary alleging that her termination was a First Amendment
violation under 42 USC §1983.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a Rule 56 (f) motion
three days after the summary judgment motion was filed.
Beattie had only several months after she sued to depose board members, but
the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court ruling that she had not been diligent:

Rule 56 (f) motions are generally favored and should be liberally granted.
th
Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 535 (5
(5th
Cir. 1999).
Beattie "may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery
will produce· needed, but unspecified facts." Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442
(Internal Citations omitted.) She must show (1) why she needs additional
discovery and (2) how that discovery will create a genuine issue of material
fact. Stearns, 170 F.3d at 535 (citing Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442). If Beattie
has not diligently pursued discovery, however, she is not entitled to relief
under rule 56 (f). See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
th
(5th
& Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, 1397 (5
Cir. 1994). We need not
address whether Beattie has shown why she needs additional discovery to
create a genuine issue of material fact, because she was not diligent. Id.
/d. At
1397.
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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254 F .3d at 606.

Springs Window Fashions v. Novo Industries, L.P., 323 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. Ct.
Appeals, (2003) was a patent case.
Defendant had notice in September that Motion for Summary Judgment had to
st
st
1st
be pled by February 1
meaning its response must be filed by FebiUary 21st
21 even

th
15th.
though discovery was open until March 15
. Defendant scheduled the deposition of
st

1st and moved for a Rule 56 (f) delay which the District Court denied.
plaintiffs for March 1
The Federal Circuit Court affirmed:

Furthermore, "[a] party who has been dilatory in discovery may not use
Rule 56 (f) to gain a continuance where he has only made vague assertions
that further discovery would develop genuine issues of material fact."
United States v. Bob Stofer Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 766 F.2d 1147, 1153
th
th
(7th
(7th
(7
Cir. 1985). See also Farmer v. Brennan, 81 F.3d 1444, 1449 (7
Cir.
1996) ("this Court has noted that the party seeking further time to respond
to a summary judgment motion must give an adequate explanation to the
court of the reasons why the extension is necessary.")
323 F.3d at 998.

SUMMARY
For each and all of the above reasons, plaintiffs Motion to Refuse the
Application of Defendant Kennedy for Summary Judgment pursuant to IRCP Rule 56

(f) must be denied.
rd
23rd
day of
Respectfully submitted, this 23
August, 2010.

Scott W. Reed, One of the
Attorneys for Mike Kennedy
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by first class mail,
postage prepaid, this 23rd day of August, 2010 to:
STARR KELSO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P. O.
0. BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816
FAJ<(208)664-6261
FAJ«208)
664-6261
MICHAEL L. HAMAN
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
0. BOX 2155
P. O.
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816
FAX (208) 675-1683
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
408 E. SHE-RMAN AVENUE
AVENUE- SUITE 215
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814
FAX (208) 664-9933
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
LlP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E

Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328

Phone (208) 664·8115
664-8115
FAX (208)
(208} 664·6338
664-6338
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
IS8#818

Attorney at Law

P. 0.
O. BoxA
Box A
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83816
664-2161
Phone (208) 664·2161

FAX (208) 765·5117
765-5117
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL,
JUDICIAL. DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-09·10010
CV-09-10010

JIM BRANNON,
)

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
Vs.
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
Incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)

DEFENDANT
KENNEDY'S
PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF

)
)
)
)
)

J..AW
tAW

Pursuant to this Court's Pre-trial Order dated June 15, 2010, defendant Mike
Kennedy proposes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

co.uncil of the City of Coeur d'Alene approved
On August 18, 2009 the city co,uncil
an agreement with Kootenai County through the District County Clerk, ex

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1
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officer auditor and rescinder whereby Kootenai County would conduct the
3, 2009.
city election to be held November 3,2009.

Said Kootenai County/City of Coeur d'Alene Agreement provides in part

2.

as follows:

4.

The parties agree that the County is the independent contractor of
the City and in no wayan
way an agent of the City, and that no joint venture
shall be created by virtue of this Agreement. The City shall have no
control over the performance of this Agreement by the Court or Its
employees, except to specify the time and place of performance, and
the results to be achieved. The City shall have no responsibility for
security or protection of the County's supplies or equipment. for
security or protection of the County's supplies or equipment

3.

The City of Coeur d'Alene has for regular elections in past years entered
into similar agreements with Kootenai County to conduct its elections.

4.

in. Idaho have similarly agreed to have their
Many other larger cities in'ldaho

respective counties conduct regular city elections.

5.

The Idaho Secretary of State has approved of the actions of cities to have
their respective regular elections conducted by counties.

6.

The city election held on November 3, 2009 was for the mayor and for city
council seats Nos. 2, 4 and 6.

7.

On ~ovember 3, 2009 there was also a separate ballot for a vote ''yes''
''yes" or
IIno"
uno" countywide upon a county bond election for the expansion of the jail
and related county facilities.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2
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The Kootenai County Elections Report to the city council signed by

8.

Deedie Beard on November 9, included the following information:
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE
ELECTION
NOVEMBER 3, 2009

Total number of registered voters
Number of absentee ballots
Total number of ballots cast

21,480

2,051

6,370

Votes Received
(*Denotes Winner)
CITY COUNCIL
Seat#2
Seat
#2

Jim Brannon
Btannon

3,160

Mike Kennedy

3,165*

9.

The number of absentee ballots reported by Kootenai County to the city
council was accurate.

10.

Plaintiff Brannon did not name in his Amended Complaint Kootenai County
nor the county election officials who conducted the election.

11.

Neither defendant City of Coeur d'Alene nor defendant Mike Kennedy
participated in any manner in the conduct of the city election on November

3, 2009 nor in the counting of ballots nor any subsequent process related to
3,2009
the election.

12.

It is not possible to determine how anyone voted absentee in the November
3,2009
3, 2009 city election except by te:stimony of such voter in open court.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF ~W
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13.

There was no factual error of the city board of canvassers in counting the
vote or in declaring the result of the election for Council Position NO.2.
No. 2.

14.

There was not any evidence coming before the Court in the trial that illegal
votes had been received or legal votes rejected at the polls sufficient to
change the result of the election for Council Position No.2,
No.2.

15.

There is no evidence that any person acting
aeting on behalf of defendant Kennedy
interfered in any manner with regard to any witness or potential witness for
plaintiff.

16.

Attorney Starr Kelso, by affidavits filed with this Court on February 28,2010
28, 2010
made extensive commitments to depose witnesses in this state and in
Canada. There is no evidence that any depositions of anyone were ever
taken on behalf of plaintiff after February 28,2010.
28, 2010.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Neither of the defendants named in the Amended Complaint,
Complaint. City of
Coeur d'Alene and Mike.
Mike_ Kennedy, committed any error or took any action
or1 November 3.
3, 2009 in violation of Title
with regard to the city election orl
56, Chapter 4 or Title 34, Idaho Code.

2.

The Amended Complaint did not state any cause of action on behalf of
plaintiff Jim Brannon.

3.

The Amended Complaint did not name Kootenai County which conducted
the election on November 3,2009.
3, 2009.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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4.

The agreement made between the City of Coeur d'Alene and Kootenai
County on August 18, 2009 for c(lnduct
cc1nduct of the city election on November
3, 2009 was lawful and allowed under all applicable provisions of the

Idaho Code.
5.

Defendant Mike Kennedy was lawfully elected to City Council Position No.
2 on November 3, 2009.

6.

There was in the conduct of the election and at all times thereafter no
violation of any of the provisions of Idaho Code §34-2101.
§34-21 01.

7.

The Amended Complaint filed December 20,2009
20, 2009 and the actions taken
on behalf of plaintiff Jim Brannon from that date forward were brought and
pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.

Dated this 2nd day of September, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.,.,. ,.

.,

f" ,..,
served by fil'l*
fil'lt 118.1
aleee 188il
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was selVed
!&ail
postage prepaid, .this
,this 2nd day of September, 2010 to:

Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P. 0.
O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 664-6261
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Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office
P. 0.
O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 676-1683

Art Macomber
Attorney at Law
408 E. Sherman Avenue
- Suite 216
AvenueCoeur d'A
83814

FAX

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

6
SC 38417-2011
L

'd

0999 'ON

Page 2016 of 2676

..JUN-a·ZOJO .02:59PM
-_.
JUN-l~-Z010

FRO!HIST CRT ""'4.1 SERV
FROIHIST

+1-209~44G-1193
+1-209~446-1193

T·T24
T-T24

P.007/00T
P.OOT/OOT

F-133

LIST OF EXHIBITS

a....c.LERf<
A....c.LERf< GiSTRICT COURT
JO
SiPTEMBiB
SEPTEMBiB 2,20
2,2010

CV - 09 - 10010
CASE No
NO • Cv

TrTLEOFCASE
TrrLEOFCASE

BRT<NNON
BR1<NNON

D~
_VS.
_vs.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS (LIST NUMERICALL
YI
NUMERICALLY)

i)eFENDANi¥~~aiTS (i..ls-r
DEFENDANi¥~~aiTS
(Lis·r ALPHABETICALLy)
ALPHABETICALLY)

xx
XX

U
u

CIT~~·!Itl!_NE
CIT~~'!lt!NE ,~
-~

It)
ftJ

THIRD PARTY EXHIBITS STATE PARTY_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Dcstrlpdon
DCStrlpdon

No,

Admit
hStip.
8YStip.

Offered

Admlttod

Refu.smt

Rnci'Ve
Rncl'V'

Rt.,liIIg
Rt.elillg

AFFIDAVIT OF GREGORY A PROF'!
PROFT

A

i.
i·

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL serrtNG
SCHEOULING
sen-ING
AND INITIAL PRt:TRIAL ORD~R: e

SC 38417-2011
~

'd

9999

'ON

Page 2017 of 2676

Sep. 3. 2010 5:09PM

No.0343
No. 0343

Mar"mber Law PLLC
Mar"tIlber

P. 2/9

STATe O~
o~ IDAr~O
IDAr~o
·. ,\
fOUNTY OF KOOTENAJ } SS
riLED:
L\ l\ ~

zoro SEP -7 AM
08
2010
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Arthur B. Macomber, State Bar No. 7370
Jonathan A. Burky, State Bar No. 8043
Macomber Law, PLLC
408 E. Shennan Avenue, Suite 215
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: 208·664-4700
Facsimile: 208-664-9933
Attorneylor
for William L. McCrory
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
llMBRANNON;
nMBRANNON;

) Case No: CV-09-10010
)

Plaintiff, ) REPLY TO DEFENDANT
) KENNEDY'S OPPOSITION TO
) MCCRORY'S MOTION TO DISMISS
vs.
) CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity )
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) DATE:
September 7, 2010
KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) TIME:
MIKE KENNEDY.
1:30 p.m.
incumbent candidate for the City of
) JUDGE:
Charles W. Hosack
)
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
)

Defendants. )
)

COMES NOW WILLIAM L. MCCRORY, a non-party in this action, by and
through his undersigned attorney, and hereby replies to Defendant Kennedy's Opposition
to McCrory's Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings. Trial in this action is scheduled
for the time and location stated above.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Kennedy's Hazel Complaint does not meet I.R.C.P. 'Sic)e3)
7S(c)(3) requirements.
In this contempt proceeding, the affidavit of Crystal Hazel "constitutes [defendant

Kennedy's] complaint," and must "apprise
''apprise (McCrory,] the alleged condemnor [,] of the
particular facts of which he is accused, so that he may need such accusations at the
hearing." Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240,244,159
240, 244, 159 P.3d 877,881
877, 881 (2007).
(l.R.C.P.) 75(c)(3)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.)
7S(c)(3) states:
The written charge of contempt or affidavit must allege the specific
facts constituting the alleged contempt. Each instance of alleged
contempt, ifthere is more than one, must be set forth separately. Ifthe
If the
alleged contempt is the violation of a court order, the written charge or
affidavit must allege that either the respondent or the respondent's
attorney was served with a copy of the order or had actual knowledge
of it. The written charge or affidavit need not allege facts showing that
the respondent's failure to comply with the court order was willful.
Crystal Hazel's affidavit fails that standard, because it does not allege specific
facts constituting the alleged contempt. Ms. Hazel does not cite any order of the court
that McCrory violated. Ms. Hazel does not cite the existence of or what constitutes any
specific breach of the purported Confidentiality Agreement contract which Kennedy's
motion alleges McCrory violated. Ms. Ha2el does not make a statement related to why
any fact she cites would put McCrory in contempt oftrus
of this court. She does not set forth
each count of contempt separately. The alleged contempt is not in violation of a court
order, but is aUeged
aJleged outside the affidavit to be a breach of a contract between non-party
McCrory and Kootenai County, neither order nor contract being cited in Ms. Hazel's
affidavit. Further, Ms. Hazel is not a party to this case, and her affidavit cites no damages
accruing to her for which she should be afforded relief. (I.R.C.P.
(LR.C.P. Rule S(a)(l).
8(a)(1).
Since Claimant Ha2el cannot and did not state she has suffered any damages, and
''does not have jurisdiction to
the affidavit is in almost every way insufficient, this Court "does
proceed," and the contempt charges must be dismissed. Steiner, 144 Idaho at 244.
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Alternatively, since Kennedy brought the motion in re: contempt, where is his
affidavit of complaint? There is nothing in Kennedy's motion nor has an affidavit been
filed with this Court alleging Kennedy has suffered damages due to McCrory's postings
on www.opencda.com. Further, there is no affidavit from Kootenai County, the
purported opposing party in the vague contract, stating that it has suffered damages based
on any act of McCrory. Finally, no affidavit exists that this court ordered McCrory to
refrain from any act at any time. Notably, the Hazel affidavit does not allege any damage
to this Court's orders, process, reputation, public judgments, or any other attribute of
either Judge Hosack individually or this Court harmed by any act of McCrory at any
time.
II.

Kennedy's Hazel Complaint has not met the new U.S. Supreme Court's
standard for pleadings, because his allegations are conclusory, and his pled
"factua)
"factual allegations (do not) plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."

While the complaint fails I.R.C,P.
I.R.C.P. 75(c)(3), it also fails the pleading standards
recently set by the United States Supreme Court related to motions to dismiss.
The Idaho State Supreme Court has "expressed (its] preference for inteIpreting
inte1preting
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in confonnance with the interpretation placed upon
the same language in the federal rules. That preference is obviously limited to situations
in which our rules and the federal rules contain identical language." Obendorfv. Terra

Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 891188
897188 P.3d 834,839
834, 839 (2008); citing Wail v. Leavell
Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 796, 41 PJd
P.3d 220,224 {2001).
(2001).
I.R.C.P. Rule 8(a)(2) and (3) state:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original

claim, counterclaim, cross·
cross·claim,
claim, or third-party claim, shall
contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.
F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2)
8(8)(2) and (3) state:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ... (2) a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
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entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may
include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
The two rules at (2) are identical, and almost identical at (3). Thus, as to (2),
Idaho will follow interpretation according to the federal rule. As to (3) they differ, but to

McCrory'ss g~in.
McCrory'
"To survive the motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."'
face. III Ashcroft

v. Iqbal,

07~1015

at 14 (556 U.S.__);
U.S. --.J; citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). "Where the well-pleaded facts do not pennit the court to infer more than the

alleged··
'show(n]-- 'that
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
-- but it has not 'show(n]
relief.'"
F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2).
the pleader is entitled to relief.
'" ld
Jd at 15; citing F.R.C,P,
In this case, the Hazel affidavit does not even infer "the mere possibility of

misconduct,''
misconduct," unless she alleges McCrory lacks First Amendment rights.Id.
rights./d. Certainly
there is not even a mere possibiJity of misconduct, because Hazel does not even say
McCrory did anything wrong, much less cite damages :from any wrongdoing, or any
breach that might indicate wrongdoing ever happened.
A court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by [l]
A
[1]
identifying pleadings that, because they are n~ more than
conclusions are not entitled to the presumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then [2] determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added.) Even if every fact cited in Ms. Hazel's
truth, her affidavit cites nothing that would
affidavit is entitled to a presumption of
oftruthJ
indicate
jndicate she is plausibly entitled to any relief based on the facts she cites. Certainly, if
Ms. Hazel, the complainant here, cannot make a statement as to why she has been
damaged and has a right to relief satisfied by findjng McCrory in contempt, Kennedy, a
defendant who did not even bring an affidavit or complaint should not be entitled to
proceed against McCrory, because he did not believe there were even grounds
groundS to bring a
SC 38417-2011
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contempt complaint through proper affidavit either under Idaho Civil Rule 8 or Idaho
Civil Rule 75.
Therefore, under the new Supreme Cowt's Iq~al standard, there is no plausible
compiaint on fiie
me with this Court that can give rise to an entitiement to relief to defendant
Kennedy or Ms. Hazel. Whether one follows I.R.C.P. Rule 8(a)(2) under the old standard,
or under F.R.C.P. Rule 8(a)(2) using the new Iqbal standard, Ms. Hazel's
complaint/affidavit is insufficient, she fails to state a claim, and this Court should dismiss
both contempt charges.

III.

Kennedy's citation of the County's motion for protective order is irrelevant,

because that protective order did not result in judicial order restraining McCrory.

Accompanying Kennedy's Counsel's letter to this Court dated August 30
was Kootenai County's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Protective
Order filed in this Court, February 19,2010. Enclosed with that letter was also a
transcript of this Court's March 2,2010
2, 2010 hearing on that motion for protective
order. Neither is of assistance to defendant Kennedy's frivolous action here.
Kootenai County's Memorandum in Support of a Motion for Protective
Order most explicitly waxes eloquent regarding the secrecy of ballots, and states
of McCrory's
nothlng about absentee ballot envelopes, which is the subject ofMcCrory's
affidavit and, presumably, the gravamen ofthese
of these contempt complaint charges.
On March 2,2010,
2, 2010, the honorable judge Simpson found an "insufficient
showing [of facts justifying plaintiff] to reach the [regularly cast] ballots." Tr. p.
7,1.15.1
As to absentee ballot envelopes, the court granted plaintiffs motion to you
''the return [absentee ballot] envelopes, copies will be provided under affidavit
"the
and oath, under 50-446 .... " Tr. p. 10,
10,11.
11. 16·17.
16-17. There was no explanation ofthis
of this
at the hearing. Idaho Code section 50-446 states, "the elector shall then execute an
affidavit on the back of the return envelope in the fonn prescribed, provided
SC 38417-2011
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however, that such affidavit need not be notarized." Perhaps this is the affidavit
and oath that the Court was referring to on line 17 of page 1100 of the transcript.
However, the Court's Order, filed on March 8, 2010, ordered Kooten.ai
County to provide to pJaintiff"(l)
plaintiff''(!) return envelopes for the absentee ballots; (2)
return envelope date stamps; (three) a Jist of absentee ballots received in cases
where the clerk keeps ballots in a central location until tabulations; and, (four) the
records of appJications for absentee ballots." Ord. ~ 4. At no location in that Order
does the Court require any sort of contract, confidentiality agreement, or other
order or mandate that can now be held against McCrory.

IV.

County's Certification regarding
Kennedy's pleading and Kootenai Countv's

the purported Confidentiality Agreements show they are contracts.

Defendant Kennedy admits the purported Confidentiality Agreements are
contracts, because his pleading avers, and such is supported by the County's
Certification, that negotiations took place between Kootenai County and
plaintiffs counsel - and not McCrory - to create those purported agreements.
KelUledy Br. pp. 5·6
5-6 (8/3111
(8/31/1 0); see McHugh Certification Upon Confidentiality
Agreements dated 8/30/10.
As cited in McCrory's earlier responses, contempt of court cannot be a
remedy for breach of contract. Kennedy merely asserts these purported
Confidentiality Agreements were not contracts, but facts before the court belie
that assertion. Both contempt complaints should be dismissed.

V.

Kennedy makes no showing that this Court's process or reputation

has been damaged by McCroty.
McCrOlI.
The header stands on its own. There is no fact alleged that McCrory has
held this Court in contempt by any of McCrory's acts. There is no showing that
this Court's process for this election's case has been damaged or delayed in any
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damaged. this Court's reputation in
way. There is no showing that McCrory has damaged'this

any forum. Kennedy's motion is frivolous and should be dismissed, with
attorney's fees and costs to McCrory.
CONCLUSION
Neither Defendant Kennedy not his proxy Hazel present an affidavit sufficient to
jurisdiction to hear the
initiate contempt proceedings. The court has, therefore, no jUrisdiction

contempt proceedings. Dismissal of the contempt proceedings is appropriate and justice
demands that the contempt proceedings against McCrory be dismissed. Further,
Kennedy's pleadings and affidavits in support of these contempt proceedings are
frivolous, because adequate research would have shown both procedural and substantive
deficiencies in the pleadings prior to their filing with this Court.
McCrory respectfully requests the court grant his motion. Oral argument is
~

requested.
Dated this

.--")
·""? f1"~

day o~~st 2010.

~1~+.~i~+"

MACOMBER LAW, PLLC

Cf;t'~/

Arthur B. Macomber
Attorney for William L. McCrory
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'?v--.t

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the;:::'
the ;:::,
day of September 2010, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing:

REPLY TO DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S OPPOSITION TO MCCRORY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
Peter Erbland
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin,
CoffIn, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101
P,O, BoxE
P.O.BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816·0328
83 816-0328
664-8115
664·8115
Main Phone:
664-6338
FAX:
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy
Michael Haman
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
676-1683
FAX:

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
[ ]
[XX] Facsimile: 664-6338

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ovemlght Mail
Overnight
(XX] Facsimile: 676·1683
676-1683

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
(XX] Facsimile: 765·5117
765-5117
[ ]

Scott Reed
P.O. BoxA
Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
664~2161
Main Phone:
FAX:

( ]
[ ]

[ ]
( ]

765~5117

Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy
Starr Kelso
P.O. Box 1312
ID 83816
83 816
Coeur d'Alene, ill
664-6261
FAX:
664·6261
ATtorney for PlaintiffJim Brannon

( ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ J Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
( ]
[XX] Facsimile: 664-6261
664·6261
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK090710P
Session Date: 09/07/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Veare,
V eare, Keri

Division: MAG
Session Time: 13:22
13 :22

Courtroom: Courtroom!
Courtroom 1

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0001
0010
Case number: CV2009-1 00
10
Plaintiff:
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: Of, City
Pers. Attorney:
Co-Defendant(s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
09/07/2010

13:31:46
13:31
:46
Recording Started:
13:31:46
Case called
13:34:16

Stop recording

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK090710P
Session Date: 09/0712010
09/07/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Veare,
Veare, Keri

Division: MAG
13 :22
Session Time: 13:22

Courtroom: Courtroom!
Courtroom 1

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

ID: 0002
Case 10:
Case number: CV2009-1 001
00 10
Plaintiff:
Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott
Defendant: Of, City
Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur
Co-Defendant(s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
09/07/2010
13:34:19

Recording Started:
13:34:19
Case called
13:34:59

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Calls, Hearing on Contempt. Did counsel receive
Trial?
Notice of
ofTrial?

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P
HOSACK09071 OP

SC 38417-2011
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13:35:34

Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur
I received a Notice.

13:36:19

Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott
There's been a blizzard of paperwork.

13:37:07

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Court hearing on Motion to Dismiss, remains set
for trial on Sept.
I have Mr Reed's Order from the prior hearing,
although other counsel. is not
here, there being no objection the Court will
enter the Orders.

13:37:50
13:38:12

13:38:48

Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott
I've submitted another Order - explains.

13:40:35

13:41:12

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'll enter the Order, substance is the same.
Moving to what we're here on,
Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings. I have
the Briefs and have reviewed
them. Is is Mr McCrory Motion.

13:41
13 :41 :28

Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott

13:41:32

Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur
Most of our pleadings are on the Affd, and
12(b)6, and lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter and
of the person. Under 7-603,
the Affd constitutes the Complaint. Stiner case.
Rule 75(c)2, talks about
contempt not initiated by ajudge.
a judge. Counsel Reed
on behalf of Kennedy filed
the Affd. Charge must allege specific facts,
that was not done. I am not
aware of any order issued by the court re:
McCrory's behavior. Hazel Affd
filed Aug 5, says she has looked at various
websites. She doesn't allege that
Mr McCrory is subject to any court order. It
doesn't show any damages to
anyone. Under the Stiner case, quoting a Jones
case. Attorney Kelso did not

13:40:53

13:41:55
13 :41 :55
13:42:52
13:44:07
13 :44:20
13:44:20
13:44:53
13:45:13
13:45:43
13:46:31
13 :46:31

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09071
HOSACK090710P
OP
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13:48:07
13:48:34
13 :49:33
13:49:33
13:50:40
13:51:44
13 :51 :44
13:52:19
13 :52: 19
13:52:56
13:53:47
13:54:55
13:56:06
13:56:29
13:57:34
13:57:54
13:58:34
13:59:21
13:59:44
13:59:58
14:00:38
14:01:14
14:02:08
14:03:07
14:03:50
14:04:07

suffer a contempt charge for filing McCrory
affd. My client did not file, or
cause the Affd to be filed. Capturing
information in the Affd is not outside
the boundary of anything. Next issue is
insufficieny of service of process.
Rule 75d2 and Rule 4d2 service upon individuals.
The actual Motion filed with
the Court, the Notice to McCroyr to Appear, says
my client was served at his
house. I should withdraw this portion, it
appears he was personally served.
But he would have no idea of the Hazel Affd. or
what it meant. He had no
knowledge that this contempt proceeding would
pursue. The affd provided is
completly insufficient. Request the Motion be
dismissed and renew request for
atty fees.
Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott
The new charge made by Mr Macomber starts will
Rule 75c2 says a contemp must
be initiated with a Motion. We followed the
rules and filed a Motion and
Affd. The order was from Judge Simpson. A subp
was issued, Kootenai opposed
that. Ballots are confidential under Idaho
constitution, and Judge Simpson
quashed the supb. He appointed Judge Marano to
look over the ballots. An
agreement was reached on how this would be done,
they approved the form of
the confidential agreement. There was an order,
you don't need another order.
Kennedy was injured by the publication of
information. Stevens v Gilbert case
says you're not confined to Rule 7. Courts have
powers to enforce their
orders and that's what we're seeking. We think
Motion to Dismiss should be
denied. 137 Idaho, goes into great detail on
what contempt is. We brought
this as a civil contempt, subject to a fine or
reprimand, not seeking a
criminal contempt. I do not believe this should

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P
HOSACK09071 OP
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14:05:07
14:05:42
14:06:23
14:06:34

14:06:59
14:07:50
14:08:45
14:09:22
14:10:19
14:10:54
14:11:53
14:12:13
14:13:32
14:14:57
14:15:33
14:16:45
14:17:09

be a case in which Mr McCrory
should be subject to a criminal contempt. We had
reasonable cause for
believing the same. There is no way Mr McCroy
can undo what has been done.
The lesser punishment is not available.
Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur
Kennedy provides no legal support that the Affd
and Motion need to be
considered together. The only Order I'm aware of
is from March 8. Nothing in
the order indicates Judge Simpson required a
confidentiality agreement.
The method of inspection was at the election
office. Judge Marano was to view
the ballots, Mr McCrory observed Judge Marano
counting ballots. In McCrory
Affd there is no mention of Kennedy. When the
ballot is removed from the
envelope it's mixed with other ballots. There is
no information presented how
Kennedy was injured. My client did not inspect
the ballots, we're not seeing
any injury. There have been no pleading from
Kootenai County.
McCrory did not view ballots, he viewed
envelopes. Envelopes have no
informatin related to this case. I'm surprised
at Kootenai and counsel for PL
and DF trying to hijack this court's remedies.
My understanding is that the stip dismissal is
that each counsel cover
fees/costs.

14:17:17

Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott
Correct.

14:17:24

Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur
I need a moment to talk to my client.
My client has decided to reject the offered
stipulation.

14:18:19

14:18:36

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Question to counsel re: discovery of
confidential information, would the

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P
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14:19:38

court have the power to step in ifthat was
published on the internet?

14:20:15

Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur
I think the court can act sua sponte.
Comments, it turns into a criminal contempt.

14:22:17
14:22: 17
14:22:40
14:23:00
14:23:41
14:24:07
14:24:29
14:25:
14 :25: 15
14:26:12

14:26:40
14:27:17
14:27:48
14:28:04
14:29:10
14:29:34
14:30:56
14:31
14: 31 :14

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We don't have a stip agreement to dismiss the
contempt proceedings. Atty fees
are a decision by the Court. There are some
meritorious arguments raised on
this contempt proceedings. The Court has a
concern in this litigation about
the rights ofthe citizen voters. This type of
litigation has a ramification
of
the average voter. Comments have been made
ofthe
about hauling citizens back
into court for trial because they voted. That is
disturbing to the Court. To
publish names, contact them about votes, so the
privacy of the voter is
of
paramont concern to the Court. Judge
ofparamont
Simpson's order was clear. To assure
be free from interference or
the voter to be"
litigation. The Court is not going
to pursue a criminal proceedings. The only thing
left is criminal
proceedings. The concern here is, we have a
spirit of confidentiality, that
as far as this court can see, was utterly,
blantely violated. The Court needs
to consider this. It remains set for trial. The
Court may decide to dismiss
the contempt on its own motion, at his point
we'll take the matter under
advisement.

14:31:57

Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott
Just to make it formal of record, for the reason
I've stated, I'd move to
dismss the proceeding with the understanding
costs/fees would not be
involved.

14:32:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles

14:31:26
14:31 :26
14:31 :40
14:31:40

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P
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You agreed with Mr Reed's position, correct?
14:32:32

14:33:01
14:33:16

Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur
I agree on that point. I need to notify the
court that I have no idea about
crminallaw, if the Court sees fit to not
dismiss, then I need to notify the
court I have no idea about Idaho criminal
defense.

14:33:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'll take it under advisement. The Court would
advise you, if needed.

14:35:04

Stop recording

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IIi rf AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTK l
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000
FILED 91712010
917/2010 AT 03:20
03:20PM
PM
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CLERK OF THE DISTRI~T K_URT
CLERK.
p"URT

~@.A.A.
@.A.A,
,~

BY

SS

=:::::::::: DEPUTY

.-1
.A

)
) Case No: CV-2009-0010010
)
)
)
) NOTICE OF TRIAL
)
)

JIM BRANNON
VS.
vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, ETAL.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for:

09:00AM
Court Trial Scheduled Friday, September 17,2010 at 09:00
AM
contempt
Judge:
Charles W. Hosack
Additional Presiding Judges: Charles W. Hosack; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Lansing L. Haynes; Fred
M. Gibler; Steven Verby;
Yerby; George Reinhardt, III; George D. Carey.
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Tuesday, September 07,2010.
07, 2010.
MACOMBER'-.)~
ARTHUR B MACOMBER~~
FAX: (208) 664-9933
/

[ ] Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

[X] Faxed

SCOTT W. REED .Y~
3>~
FAX: (208) 765-5117 <Y
<¥

[ ] Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

1)<]
I)<] Faxed

PETER C. ERBLAND ~
FAX: (208) 664-6338 db

[ ] Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

[f,J Faxed
["J

MICHAEL L. HAMAN
FAX: (208) 676-1683 ,yO)
-YO)

[ ] Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

[jJ
[X] Faxed

STARR KELSO
FAX: (208) 664-6261 ~7

[ ] Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

[[)(.i
)(.i Faxed

Dated: Tuesday, September 07,
2010
07,2010
Daniel J. English
Clerk Of The District Court
By:

ofTrial
Notice of
Trial
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin. Brooke & Miller, LLP
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I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

II

Case No. CV.Q9·10010
CV..09-10010

JIM BRANNON,
)

Plaintiff,

Vs.

)

)

SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, In his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION IN LIMINE

)
)
)
)

On March 22, 2010 defendant Kennedy filed a Motion in Limine with supporting brief
to exclude all evidence related to Tammy Farkes, Monica Paquin and Alan Friend all of
whom cast votes from Canada and all of whom were named in the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff has since added to the list of challenged absentee voters Kimberly Gagnon
and Denise Dobslaff who voted absentee from Califomia.
California. Each of the five is a registered
voter within the City of Coeur d'Alene.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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The plaintiffs Preliminary Witness list identifies the five as witnesses but none will
appear. (Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Plaintiff's Preliminary Witness List Names other
17 •. 18, 24, 25, 26 ,27, 28, 49 and 50) to testify as to residence andlor
and/or
witnesses (Nos. 17,,18,24,25,26

conversations with one or more of these five voters.
As set forth in the initial brief in support, each of these persons mailed an absentee
ballot which was received, properly checked against registration and counted along with
a"
all other absentee ballots.
ballots ..' Idaho Code Section 34-107 (3) allows for absentee votes from
qualified electors. The Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, cited and
attached to the opening brief, allows out of state and out of country absentee voting.
None of these five persons reside in Coeur d'Alene. All of the five had the right
under federal and state laws to vote in the Coeur d'Alene City Election on November 3,
2009.
The actions of the county eledion
election officials was purely ministerial. Deedie Beard as
the Election Manager and her staff had a "clear legal duty" to accept the absentee ballots
as received without any discretion to investigate or to reject the same. Utah Power & Light
Companyv. Campbell, 108
Idaho 950,953,703
714.
1081daho
950, 953, 703 P.2d 714,
Dairy Products, 107 Idaho 6,9,684
6, 9, 684 P.2d 983,

(1985), Dalton v.ldaho
v./daho

(1984).

The federal and state law is clear and explicit. Plaintiff in the five months since this
motion in limine was filed has presented no contrary legal authority and for good and
sufficient reason. There is none.
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The proposed testimony of witnesses Nos. 17.
17, 18,24,25,26,27,28,49
18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,49 and 50 is
irrelevant and should be excluded along with any and all testimony or evidence offered
relating to any of these five voters.
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withllul I;ot!rcion,
~.:ocrcion, based upon my personlll K110wledgc,
<.u1d i wl)uld
wQuld ::;0
::;o l~~li1y
L~~tily if
llwn
k11owledgc, <.uld

0.

prcs~nt

in

t:ou1'T.~
t:OUl'l.~

:2.
2, Thall
That.! voted in the 2009 Cit:·
Cit:, of Coeur d'A lcnc
ICIlG G~nt!raJ
G~nt:ral EI~ction
El~ction hy ~Ibsc:ntee
~•bsc:ntee ballot;
3. T))IJ.I.
3,
TJ)IJ.I. I v(Jted
voted in the
t.he :mid dection
dcction Llnd~r
und~r a mi::;taken undcrs~ding and gMd tbith belief
that the locmioJl of my residence met thelcgnl
rOT hcing :1 City of C()tHlf
A)cn~
the lcgnl requirement);
requirements f'or
c()tHir d'
d 'A
len~
hb.h.:' Staw
St:JW L.aw,
Law, lO
to penn.il
pc.rrn.il mt;;
m~:; to vott: in the 1009
:!009 City nf C:ncur
c:neur d' /\len('
Ckncrul
resident. under hbh':l
AJcl'I(' CkrlCrul
Election;
4. Th:JL roy rcsicJtmce, as uc:Unl:u
dc:fin~:d in Idaho C()d~
Cnd~ ~ecTi(ln
~ecrion 50-402, (8t~~~ iofurmatiun
4,
iofl.lrmatilln .'l.-t
." .. t
l"urth io I tiuht)
tiuhl) Cmle s~ctifln
s~ctinn 50.402)
50·402) unhc: t:im~: I sig1'\cd
sigr\cd and l'c·turncd
rc.turncd my <ib:5c:nlc(!
<ib:>c:nlc!! "'allol,
nalloL, wa.o.;
\.\';)."
located at:

~.P.t~Ct. (J/e.~l"...
e. ~l-:.. ,~~:t../&,1l:!lt./~"
·~~:LI&-1L:!It./~-. .. .". . ..,. ""'.,_
.. .. ~.p.i,~(t.
,,"'. ,. ',_.'_'__
_ Jlr.;J~/J..!!!::r1."I_/33-,·
,:::::10" .
..
III 8· -:1j"i1j..?.~,
.J.lr.;..~.~/J.!!!::r1 . 1.../33.-· C.:::::J.-·
...
..?.. ~· . ....

PI

c

(:>ll'I.~~;:
::II.hJrd:':l of rl.::::>icJcnc\,;)
(:>ll'l..~~;: ::u.hJrd£
rt:::>icJcnc~;)
5.
5, 'l'h;;Lt
'l'h;;Ll Il~.:a:H
I.:a!H mv ..,'ole
-..·ole in 111t~
rlu~ 2001)

u, e.

Citv ofCucur
City
ofCl.)clIr d'Alene: Gcn(~l.'aJ
Gcn(~ral l~k~tiou
I~k~ti(lll ft..ll'
r",11'
:f.'h,.l.1.k
:I'.0.1.1.1.k. . . . .lY!..dl
./.~Ldl.~,~,.. gj,.1.!le.j.:f.J?tiJ:...~.~j:
gj_d.tle.)...:;....l?.tiJ:..~.~j:. .~.~Lrf(inscrl
~.~LJ'f( i fI sc rl ciU1er
c i U) tl r Mike K
f<,·:rlncdy
\': filled y 0
01~I~ .Jin1
.J j f! I
'Rrnnnon
C(ll.I.ncil.l::k"'li...,J'I fill' S·.:~H
S'.:~H 2.
Rrnnnon here) in the City 1)f"(\IC:II~
~,~1"(\JC:II.f' d'A.kn~: City C(tl.l.ncil.l::k'-'lktn
DATED rh.is
t· doy of ~f...(L-.1!:-;?:¢'f'r.·'
.. ::w
::W 1
l u.
th.is . .t'
~f...(L-.1.!:1?i'f'r." .'
u.
.
.....
/);
......
/}/
__t)<~f.~Lt.·_-;;_c.
k~')"",;'Cf.~LI.·,,:l.C.,.....
....L:.......[;.;:1.,_,,..,_/,'"""'.:mr~-'-L'i,,-I=~:d!/:~,
__L_
__
__
__
__
__
(print )'1)lU.'
Y'.lllt' mun.;;
munt: here)

.:£. .

·--

t.:.......W,,-,

'.~~~--,,,- . -~-,

Phyllis I. Simon

YOO I.\RF.
t.\RF. NOTfFIEU
NOTTFIEU TRAT
TR.AT YOUR J\PPEAR.'\NCf~
APPEAR.'\NCf~ AT TRJAL DOI~S N(>J~..J~~~)Vli:
.J~~~>VI.i:
THAT Y(),U
LENTo:, fOAHO
rOAHO
Y<)'U WERE A ·Rt~Sll).":l'IT'
•Rt~Slo.fi:NT' OF THE CITY 0','
01,. COEUn 'A
'ALENTo:,
ENTITLED TO VOTE lN
iN '[HIt
TH.lt NOV'li:MlJl~R J, ~.90~J2!,~,~fI.~.~.!N.~
~J}O~J2!,~.~fJ.~.~.!N.~
RF.TURN ALL 4 Pi\f:f::S
PAf:f::s ANn
ANU AFFIl)AVIT
AFFJl)AVIT TO:
K~~bu,_Artorru:rv at' Law
Stan K~~b",=Aftorn")"
P.O. 6ox
131.2
60x 1312

or

4 NOTICE OF TESTiMONY
TEST!MONY
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Alt!ne. itlahll
itlahn 8381 h- LH 2
d' AIt!lle.

ddoH
0
H.;f-...·vl~--1~...,.,
.I1-...·Vl~-·1!V\ /I

o

CZ
~ ,.. I
CZ~·-~·- ~~!O

<;L(
<;Lt u . l

5 NOT1CF.·:
NOTICE OF TESTIMONY
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20!0
2010 SEP I100 M-i
M-'1 8: 00

STARR KE.LSO
STi\RR
A ttomcy
\lomey at II,ow
,nw 1/2445
112445

P.O. Box 1312
"-:n (.', l.daiw
I.daiw 83816
Coeur d' A
Ah.:n<..·.
Td: 208-765-3260
'I'd:
Fax:

20R-(:;64~6261
20S-t'i64~626l

AtlOrncy
I()r Plaintiff Brunnol1
Atwrncy fi>r
Brunnon

JIJI)ICI;\1... DISTRICT OF
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT FOR THE
TUE FIRST JIJDICIAL
THE STAIV
II.:: COUNTY OF KOOTENAr
STA!V OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI
Tl IE
Case No,
No. CV -09-10010
-09-1 001 0

JIM BRANNON,
BRANNON.

Plaintill
PJainlill
PLAINTJFF'S
WITNF,SS
PLAJNTJFF'S WJTNF,SS
LIST PURSUANT T'O IN I'I'IAL PREPRE-TRIAl,
TRIAl.

vs,
V$,

a.nd I ,IST
ORDER; and
,1ST 01:

CITY OF COEUR IYALENE,
!YALENE. IDAHO,
IDAHO.
n
municipal wrporat·ioll,
wrporat·ion. cen.t
et.n.L
fI Illunicipal
Dd.cndanls.
Dd.i:ndanls.

ILLEGAL VOTES AND BY WHOM
PURSUANT T()
TC> I.e.
J.C. 34-20l7

GJVl:~N
GIVl:~N

COMES NO\V PlainlilTJim
Brannon hy ilnd
attorney Slarr
PlainliiTJim 1.3mnnon
and lhrough hi.s atl:orncy
Starr Kdso mld
and submils
submits

this preliminary wiwc:-;s
wilrlc:o;s list
Iisl pursuant TO
to [he Cow1'S
Court's lnjlial
Injlial Prelrial
Pretrial Order. Thv Plainlifrs
Plainlirrs righl,
right,

pursuant to ldnho
Idaho

Cod~
C(ld~

seclion
scc1ion 34-2017, to provide opposing parties a written

!i~r

(If
of the number

of ilkgnl voles
h': inlends
inlcnds to prove allriul
at trial comm~~ncing on Scplcmber
or
VOles and hy whom given which h,:
Seplember

13.1010
13. 1010 is reserved ,Ina
'1nJ not waived hy submittal
suhmittal Oflhis
oflhis list pUl'suanr
pursuanr 10 the CoU/i.'s
Cnwt's

trial

initi~ll pr(.~
jnjli~1l
pr<..~

ord~-:r.
ord~-:r,

WITNESSES:

Jim Brunnon
I. .lim
I,

;Is
lO
,IS l()

his vott!r statu;;;
stntu;;; and candidacy and :Jggr'icvcd
:.1ggr·icvcd status
hls
stalus as set f(>rth
f()['th in the

Amended Complaint: c/o his counsel;
Sus~111 W(:athl:rs
Wl:athL:rs as to JH~~r
IH~~r trlilllrc
trtilurc to comply with I.daho
l.daho Code Title 50 Ch~·lptcr 4 :Jnd
:.rnd 'rille
'l'illc
2. SUS~lIl

SO
()vt!rall lack ofknowlcdg'~
()fkllowlcdg,~ of
oj' ekel)on
:lI1d proccdur(:~;
proccd\lJ'(:~: and m:ls
50 Chapler
Chapter 9: ()Vtrall
ckction Jaw :md
m:ts in

conducling p:.Jl1:
p:Jrt of the City election; c/o her cc.umsd:
CI.HJ11Se\:
1l City or(\)~lIr
orc~.)~llr d'Alene I'cP"CSCllWlivc
rcpr·cscnWiivc 10
IO lI:stiJy
ll:stiJy as to the cnnvus:-;
cnnVUS:-i hdd

(11.1

Nowmhcr 9,

2009. and ij 1$
1::: counling.
counting. 20S
205 IJ nbscnle\;.'
nbscnlt:t.• oallo[$
hallots inslead
instead of 204 I legal vol.t'$
vol.es :;\ctuolly
::1ctually recci ved:
c/o iit·s
1·$ (~~)Llflsci:
c/n
<~~Hrnsci:
P~ELIMINARY WITNESS
P~EUMINARY
WlTNESS LIST AND SUPPLEMENT't\L
SUPPLEMENT'Ai, LIST OF
ILLECiAL VOTES ANI)
AND BY WHOM GIVt::N
Plii{SUANT TO LC.
J4,20l7
ILLEC;AL
GIVI::N PlJl{SUANT
LC, J4,,2017

I'LAlNTJFF'S
PLAINTIFF'S
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w

Gridk~y as W rh~ Dc(:emb~r

1.2009
I. 2009 Illt!ding
mt!ding held \vilh
\Vith

Can~rly
~I'ratt!gy 10
contest;
Cal'l~rty ~md joint defense ~l'rategy
to avoid contest:

Kcnn~<..ly ::IHorl1eys
::1Horneys

do Clly'S
City's

and John

coltnsel~
counsel~

5. WmTt:n
Wm-rt:n Wilson LlS
as to
her 1~ 200l)
with Kc.rmedy
5,
t.o the Decem
Deccmber
2009 meeting held wilh
Kc,rmedy ;,lttonwys
;,lttOl'lwys nnd
rlnd
C~1Jferty
C~lJferty

.John
'/Oh11 A.
(I,
(l.

and joint dd~~l1se
dd~~nsc .strategy
slra1cgy 10
to avoid

Peter Erhland as t.o
to the

l)cc\~ll10cl'
I)cc\~ll1bcl'

contt~st:
COnlt~sl:

c/o City's counsel:
clo

1.2009
I. 2009 mcdi,ng
mcdi.ng hdd with City

CaiTcrty and joint effort to
Cafferty
tn nvoi.d
(lvoj,d C(llltcst;
COlltcst; do

hi~

attorney~
allorney~

[Jnd
rmd John A,
A.

law office:.
offjc~

7,
m~~tjJlg held with City uHorrlC:-)!s
~ll\d John
A,
7. Scoll Reed us to T,he
t.hc Dcccmher 1. 2009 m~~ting
utt.ornc:-ys ~mel
John;\,
Cafl~rty~ direeti(),,~
Cafl~rly~
direction~ pl'(wid~~d
pt·(wid~xl 10
w Caf'li:rty <lnd
and

Eng.Ji:sh including hut. not limited to his
hi~ 1·12·
I· I 2·

1
10
() J.~I.'
J.~tx to Cal"l't:rty:
Cartt:rty: ohst.ruction
obstruction ofwitncs::lc::l
ofwirncs::;c::; 'p(1\:~lldn
Pa\:~ttdn and Farkl:ls~
Farkt:s~ clo
c/n his law ofticc:

S.
~. John A. CaHcrly
Caflcrly as to
tn the Decembcr
December I, 2009 mC~1.ing
mc~ting hdd
held with City ll1i:ornc),s
tl1torncys and
Kennedy attorney:;:
attorney:;; ongoing discussion:-;.
correspondence. ;Jnd planning re,garding
re.garding Ih~~
th~~
discus$io/l:-;. correspondence,

dd·ense of thi.~ election
dd'ense
eleClion contest; obstruction of Plain1iff's efforts to ohr.ain (lnd
(In(l rc:view
review
documents~
doct.lmcnts~

eleclion
election

(kJcnsl..~ (If
<kJcns~.~
l'.lf lhi~
thi~

planning and cOllllllunicatjons
communications with Dnn I.~nglish
l.~nglish n.:g:arding the

clo Knolclll;li
Deedie Heard's
election contest: c/o
Knotcm:~i County: lhe.
the. cb;truct.ion
destruction of Dccdie

~.:ompuler"s datnbase:
l:ompuler"s

9,
e·1l1ail cO['l'csp(lndtmce
9. Barry Mel Jug:h as to his C·mail
corr·cspondtmce with Lawrence Spencer r~~gardjng
r~~garding the
dirlcrence h(:rwccll
h(:rwccn

abst.'.rlle\:.~
absc.rlle\:.~

nallnt.
hullnls counted
couflted and len
hallnt. rccc,jvcd
rccc.ivcu records and absentee hullols

extra illc!l.allv
t:ount.cd absentee ballots:. c/o Kootenai Countv:
.. .' t:ounted
·-·'

•'

~lS
~~s

10.
I0. Dan Euglish
English
J~1ilure.s
J~li1ure.s

~
.I

•

to his ov\:rnll
ilnd h,is
ov-::rnll actions in. (:onducting
<:onducting part of the City eketion
ckction and
h.is

to (:(H1lply v,,'ith
v.-·ith Idaho Sltltc
SttllC law l'cgarding.
huL not limikd 10
to Ti!k 34 and
W(:(Hl1ply
I'egarding. hUL

Thl~

50

of the Idaho Code: identify
identi fy election documenls:
tiled
documents: the (:ontcnls
(:on tents (If
elf his vurious
vnrious affidavits lilcd

to keep an ~\bSl:nl
~\bscnt Votel'
Votc1· rec.ord
record require,d
require.d by stare Jaw,
Jaw. ill~lhility
in~ahility tn
to
in this mauer;
mailer; the failure 10
~s(ablish
~slablish

205! legal
2051

ab~cnh.x:
(Ib~cn1l,x;

2041 c(HUlwbk.
Clnmwbk. legal.

ballots W<;;I'C
ballou.;
w<:rc

Gotmt~d.
Gount~d,

hallots we,re
wc.rc n.:,ccive,d
n.:.ccive.d wh\":11
wh(:ll

ah~cmcc htlll(lt~
ah~clltcc
hullnt~ \wr\.~
\Wr~o~ rec~ived

nvailabft..~ I\~c()rds
nvailablt..~
r~~cords

and thn11crl
thnttcn or l:.~il:J.hl.
t~i1:J.ht

(mly
<:mly rdkct

if!cg~il
jlkg~il

absentee
ahsenlee

and the vote
vOle wunlintt
wuntintt machines rclkct "Dup"
"Dur" bailots (hal
that were

illegally cotH'1Wd:
COlll'lWd: c/o
clo Kool.enai
OniC(;;;
Kool.cnai County Prosecuting Altnrll(:y's
Attnr111::y's 011ict::

11.

Dc.~(:di~.~
I)c..~(:djl~

Beard as to her ovt.•rall
ovt,'1"il1l adiolls
ad ions in conducting pari
part of Ih~
lh~ City

l11ilurc
nlilufC to 1.:omply
l..:o111ply \vith Idaho

Swt~

:22

f~ilun~
f~ihJt'(~

and her

rc.garding, but not.limit.:d
law rc,garding,
llol.lil1lil~d to litk 34 ~md Title 50

C.' ode: idcnti fy election
or lh~ Idaho C.'ode:

in Ihis
mailer and
this mallcr

ck~~lion
Ck~~li()n

dO(~Ulll<.mls~
do(~umcnts~

var!ou;:; affldavit!i
aff1davits filed
the C(lllt(:nts
C(lnt(:lHs or
of her vartous
fi led

to properly keep a.hsent
ahscnt voter records and

r(~c(,~ipt
rt.~ct:.~ipt

and count'ing
count·ing of

PLAIN'T'IFF"S PREUMJNARY WI'l'NESS
PLAINl'IFF'S
Wl'l'NESS LIST AND SUPPLFMFNT.i\L
SUPPLFMFNT/\L LIST Of
or
II.LEGAL
fi.LEGAL VO'rr·:S AND
ANDRY
RY WI'IOM
WHOM GIVEN
UIVEN PUKSUi\NT
PUKSU.'\NT TO I.e.
I.C. 34~2017

vurr·:s
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Count.y~
C()Ul1\.y~

Pro~l:cuting
Pro~l:cllting

rhc
oflwr complltl~r'S
computl~r's datahaSt!;
dataha.st!; c/o
rhe destruction oflwl'

Attorney"s Oftke;
Attorney's
Ofti~.~e;

12. S..:ni<lr
S~ni(lr Magistrate .ludt!c
.Iud8-e Eugenc
regarding his rnultipk~ vi~;jl~
Eugene Marano regnrding
vi~:il~

dcpnrnncnl (0
to f..~(lunl.
~..~ounl. ballots and
dcpnrnncl'll

Kootenai
COUllty
Kontenni County

cnvclop~.s
cnvclop~~

his torn Is
and hi!'
I::;

th~n;of;

ill
[Cl

the

d~cliLlns
d~clions

al'fidavit: c/o
his affidavit:

C()lIrth()\.I::;t.~~
Courthou::>t.~~

13.
I 3. Susfln
Suson Smith as
liS to hcl'
her involvement"
involvemcm in the City
CilY election ano
and her preparation of reports
based upon :he Sl::crctary
ST.:lI.C' s d~llabas~ I'cOc:ctlng
ext.ra illcgnl
lIegral
S~::crctary of Sr.nt.c'
rc0c:ct1ng eilher
either lcn
ten or cig,hl
cig.hl extra
ahs~nl.cc

ball.ots
banois

wer~

counted:

14. Carrie Phill!rs
Phillirs as to her
ber involvement in the City ckL:tion
ckl:l.ion and her preparation
prcparation ofrcp0l1s
ofrepm1s
h~1scd
h~lscd

or

datah3se and the
I 0 or eighl.
eight. extra illegal ahsentee
absentee
upon the Secretary oC St:Hc'
StIlle'ss damh3se
t.he 10

ballnls I:hlll:
l:hut we·rc
\:vc.rc coullllxl;
countlxl;

15,
Illr::;( as to his contact. with Defendanl.
to
15. Timothv A. I !urst
Defendant. Kcnnl:dv's
Kcnn~:dv's allomevs; initi[ll
initirll rcfusnl w
pi

01
01

,.I

sign
~ign :.tflidav.it
l,lflidav,[t (s)
J.)d~ndant

State's

pr~par~d

,.
"

r~:~garding Idaho law
hy Plaintiff's attorney "\;~garding
Jaw despite doing so for

K('[lnedy'
allorney: his vnriolls
anidavils tikd in this maI1t:f;
K('nnedy ·s allomey:
vnrious anidavits
mat1t:r: c/o Secrelary
Secretary

t)/'
l)f'

Of'JiCl~:
Of'licl~:

16,
ht!1' (.~()lltLlct
Secr(;:~l'ary
16. Bctsie Kim!wnugh
Kimlwnugh as 10
to ht:r
<..~onttlct with City elect.ion
election n.;rr~scnlaliv(:~$
n.;pr~scntaliv(:~$ regarding Secrt~l'ary

of Stmc' s.s dafahnsc:
17. Erin .lcnkin~
.Icnkjn~ 11s
liS 10
ofdiscussiol1!,
to his tdephonc
tdcphonc and in person recordings of
discussion!' v,'ith
v.·ith Po~~quin,

Dobsbfl (bgnOll.
(lag non. Harris. Prior: Ainsworth: and
m1(1 Whitt':
Whitl':

or

non~s~:rvicc of subpocnas
subpoenas
IIS.
S. Colleen .luhnslon
./ohnslon as to her returns of nOll~scrvicc

f(ll·
"()!'

Pacquin. Dobslafl:
Pacquill.
/Jobslan:

(lagnon. Farh:s. <.Iml
uml Friend
Ciagnoll.
I I),
9. Monic;)
Monic:J Pacquin as 10
to

J~u.:ts
J~H,;tS

regarding her

illcg~ll

voter status and disc.us.si()n:-;
disc·l.Js.si()n:o; wilh
with Scolt.

Reed alld
and Erin ./enkins;
Jenkins;

20. Tammy FnJ'h::-:
Fnrh::--: as to
~;ilh
~'ilh

1~lcts
f~tcts

regarding her illegal v(lIt!1'
volt!r status and

vote nnd discussions
di$cll~sions

ScoH Reed

21,
21. Alan Fl'iend
Fl'icnd as 10
to facts I'cgMding
regMding his illegnl
illeg.n1

12,
2::!.

h~r

Dcnist:.~
Dcnis(~

vott~r
volt~r

status and vOle,
vole.

Dobsl;:llfas lo
Dobs/.:lIfas
Lo 6cts regarding her ilkgal
ilkgaJ voteI'
\'ntel' ,-:;t;ltUS
.-:;t;Jtu.s :Hld
:wd vote and

disc:~ussion.s
di$(~lIssions

with

Erin ,Ienkins
Jenkins

23. Kimberly Gagnon as to Jltcts reg,:ll'ding
reg:1rding her illegal voter
votcr status
slalus :lIld
:md vow and discussions
with 1-':l'in
Erin .knl.;i.ns
knJ,ins
,1

PLAfNTIFF'S PRPUMINJ\RY WITNESS
PLAlNTIFF'S
WlTNESS LIST AND SlJPPt.r::MENTi\L
SlJPPI,f::MENT/\I, !.1ST
I.IST 01:
I.e. 34<?017
II,I"EG:\L
IU . EG:\L V()TI:;S
V<)TI:$ AND ny
nY WI·tOM
WHOM ('iIVFN
CiiVFN PURSUANT TCJ !.C.
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24. Ri(';K
Cl.Il'rk as to knowledge. or lack 111I.::r(,;01:
(Cuf'l'k)
Rif.:k (Elm(.:;r)
(Eim!.::rl Currk
tlll.::rt.;ol: nCTmnmy
ni:'Tmnmy (Currk)
prin1;;~ry
hnrnt;.~
prinl;;lI'Y h()J'llt;.~

nr
or

plac~
p'ac~

Furl.;t.~s
Furkt.~s

and her

or
ilkgal vote;
vote ;
o/" ahode and Farkcs
Farkc$ illegal

15. Mr.s.
Mrs. Elmer (Ri
(Rj(.~k)
...~k) Currie as
a.s to knowledge;,

ofTammy
abode of
Tal1lIl'lY (Currie)

~md
Fark~s ~l11d

(~I'
<~1·

lack th\:r\::o(
thcr~::o( of primary home (II'
t.:1r pl~tl:.c
pl~t~:.c or
of

he1· illt.:[:\::.tl
hel'
illt.:~a'

Vl.H~:
Vl.)\~:

26. Rcpr.:scntulive
Representalive of Lake
Lak\: CilY
City Billing.
Billing located nt 1423 N,
N. Government ·way
\Nay as
ns 10
to knowledge.
or lack thcreof~
an.d his
thereof'~ of primary home or place of abodt: or
or Altlll
Altul Friend and

ilkg~11
ilkg~•l

vott.!;

Will'~{~ll G::tgnnl1
G::tgnnn (IS
ns 10
lo knowbJgc of the
or pl<l(:~
plac~ of a
hod~~ of Kimberly
27. Will'~{~n
rhe primary home Or'
ahod~~

Oagnon: c/o address claimed by Gagnon
Ongnon and Gagnon's illegal vole,
vole.
(lagnon:

28. Beatrice J(lhaJlIl~s::;.:n
Joha.nn~s::;.:n a.s
ti!'i 10
to knowledge uf Ihl.;.~
lht~
P.:1cquin: c/() nddn:ss
nddn.:ss claimed by Pncquin and
P;;lcquin:
29. Nancy White as fO
ber illcgHI
illc!!,HI VOlcr
sla1.lIf.: arid
:29.
l'o her
voter stat.11s
arld

prirn~ary home
prirn~lry
h~r
h~1'

or place or
o!.' abode of Monil~n

illegal vote:

volc~
vole~

c/o WindeJ'tllCI\~
Windel·t11CI'4..~ R~..~alty
R\"~alty Coeur

d'Alene.
ldnho
d'
Alene. Idnho

:10.
l\inS\,\!orl.h m; 10
VOlC., Sli.IIUS
SI;.IIUS ami
aIllI
:HJ. Duslin
Dustin 1\in::;,.vorl.h
lo his illegal voter·

vlll~~
(:/0
voL~~ (:/o

K()()lemli
Kooremai Tirh:: Co.

Cn~lJr
Cn~ur

d·Alene,IJahc.)
d'Alene. luahc.1

:3J I. Susan

Harri~

1ll.ldl'~~sS
<H..ldr~~ss

daiJ11cd
daimcd as

bm;inc~s addrcs~

dnilllt:d
dnimt:d as

as to her illegal vnt(:r ::;latus
::;tHlUs and voh;;; c/cl
C/Cl h\lsirlcs:-;
h11sincs:-;

residcnc(·
residcnc('
32, Ronald Prio)'
,IS 10
VOler slatus
VOl!;!: c/o
clo
Pr·ior ''s
to his illegal voter
stal.us and votl;!:
32.

a·c.sidcncc
I'csidencc
33.

R~hn1w
R~hnlw

Zl:IJ:.Jrs ;'IS
<'ls1'o
votCJ' status
\<Otc: c/o Tnnerccpr. 1m:
lm: ... her .....~mplt)y(~r
~mpltly,~r
Zdlars
to her illegal vote,'
stalus and "Ole:

.H. P(ltrj(~iH
fh,rrl:) ,IS
to her c~lsl:ing
onc of which W<.'IS
counled
Pntril~iu l·h1rrl:)
;1:; 1.0
c~1st:ing two ab~c;n,,",e
ab~cnll:.'e bal/ols
ballots one
W<.'ls ij Ilegally
Ilegally counted

and

V(lIL~:
votL~:

c/o Iwr
lwr residence in Exhibit 5

35. Knlcb Trinkle :}s
:.1s to his service oCsubpocmt
ofsubpocmt Oil
on (farris,
I farris. Prior,
Prior. While. Z<.:~ll:.trs.
Zc.:~llars. c/o
Conlidt:OIjal
investig:.stion~
Conlidt:ntial investig:.stion::-:
36. S1cphanic
S1cphallic Oossard
O(lssard as 10
orsubpocna
to her scrvjc(~
scrvic(~ of'
subpoena I)n
em Harris,
Harris. Priur,
Prior. Whitl~, /dlan;; c/o
Kelso II.aw
,aw omcc
Onlcc
37, Man
Mall. Kelso as
37.
3~.

10
lo hi~ I.elephonc
t.elephonc call from Rahana

Donna Mdl:.llde;t,
Mdt:nde;~, as to nol signing her ahs~nl.ee ballot and signing unci
und sending in Mlol.her·
Mlother'
person's
person
's ~1hs~ntee
~1hs~nree hnllol
hnllnt and illegaJ
illegal vol\:::
vote:

.)9,
.19.

Paul Thomas

~JS
~~s

Telt~r)hone
Telt~l)h(Jlle

unknown. check

vmc1' l'cgi~lrali()n
vorel'
J'Cgi~tration

to not signing hi::;
abscntr;;e hallM
his ab.scntr;;e
hniiM nnd
and signing anti
anJ sl::nJing
s~::nJing in anolher
another

p~.~J'S()n's ~Ibsenl~~c
PI.~J's()n's
~·bsenl~~c hallot

4

Zel/ars: c/o Kdso Lav,!
Zellars:
La\v Onic~
Ol'fic~

and ilkgal vole:
vote: Telephone ullkno\-\'l,
unkno\-\11, check

vok~r rcgistralion
vo((~r
rcgistralioH

PLAINTIFF'S !'1~I.'l..JMJNARY
!'I~I:J..JMJNARY WrrNESS
Wf"I"NESS UST AND SUPPLEMb:NTAL. LfST
LIST OF
n,LEGAL
AND BY WHOM GIVEN PURSUANT'
l'l,LEGAL VOTES J\ND
PURSUJ\Nl' TO I.e.
l.C. 34-2017
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40. n~ulHh
uot signing ht:.r abs(:tltec
IXJllot and signing and ~(:ndjng
n~ulah Thomas as to l}(ll
abSl:tllCC lxJII()t
~(:nding in another
ah:-;cnrc,~
ah!'cl1le,~

person's

ballot and

illcg~1l
il\Cg~ll

vote; Telephone llnkJlown.
unkllown. check voter registraLion
regisl.raLion
vote:

Chri$\()ph .... .~r I ,l)d;~~ a.s to not signing his uhs~nl.c,~
41. Chri$h1ph
uhs~nt.c'~ ballot and signing :lnd
::tnd sending in
person's uhs~:ntce ballol
person'::;:
ballot and

ill~.gJI
ill~,gJI

vote:

Tck:piH.Hl~~
Tck:pll(.Hl~~

unk,nown.
unk.nown. check

V(llCt'
V(llCr

(lnoth,,~r
(lnoth"~r

registration

42. Dcbra
Debra I"ock(:
I.-ock': as 10
to not signing her ahsentee
ahsen1'cc hallot
ballot and signing ~nd sending in another
abs(:nwc o;;,lIol
person's abs,:nwc
h;;tllot fllle!
rmd illegal vot.e;
vote; Telephone unknown,
unknowr1, check vnj'cr
vnl·cr registration

43. Nick (/Imriscl)
Clamrisco as lo
Lo noL
nuL signing
signing. :md
:llld sending in his illegal

unknown,

44. Kothryn

(,:h~~ck
t:h~~ck

~~b~enh:~c
~lb~enh:~c

hutlot: Tdcphouc
hutlol:
Telephone

voter registrat.ion:
registration:

Gunt~ico
Gt.rnl.~ic(1

as to signing and

~end in~;
~elldinl;

in another person's i llcgn!
baJJot and
IIcgn! ahscnt.cc
ahscnl.cc baJJOl

hCI' illegal voll~: T~kph()ne
her·
T~kphone unknown. c,heck
c.hcck vol~:r registration

45. Karen Thom:IS
Thom:1s :.is
:.ts to not signing her nhsentce
nhsentcc hallot
ballot unci signing and
nnd sl':nding
st::nding ill
in
p(:rson's absentee hallot
hallol, and illegol
illcgnl vOl.e;
vot.c;

Tdcphon~ unknown,

~lI1othcJ'
~mothcl'

check votcr'
voter· registration

,H>.
-H>. Robert Th(Jtl1u~
Thornu~ as to not
nnt signing hi:-;
hi.s "hsl:nt~~1:
ahs~:nt~~~: ballot and signing and
tlfld st~nding
s~.:.~nding in another
p~~r:ilon's ahs(~ntce
"~~J';i:on's
ahs(~ntcc

47.

ballot and illegal vOle;
vote; Tckphonc unknown.

l.aWI'I::llel~
Sp(~ncer
l.awn::ncl~ Sp(~nc:er

as m his anidllvil
anidavil and his

()bl~ljlling
obt~aining

Koorcnai:
KOOTenai: (:orn:.spondillg
(:orn:.sponding wilh
with Knntcnui County

chL~ck
Chl~ck

vut.c;;r r~gjslra(ion
vul.c;;r
r~gistration

Ahsentee
Record(s)Ahsentcc Ballo! Rccord(s)-

Pros~~cming
Pros~~cU1ing

All.orney Barry Mdlut:th
A1I.orney
McHut:th with
wit.h

regard 10
discl'epancy between
hetween the
to the di.scr·epancy
t.hc Absentee l1allot
llallot Record-Koolenal
Record-Kootenai and Lhe
Lhc numher
abs~:rllce txdlOlS
txdlots counted hy vote counting
ma~.:hines in the
dt~dion: (~/o Kelso Law
or abs~:lllce
counling machines
t.he City dl~di()n:
Ol'lil:~,~:
O/'lil:~~:

4X
Chaddt~rdon as to receiving the wrong hanoI'
baJI.ot al'
ar rh~ poll and having to onlain a
4X.. .Iulie
Julie Chadd(~rd()n
corr'l:l~t
C(lrr'l:l~t

ballot Telephone number unknown hclicvcd well know
ballot:
knm"'' In lkl(:ndant
I. kl(:ndant Kennedy:

49. NaJl\,;Y
Nan~.;y Powers cOll)mcrciLlI
commcrci<~l properly
property landlord of building claimed by Alan
/\inn Friend Lobe
lo be his
r.:sid~.~ncc
"t:sidl.~nce
numb~r
nUl11b~1.'

as to any klll)wlecige
knt1wledge regarding Alan f-riend
foriend nnd his ilkgal

lIll.known
LUl.known will he provided

wh~~n

Vl.lll:.
VI)ll:.

Tckphom:
Tekphont::

obrained.

50. P(lrl,(:r
P<lrf\(:r Gibsnn as to his c.oJwers3tion
e,olwcl's31.ion lind
nnd I'ccl,mJiJJg
rcc:l)l'diJJg of with Mrs. Flrnl:r (Rick) Currie

regarding Tammy Farl\es and her
hcl' illcgal
illegal vole.
voLe. c/o C·onJidcn1.iiJI
C'onJidcnti:Jl lnvtstig<.:Liom;.
Invtstig,,:liom;.
51. Valerie
Vakric R. /\insworth/WcJhortl
/\ insworth/Wclhorn as to

h~r

knowledgc
knowledge or
ol"the
the iilkgal
lkgal vote
VOlt.: o( Dustin

Ainsworth:
52. Judi C. Lauf'enhel'g
Laur·enherg as
ns to lwr
Iwr knowk:dgc oCthe
of' the illegnl vole
vote of'Ousti.n
of' Dustin 1\in:-;worth:
I\in:o;worth:

5

PLAINTfFF"S PRELtrvnNARY
PRELtrvl'JNARY WITNESS LIST AND SlJPPLEMENT..:\L
SlJPPLEMENT."\L .LJST
PLAINTfFV'S
,LIST or
I. C. :14·:2017
:14-:20 !7
ILLE(JAL VOTES ANI.> HY
BY WHOM GIVEN PURSUANT 'l'O
''1'0 1.<.'.
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Man:cillc Dr,
MUJ'(;cilJc
Dr. Cocur
Coeur d'Aknc as Lo
to her

rcsidcnc~:~
rcsidcnCt~

and

wiK~rc
wJll.~rc

she
sht:

vote.
h'~r 'VOle.

NOTE:
NO'J'E: 1\11
All illetl.al
illet1.al. . vOlcr~
voter~ will b~
tesr.ifv- us to whom thev
thcv. voted for
.
. . b.:.
4- a::;kcd to testify

4DA'I"ED.l~··dny of
DA'rED.l~'·dny
or ~~I,
~1, 20 I 0o..
;;:~'"
;;":1'-

.-'"

.,"

-

.

r\;.~f.!ardjJ)g
r~:.~f.!arding

Seal 2.
,. ' -- Scat2.
.

.' .'.'. '. '.~.'. :421(~~~~..
. .,. _,__. . .,.,~
'.'~' :421 (~i-=-~" '''''''',''''-,--",,''''''~

Starr Kciso.

AlI\)rn~y
Allurn~y

for Pia
Plainti
inti tT HraJlllUll
Hrammn

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I\
J\ copy was hand uclivcred
Jciivcl'cd to Lkfendanls City and
WC1.1lhers altorncv Mjchael
Wc1.1thers
Mjchad Haman, and
ilnd Dcl1mdafll
Dcl1mdant Kt.',lllledv's
Kt.·.nnedv's attomcv.s
att0J'l1CV8 Scull Reed and Peter
Ernland
Erhln.nd on l~<ll~i)
,~<ll~i):. of
of~
~ .2010.
_201 0.
"
"
.•

c" l. {

c'' l. { (~-· ~~1-p
"""--,.,,,
. ,,.,Lt, ········-·",.,.,,_.,Starr
,Sturr
__.Kds~)
.Kds~.,
.""--=,_
. ,-='-······Ct.

(,()

(~_,

~~1-1' 1-""
f-.. .

PLAI"NTIFF'S PI\!::LIMINARY
P!U::LIMINARY WITNESS LJST AND SI.JPI>Lf:MENTAL
SUPI>Lf:MENTAL US'f OF
ILl ,EGAL
YGAL VOTES AND BY WHOM OJVEN
OIVEN PURSUANT TO I.e.
LC. 34-20!
34-20 I 7
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Coeur d'Alene
Reporting
muf<Depositiot~ tJlJportm
t[(§portm
Conrt QlM

September 10,
10. 2010
Mr. Arthur B. Macomber
Macomber Law Firm
408 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 215
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alened'Alene - Case No. 10010
9n12010
/2010 McCrory contempt hearing
Dear Mr. Macomber:
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 37 pages, entitled Contempt
Hearing dated 9/7/2010,
9/7/2010, has been delivered to the following recipients:
The original and a copy has been delivered to:
Arthur B. Macomber
Macomber Law Firm
408 E Sherman Ave., Suite 215
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
A copy has been delivered to:
Scott W. Reed
401 Front Street
street
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Keri Veare at
Coeur d'Alene Reporting at 208-765-3666.

cc: Original transcript
Court Clerk
All Counsel

SC 38417-2011
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Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
923 N. 33.n1mStreet
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155
Telephone: (208) 667-6287
n"'AI"I!_!1_.
D,.An!-!1-• 1'''1\0\
/',1\0\
.l"CI.\,;:)ll1U.ll:io
.1·a\';:)lllU.1~.

P. 115

,....P \ 0 V\ t~: 59
?.0\GS•-_,· ·'

~,,~
~'1~ 1 L"O"')
L"Q"')

\..!.VOJ UfU-J.UO.:J
\.!.VO)
UIU-J.UO.:J

ISB #4784
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene/Clerk
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
lN
THB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Case No. CV-2009-10010
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D'
ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE

vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et aI,
al,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendants City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene and its Clerk, by and
through their counsel ofrecord, and hereby moves this Court for an Order in Limine prohibiting the
Plaintiff :from
from making any mention or interrogation, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever
concerning the following matters:

1.

Introduction of any witnesses, records or exhibits not previously disclosed per the

Court's Pre--Trial Order.
2.

That the Comt prohibit cumulative witness testimony. ''The admission of cumulative

evidence is within the trial court's sound discretion." State v. Rosencran(z,
Rosencranrz, 110 Idaho 124, 131, 714
P,2d
P.2d 93,100
93, 100 (Idaho App. 1986). See also Rule 403, Idaho Rules of Evidence.
DEFENDANTCITYOFCOEURD' ALENE'SMOTIONINLIMINE
ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE ·1
-1
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That the Court prohibit the introduction of evidence of audio recordings or other

renditions of an out of court statement under Rules 802 and 804, IRE. As the Court knows, Rules
802 and 804 prohibit hearsay if the declarant is unavailable. And, moreover, the exceptions are

liaJ.-row and limited.
Backing up, it is well known that this case comes down to whether the Plaintiff can clearly
show that the County accepted illegal votes, and hence that said votes were illegal; and, ifso whether
said illegal voter cast a vote for the Plaintiff or the Defendant Kennedy. Thus, even if the Plaintiff
can establish that one voted i11egally, which is doubtful, he must then present admissible evidence
01'
Ol' testimony of whom the vote was cast.

In this case, if the Plaintiff can overcome the first hurdle,

he will attempt to overcome the second hurdle by way of audio recordings. This is improper under
the Rules of Evidence.
Indeed, based on the submissions, it is anticipated that the Plaintiff will contend that he
should be anowed
aJlowed to present audio recordings or other renditions because the declarants are now
unavailable to testify. However, Rule 804(a)(5),
a)(S), mE, cleady provides that the proponent must first
establish that the declarant is unavailable. See Siale
Stale v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 868, 11 P.3d
P.3d 483, 487
(Ct. App. 2000) CUUnavailability of a witness's testimony is a preliminary
preliminacy fact, which must be
established by the proponent to the satisfaction of the trjal
trjaJ court.) See also Nelson v. Fibreboard

Corp., 912 F.2d 469 (9
(9thth Cir. 1990) (citing Driscoll v. Schmitt, 649 F.2d 631,632
631, 632 (8th Cir.l981);
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 165
765 F.2d 456,463
456, 463 (5th Cir.1985); Baylor, 733 F.2d at 1534.") In the

Nelson matter, the Court noted that the proponent must show that the declarant was "entirely
unavailable for even a deposition. !d.
ld. The Nelson Court also discussed the fact that the proponent
H

could have sought a continuance to obtain the declarant. !d.
ld. In Button, the expression of doubt as

DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE --22
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to whether the declarant would appear was insufficient, and there was no showing that the declarant
was unwilling to show for trial. Button, 134 Idaho at 868, 11 P.3d at 487.
Here, as noted, the Plaintiff has identified audio recordings of witnesses for the purpose of
J:::r. •
J::r..

1

•

1

.£.>
~

1

1 ..1
1..1

1

yy
vy

f

-

....... •
.......

• .,.... ..

4

..
•
.
..

oue:nng
011e:nng the same :m.
ill. place
p1ace 0.1
0.1 toe
tne actllal
actLlal oecJarant.
ueClarant. .l1.0wever,
nowever, the ..t"Jamtlfi
l"JamWi nas maae no snowmg
snowlDg
whatsoever th~t the declarant(s) is unavailable. Simply because the declarant does not reside here
is not sufficient. There must be a showing of unavailability, even for a deposition. It is noted that
in March, 2010, the Plajntiff sought a continuance of trial for the purpose of obtaining the

depositions of the declarants. But, there is nothing in the flle to show or even suggest that the
Plaintiff made any efforts to take a deposition, telephone or otherwise. In fact, there is nothing in
the record that would show that the Plaintiff made much of an effort, if at all, to get the declarant to
trail. As such, the Plaintiff carmot take advantage of the exception if he made no efforts to even

determine if the declarant would be available or not.

Plaintiffmust show that he made
Even ifthe declarant is unavailable, the next step is that the Plaintiffmust
reasonable efforts to obtain the declarant's testimony. In Siale
II P.3d 483
Stale v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 11
(Ct,
(Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals also commented on the diligence of the proponent in

obtaining the declarant for trial. In other words, to satisfy the "reasonable means" requirement of
Rule 804(a)(5), the proponent must make diligent and reasonable efforts. ld. Indeed,
Jndeed, in U.S.
u.s. \I.v.

Williams, 930 F.2d 921 (9
(9thth Cir. 1991),
1991), for example, the Ninth Circuit found an absence of diligence
when the proponent simply prepared subpoenas but never actually served the same,
same. Us.
US. v. Williams,

supra, at 922. Clearly, simply preparing subpoenas and making a half·hearted
half·hearted effort to present those
locally when the Plaintiff knew of the declarant's whereabouts is insufficient.

D, ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE ·3
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On the other hand,
hand. in U.S.
u.s. v. Shayesteh,132
Shayesteh.132 F.3d41 (9 1thb Cir. 1997),
1997). the Court found that the
proponent did undertake diligent efforts by attempting to procure the attendance of a Canadian
citizen by procuring the assistance of Canadian authorities in locating the declarant. It also is noted
t~at.even

if an '''absent
'"absent witness is beyond the court's jUliscllctio:n,
jUlisdictio:n, 'the [proponent) must show

diligent effort on its part to secure the (witness') voluntary return to testify.
HI U.S.
u.s. v. Yida, 498 F.3d
testify."'
945, 952 (911bb Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361,361
361, 367 (lst Cir.l978). Here,
945,952
there is no evidence whatsoever that the Plaintiff made any effort to procure the availability of the
declarants,
declatants, let alone seek the assistance of foreign authorities.
Clearly.
Plaintiffs diligence is lacking. Indeed, as noted there is no evidence
Clearly, the evidence of
ofPlaintiffs
that the Plaintiffserved a subpoena, attempted to take a deposition, attempted to arrange a telephonic
deposition, or even sought the assistance ofauthorities from other jurisdictions. Rather, the Plaintiff
simply has thrown his hands up and said that the declarants are too far away and therefore are
unavailable. Once again, however.
however, it should not be forgotten that the Plaintiff represented to the
Court in March, 2010, that he was going to track down the witnesses and take their depositions.
In sum, the Plaintiffhas failed to showthat
show that any declarant is unavailable, due to unwillingness

or otherwise; and, he has failed to show reasonable means or diligence to procure the testimony.
Therefore, notwithstanding the authenticity issues underlying the audio recordings, they contain
hearsay and are inadmissible.
4.

Exhibits referencing statutes are inadmissible. Surely the Plaintiff knows that a

statute is not an exhibit. Little more needs to be said.

5.

Exhibits containing newspaper mticles or blogs, or internet conununications are

hearsay and unaccepted by any Rule.
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE --44
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thiS-P-

ofSeptember,
DATED this_p_ day of
September, 2010.
HAMAN LAW OFFICE

By:
By:
",
Michael'!:Haman, counsel for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVING

!HEREBY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
this~
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ORIGINAL

Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-09-10010
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
JUDGE HOSACK PURSUANT
TO IRCP RULE 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) and (4)

CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE,
ALENE, IDAHO,
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney Starr Kelso, and
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) and (4) submits this Memorandum
of Law in support of
ofhis
his affidavit supported Motion to disqualify Judge Hosack.
FACTS
1. At the hearing held on numerous motions in this matter on August 31, 2010, Judge
Hosack denied Defendant Kennedy's Motion for Summary Judgment;
-2. At the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, to the knowledge of either Plaintiff or
his attorney did Judge Hosack express or intimate anything other than judicial interest
in the proceeding;
3. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed
personal opinions that election contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications
upon the average voter" that are "not a salutary connotation."
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4. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed
personal opinions that Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34
Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code which specifically require (1) identifying voters by
name, (2) voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be
determined if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined
based upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot, "is an anathema to everything about
our democratic process."
5. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 201
2010,
0, was it known to
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed
personal opinions that ((1)
1) the privacy of even illegal voters is of paramount concern to
him and (2) the most important duty of the Court is to assure that voters, even illegal
voters, of their right to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free
of threat of litigation.
6. That despite repeated efforts Plaintiff Brannon's attorney was not able to obtain and
review a copy of the transcript of a hearing (that was held on September 7, 2010 at
which Plaintiff's attorney was not present) before Judge Hosack on a contempt of court
charge claimed by Defendant Kennedy and his attorney Scott W. Reed against Bill
McCrory until the late afternoon on Saturday September 11, 2010;
7. That the transcript of the September 7, 2010 hearing revealed for the first time Judge
Hosack's harbored and possessed unrevealed personal opinions that:
a. Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34 Chapter 20 of
the Idaho Code which specifically require (1) identifying voters by name, (2)
voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be determined
if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined based
upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot "is an anathema to everything
about our democratic process."
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b. (1) the privacy of illegal voters is of paramount concern to him and (2) the most
important duty of the Court is to assure voters, even illegal voters, of their right
to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free of threat of

litigation.
c. Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed personal opinions that
election contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications upon the average
voter" that are "not a salutary connotation."

8. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 1, "an anathema to
everything about our democratic process" means that an election contest process as

established by the Idaho Legislature is detestable, not agreeable with, a curse upon, an
execration, and an evil to our democratic process.
9. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 2, for a person to state
that an election contest process established by the Idaho Legislature "has ramifications
upon the average voter that in the view of this court is not a salutary connotation"

means that this court, Judge Hosack, believes that an election contest is not
wholesome, healthy, or promoting or conducive to all of the City of Coeur d'Alene's
legal voters who cast their legal votes in the November 3, 2009 City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene
General Election.
ARGUMENT
The right to due process under the Idaho and U.s.
U.S. Constitutions requires and impartial
Us. 510,47
510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927); State v. Lanliford, 116
judge. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US.
Idaho 860, 781197 (1989).
The prejudice of a judge contemplated by the constitution (Art. 1, sec. 18) is a prejudice
that is directed against the party litigant, and is of such nature and character as would render it
improbable that the presiding judge could or would give the litigant a fair and impartial trial in
the particular case pending. Bell v. Bell, 18 Idaho 636, 111 Pac. 1074 (1910).

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) Disqualification for Cause.
provides:
"1. That the judge or magistrate is a party, or is interested, in the action or proceeding;"
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) Disqualification for Cause.
provides:
"4. That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case
in the action." (emphasis added)

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (B) Motion for Disqualification. requires:
"The presiding judge or magistrate sought to be disqualified shall grant or deny the
motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in the manner prescribed by these rules for
motions."
Idaho case law provides that,
"The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
Desfosses v. Des/osses,
Desfosses, 813 P. 2d 366, 120 Idaho 27
from his participation in the case." Des/osses
(1991).
The Desfosses
Des/osses Court held that "disqualifying prejudice cannot be deduced from adverse
rulings by a judge," and "suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture, innuendo,
and statements of mere conclusions may not be substituted for a statement of facts."
The Desfosses Court relied upon and specifically directs attention to the United States
Supreme Court case of United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 Us.
US. 563, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed
778 (1966) citing Berger v. United States, 255 Us.
US. 22, 31, 41 S. Ct. 230, 232, 65 L. Ed 481
(1922)
In Berger, the United States Court addressed statements attributed to Judge Landis in an
affidavit based solely upon "information and belief' that Judge Landis stated regarding German
Americans:
"If anybody has said anything worse about the Germans than I have I would like to
know it so I can use it." "One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be
prejudiced against the German Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking
with disloyalty."
The Berger Court noted that the purpose of requiring an affidavit( s) is because the reasons
and facts for the belief of the litigant that the judge is interested, biased, and or prejudiced, must
give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of
4
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judgment. More directly than even the affidavit filed in Berger, the Affidavit with attached
actual transcript of the September 7, 2010 hearing filed in this matter has a clear, undisputable,
and direct relation to the attitude of Judge Hosack towards, if not Plaintiff Brannon and his
attorney, certainly this case ... an election contest. .. As documented in his expressed opinion in
open court, his personal view of this election contest is that it is "an anathema to everything
about our democratic process" and not wholesome, healthy, or promoting or conducive to ali
aU of
the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene's
Alene's legal voters who cast their legal votes in the November 3,
3,2009
2009 City
of Coeur d'Alene General Election. This objectionable inclination and disposition of Judge
Hosack is definite in time and place and character.
The Affidavit and hearing transcript show the objectionable inclination or disposition of
Judge-Hosack, and it is his duty to "proceed no further" in the case. Berger, supra.
Judge,Hosack,
As the Berger Court stated:
" ... the tribunals of the country shall not only be impartial in the controversies submitted
to them but shall give assurance that they are impartial, free ... from any 'bias or prejudice
that might disturb the normal course of impartial judgment."
Contrary to the misguided personal opinions of Judge Hosack, while the will of the legal
electorate must be protected, so must the sanctity of the ballot and the integrity of the election.
The integrity of the election has been, and remains, the sole thrust of this case. A thrust that all
Defendants, following the leadership of Defendant Kennedy, has tried to lead, apparently with
substantial success, this Court away from. Courts can not, under any circumstance, ignore
fraudulent conduct whether it be, but not limited to, (1) counting more absentee ballots than
exist; (2) not maintaining records specifically required by Idaho statutes to verify the date and
time of receipt of applications for absentee ballots, issuance of absentee ballots, return of
absentee ballots, and the failure of any absentee ballots to be returned; (3) being unable to
document which ballot, City or County some 53 voters received and voted; (4) providing County
voters with City ballots; (5) not investigating and prosecuting unquestionable voter fraud; (5)
ignoring the fact that the only document establishing how many and when absentee ballots were
returned reflects that ten (10) more absentee ballots were counted by the machines than were not
void or duplicative.
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Contrary to the misguided personal opinions of Judge Hosack, the sanctity of free and
honest elections is the cornerstone of a true democracy and not "just an election regardless of
honest." Election contests such as this case are the only manner provided by Idaho's Legislature
to guarantee that the cornerstone of our democratic process is preserved. Election contests are the
antithesis of the anathema label that Judge Hosack utilizes to describe this protector of the
cornerstone of our democratic process.

CONCLUSION
The Court must duly schedule and notice a hearing on this motion. Short of that Judge
Hosack should immediately and voluntarily disqualify himself from all further proceedings in
this case.

DATE~==er, 2010.
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed Defendant City and Weathers counsel Mike
th
13th
Haman and
fendant Kennedy's counsel Scott Reed and Peter Erbland on the 13
day of
Septe
,010.
, 010. ~

v---

Starr Kelso
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Starr Kelso <kelsolawoffice@gmail.com>

salutary
1 message

starr.kelso@frontier.com <starr.keiso@frontier.com>

Sun, Sup
Sep 12, 2010 at 12:17 PM
SUn,

To: kelsolawoffice@gmail.com
salou·taroy
sal•u•tar•y
'seel ya,t£r
Y9,t£r iShow Spelled[sal-yuh-ter-ee] Show IPA
-adjective

1.
favorable to or promoting health; healthful.

2.
promoting or conducive to some beneficial purpose; wholesome.
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Starr Kelso <kelsolawoffice@gmail.com>

case
1 message
starr.kelso@frontier.com <starr.kelso@frontier.com>
To: kelsolawoffice@gmail.com

Sat, Sep 11, 2010 at 10:12 PM

255 U.S. 22 (1921)
BERGER ET Al.
AL.

v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 460.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 9, 1920.
Decided January 31,1921.
31, 1921.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
23*23 Mr. Seymour Stedman and Mr. Henry F. Cochems for Berger et al.
The Solicitor General for the United States.
26*26 MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.
Section 21 of the Judicial Code provides as follows:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge
before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge 27*27 shall proceed no further therein, but another
judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed in the section last preceding, or chosen in the manner
prescribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter. Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, ... No party shall be entitled in any case to file more
than one such affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. The same proceedings shall be had when
the presiding judge shall file with the clerk of the court a certificate that he deems himself unable for any
reason to preside with absolute impartiality in the pending suit or action."
February 2, 1918, there was returned into the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of
Illinois, an indictment against plaintiffs in error (it will be convenient to refer to them as defendants), charging
them with a violation of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, known as the Espionage Act, c. 30, 40 Stat.
217.[1] In due time they invoked
invoked§
§ 21 by filing an affidavit charging Judge Landis, who was to preside at the
trial, with personal bias and prejudice against them, and moved for the assignment of another judge to
preside at the trial. The motion was denied and upon the trial defendants were convicted and each sentenced
to twenty years' imprisonment. From the judgment and sentence they took 28*28 the case to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court, reciting that certain questions of law under
§ 21 have arisen upon the affidavit and motion upon which the court is in doubt and upon which it desires the
advice and instructions of this court, certifies questions of the sufficiency of the affidavit and of the duty of the
judge thereunder, and also certifies the affidavit and other proceedings upon such motion.
The affidavit, omitting formal and unnecessary parts, is as follows: Petitioners (defendants) represent "that
they jointly and severally verily believe that His Honor Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis has a personal bias
and prejudice against certain of the defendants, to wit: Victor l.
L. Berger, William F. Kruse and Adolph Germer,
defendants in this cause, and impleaded with J. Louis Engdahl and Irwin St. John Tucker, defendants in this
case. That the grounds for the petitioners' beliefs are the following facts: That said Adolph Germer was bom
born
in Prussia, a state or province of Germany; that Victor L. Berger was born in Rehback, Austria; that William F.
Kruse is of immediate German extraction; that said Judge Landis is prejudiced and biased against said
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defendants because of their nativity, and in support thereof the defendants allege, that, on information and
belief, on or about the 1st day of November said Judge Landis
landis said in substance: 'If anybody has said
anything worse about the Germans than I have I would like to know it so I can use it.' And referring to a
German who was charged with stating that 'Germany had money and plenty of men and wait and see what
she is going to do to the United States,' Judge Landis said in substance: 'One must have a very judicial mind,
indeed, not be to prejudiced against the German Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with
disloyalty. This defendant is the kind of a man that spreads this kind of propaganda and it has been spread
until it has affected practically all the Germans 29*29 in this country. This same kind of excuse of the
defendant offertng to piotect the Geiman people is the same kind of excuse offered by t"e
paCifists in t..,is
tS,e pacifists
t.l-tis
country, who are against the United States and have the interests of the enemy at heart by defending that
thing they call the Kaiser and his darling people. You are the same kind of a man that comes over to this
country from Germany to get away from the Kaiser and war. You have become a citizen of this country and
lived here as such, and now when this country is at war with Germany you seek to undermine the country
which gave you protection. You are of the same mind that practically all the German-Americans are in this
country, and you call yourselves German-Americans. Your hearts are reeking with disloyalty. I know a
safeblower, he is a friend of mine, who is making a good soldier in France. He was a bank robber for nine
years, that was his business in peace time, and now he is a good soldier, and as between him and this
defendant, I prefer the safeblower.'
"These defendants further aver that they have at no time defended the Kaiser, but on the contrary they have
been opposed to an autocracy in Germany and every other country; that Victor L. Berger, defendant herein,
editor of the Milwaukee Leader, a Socialist daily paper; Adolph Germer, National Secretary of the Socialist
party; William F. Kruse, editor of the Young Socialists Magazine, a Socialist publication; and J. Louis Engdahl
disapproved the entrance of the United States into this war.
"Your petitioners further aver that the defendants Tucker and Engdahl were born in the United States and
were not born in enemy countries, and are not immediate descendants of persons born in enemy countries,
but verily believe because they are impleaded with Berger, Kruse and Germer that they as well as Berger,
Germer and Kruse can not receive a fair and impartial trial, and that the prejudice of said Judge Landis
against said 30*30 Berger, Germer and Kruse would prejudice the defense of said defendants Tucker and
Engdahl impleaded in this case."
The affidavit was accompanied by the certificate of Seymour Stedman, attorney for defendants, that the
affidavit and application were made in good faith.
The questions certified are as follows:
(1) Is the aforesaid affidavit of prejudice sufficient to invoke the operation of the act which provides for the
filing of affidavit of prejudice of a judge?
(2) Did said Judge Landis have the lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the said affidavit of his
prejudice, or upon any question arising out of the filing of said affidavit?
(3) Upon the filing of the said affidavit of prejudice of said Judge Landis, did the said Judge have lawful right
and power to preside as judge on the trial of plaintiffs in error upon said indictment?
The basis of the questions is§
is § 21, and the primary question under it is the duty and power of the judge,
judge,whether the filing of an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice compels his retirement from the case or whether
he can exercise a judgment upon the facts affirmed and determine his qualification against them and the
belief based upon them?
These alternatives present the contentions in the case. Defendants contend for the first; the United States
contends for the second. The assertion of defendants is that the mandate of the section is not subject to the
discretion or judgment of the judge. The assertion of the United States is that the motion and its supporting
affidavit, like other motions and their supporting evidence, are submitted for decision and the exercise of the
judicial judgment upon them. In other words, the action of the affidavit is not "automatic," to quote the Solicitor
General, but depends upon the substance and merit of its reasons and the truth of its facts, and upon both the
judge has 31*31 jurisdiction to pass. The issue is, therefore, precise, and while not in broad compass is
practically of first impression as now presented.
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In Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, the section was referred to but not passed upon. In Ex parte American
Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, the phase of the section presented here was not presented. There proceedings
in bankruptcy had progressed to a decree of adjudication, and the judge who had conducted them was
charged by certain creditors with bias and prejudice based on his rulings in the case. Such use of
of§
§ 21 was
disapproved. "It was never intended," it was said, "to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of
adverse rulings made, for such rulings are reviewable otherwise, but to prevent his future action in the
pending cause." As pertinent to the comment and to the meaning of§
of § 21, we may say, that Judge Chatfield,
against whom the affidavit was directed, said that he felt that the intention of§
of § 21 was "to cause a transfer of
the case, without reference to the merits of the charge of bias," and he did so immediately, in order, as he
said, "that the application of the creditors" might "be considered as speedily as possible by such Judge as"
designated." Another judge was deSignated
designated and to restrain action by the latter and vacate the
might "be deSignated."
orders that he had made, and to command Judge Chatfield to resume jurisdiction, mandamus was sought. It
was denied. The case establishes that the bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge must be
based upon something other than rulings in the case.
The cases at circuit in which
§ 21 was considered have not much guidance. They, however, deserve
which§
attention. Ex parte NK
N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. Rep. 978, may be considered as expressing power in the
presiding judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the facts affirmed. In Ex parte Glasgow, 195 Fed. Rep. 780,
the question came up 32*32 upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus and it appeared that the affidavit
of bias was not filed until after trial of the case and when the court was about to pass upon a motion in arrest
§ 21 was not applicable at such stage of the proceedings. Henry v.
of judgment and new trial. It was held that
that§
Speer, 201 Fed. Rep. 869, was a petition for mandamus to require an affidavit of bias against District Judge
Speer to be certified to the senior circuit judge that the latter might determine its sufficiency, and to restrain
Judge Speer from exercising jurisdiction of the case. The writ was refused on the ground that the affidavit did
not conform to
to§
§ 21 in that it omitted to charge "personal" bias, a charge of such bias, it was held, being a
necessary condition. The court, (Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit),
Circuit}, by Judge Meek, said, "Upon the
making and filing by a party of an affidavit under the provisions of section 21, of necessity there is imposed
upon the judge the duty of examining the affidavit to determine whether or not it is the affidavit specified and
required by the statute and to determine its legal sufficiency. If he finds it to be legally sufficient then he has
no other or further duty to perform than that prescribed in section 20 of the Judicial Code. He is relieved from
the delicate and trying duty of deciding upon the question of his own disqualification." This comment sustains
defendants' view of § 21 and marks a distinction between determining the legal sufficiency of the affidavit and
passing upon the truth of its statements, a distinction to which we shall presently advert.
The cases (one being excepted) to the extent they go, militate against the contention of the Government and
they have confirmation in the words of the section. Their declaration is that "whenever a party to any action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice 33*33 either against him or in favor of any
opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated .
. . to hear such matter." There is no ambiguity in the declaration and seemingly nothing upon which
construction can be exerted - nothing to qualify or temper its words or effect. It is clear in its permission and
direction. It permits an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice to be filed and upon its filing, if it be accompanied
by certificate of counsel, directs an immediate cessation of action by the judge whose bias or prejudice is
averred, and in his stead, the designation of another judge. And there is purpose in the conjunction; its
elements are complements of each other. The exclusion of one judge is emphasized by the requirement of
the designation of another.
prOVision
But it is said that there is modification of the absolutism of the quoted declaration in the succeeding provision
that the "affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief' of the existence of the bias or prejudice.
It is urged that the purpose of the requirement is to submit the reality and sufficiency of the facts to the
judgment of the judge and their support of the averment or belief of the affiant. It is in effect urged that the
requirement can have no other purpose, that it is idle else, giving an automatism to the affidavit which
overrides everything. But this is a misunderstanding of the requirement It has other and less extensive use as
pOinted out by Judge Meek in Henry v. Speer, supra. It is a precaution against abuse, removes the averments
pointed
and belief from the irresponsibility of unsupported opinion, and adds to the certificate of counsel the
supplementary aid of the penalties attached to perjury. Nor do we think that this view gives room for frivolous
affidavits. Of course the reasons and facts for the belief the litigant entertains are an essential part of the
affidavit, and must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede 34*34
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impartiality of judgment. The affidavit of defendants has that character. The facts and reasons it states are not
frivolous or fanciful but substantial and formidable and they have relation to the attitude of Judge Landis' mind
toward defendants.
It is, however, said, that the assertion and the facts are stated on information and belief and that hence the
affidavit is wholly insufficient,
insufficient,§
§ 21 requiring facts to be stated "and not merely belief." The contention is that
"the court is expected to act on the affidavit itself' and that, therefore "the act of Congress requires facts not opinions, beliefs, rumors, or gossip." Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra, is cited for the contention.
'vAJe
'vA.Je do not know what counsel means by "opinions, beliefs, rumors, or gossip.
gossip." Tha
The balief
belief of a party
part-y tha
the
section makes of concem
concern and if opinion be nearer to or farther from persuasion than belief, both are of
influence and universally regarded as of influence in the affairs of men and determinative of their conduct, and
it is not strange that
that§
§ 21 should so regard them.
II

We may concede that § 21 is not fulfilled by the assertion of "rumors or gossip" but such disparagement
cannot be applied to the affidavit in this case. Its statement has definite time and place and character, and the
value of averments on information and belief in the procedure of the law is recognized. To refuse their
application to
to§
§ 21 would be arbitrary and make its remedy unavailable in many, if not in most, cases. The
section permits only the affidavit of a party, and Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra, decides, that it
must be based upon facts antedating the trial, not those occurring during the trial. In the present case the
information was of a definite incident, and its time and place were given. Besides, it cannot be the assumption
of § 21 that the bias or prejudice of a judge in a particular case would be known by everybody, and
of§
necessarily, therefore, to deny to a party 35*35 the use of information received from others is to deny to him
at times the benefit of the section.
We are of opinion, therefore, that an affidavit upon information and belief satisfies the section and that upon
its filing, if it show the objectionable inclination or disposition of the judge, which we have said is an essential
condition, it is his duty to "proceed no further" in the case. And in this there is no serious detriment to the
administration of justice nor inconvenience worthy of mention, for of what concern is it to a judge to preside in
a particular case; of what concern to other parties to have him so preside? And any serious delay of trial is
avoided by the requirement that the affidavit must be filed not less than ten days before the commencement
of the term.
Our interpretation of§
of § 21 has therefore no deterring consequences, and we cannot relieve from its imperative
conditions upon a dread or prophecy that they may be abusively used. They can only be so used by making a
false affidavit; and a charge of, and the penalties of, perjury restrain from that - perjury in him who makes
the affidavit, connivance therein of counsel thereby subjecting him to disbarment. And upon what inducement
and for what achievement? No other than trying the case by one judge rather than another, neither party nor
counsel having voice or influence in the designation of that other; and the section in its care permits but "one
such affidavit."
But if we concede, out of deference to judgments that we respect, a foundation for the dread, a possibility to
the prophecy, we must conclude Congress was aware of them and considered that there were countervailing
benefits. At any rate we can only deal with the act as it is expressed and enforce it according to its
expressions. Nor is it our function to approve or disapprove it; but we may say that its solicitude is that the
tribunals of the 36*36 country shall not only be impartial in the controversies submitted to them but shall give
assurance that they are impartial, free, to use the words of the section, from any "bias or prejudice" that might
disturb the normal course of impartial judgment. And to accomplish this end the section withdraws from the
presiding judge a decision upon the truth of the matters alleged. Its explicit declaration is that, upon the
making and filing of the affidavit, the judge against whom it is directed "shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed in the section last preceding, or chosen in the
manner prescribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter." And the reason is easy to divine. To commit
to the judge a decision upon the truth of the facts gives chance for the evil against which the section is
directed. The remedy by appeal is inadequate. It comes after the trial and, if prejudice exist, it has worked its
evil and a judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is precarious. It goes there fortified by presumptions, and
nothing can be more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind in which there is a personal
ingredient.
After overruling the motion of defendants for his displacement, Judge Landis permitted to be filed a
stenographic report of the incident and language upon which the motion was based. We, however, have not
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discussed it because under our interpretation of§
of § 21 it is excluded from consideration.
We come then to the questions certified, and to the first we answer, Yes, that is, that the affidavit of prejudice
is sufficient to invoke the operation of the act. To the second we answer that, to the extent we have indicated,
Judge Landis had a lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit. To the third we answer, No, that
is, that Judge Landis had no lawful right or power to preside as judge on the trial of defendants upon the
indictment.
So ordered.
37*37 MR. JUSTICE DAY, dissenting.
As this case is to settle the practice for this and similar cases which may arise in the federal courts, and as
the opinion does not consider some aspects of the record, I venture to state the reasons which impel me to
reach a different conclusion than that announced by the majority.
An examination shows that statutes exist in a number of States covering the subject under consideration.
These statutes vary in character, and in the requirements for establishing the bias or prejudice of the judge
which may require him to abstain from sitting at the trial of a particular case. In some of them an affidavit of
belief of prejudice, or that a fair trial cannot be had before a particular judge, is sufficient to disqualify him.
Other statutes require supporting affidavits and the certificate of counsel, and provide for a hearing on the
matter of disqualification. In some States the matter is required to be heard before another judge.
The federal statute, now under consideration, had its origin in an amendment to the Judicial Code, introduced
in the House of Representatives when the adoption of the Code was under consideration. As adopted in the
House, the affidavit was required to set forth the reasons for the belief that personal bias or prejudice existed
Congo Rec., vol. 46, part 3, p. 2626, et
against the party, or in favor of the opposite party to the suit. (See Cong.
seq.)
When the bill came before the Senate the section was amended so as to require the facts, and the reasons
for the belief that bias or prejudice existed, to be set forth, and the affidavit is required to be accompanied by
a certificate of counsel of record that it and the application are made in good faith. (Sen. Doc., No. 848, 61st
Cong., 3d sess.) It is thus apparent that the section in the form in which it finally became part of the Judicial
Code intended that the bias or prejudice which should disqualify 38*38 a judge should be personal against the
objecting party, and that it should be established by an affidavit which should set forth the reasons and facts
upon which the charge of bias or prejudice was based. The evident purpose of this requirement was to
require a showing of such reasons and facts as should prevent imposition upon the court, and establish the
propriety of the affidavit of disqualification. "It is not sufficient," said the late Mr. Justice Brewer, when a
member of the Supreme Court of Kansas, in City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kansas, 627, "that a prima facie
case only be shown, such a case as would require the sustaining of a challenge to a juror. It must be strong
enough to overthrow the presumption in favor of the trial-judge's integrity, and of the clearness of his
perceptions."
I accept the opinion of the majority that the judge under the requirements of this statute may pass upon the
sufficiency of the affidavit, subject to a review of his decision by an appellate court, and, if it be sufficient to
show personal bias and prejudice, the judge should not try the case. But I am unable to agree that in cases of
the character now under consideration the statement of the affidavit, however unfounded, must be accepted
by the judge as a sufficient reason for his disqualification, leaving the vindication of the integrity and
independence of the judge to the uncertainties and inadequacy of a prosecution for perjury if it should appear
that the affidavit contains known misstatements.
Notwithstanding the filing of the affidavit purporting compliance with the statute, the court has a right to use all
reasonable means to protect itself from imposition. Davis v. Rivers, 49 Iowa, 435. The personal bias or
prejudice of the judge against the defendants in this case is said to be established by language imputed to the
judge as his utterances concerning the attitude of the German people during the progress of the war.
39*39 The affidavit filed contained a statement of alleged language of the judge, concerning a German who
was "charged" with making the statements set forth. Upon receiving the affidavit the Judge at once inquired of
counsel whether the language ascribed to him was not in fact uttered in connection with the disposition of the
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case of United States against one Weissensel in sentencing him after conviction by a jury of a violation of the
fact The Judge asked
Espionage Act in the same court. Counsel informed the Judge that such was the fact.
counsel for Berger whether he had made any effort to ascertain the accuracy of the statement alleged to have
been made by the court. Counsel replied that he had not. It would seem incredible that any judge could have
made such statements concerning a defendant not yet tried in his court, in advance of trial and upon a mere
charge of an offense. Counsel in open court admitted that the offending language was used in passing
sentence after conviction in Weissensel's case.
tv1oieovei, upon the affidavit baing
being filed, and aftai
aftei this admission of counsel, the District AttorneY
Attorney offaied
offeied in
evidence a transcript of what took place and what was in fact said upon the sentencing of Weissensel. The
Judge permitted this stenographic report, sworn to by an experienced stenographer, who made it, to be a true
and correct report of the statements made and the proceedings had, to be put into the record, saying that the
truth should be shown of record in connection with the falSity,
falsity, although he was of opinion that the facts stated
in the affidavit failed to establish bias or prejudice against the defendants which would disqualify him from
sitting at the trial.

This stenographic report, sent up with the certificate and made part of it, and which there is no reason to
believe fails to state accurately what took place, is in marked contrast with statements of the affidavit which
the defendants made when seeking the disqualification of the 40*40 Judge. It shows, as we have already
stated, that the utterances of the Judge were after conviction of Weissensel, and were made when he was
passing sentence. It shows that the statement of the Judge concerning German-Americans was quite different
from that stated in the affidavit, and referred to the type of man who had been convicted and was before him
for sentence. The Judge in speaking of the convicted defendant said that he was of the type of man who
branded almost the whole German-American population, and that one German-American, such as the
defendant, talking such stuff did more damage to his people than thousands of them could overcome by being
good and loyal citizens; and that he, the defendant, was an illustration of the occasional American of German
birth whose conduct had done so much to damn the whole ten million in America. While this language might
have been more temperate, there does not appear to be in it anything fairly establishing that the Judge
directed his observations at the German people in general, but rather that his remarks were aimed at one
convicted as was the defendant, of violation of law.
As I understand the opinion of the court, notwithstanding the admissions of counsel, and the sworn
stenographic report of what took place, the affidavit must be accepted, and, if it discloses matters, which if
true, would tend to establish bias and prejudice, the same must be given effect and the judge be disqualified.
It does not seem to me that this conclusion comports with the requirements of the statute that reasons and
facts must be set forth for the consideration of the judge. It places the federal courts at the mercy of
defendants who are willing to make affidavits as to what took place at previous trials in the court, which the
knowledge of the judge, and the uncontradicted testimony of an official report may show to be untrue, and in
many districts may greatly retard the trial of criminal causes.
41 *41 While, as I have said, in sentencing Weissensel the Judge might have been more temperate in his
observations, I am unable to find that the statements of the affidavit, when read in connection with the
admissions of counsel and the established facts as to what took place as gathered from the stenographic
report, showed such evidence of personal bias or prejudice against the defendants as required the Judge
upon the mere filing of this affidavit to permit its misleading statements to be placed of record, and to proceed
no further with the case.
It does not appear that the trial judge had any acquaintance with any of the defendants, only one of whom
was of German birth, or that he had any such bias or prejudice against any of them as would prevent him
from fairly and impartially conducting the trial. To permit an ex parte affidavit to become in effect a final
adjudication of the disqualification of a judge when facts are shown, such as are here established, seems to
me to be fraught with much danger to the independent discharge of duties by federal judges, and to open a
door to the abuse of the privilege which is intended to be conferred by the statute in question.
In my judgment the questions propounded, in the light of the disclosures of this record, should be answered
as to the first: That the affidavit of prejudice, when read in the light of the other disclosures in the record, was
insufficient to meet the requirements of the act. As to the second: That while the judge might have called upon
another judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit, he had jurisdiction to pass upon it himself if he saw
fit to do so. As to the third: That the mere filing of the affidavit did not require the judge to proceed no further
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with the trial of the defendants upon the accusation against them.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY concurs in this dissent.
42*42 MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, dissenting.
I am unable to follow the reasoning of the opinion approved by the majority or to feel fairly certain of its scope
and consequence. If an admitted anarchist charged with murder should affirm an existing prejudice against
himself and specify that tl1e judge had made certain depreciatory remarks concerning all anarchists, what
would be the result? Suppose official stenographic notes or other clear evidence should demonstrate the
falsity of an affidavit, would it be necessary for the judge to retire? And what should be done if dreams or
visions were the basis of an alleged belief?
The conclusion announced gives effect to the statute which seems unwarranted by its terms and beyond the
probable intent of Congress. Bias and prejudice are synonymous words and denote "an opinion or leaning
adverse to anything without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge" -a
- a state of mind. The statute
relates only to adverse opinion or leaning towards an individual and has no application to the appraisement of
a class, e.g., revolutionists, assassins, traitors.
To claim personal bias without more is insufficient; "the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or
prejudice exists" must be set out, and plainly, I think, this must be done in order that the judge or any
reviewing tribunal may determine whether they suffice to support honest belief in the disqualifying state of
mind.
Defendants' affidavit discloses no adequate ground for believing that personal feeling existed against any
anyone
one
of them. The indicated prejudice was towards certain malevolents from Germany, a country then engaged in
hunnish warfare and notoriously encouraged by many of its natives who, unhappily, had obtained citizenship
here. The words attributed to the judge (I do not credit the affidavit's accuracy) may be fairly construed as
showing 43*43 only deep detestation for all persons of German extraction who were at that time wickedly
abusing privileges granted by our indulgent laws.
Of course, no judge should preside if he entertains actual personal prejudice towards any party and to this
obvious disqualification Congress added honestly entertained belief of such prejudice when based upon fairly
adequate facts and circumstances. Intense dislike of a class does not render the judge incapable of
administering complete justice to one of its members. A public officer who entertained no aversion towards
disloyal German immigrants during the late war was simply unfit for his place. And while "An overspeaking
judge is no well tuned cymbal" neither is an amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming
receptacle for judicial power. It was not the purpose of Congress to empower an unscrupulous defendant
seeking escape from merited punishment to remove a judge solely because he had emphatically condemned
domestic enemies in time of national danger. The personal concern of the judge in matters of this kind is
indeed small, but the concern of the public is very great.
In my view the trial judge committed no error when he considered the affidavit, held it insufficient, and refused
to retire.
[1] "Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements
with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to
promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the
United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, shall be
punished .... "

Go to Google Home --About
About Google --About
About Google Scholar
©201 0 Google
©2010

SC 38417-2011

Page 2069 of 2676

https:/Imail.google.comlmail/?ui=2&ik=5ad2dOO
/mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=5ad2d00 175&view=pt&search=inbox&th= 12b045. ..,. 9/11/2010

Gmail - case 2

c~:~il

Page 1 of 13

Starr Kelso <kelsolawoffice@gmail.com>

case 2
1 message
<starr.kelso@frontier.ccm>
staii.kelso@fiontiei.com <starr.kelso@fromier.ccm>

To: kelsolawoffice@gmail.com

--

_. ·-·
--_.-.. ....
, -_ -·

~ ..... 11 , ?n1n
1n•1A PIA
"~...+, ...............
..............
..... ...+t 1n·1A
..,
......
.-.. Dll

....
.....

384 U.S. 563 (1966)
UNITED STATES

v.
GRINNELL CORP. ET AL.
No. 73.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued March 28-29, 1966.
Decided June 13, 1966.[*]
1966.[*)
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND.
565*565 Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States in all cases. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert B. Hummel, Gerald Kadish and Noel E.
Story.
John F. Sonnett
Sennett argued the cause for appellant in No. 74 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs
for Grinnell Corp. were Denis G. Mcinerney, Roger T. Clapp, Harold F. Reindel, Jerrold G. Van Cise and
Robert F. Martin.
Macdonald Flinn argued the cause for appellant in No. 75 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs
for American District Telegraph Co. were Robert O.
0. Donnelly and Thomas B. Leary.
John W. Drye, Jr., argued the cause for appellant in No. 76 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs
for Holmes Electric Protective Co. were Francis S. Bensel and Bud G. Holman.
566*566 J. Francis Hayden argued the cause for appellant in No. 77 and for appellees in No. 73. Mr. Hayden
also filed a brief for Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an important question under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act,[1] which makes it an offense for any
under§
person to "monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." This is a civil suit
CO. (ADD,
brought by the United States against Grinnell Corporation (Grinnell), American District Telegraph Co.
Holmes Electric Protective Co. (Holmes) and Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware (AFA). The District Court
held for the Government and entered a decree. All parties appeal,[2] the United States because it deems the
relief inadequate and the defendants both on the merits and on the relief and on the ground that the District
Court denied them a fair trial. We noted probable jurisdiction. 381 U. S. 910.
Grinnell manufactures plumbing supplies and fire sprinkler systems. It also owns 76% of the stock of ADT,
89% of the stock of AFA, and 100% of the stock of Holmes.[3] ADT provides both burglary and fire protection
services; Holmes provides burglary services alone; AFA supplies only fire protection service. Each offers a
central station service under which hazard-detecting devices installed on the protected premises
automatically 567*567 transmit an electric signal to a central station.[4] The central station is manned 24
hours a day. Upon receipt of a signal, the central station, where appropriate, dispatches guards to the
protected premises and notifies the police or fire department direct. There are other forms of protective
services. But the record shows that subscribers to accredited central station service (i. e., that approved by
the insurance underwriters) receive reductions in their insurance premiums that are substantially greater than
the reduction received by the users of other kinds of protection service. In 1961 accredited companies in the
central station service business grossed $65,000,000. ADT, Holmes, and AFA are the three largest
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companies in the business in terms of revenue: ADT (with 121 central stations in 115 cities) has 73% of the
business; Holmes (with 12 central stations in three large cities) has 12.5%; AFA (with three central stations in
three large cities) has 2%. Thus the three companies that Grinnell controls have over 87% of the business.
Over the years ADT purchased the stock or assets of 27 companies engaged in the business of providing
burglar or fire alarm services. Holmes acquired the stock or assets of three burglar alarm companies in New
York City using a central station. Of these 30, the officials 568*568 of seven agreed not to engage in the
protective service business in the area for periods ranging from five years to permanently. After Grinnell
acquired control
controi of the other defendants, the latter continued in their attempts to acquire central station
companies-offers being made to at least eight companies between the years 1955 and 1961, including four
of the five largest nondefendant companies in the business. When the present suit was filed, each of those
defendants had outstanding an offer to purchase one of the four largest nondefendant companies.
In 1906, prior to the affiliation of ADT and Holmes, they made a written agreement whereby ADT transferred
to Holmes its burglar alarm business in a major part of the Middle Atlantic States and agreed to refrain forever
from engaging in that business in that area, while Holmes transferred to ADT its watch signal business and
agreed to limit its activities to burglar alarm service and night watch service for financial institutions. While this
agreement was modified several times and terminated in 1947, in 1961 Holmes still restricted its business to
burglar alarm service and operated only in those areas which had been allocated to it under the 1906
agreement. Similarly, ADT continued to refrain from supplying burglar alarm service in those areas earlier
allocated to Holmes.
In 1907 Grinnell entered into a series of agreements with the other defendant companies and with Automatic
Fire Protection Co. to the following effect:
AFA received the exclusive right to provide central station sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm and
automatic fire alarm service in New York City, Boston and Philadelphia, and agreed not to provide burglar
alarm service in those cities or central station service elsewhere in the United States.
569*569 Automatic Fire Protection Co. obtained the exclusive right to provide central station sprinkler
supervisory and waterflow alarm service everywhere else in the United States except for the three cities in
which AFA received that exclusive right, and agreed not to engage in burglar alarm service.
ADT received the exclusive right to render burglar alarm and nightwatch service throughout the United States.
ADrs 1906 agreement with Holmes, however, it could not provide burglar alarm services in the areas
(Under ADTs
for which it had given Holmes the exclusive right to do so.) It agreed not to fumish
furnish sprinkler supervisory and
waterflow alarm service anywhere in the country and not to furnish automatic fire alarm service in New York
City, Boston or Philadelphia (the three cities allocated to AFA). ADT agreed to connect to its central stations
the systems installed by AFA and Automatic.
Grinnell agreed to furnish and install all sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm actuating devices used in
systems that AFA and Automatic would install, and otherwise not to engage in the central station protection
business.
AFA and Automatic received 25% of the revenue produced by the sprinkler supervisory waterflow alarm
service which they provided in their respective territories; ADT and Grinnell received 50% and 25%,
respectively, of the revenue which resulted from such service. The agreements were to continue until
February 1954.
The agreements remained substantially unchanged until 1949 when ADT purchased all of Automatic Fire
Protection Co.'s rights under it for $13,500,000. After these 1907 agreements expired in 1954, AFA continued
to honor the prior division of territories; and ADT and AFA entered into a new contract providing for the
continued sharing of revenues on substantially the same 570*570 basis as before.[5] In 1954 Grinnell and
ADT renewed an agreement with a Rhode Island company which received the exclusive right to render
central station service within Rhode Island at prices no lower than those of ADT and which agreed to use
certain equipment supplied by Grinnell and ADT and to share its revenues with those companies. ADT had an
informal agreement with a competing central station company in Washington, D. C., "that we would not solicit
each other's accounts."
accounts.''
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ADT over the years reduced its minimum basic rates to meet competition and renewed contracts at
substantially increased rates in cities where it had a monopoly of accredited central station service. ADT
threatened retaliation against firms that contemplated inaugurating central station service. And the record
indicates that, in contemplating opening a new central station, ADT officials frequently stressed that such
action would deter their competitors from opening a new station in that area.
The District Court found that the defendant companies had committed per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman
Act as well as § 2 and entered a decree. 236 F. Supp. 244.

I.
The offense of monopoly under§
under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition 571 *571 or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident. We shall see that this second ingredient presents no major problem here, as what was done
in building the empire was done plainly and explicitly for a single purpose. In United States v. duPont
du Pont & Co.,
351 U. S. 377, 391, we defined monopoly power as "the power to control prices or exclude competition." The
existence of such power ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market. In American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 797, we said that "over two-thirds of the entire domestic field of
cigarettes, and ... over 80% of the field of comparable cigarettes" constituted "a substantial monopoly." In
416, 429, 90% of the market constituted monopoly
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416,429,90%
power. In the present case, 87% of the accredited central station service business leaves no doubt that the
congeries of these defendants have monopoly power-power which, as our discussion of the record
indicates, they did not hesitate to wield-if that business is the relevant market. The only remaining question
therefore is, what is the relevant market?
In case of a product it may be of such a character that substitute products must also be considered, as
customers may turn to them if there is a slight increase in the price of the main product. That is the teaching
of the du Pont case (supra, at 395,404),
395, 404), viz., that commodities reasonably interchangeable make up that
"part" of trade or commerce which § 2 protects against monopoly power.
The District Court treated the entire accredited central station service business as a single market and we
think it was justified in so dOing.
doing. Defendants argue that the different central station services offered are so
diverse that they cannot under du Pont be lumped together to 572*572 make up the relevant market. For
example, burglar alarm services are not interchangeable with fire alarm services. They further urge that du
Pont requires that protective services other than those of the central station variety be included in the market
definition.
But there is here a single use, i.e.,
i. e., the protection of property, through a central station that receives signals. It
is that service, accredited, that is unique and that competes with all the other forms of property protection. We
see no barrier to combining in a single market a number of different products or services where that
combination reflects commercial realities. To repeat, there is here a single basic service-the protection of
property through use of a central service station-that must be compared with all other forms of property
protection.
In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U. S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities. We do not pursue that
question here. First, we deal with services, not with products; and second, we conclude that the accredited
central station is a type of service that makes up a relevant market and that domination or control of it makes
out a monopoly of a "part" of trade or commerce within the meaning of§
of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The
defendants have not made out a case for fragmentizing the types of services into lesser units.
Burglar alarm service is in a sense different from fire alarm service; from waterflow alarms; and so on. But it
would be unrealistic on this record to break down the market into the various kinds of central station protective
services that are available. Central station companies recognize that to compete effectively, they must offer
service.(6] The different 573*573 forms of accredited central station service are
all or nearly all types of service.[6]
provided from a single office and customers utilize different services in combination. We held in United States
v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374
37 4 U. S. 321, 356, that "the cluster"
cluster'' of services denoted by the term "commercial
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banking" is "a distinct line of commerce." There is, in our view, a comparable cluster of services here. That
bank case arose under § 7 of the Clayton Act where the question was whether the effect of a merger "in any
line of commerce" may be "substantially to lessen competition." We see no reason to differentiate between
"line" of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and "part''
"part" of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act.
See United States v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S.
U. S. 665, 667-668. In the
§ 7 national bank case just
the§
mentioned, services, not products in the mercantile sense, were involved. In our view the lumping together of
various kinds of services makes for the appropriate market here as it did in the § 7 case.
Theie aie, to be SUie,
suie, substitutes fOi
foi the accredited central staticn
station service. But none of t.,em
t"em appears to
operate on the same level as the central station service so as to meet the interchangeability test of the du
Pont case. Nonautomatic and automatic local alarm systems appear on this record to have marked
differences, not the low degree of differentiation required of substitute services as well as substitute articles.

574*574 Watchman service is far more costly and less reliable. Systems that set off an audible alarm at the
site of a fire or burglary are cheaper but often less reliable. They may be inoperable without anyone's knowing
it. Moreover, there is a risk that the local ringing of an alarm will not attract the needed attention and help.
Proprietary systems that a customer purchases and operates are available; but they can be used only by a
very large business or by government and are not realistic alternatives for most concerns. There are also
protective services connected directly to a municipal police or fire department. But most cities with an
accredited central station do not permit direct, connected service for private businesses. These alternate
services and devices differ, we are told, in utility, efficiency, reliability, responsiveness, and continuity, and the
record sustains that position. And, as noted, insurance companies generally allow a greater reduction in
premiums for accredited central station service than for other types of protection.
Defendants earnestly urge that despite these differences, they face competition from these other modes of
protection. They seem to us seriously to overstate the degree of competition, but we recognize that (as the
District Court found) they "do not have unfettered power to control the price of their services ... due to the
fringe competition of other alarm or watchmen services." 236 F. Supp., at 254. What defendants overlook is
that the high degree of differentiation between central station protection and the other forms means that for
many customers, only central station protection will do. Though some customers may be willing to accept
higher insurance rates in favor of cheaper forms of protection, others will not be willing or able to risk serious
interruption to their businesses, even though covered by insurance, and will thus be unwilling to consider
anything but central station protection.
575*575 The accredited, as distinguished from nonaccredited service, is a relevant part of commerce.
Virtually the only central station companies in the status of the nonaccredited are those that have not yet been
able to meet the standards of the rating bureau. The accredited ones are indeed those that have achieved, in
the eyes of under-writers, superiorities that other central stations do not have. The accredited central station
is located in a building of approved design, provided with an emergency lighting system and two alternate
main power sources, manned constantly by at least a required minimum of operators, provided with a direct
line to fire headquarters and, where possible, a direct line to a police station; and equipped with all the
devices, circuits and eqUipment
equipment meeting the requirements of the underwriters. These standards are important
as insurance carriers often require accredited central station service as a condition to writing insurance. There
is indeed evidence that customers consider the unaccredited service as inferior.
We also agree with the District Court that the geographic market for the accredited central station service is
national. The activities of an individual station are in a sense local as it serves, ordinarily, only that area which
is within a radius of 25 miles. But the record amply supports the conclusion that the business of providing
such a service is operated on a national level. There is national planning. The agreements we have discussed
covered activities in many States. The inspection, certification and rate-making is largely by national insurers.
The appellant ADT has a national schedule of prices, rates, and terms, though the rates may be varied to
meet local conditions. It deals with multistate businesses on the basis of nationwide contracts. The
manufacturing business of ADT is interstate. The fact that Holmes is more nearly local than the others does
not 576*576 save it, for it is part and parcel of the combine presided over and controlled by Grinnell.
As the District Court found, the relevant market for determining whether the defendants have monopoly power
is not the several local areas which the individual stations serve, but the broader national market that reflects
the reality of the way in which they built and conduct their business.

SC 38417-2011

Page 2073 of 2676

https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=5ad2d00 175&view=pt&search=inbox&th=12b045... 9/1112010
https:llmaiLgoogle.comlmail/?ui=2&ik=5ad2dOO
911112010

Gmail - case 2

of13
13
Page 5 of

We have said enough about the great hold that the defendants have on this market. The percentage is so
high as to justify the finding of monopoly. And, as the facts already related indicate, this monopoly was
achieved in large part by unlawful and exclusionary practices. The restrictive agreements that pre-empted for
each company a segment of the market where it was free of competition of the others were one device.
Pricing practices that contained competitors were another. The acquisitions by Grinnell of ADT, AFA, and
Holmes were still another. Grinnell long faced a problem of competing with ADT. That was one reason it
acquired AFA and Holmes. Prior to settlement of its dispute and controversy with ADT, Grinnell prepared to
go into the central station service business. By acquiring ADT in 1953, Grinnell eliminated that alternative. Its
control of the three other defendants eliminated any possibilirl
possibilit'-t of an outbreak of competition t~at might have
occurred when the 1907 agreements terminated. By those acquisitions it perfected the monopoly power to
exclude competitors and fix prices.[7]
prices.[?]
577*57711.
The final decree enjoins the defendants in general terms from restraining trade or attempting or conspiring to
restrain trade in this particular market, from further monopolizing, and attempting or conspiring to monopolize.
The court ordered the alarm companies to file with the Department of Justice standard lists of prices and
terms and every quotation to customers that deviated from those lists and enjoined the defendants from
acquiring stock, assets, or business
bUSiness of any enterprise in the market. Grinnell was ordered to file, not later than
April 1, 1966, a plan of divestiture of its stock in each of the other defendant companies. It was given the
option either to sell the stock or distribute it to its stockholders or combine or vary those methods.[8] The court
further enjoined any of the defendants from employing in any capacity the President and Chairman of the
Board of Grinnell, James D. Fleming. Both the Govemment
Government and the defendants challenge aspects of the
decree.
We start from the premise that adequate relief in a monopolization case should put an end to the combination
and deprive the defendants of any of the benefits of the illegal conduct, and break up or render impotent the
monopoly power found to be in violation of the Act. That is the teaching of our cases, notably Schine Theatres
v. United States, 334 U. S.110, 128-129.
We largely agree with the Government's views on the relief aspect of the case. We start with ADT, which
presently does 73% of the business done by accredited central stations throughout the country. It is indeed
the keystone of the defendants' monopoly power. The mere 578*578 dissolution of the combination through
the divestiture by Grinnell of its interests in the other companies does not reach the root of the evil. In 92 of
the 115 cities in which ADT operates there are no other accredited central stations. Perhaps some cities could
not support more than one. Defendants recognized prior to trial that at least 13 cities can; the Government
urged divestiture in 48 cities. That there should be some divestiture on the part of ADT seems clear; but the
details of such divestiture must be determined by the District Court as the matter cannot be resolved on this
record.
Two of the means by which ADT acquired and maintained its large share of the market are the requirement
that subscribers sign five-year contracts and the retention by ADT of title to the protective services equipment
installed on a subscriber's premises. On this record it appears that these practices constitute substantial
barriers to competition and that relief against them is appropriate. The pros and cons are argued with
considerable vehemence here.[9] Again, we cannot resolve them on this record. The various aspects of this
controversy must be explored by the District Court and suitable protective provisions included in the decree
that deprive these two devices of the coercive power that they apparently have had towards restraining
competition and creating a monopoly.
579*579 The Government proposed that the defendants be required to sell, on nondiscriminatory
nondiSCriminatory terms, any
devices manufactured by them for use in furnishing central station service. It seems clear that if the
competitors are to be able to compete effectively for the existing customers of the defendants when the
present service contracts expire, they must be assured of replacement parts to maintain those systems.[1
systems.(1 0]
The Government urges visitation rights, that is, requiring reports, examining documents, and interviewing
company personnel, a relief commonly granted for the purpose of determining whether a defendant has
complied with an antitrust decree. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S.
U. S. 76, 95. The
District Court gave no explanation for its refusal to grant this relief.[11] It is so important and customary a
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provision that the District Court should reconsider it.
Defendants urge and the Government concedes that the barring of Mr. Fleming from the employment of any
of the defendants is unduly harsh and quite unnecessary on this record. While relief of that kind may be
appropriate where the predatory conduct is conspicuous, we cannot see that any such case was made out on
this record.
The Government objects, as do the defendants, to the broad and generalized terms of the restraining order.
ertiphasized in Schine Theatres v. United States, supra, at 125-126, that the
They properiy point out, as we erfiphasized
precise practices found to have violated the Act should 580*580 be specifically enjoined. On remand we
suggest that that course be taken.
The defendants object to the requirements that Grinnell divest itself of its holdings in the three alarm company
defendants, but we think that provision is wholly justified. Dissolution of the combination is essential as
indicated by many of our cases, starting with Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
U. S. 1, 78. The
defendants object to that portion of the decree that bars them from acquiring interests in firms in the
accredited central station business. But since acquisition was one of the methods by which the defendants
acquired their market power and was the method by which Grinnell put the combination together, an
injunction against the repetition of the practice seems fully warranted. The defendants further object to the
requirement in the decree that the alarm company defendants report to the Department of Justice any
deviation they make from their list prices. We make no comment on that because in view of the other
extensive changes necessary in the decree, the District Court might well deem it to be unnecessary in the
fashioning of the new decree. In other words, we leave that matter open, to rest finally in the discretion of the
District Court.
III.
Ill.
The defendants contend that Judge Wyzanski, who tried the case, was personally biased and prejudiced and
should have been disqualified from sitting in the case, and that he denied them a fair trial. We think this point
is without merit.
The complaint was filed in April
April1961,
1961 , the answers in July 1961. Shortly thereafter extensive taking of
depositions began. The District Court in January 1963 directed that no depositions be taken after September
1, 1963. In response to an inquiry from the court both sides suggested that the trial be set no earlier than
January 1964.
581*581 At a pretrial conference in December 1963, government counsel told the court that the parties had
been trying to reach agreement on a consent decree but were far apart and asked how the court would like to
handle the presentation of the evidence in the event a settlement was not reached. Grinnell's lawyer
suggested that the next appropriate procedure would be a pretrial on the question of relief-a suggestion that
the District Court construed as an invitation to the court to discuss the relief apart from the merits. The
Government objected. The court then asked for a brief from each side setting forth its views on relief if the
Government prevailed on the merits. In response to the court's statement that "as I understand it, you want to
find out what kind of relief I would be likely to allow if the government's case stood virtually uncontradicted,"
Grinnell's counsel replied: "That is what I had in mind, your Honor, yes."
Thereupon the court set a day for such a hearing. At the next pretrial conference Grinnell's counsel stated that
"if your Honor would indicate the relief that might be appropriate in this case that would help both sides to
come to a better understanding."
Then the following colloquy occurred:
"THE COURT. I don't think it would help very much.
"MR. MciNERNEY. Well, your Honor, I think it would help both the plaintiff and the defendants to know what is
really at stake here in this trial.
"THE COURT. I assure you that you would not be helped by anything I would say. You would do better to get
together with the government rather than run the risk of what I would say from what I have seen. Let me just
assure you of that. ..."
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The case was then set for trial on June 15, 1964. When Grinnell's counsel sought to argue further, the court
stated: "There is no use in discussing it with me. I have 582*582 read enough to know that if I have to decide
this case on what I have seen from the government you will not be in a position at this stage to agree to it."
On June 3, 1964, defendants argued for a postponement of the trial, saying they needed more time. The court
denied the motion. Then they argued that the relief issues to be tried be limited to those raised by the
pleadings so as to eliminate what they considered to be extraneous issues raised by the Government. To that
the court replied:
"I can't understand frankly why you don't realize that you have forced me to look at the documents in this
case, which I dislike doing in advance of trial. You have invited me, therefore, into what I regard as, from your
point of view, a rather undesirable situation. I think I made that clear at the beginning. I have told you that,
forced by you to look, my views are more extreme than those of the government; and I have also made you
realize that if I am required to make Findings and reach Conclusions I am opening up third-party suits that will
make, in view of the size of the industry, the percentage of people involved higher than in the electrical
cases."
motion(12] for the disqualification of Judge Wyzanski on the grounds of
Shortly thereafter defendants filed a motion[12]
personal bias and prejudice.[13]
583*583 The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 31. Any adverse attitudes that Judge Wyzanski evinced toward the
defendants were based on his study of the depoSitions
depositions and briefs which the parties had requested him to
make. What he said reflected no more than his view that, if the facts were as the Government alleged,
stringent relief was called for.
During the trial he repeatedly stated that he had not made up his mind on the merits. During the trial he ruled
perSisted in offering it Judge Wyzanski
certain evidence to be irrelevant to the issues and when the lawyer persisted
said, "Maybe you will persuade somebody else. And if you think so, all right. I just assure you it is a great
ceremonial act, as far as I am concerned." We do not read this statement as manifesting a closed mind on the
merits of the case but consider it merely a terse way of repeating the previously stated ruling that this
particular evidence was irrelevant.
We have examined all the other claims of the defendants made against Judge Wyzanski and find that the
claim of bias and prejudice is not made out. Our discussion of the relief which he granted shows indeed that
he was, in several critical respects, too lenient with those who now charge him with bias and prejudice.
The judgment below is affirmed except as to the decree. We remand for further hearings on the nature of the
relief consistent with the views expressed herein.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
I cannot agree with the Court that the relevant market has been adequately proved. I do not dispute that a
584*584 national market may be found even though immediate competition takes place only within individual
communities, some of which are themselves natural monopolies. For a national monopoly of such local
enterprises may still have serious long-term impact on competition and be vulnerable on its own plane to the
antitrust laws. In the product market also the Court seems to me to make out a good enough case for lumping
together the different kinds of central station protective service (CSPS). But I cannot agree that the facts so
far developed warrant restricting the product market to accredited CSPS.

I
1

Because the ultimate issue is the effective power to control price and competition, this Court has always
recognized that the market must include products or services "reasonably interchangeable" with those of the
alleged monopolist. United States v. duPont
du Pont & Co., 351 U.S.
U. S. 377, 395. In this instance, there is no doubt that
the accredited CSPS business does compete in some measure with many other forms of hazard protection:
watchmen, local alarms, proprietary systems, telephone-connected services, unaccredited CSPS, directconnected (to police and fire stations) systems, and so forth. The critical question, then, is the extent of
competition from these rivals.
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The Government and the majority have stressed that differences in cost, reliability and insurance discounts
may disqualify a competing form of protection for a particular customer. For example, it is said that proprietary
systems are too expensive for any but large companies and local alarms may go unanswered in some
alternative to CSPS, it does not much
neighborhoods. But if in general a CSPS customer has a feasible altemative
matter that other ones are foreclosed to him, nor that other CSPS customers have different second choices.
From this record, it may well be that other forms of protection are each competitive enough with segments of
the CSPS 585*585 market so that in sum CSPS rarely has a monopoly position.
From the defense standpoint, there is substantial evidence showing that the defendants do feel themselves
under pressure from other forms of protection, that they do compete for customers, and that they do lower
prices even in areas where no CSPS competition is present. This concrete evidence of market behavior
seems to me to rank higher than the kind of inference proof heavily relied on by the Govemment-physical
Government-physical
differences between competing forms of protection, self-advertising claims of CSPS companies that they
represent a superior service, and varying insurance discounts. Given that the burden of proof rests upon the
Government, the record leaves me with such misgivings as to the validity of the District Court's findings on
this score that I am not prepared to agree that the Government has made the showing of market domination
that the law demands before a business is sundered.
At the same time the case must be recognized as a close one, and I am not ready to say at this stage that the
findings and conclusions of the District Court might not be supportable. All things considered, I join with my
Brothers FORTAS and STEWART to the extent of voting to remand the case for further proceedings so that
new findings can be made as to the relevant product market. This course seems to me the more appropriate
ed. ), we have not had the benefit
in light of the fact that because of the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29 (1964 ed.),
of any intermediate appellate sifting of this record. In view of the disposition I propose, I do not consider any
of the other questions in the case.
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS,
FORTAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting.
I agree that the judgment below should be remanded, but I do not agree that the remand should be limited to
586*586 reshaping the decree. Because I believe that the definition of the relevant market here cannot be
sustained, I would reverse and remand for a new determination of this basic issue, subject to proper
standards.
We have here a case under both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, which proscribe combinations in restraint of
trade, and monopolies and attempts to monopolize. The judicial task is not difficult to state: Does the record
show a combination in restraint of trade or a monopoly or attempt to monopolize? If so, what are its
characteristics, scope and effect? And, finally, what is the appropriate remedy for a court of equity to decree?
Each of these inquiries depends upon two basic referents: definition of the geographical area of trade or
commerce restrained or monopolized, and of the products or services involved. In § 1 cases this problem
ordinarily presents little difficulty because the combination in restraint of trade itself delineates the "markef'
with sufficient clarity to support the usual injunctive form of relief in those cases. See, e. g., United States v.
Griffith, 334 U. S. 100. In the present case, however, the essence of the offense is monopolization, achieved
"markef' definition is of the essence, just
or attempted, and the major relief is divestiture. For these purposes, "marker'
as in § 7 cases[1] the kindred definition of the "line of commerce" is fundamental. We must define the area of
commerce that is allegedly engrossed before we can determine its engrossment; and we must define it before
a decree can be shaped to deal with the consequences of the monopoly, and to restore or produce
duPont
Pont & Co. (the Cellophane Case), 351 U.S.
U. S. 377, 587*587389-396;
587*587 389-396;
competition. See United States v. du
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1945).
In§
In § 2 cases, the search for "the relevant markef' must be undertaken and pursued with relentless clarity. It is,
in essence, an economic task put to the uses of the law. Unless this task is well done, the results will be
distorted in terms of the conclusion as to whether the law has been violated and what the decree should
contain.
In this case, the relevant geographical and product markets have not been defined on the basis of the
economic facts of the industry concemed.
concerned. They have been tailored precisely to fit defendants' business. The
Government proposed and the trial court concluded that the relevant market is not the business of fire
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protection, or burglary protection, or protection against waterflow, etc., or all of these together. It is not even
the business of furnishing these from a central location. It is the business, viewed nationally, of supplying
"insurance accredited central station protection services" (CSPS)- that is, fire, burglary and other kinds of
protection furnished from a central station which is accredited by insurance companies. The business of
defendants fits neatly into the product and geographic market so defined. In fact, it comes close to filling the
defined.[2J This Court has now approved this Procrustean definition.
market so defined.[21
The geographical market is defined as nationwide. But the need and the service are intensely local-more
local by far, for exampie, than the market which this Court found to be local in United States v. Philadelphia
374 U. S. 321,
321 , 357-362. [3]
Nat. Bank, 374
[31 The premises protected 588*588 do not travel. They are fixed
locations. They must be protected where they are. Protection must be provided on the spot. It must be
furnished by local personnel able to bring help to the scene within minutes. Even the central stations can
provide service only within a 25-mile radius. Where the tenants of the premises turn to central stations for this
service, they must make their contracts locally with the central station and purchase their services from it on
the basis of local conditions.
But because these defendants, the trial court found, are connected by stock ownership, interlocking
management and some degree of national corporate direction, and because there is some national
participation in selling as well as national financing, advertising, purchasing of equipment, and the Iike,[4]
like,[4] the
court concluded that the competitive area to be considered is national. This Court now affirms that conclusion.
This is a non sequitur. It is not permissible to seize upon the nationwide scope of defendants' operation and to
bootstrap a geographical definition of the market from this. The purpose of the search for the relevant
geographical market is to find the area or areas to which a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or
services that he seeks. The test, as this Court said in United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, is "the
geographic structure of supplier-customer relations," 374 U. S. 321, 357, quoting Kaysen & Tumer,
Turner, Antitrust
Policy 102 (1959). And, as MR. JUSTICE CLARK put it in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
U. S.
320, 327, the definition of the relevant market requires 589*589 "careful selection of the market area in which
the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies."[5] The central issue is
where does a potential buyer look for potential suppliers of the service- what is the geographical area in
which the buyer has, or, in the absence of monopoly, would have, a real choice as to price and alternative
facilities? This depends upon the facts of the market place, taking into account such economic factors as the
consistently with cost and functional
distance over which supplies and services may be feasibly furnished, conSistently
efficiency.
The incidental aspects of defendants' business which the court uses cannot control the outcome of this
inquiry. They do not measure the market area in which buyer and sellers meet. They have little impact upon
the ascertainment of the geographical areas in which the economic and legal questions must be answered:
have defendants "monopolized" or "restrained" trade; have they eliminated or can they eliminate competitors
or prevent or obstruct new entries into the business; have they controlled or can they control price for the
services? These are the issues; and, in defendants' business, a finding that the "relevant market" is national is
nothing less than a studied failure to assess the effect of defendants' position and practices in the light of the
competition which exists, or could exist, in economically defined areas-in the real world.
Here, there can be no doubt that the correct geographic market is local. The services at issue are intensely
local: they can be furnished only locally. The business as it is done is local-not nationwide. If, as might well
be the case on this record, defendants were found to have violated the Sherman Act in a number of these
local areas, a proper decree, directed to those markets, as well as to 590*590 general corporate features
relevant to the condemned practices, could be fashioned. On the other hand, a gross definition of the market
as nationwide leads to a gross, nationwide decree which does not address itself to the realities of the market
place. That is what happened here: The District Court's finding that the market was nationwide logically led it
to a decree which operated on the only national aspect of the situation, the parent company nexus, instead of
on the economically realistic areas-the local situations. This Court now directs the trial court to require
"some [unspecified] divestiture" locally by the alarm companies. This is a recognition of the economic reality
that the relevant competitive areas are local. In plain terms, the Court's direction to the trial court means a
"market-by-markef' analysis for the purpose of breaking up defendants' monopoly position and creating
competitors and competition wherever feasible in particular cities. In my view, however, by so directing, the
Court implies that which it does not command: that the case should be reconsidered at the trial court level
because of the improper standard it used to define the relevant geographic markets.
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The trial court's definition of the "product" market even more dramatically demonstrates that its action has
been Procrustean-that it has tailored the market to the dimensions of the defendants. It recognizes that a
person seeking protective services has many alternative sources. It lists "watchmen, watchdogs, automatic
proprietary systems confined to one site, (often,
{often, but not always,) alarm systems connected with some local
police or fire station, often unaccredited CSPS [central station protective services], and often accredited
CSPS." The court finds that even in the same city a single customer seeking protection for several premises
may "exercise its option" differently for different locations. It may choose 591 *591 accredited CSPS for one of
its iocations and a different type of service for another.
But the court isolates from all of these alternatives only those services in which defendants engage. It
eliminates all of the alternative sources despite its conscientious enumeration of them. Its definition of the
"relevant market" is not merely confined to "central station" protective services, but to those central station
protective services which are "accredited" by insurance companies.
There is no pretense that these furnish peculiar services for which there is no alternative in the market place,
on either a price or a functional basis. The court relies solely upon its finding that the services offered by
accredited central stations are of better quality, and upon its conclusion that the insurance companies tend to
give "noticeably larger''
larger" discounts to policyholders who use accredited central station protective services. This
Court now approves this strange red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp classification.
The unreality of the trial court's market definition may best be illustrated by an example. Consider the situation
of a retail merchant in Pittsburgh who wishes to protect his store against burglary. The Holmes Electric
Protective Company, a subsidiary of Grinnell, operates an accredited central station service in Pittsburgh. It
provides only burglary protection.

The gerrymandered market definition approved today totally excludes from the market consideration of the
availability in Pittsburgh of cheaper but somewhat less reliable local alarm systems, or of more expensive
(although
{although the expense is reduced by greater insurance discounts) watchman service, or even of unaccredited
central station service which virtually duplicates the Holmes service.
Instead, and in the name of "commercial realities," we are instructed that the "relevant market"-which totally
592*592 excludes these locally available alternatives-requires us to look only to accredited central station
service, and that we are to include in the "market" central stations which do not furnish burglary protection
and even those which serve such places as Boston and Honolulu.[6]
Moreover, we are told that the "relevant market" must assume this strange and curious configuration despite
evidence in the record and a finding of the trial court that "fringe competition" from such locally available
alternatives as watchmen, local alarm systems, proprietary systems, and unaccredited central stations has, in
at least 20 cities, forced the defendants to operate at a "loss" even though defendants have a total monopoly
in these cities of the "market"-namely, the "accredited central station protective services." And we are led to
this odd result even though there is in the record abundant evidence that customers switch from one form of
property protection to another, and not always in the direction of accredited central station service.
I believe this approach has no justification in economics, reason or law. It might be supportable if it were
found that the accredited central stations offer services which are unique in the sense that potential buyersor at least a substantial, identifiable part of the trade-look only to them for the services in question, and that
neither cost, type, quality of service nor other factors bring competing services into the market. The findings
here and the record do not permit this conclusion.
The Government's market definition, accepted by the trial court, is a distortion which inevitably leads to a
superficial and distorted result even in the hands of a highly skilled judge. As this Court held in Brown Shoe,
supra, the "reasonable interchangeability of use or the 593*593 cross-elasticity of demand," determines the
boundaries of a product market. 370 U. S., at 325. See also the Cellophane Case, 351 U. S., at 380. In plain
language, this means that the court should have defined the relevant market here to include all services
which, in light of geographical availability, price and use characteristics, are in realistic rivalry for all or some
part of the business
bUSiness of furnishing protective services to premises. In the present situation, however, the court's
own findings show that practical alternatives are available to potential users- although they vary from market
to market and possibly from user to user. These have been arbitrarily excluded from the court's definition.
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I do not suggest that wide disparities in quality, price and customer appeal could never affect the definition of
the market. But this follows only where the disparities are so great that they create separate and distinct
categories of buyers and sellers. The record here and the findings do not approach this standard. They fall far
short of justifying the narrowing of the market as practiced here. I need refer only to the exclusion of
nonaccredited central stations, which the court seeks to justify by reference to differentials in insurance
discounts. These differentials may indeed affect the relative cost to the consumer of the competing modes of
protection. But, in the absence of proof that they result in eliminating the competing services from the
Wi supplies,[7]
category of those to which the purchaser "can practicably tum" foi
supplies,[?] they do not justify'
justify SUC1'i
suc1'i total
exclusion. This sort of exclusion of the supposedly not-quite-so-attractive service from the basic definition of
the kinds of business and service against which defendants' activity will be measured, is entirely unjustified on
this record.[SI
record.[S]
594*594 The importance ofthis
of this kind of truncated market definition vividly appears ifwe
if we are to say, as the trial
court here held, that if defendant has so large a fraction of the market as to constitute a "predominant" share,
a rebuttable presumption of monopolization follows. The fraction depends upon the denominator (the
"market") as well as the numerator (the defendants' volume). Clearly, this "presumption" is unwarranted
unless the "market" is defined to include all competitors. The contrary is not supported by this Court's
decisions in either the Cellophane Case, supra, or United States v. du Pont & Co. (General Motors), 353 U. S.
586. The latter case defined the market in terms of the total products which could be used for the defined
purposes: automobile fabrics and finishes. This embraces the total range of options for customers seeking
these products. On the contrary, as the record here shows and as the findings, candidly read, imply,
substantial options exist for services other than through accredited central stations providing protective
services. Those options, whether for all or a part of the services in issue, must be included in the assessment
of the market.
In the opinion which this Court hands down today, there is considerable discussion of defendants' argument
that the market should be "broken down" by different 595*595 type of service: e. g., burglar protection, fire
"cluster'' of services as
protection, etc. The Court rejects this on the ground that it is appropriate to evaluate a "cluster"
such. It points
pOints to Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, for support for its approach. In that case, MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN'S opinion for the Court carefully set out the distinctive characteristics of banking services: that
some of these services (e. g., checking accounts) are virtually free of competition from other types of
U. S., at 356-357. See
institutions, and that other services are distinctive in cost or other characteristics. 374 U.S.,
also United States v. First Nat. Bank, 376 U.S.
U. S. 665, 668 (per DOUGLAS, J.). Similarly, in United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
U. S. 131, and International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S.
U. S. 242, 249-252,
sufficiently distinctive in terms of
"first-run" moving pictures and championship boxing matches were held suffiCiently
demand in the market place to warrant consideration as separate markets.
But no such distinctiveness exists here. As I have discussed, neither this record nor the trial court's findings
show either a distinctive demand or a separable market for "insurance accredited central station protective
services." The contrary is evident. None ofthe
of the services furnished by accredited central stations is unique, as I
have discussed. Nor is there even a common or predominant "cluster''
"cluster" of services offered by the central
stations. One of the defendants, Holmes, is engaged only in the burglary alarm business. Another, AFA,
furnishes only fire and waterflow service. Only ADT among the defendants makes available to its customers
the full "cluster."
I do not mean to suggest that the Government must prove its case, service by service. But in defining the
market, individual services, even if furnished in isolation, ought to be specified and here, as distinguished
from the conclusion impelled by the circumstances in 596*596 Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, competitors for
individual services ought to be taken into account.
I do not intend by any of the foregoing to suggest that, on this record, the relief granted by the trial court and
the substantially more drastic relief ordered by this Court would necessarily be unjustified. It is entirely
possible that monopoly or attempt to monopolize may be found- and perhaps found with greater force-in
local situations. Relief on a pervasive, system-wide, national basis might follow, as decreed by the trial court,
as well as divestiture in appropriate local situations, as directed by this Court. It is impossible, I submit, to
make these judgments on the findings before us because of the distortion due to an incorrect and unreal
definition of the "relevant market." Now, because of this Court's mandate, the market-by-market inquiry must
begin for purposes of the decree. But this should have been the foundation of judgment, not its superimposed
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conclusion. This inquiry should- in my opinion, it must-take into account the total economic situation-all of
the options available to one seeking protection services. It should not be limited to central stations, and
certainly not to "insurance accredited central station protective services" which this Court sanctions as the
relevant market. Since I am of the opinion that defendants and the courts are entitled to a reappraisal of the
liability consequences as well as the appropriate provisions of the decree on the basis of a sound definition of
the market, I would reverse and remand for these purposes.

[*]Together
[*]
Together with No. 74, Grinnell Corp. v. United States, No. 75, American District Telegraph Co. v. United
States, No. 76, Holmes Eiectric
Alsiffi Co. of
Electric Protective Co. v. United States and No. 77, Automatic Fii6
Fiie Alaim
Delaware v. United States, also on appeal from the same court.
[1] 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.
U. S. C.§
C. § 2 (1964 eel.).
[2] Expediting Act
Act§
§ 2,32
2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.
U. S. C.§
C. § 29 (1964 ed.); United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
371 u.s.
U. S. 38.
[3] These are the record figures. Since the time of the trial, Grinnell's holdings have increased. Counsel for
Grinnell has advised this Court that Grinnell now holds 80% of ADTs
ADrs stock and 90% of the stock of AFA.

[4] Among the various central station services offered are the following:
(1) automatic burglar alarms;

(2) automatic fire alarms;
(3) sprinkler supervisory service (any malfunctions in the fire sprinkler system-e. g., changes in water
pressure, dangerously low water temperatures, etc.-are reported to the central station); and
(4) watch signal service (night watchmen, by operating a key-triggered device on the protected premises,
indicate to the central station that they are making their rounds and that all is well; the failure of a watchman
to make his electrical report alerts the central station that something may be amiss).

[5] In 1959, ADT complained that AFA's share of the revenues was excessive. AFA replied, in a letter to the
president of Grinnell (which by that time controlled both ADT and AFA), that its share was just compensation
for its continued observance of the service and territorial restrictions: "[T]he geographic restrictions placed
upon us plus the requirement that we confine our activities to sprinkler and fire alarm services exclusively,
since 1907 and presumably into the future, has definitely retarded our expansion in the past to the benefit of
ADT growth .... [AFA's] contribution must also include the many things that helped make ADT
big." (Emphasis added.)

[6] Thus, of the 38 nondefendant firms operating a central service station protective service in the United
States in 1961, 24 offered all of the following services: automatic fire alarm; waterflow alarm and sprinkler
supervision; watchman's reporting and manual fire alarm; and burglar alarm. Of the other firms, 11 provided
no watchman's reporting and manual fire alarm service; six provided no automatic fire alarm service; and two
offered no sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm service. Moreover, of the 14 firms not providing the full
panoply of services, 1
10
0 lacked only one of the above-described services. Appellant ADTs
ADT's assertion that "very
few accredited central stations furnish the full variety of services" is flatly contradicted by the record.
[7] Since the record clearly shows that this monopoly power was consciously acquired, we have no reason to
reach the further position of the District Court that once monopoly power is shown to exist, the burden is on
the defendants to show that their dominance is due to skill, acumen, and the like.
[8] Although the Government originally urged that the decree was inadequate as to divestiture in that it
permitted Grinnell to distribute the stock of the other companies to Grinnell's shareholders, it has abandoned
that point in this Court.
[9] Specifically, the areas of disagreement are: (1) Defendants urge that barring them from offering five-year
contracts would put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis nondefendant firms; the Government
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responds that since they violated the law, they may properly be subjected to restrictions not borne by others.
See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U. S. 707, 723-724. (2) Some customers of defendants may
wish to have long-term contracts; the Government responds that this may be explored on remand. (3) There
is some dispute as to whether, if the central station company cannot retain title to the equipment it installs, the
insurance companies will accredit the system. This, too, is a proper subject for inquiry on remand.
[1 0] Prior to trial, the defendants agreed that this would be an appropriate provision
[10]
proviSion in a decree were the
Government to prevail in all its claims of antitrust violations. Although defendants now maintain that this
"settlement talk," that earlier concession is a relevant factor that the District Judge can
pretrial discussion was "sett!ement
properly take into account on remand.
[11] This provision, too, gained pretrial acceptance. See n. 10, supra.
[12] 28 U.S.
U. S. C.§
C. § 144 (1964 ed.) provides in relevant part:
"Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the
judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned
aSSigned to hear such
proceeding."
[13] Judge Wyzanski referred the question of his disqualification to Chief Judge Woodbury of the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit who after hearing oral argument held that no case of bias and prejudice had been
made out under § 144.
[1] United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
U. S. 441, 447-458; United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S.
U. S. 271, 273277; United States v.

I
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
d' Alene, Idaho 83
83816
816
Coeur d'Alene,
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-09-10010
AFFIDAVIT OF
STARR KELSO
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY JUDGE HOSACK

CITY-bF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO,
a municipal corporation, et.al
Defendants.

STA'FE OF IDAHO )
ss.
County of Kootenai )
Starr Kelso, being first duly sworn upon oath, testifies as follows:
1. I am over the age of 18 years, competent to testify, and I make the below statements
upon my own personal knowledge;
2. After 4:00 p.m. on September 7, 2010 upon reaching my law office after the
completion of the first day of a binding arbitration proceeding in Kootenai County
Case No. CV -09-1002 I was met by Jim Brannon the Plaintiff in this matter. He was in
an extremely agitated state. I was advised by Mr. Brannon of some extremely
disturbing events that occurred at the Contempt Hearing held in this matter earlier in
the afternoon on the ih, regarding a complaint of Defendant Kennedy and his attorney
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Scott W. Reed that Bill McCrory should be held in contempt of court for signing an
affidavit that I had prepared and filed as the attorney for Plaintiff in this matter.
3. I have previously filed my affidavit regarding the preparation, filing, and reason for my
filing of the affidavit of Bill McCrory in this matter.
4. The description of the events conveyed was so disturbing to me that Mr. Brannon and I
telephoned Biil
BiU McCrory, the defendant in the civil contempt proceeding that had
occurred earlier on September 7, 2010, so that I could obtain his perspective of the
events that had transpired at the hearing.
5. That when Bill McCrory was contacted by telephone he was in such an emotionally
distressed state over what had occurred that he was unable to discuss the events that
had transpired.
'6. I was, however, informed that a transcript of the hearing had been, or was being,

ordered in an expedited fashion.
7. I was delivered a copy of the transcript of the hearing of September 7, 2010,
201 0, by Bill
McCrory, mid-afternoon on September 11,2010
11, 2010 at my office where I was at preparing
for the trial in this matter scheduled to commence at 9:00
9:00a.m.
a.m. on September 13,2010
13, 2010
before Judge Hosack.
8. I was not able to review the transcript until later in the evening on September 11,2010.
11, 2010.
9. According to the Court records in this matter the original transcript of the hearing has
been filed with the Court in this matter. A copy of the transcript that I received is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference as if fully set
forth hereat word for word.
10. The copy that I received is not signed by the court reporter, Keri Veare, but the copy
does reflect a signature date of September 9, 2010. Given that Court's records reflect
that the original of the transcript of this hearing has been filed with the Court, I have no
reason to question that the copy I received on the afternoon of September 11, 2010 is
not a true, accurate, and complete copy of the actual, signed, original hearing transcript
on file with the Court in this matter.
11. In reviewing the hearing transcript I had a difficult time believing what Judge Hosack
was stating, particularly beginning at page 30, line 14, and continuing thereon:
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14 .... "On the other hand, the Court has a concern in this litigation about the rights of
the citizen voters. This type of litigation which may be and no doubt is and should be
important in litigants has ramifications upon the average voter that in the view of this
court is not a salutary connotation.
And there's been arguments even made in open court that because this is an eiection
case, a court should exercise extraordinary powers never used in civil litigation before
in the history of American jurisprudence and haul citizens back at their own cost into
court for a hearing for trial because they voted. That's very disturbing to this court ....
To have litigation, publishing voters' names, calling whether their affidavits are
correct, whether they're legal or illegal, whether they can be hauled into court, grilled
by a judge with regard to their votes is an anathema to everything about our democratic
process.
So the secrecy, the confidentiality, the privacy of the voter is of paramount concern
to the Court, and some apparent disregard of those issues by litigants or participants is
of concern to this court ....
The confidentiality, the most important duty of the Court is to assure the voter of
their right to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free of the
threat of litigation."
12. I certify that this Affidavit, the Motion to Disqualify Judge Hosack, and the
Memorandum filed herewith are all made in good faith under the rules, after
consultation with a number of other attorneys and individuals.
13. At the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, to the knowledge of either Plaintiff or
his attorney, Judge Hosack had not expressed or intimated anything other than judicial
interest in the proceeding;
14. At no time before or at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to
either Plaintiff or his attorney and possessed unrevealed personal opinions that election
contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications upon the average voter" that are
"not a salutary connotation."
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15. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed
personal opinions that Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34
Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code which specifically require ((1)
1) identifying voters by
name, (2) voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be
determined if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined
based upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot, "is an anathema to everything about
our democratic process."
201 0, was it known to
16. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010,

either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed
personal opinions that (1) the privacy of even illegal voters is of paramount concern to
him and (2) the most important duty of the Court is to assure that voters, even illegal
voters, of their right to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free

of threat of litigation.
17. That the transcript of the September 7, 2010 hearing (first received and reviewed on

September 11, 2010)
201 0) revealed for the first time Judge Hosack's harbored and
possessed unrevealed personal opinions that:
1. Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34 Chapter 20 of
the Idaho Code which specifically require (1) identifying voters by name, (2)
voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be determined

if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined based
upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot "is an anathema to everything
about our democratic process."
2. (1) the privacy of illegal voters is of paramount concern to him and (2) the most
important duty of the Court is to assure voters, even illegal voters, of their right
to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free of threat of

litigation.
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3. Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed personal opmlOns
opmwns that
election contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications upon the average
voter" that are "not a salutary connotation."
18. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 2, "an anathema to
everything about our democratic process" means that an election contest process as
estabiished by the Idaho Legisiature is detestabie, not agreeabie with, a curse upon, an
execration, and an evil to our democratic process.
19. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 3, for a person to state
that an election contest process established by the Idaho Legislature "has ramifications
upon the average voter that in the view of this court is not a salutary connotation"
means that this court, Judge Hosack, believes that an election contest is not
wholesome, healthy, or promoting or conducive to all of the City of Coeur d'Alene's
2009 City of Coeur d'
legal voters who cast their legal votes in the November 3,
3,2009
d'Alene
Alene
General Election.
20. In my opinion the statements made by Judge Hosack, in open court regarding the
merits of this statutorily mandated election contest and procedures is not based upon
the merits of this case.
21. This Affidavit, Motion to Disqualify, and Memorandum is not filed in an attempt to
oust Judge Hosack because of any adverse ruling. The most recent ruling of Judge
Hosack was to deny Defendant Kennedy's Motion for Summary Judgment. While the
same ruling also denied Plaintiff
Plaintiffss Motion to file a Third Amended Complaint because
of"colorfullanguage"
of
"colorful language" (fraud or corruption), Judge Hosack orally ruled from the bench
that Plaintiff would be permitted to put on evidence in that regard during the course of
the trial and, if appropriate, seek amendment of the pleadings at the end of the
testimony.
22. The statements made by Judge Hosack reflect a personally held bias and prejudice
against Plaintiff Brannon for bringing what he describes as a non-salutary (to voters)
action and bringing such an action that is "an anathema to everything about our
democratic process." These statements, made in open court, can only be based upon
his personal perception, unsupported by any case decision or treatise, reviewed by
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affiant, that this election contest is (1) not favorable to, healthful, or conducive to the
election process and the average voter, and (2) "is an anathema" (a vehement
denunciation, cursed, damned, reviled, loathed, or shunned) "to everything about our
democratic process."
23. It is my opinion that these statements, in open court, dramatically and clearly reveal a
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Judge Hosack to this election case, regardless of any evidence that will be introduced
at trial, and that these deep seated opinions will prevent him from having any
impartiality in any Judgment.

Starr Kelso

th
13th day of September, 2010 before me the undersigned Notary Public, personally
On this 13
appeared Starr Kelso known or identified to me, to be the person whose name is subscribed to
the within·
within · /rument, and cknowledged to me that the statements contained therein are true and
correct t. hebe
he be t of his b lief and that he executed the same.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Michael Haman attorney for Defendants
th
City and Weathers, and Defendant Kennedy's counsel Scott Reed and Peter Erbland on the 13
13th
day ofSepte
r, 2010.
r,2010.

Starr Kelso
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1

September 7, 2010; 1:31 p.m.

2

P R 0 C E E DIN
D I N G S
PRO

3

--000---ooo--

4

THE COURT:

This is in civil 09-10010 Brannon

5

versus City, and others.

6

proceedings.

7

checking with the clerk.

8

with regard to the 17th of September trial setting in

9

this case?

10

I

This is on the contempt

Have counsel received a notice?

I was

Did a written notice go out

was looking at the court minutes.

I

11

remember setting it for trial.

Thumbing through the

12

file, I didn't find a notice.

But the file is rather

13

thick, so I could have missed it.

14

counsel recall whether a written notice of that trial

15

setting has been received by counsel?

16

MR. MACOMBER:

Are counsel -- do

Your Honor, I received a notice

17

of trial that today was the court trial, scheduled

18

today.

19

that by fax back on August 19th at 2:30 in the

20

afternoon.

And nothing about a later date.

And I received

That's the only thing I received.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. REED:

August 19th.

Let's see.

My understanding, your Honor,

23

exactly what you have said, that the hearing upon the

24

motion was to be held today and trial was to be on the

25

17th.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. REED:

All right.
I don't recall receiving a notice,

3

but there's been a blizzard of papers, so I can't say

4

yes or no.
THE COURT:

5

Well, yeah, the notice of trial as

6

Mr. Macomber states does say the court trial scheduled

7

Tuesday, September 7th, contempt proceedings at 1:30.

8

The -- and that was done.

9

it's -- the notice is in error because the trial setting

That was -- that's on the --

10

was for September 17th.

11

reflect.

12

date that we have and that's the date we're going with.

13

That's what the court minutes

That's what the Court ordered.

That's the

So the notice of trial is misnamed, really.

14

It's a court hearing on the -- basically, the motion to

15

dismiss the contempt proceedings.

16

notice of trial setting.

17

And we'll get out a

The court minutes clearly reflect that that

18

was the order of the Court.

19

trial, remains set for trial on September 17th at

20

9:00 a.m.

21

All right.

The matter was set for

And although we're here on these

22

contempt proceedings, I do -- have had in the file here

23

Mr. Reed's order on motions.

24

counsel; although, Mr. Macomber's not really involved.

25

Mr. Kelso's not here.

SC 38417-2011
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1

from either Mr. Haman or Mr. Kelso.

2

objection to the form of the proposed order; is that

3

correct?

4

MR. REED:

5

THE COURT:

You've heard no

{Nods
(Nods head.)
All right.

The order, written

6

order doesn't reflect that the second amended -- motion

7

for second amended complaint was withdrawn, which I

8

think is what we actually talked about, but the end

9

result is the same.

The second amended motions have

10

been denied.

One was denied, I guess, for reasons that

11

had been withdrawn.

12

being no objection to the form of the order, we'll go

13

ahead and enter the order and the form submitted by

14

Mr. Reed.
MR. REED:

15

So we'll go ahead and-and -- there

Your Honor, in compliance with

16

Mr. Kelso's objection, I submitted another order that

17

said what he said, which wasn't what I recalled, but as

18

you point out, it doesn't make any difference.
THE COURT:

19

20

There's another order and another

objection?

21

MR. REED:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. REED:

Well-Well -Some of this stuff -- pardon?
I prepared an order and faxed it

24

over to the Court on Friday that reflected the fact that

25

he had objected and said there wasn't a motion to --
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1

that he had withdrawn the second

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. REED:

4

THE COURT:

5
6

Okay.
-- motion.
So there's another proposed order

that's been sent over to the Court that I haven't
MR. REED:

It was sent over.

But again, your

7

Honor, it's -- I don't think it makes any difference,

8

but yes, there's another order filed that somehow didn't

9

get upstairs.

10
11
12

THE COURT:

So it hasn't got to the Court

file, all right.
Well, I'll go ahead and fiddle with the

13

language and make the corrections.

14

a note here that has some scribblings from Mr. Kelso, so

15

I'll work that through and we'll go ahead and enter the

16

form, the order -- the form is -- doesn't make any real

17

difference because the substance is the same.

18

All right.

Apparently, there is

Then moving to what we're here

19

today on, which is the motion to dismiss the contempt

20

proceedings, and we now have the briefs submitted by the

21

parties pursuant to the briefing schedule.

22

have had an opportunity to review the parties' briefs.

23

So it is, of course, Mr. McCrory's motion to dismiss.

24

So Mr. Macomber?

25

MR. MACOMBER:
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1

Honor, the first thing I would like to bring up, most of

2

our pleadings centered on the sufficiency of the

3

affidavit, and I believe that is also a proper motion to

4

dismiss under 12(b) (6).

5

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction according to

6

12(b) (1) and (2).

7

two.

8

matter and the second is lack of jurisdiction over the

9

person.

10

But we also see a potential

Frankly, I'm not sure if it is one or

One is the lack of jurisdiction over the subject

This also has to do with the affidavit itself.

11

And I want to bring the Court's attention to a case

12

called Steiner v Gilbert, which is 144 Idaho 240.

13

it says on page 881 of that case, quoting out of the

14

Pacific Reporter, 159 P.3d 881, "Until the claimant can

15

provide a sufficient affidavit, the Court does not have

16

jurisdiction to proceed."

17

And

This is -- the Court says this is a contempt

18

case, and they're talking about sufficiency of the

19

affidavit under Idaho Code 7603.

20

affidavit constitutes the complaint which functions to

21

apprise the alleged contemnor of the particular facts of

22

which he is accused so that he may meet such accusations

23

at the hearing," and the case Steiner cites from In Re

24

Contempt of Reeves, which then the Court went on in

25

Steiner to say, "Until they can provide a sufficient
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1

affidavit, the Court does not have jurisdiction to

2

proceed," which leads us directly to the affidavit.

3

And then once I

the affidavit is really a

4

12(b) (6), your Honor, but we should talk about

5

jurisdiction initially.

6

affidavit, what we find is there is really nothing

7

that's required by the case law or the civil rules to

8

give the Court jurisdiction in this case.

9

move to look at Rule 75 at (c) (2), it talks about

And if we look at the Hazel

And if we

10

contempt not initiated by a judge, motion, and affidavit

11

must be commenced by motion and affidavit.

12

In this case, Counsel Reed, on behalf of

13

Defendant Kennedy, filed the affidavit of Christa Hazel.

14

And what it says in Rule 75(c)
75(c} (3) at the top of the new

15

rules page, it says, "The written charge must allege the

16

specific facts constituting the alleged contempt.

17

instance of contempt, if there's more than one, must be

18

set forth separately."

19

here.

Each

That was certainly not done

20

"If the alleged contempt is the violation of a

21

court order, the written charge or affidavit must allege

22

that either the respondent or the respondent's attorney

23

was served with a copy of the order or had actual

24

knowledge of it."

25

Honor, of any order issued by the Court related to

SC 38417-2011
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1

Mr. McCrory's behavior.

2

And then it closes out and it says, "The

3

written charge or affidavit need not allege facts

4

showing that the respondent's failure to comply was

5

willful."

6

see is this was filed on August 5th, 2010.

7

name.

8

And what she purports to have personal knowledge of is

9

that basically she has looked at various Web sites,

So when we go to the Hazel affidavit, what we

It says she is 18.

It gives her

She resides in Coeur d'Alene.

10

including OpenCDA.com.

11

that Mr. McCrory is subject to a court order.

12

doesn't allege that there is any interest that Christa

13

Hazel has in getting relief from this court.

14

She doesn't at any time allege
She

She doesn't allege that anything that she

15

cites in her affidavit in terms of Mr. McCrory's posting

16

to OpenCDA had anything to do with disrupting the

17

Court's process in any way, undermining the Court's

18

process or the Court's

19

again, there was no order.

There's really a bunch of statements about how

20

Ms. Hazel surfed the Web, but -- and then it doesn't

21

show anything about any damages to anyone.

22

Now, under the Steiner case, what it says

23

if -- well, it talks about the court order again, of

24

which there is none here.

25

be presented" -- this is -- I'm sorry, your Honor.
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1

Steiner quoting a case Jones v Jones 91 Idaho 578.

2

"When the contempt is not committed in the immediate

3

view and presence of the Court or a judge at chambers,

4

an affidavit shall be presented to the Court or a judge

5

of the facts constituting the contempt or a statement of

6

the facts by the referees or arbiters or other judicial

7

officer."

8
9

There's really no way that you could read
Christa Hazel's affidavit and see any allegation of a

10

contempt.

11

these things and that's it."

12

personified.

13

saw all
She says, "I surfed the Web and I sawall
It is insufficiency

And if this was given to Mr. McCrory, it

14

certainly would not apprise him of any particular facts

15

of which he is accused of contempt.

16

remember that the two contempt charges are composed of

17

my clients' affidavit being filed with this court by

18

Starr Kelso, which we should note in passing did not

19

suffer a contempt charge by Defendant Kennedy for

20

actually filing it.

21

And the Court will

And the second contempt charge is the posting

22

on OpenCDA after that affidavit was filed with the Court

23

when it was clearly a public record.

24

properly made a public record by filing with the Court

25

may be a question, but my client did not file that or
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1

cause it to be filed.

2

In fact, in his objection, Defendant Kennedy

3

makes a couple of statements about how if McCrory did

4

not file the affidavit himself, certainly he was in

5

league with Kelso to get it done.

6

Now, again, at that point, we're faced with
NOw,

7

the fact that Attorney Kelso is not accused of contempt

8

for actually filing it.

9

for the Court that it is good legal practice to capture

And I would just like to say

10

evidence as soon as it is available.

11

is why the affidavit appears to have been made.

12

events occurred.

13

And that, to me,
The

They were quite detailed.

Mr. McCrory's affidavit does show quite a bit

14

of detail about absentee ballot envelopes.

And so

15

capturing that information is not outside of the

16

boundaries of anything that a normal, good counsel would

17

not do.
And so when we get to the affidavit, we're

18

19

really left with nothing.

And we cannot -- we cannot

20

base the case on the pleadings of Mr. Kennedy in this

21

case.

22

allegations on the affidavit.

23

Mr. McCrory's first motion to dismiss based on that

24

12(b) {1)
(1) or (2).

25

questions about that before I move forward or if that

We have to base -- we have to base the
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1

should just ...
THE COURT:

2

3

Why don't you go ahead and present

your -- I'm sure Mr. Reed will have some response.
MR. MACOMBER:

4

Okay.

The next issue in this

5

case is actually insufficiency of process 12(b) (5).

6

Insufficiency of service of process.

7

this comes up is because in Rule 75, under the 75(d)

8

like David, nonsummary proceedings, service, time limits

9

at No.
No.2,
2, "If the respondent is not a party to the

And the reason

10

pending action in which the contempt proceedings are

11

brought, service shall be as provided in Rule 4, but the

12

respondent need not be serviced with a summons."

13

And when we go to Rule 4, what we find is a

14

standard rule on personal service in Idaho, which was

15

not accomplished in this case, but which is found at

16

Rule 4(c) --I'm
-- I'm sorry, Rule 4(d) (2), "Service upon

17

individuals," and this affidavit and motion were

18

required to be served personally on my client.

19

were not.

20

not my client's attorney, who is Starr Kelso.

21

They

They were actually served on someone who is

And if we look at the actual motion that was

22

filed with this court, motion to strike affidavit -- oh,

23

let's see.

24

the notice to William L. McCrory to appear.

25

a copy; although, it's not file stamped with the Court,

I'm sorry, your Honor.
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1

and there's an affidavit of service in there that says

2

that Steven Reed served it on my client at his house,

3

and I had not -- I had seen the notice given to Starr

4

Kelso.

So perhaps I should withdraw this portion, your

5

Honor.

I did not know that my client was personally

6

served by Steven Reed.

7

It appears that he was.

However, then we get to 12(b) (6), and we find

8

that even if he was served with the motion and

9

affidavit, he would have no idea what Ms. Hazel and her

10

affidavit meant to him.

11

NOw,
Now, I've discussed the affidavit somewhat.

12

And again, it's really completely insufficient to give

13

Mr. McCrory notice of any contempt before this court.

14

And, in fact, in the Hazel affidavit, she talks about

15

copies from the Web site and comments that were made by

16

various people, and then she gives a complete copy of

17

William McCrory's affidavit.

18

in her affidavit that says that there was any order of

19

the Court or any knowledge could be had on his part that

20

this contempt proceeding would pursue against him.

And there's really nothing

21

There is the case of In Re Contempt of Reeves,

22

which is 112 Idaho 574 where the Court on the Pacific --

23

no, I'm sorry, that is the Idaho page, page 581, says,

24

"In such a case, the affidavit constitutes the

25

complaint.
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1

contemnor of the particular facts of which he is accused

2

so that he may meet such accusations at the hearing.

3

Where the affidavit fails to allege all essential

4

material facts, the deficiency cannot be cured by proof

5

supplied at the hearing."

6

to this court, your Honor, and to my client, is

7

completely insufficient to assist him and to understand.

8
9

And so the affidavit provided

And if it puts sort of a bold underline under
that, I will share with the Court that I was hired and I

10

analyzed the case, and I thought I had a contract case

11

on my hand.

12

I assumed to be in my purview, nor criminal contempts,

13

which I will argue later is actually the situation here,

14

that there's a criminal sanction pending.

15

I have neither done civil contempts, which

And so related to the motion to dismiss, I

16

will not be belabor the Court with the other things that

17

we mentioned in the pleadings.

18

they've read the pleadings and I don't feel a need to

19

follow up further on that.

20

the motion to dismiss, and based on the situation here,

21

we, again, renew our request for attorney's fees and

22

costs regarding the motion and all this prior action.

23

The Court has stated

And so Plaintiff requests

The affidavit is so insufficient, it seems to

24

me that if Defendant Kennedy had actually done the

25

research on a civil contempt and then found out when a
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1

civil contempt turns into a criminal sanction, that this

2

probably wouldn't have occurred, or if it had, it

3

certainly would have occurred with a sufficient

4

affidavit as the complaint.

S
5

THE COURT:

6

MR. REED:

Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Reed?
Thank you, your Honor.

The new

7

charge made by Mr. Macomber starts off with looking at

8

Rule 75(c)
7S(c) subsection-subsection -- 7S(b)
-- get it right
75(b) in which
which--

9

yet.

7S(c) (2), contempt not initiated by the judge
75(c)

10

says, "All contempt proceedings, except those initiated

11

by the judge as provided, must be commenced by a motion

12

and affidavit."

13

There was a six-page motion filed -- seven
with this affidavit, which set forth

14

pages, actually

IS
15

in some detail the basis for the complaint.

16

and the affidavit have to be taken together.

17

The motion

Cases in which there was only an affidavit

18

filed are not apropos here.

We followed the rules

19

exactly by filing a motion and an affidavit.

20

get to what counsel opposed in the briefs that we

21

received, there was indeed an order of this court as I

22

set forth in my brief.

If I can

23

The order of the Court was from Judge Simpson.

24

Mr. Kelso started this process out by issuing a subpoena

25
2S

duces tecum to Kootenai County to bring all of the
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ballot records, the ballot envelopes and so forth.

2

Kootenai County opposed it and said that given enough

3

opportunity the parties can cast ballots to determine

4

the -- can evaluate the ballots to determine the caster

5

of the ballots by allowing Mr. Brannon or anybody else

6

unfettered access, appears to be realized.

7

ordered

8

9

They

sought an order for quashing the subpoena.
Judge Simpson followed that, and I provided to

the Court the transcript of the hearing before Judge

10

Simpson in which he agreed the secrecy of votes is

11

guaranteed by the Idaho constitution.

12

protects the secrecy of the ballots.

13

absentee ballot statute cited above are intended to

14

protect the secrecy of absentee voter ballots.

15

he quashed the subpoena.

16

Absolutely
Constitution

And then

What followed thereafter was an attempt to

17

comply with the statute, first of all, by appointing a

18

judge, Judge Marano, to look over the -- to supervise

19

the examination of the ballots, then they're followed

20

obviously as we just cited in -- well, as the

21

prosecuting attorney's affidavit recites, there were

22

negotiations between the prosecuting attorney and

23

between Starr Kelso, and they reached an agreement on

24

how this would be done and where it would be done, and

25

that Judge Marano would preside over that, and together
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they approved the form of the confidential agreement.

2

It's not a contract.

3

those who were not members of the clerk's office, pledge

4

that they will keep everything confidential and pledge

5

that -- not pledge, set forth that in the event they do

6

not, that they are going to be subject to contempt of

7

court.

8

restrictions.

9

have another order when there's been a previous order

It's an agreement in which all of

Plaintiff agreed to follow the Simpson
Those are the orders.

You don't have to

10

and then they agree to comply with it but do not.

11

That's our position.

12

As far as the particular action is concerned,

13

the county, of course, was not part of this lawsuit for

14

reasons I can't understand, but they have not been made

15

part of it by Mr. Kelso.

16

officer of the court on behalf of the Defendant Kennedy

17

who, in fact, was injured by those publication in the

18

paper and the rest of whatever went on was there.

19

he's not seeking -- it's not the sort of fence-line case

20

where you keep the gate open or keep the gate closed.

21

We filed this action as an

He's not injured in that sense.

But

He's just

22

injured in the general sense of this political lawsuit.

23

The Stevens (sic) versus Gilbert case, very

24

specifically -- 144 Idaho, very specifically says that

25

you're not confined to rule Idaho Code 7-6 and so forth,
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to all the listings there of what they're there.

2

quoting, "The Court has held that Idaho 7-611 does not

3

preclude alternative civil sanctions under common law or

4

Idaho Code 1-1603," quote, "Marks versus Vehlow.

5

court has the power to compel obedience to its

6

judgments, orders and process."

7

I'm

Every

Courts have recognized it doesn't attempt to

8

delimit the power recognized therein; therefore, doesn't

9

abuse its discretion by imposing reasonable sanctions

10

that are not specifically articulated.

11

unlimited power to enforce their orders and that's what

12

we're seeking.

13

Courts have

Counsel has -- well, and then I get to the

14

question to the motion to dismiss.

Motion to dismiss,

15

as we set forth, has a very high bar.

16

that I rather like the US Supreme Court decisions that

17

he cited, and I thought that if they had been applied

18

here, we could have got rid of this case in June, but

19

they were not applied here.

20

favor of dismissal.

I have to confess

Those are rather strict in

21

Our law, Copeland and Beta Theta (phonetic) I

22

quoted, issue's not whether the plaintiff will not only

23

prevail but whether he's entitled to offer evidence to

24

support the claims.

25

dismissal under 12(b) (6) is likely to be granted only in
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1

the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allegations

2

showing on the face of the complaint there's some

3

insurmountable bar to the reading.

4

reasons, we think the motion to dismiss should be

5

denied.

For all those

Counsel has mentioned something that has

6

7

occurred to me that is entirely separate and apart from

8

the motion to dismiss at the present time.

9

Mr. Macomber put together his brief, I was compelled

When

10

not compelled.

11

what we had previously cited.

12

East Fork Ditch Company 147 Idaho, which goes into great

13

detail on what contempt is.

14

I was invited to look at other law than
I came across Camp versus

We brought this action as a civil contempt.

15

That's all we were seeking.

16

been done here was wrong, should be subject perhaps to a

17

fine, perhaps to reprimand, something like that.

18

We were thinking what had

We were not seeking a criminal contempt.

Camp

19

versus East Fork Ditch Company makes an analysis of all

20

of this.

21

the Court ordered the contemnor not to do," which is the

22

situation here, "then under Idaho law the Court can only

23

impose a criminal contempt sanction, a determinate fine

24

and/or determinate jail sentence.

25

go back in time and not do what he did."

It says, "If the contempt involves doing what
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1
2

looking at a jury trial on a criminal charge.

3

I believe sincerely that what was done here was wrong, I

4

do not believe that this should be a case in which

5

Mr. McCrory should be subject to a criminal charge.

6

was unaware of that at the time we started this.
Talk about a jury trial.

7

Be happy to do that.

And while

I

I don't mind the

8

jury trial.

Can handle that.

9

just don't think that the punishment that might come or

10

even the record that might come in a criminal action

11

would be appropriate.

12

I

I point this out to the Court as long as we

13

understand that the motion to dismiss should be denied

14

and that we had reasonable cause for bringing the same,

15

and that we proceeded at this point without any

16

justification for attorney's fees or anything like that.

17

I would be willing to have the contempt charge

18

dismissed.

19

This is new information.

I was not aware of

20

it until I finished completing the brief I had and put

21

the stuff together and started looking at that

22

particular language.

23

Mr. McCrory can undo what has been done, it makes it a

24

criminal contempt charge, and that is my own personal

25

opinion that that is not an appropriate punishment for
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1

what was done and the lesser punishment is not available

2

based upon that opinion.

3

THE COURT:

All right.

4

MR. MACOMBER:

Mr. Macomber?

Thank you, your Honor.

5

Defendant Kennedy provides no legal support of the

6

contention that the motion and the affidavit need to be

7

considered together by this court or by Mr. McCrory upon

8

delivery by AAYS at his home of the affidavit.

9

there is

10

I will find the case that says they cannot

rely on the pleadings.

11

And

They must rely on the affidavit.

In any case, I will come back to that.

12

Kennedy states there was an order from Judge Simpson.

13

The only order that I'm aware of is the order generated

14

on March 8th, and you saw the transcript at least was

15

sent by counsel for Mr. Kennedy related to the hearing

16

that day.

17

Simpson would have required a confidentiality agreement

18

of this sort.

19

And nothing in the order indicates that Judge

I can quote directly from the order.

It says,

20

"It is further ordered that the plaintiff and Kootenai

21

County, by and through their respective counsel, confer

22

with each other to determine a plausible procedure for

23

inspection.

24

appropriate place and method, as well as an appropriate

25

presiding officer to be appointed by this court if
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1

inspection is so ordered pursuant to Idaho Codes 34-2018

2

and 2019."

3

The place and method of inspection really has

4

nothing to do with a confidentiality agreement.

5

confidentiality agreement would have to do with a

6

condition of an inspection imposed by the holder of the

7

documents, Kootenai County, on anyone that may wish to

8

view them.

9

The

The order doesn't mention that.
The order -- I just -- I don't see anything

10

calling for this document.

11

the appropriate place, I suppose I should cover first,

12

was here in Kootenai County at the elections office.

13

And the method was that, as I recall Judge Marano, was

14

to actually view the ballots and Mr. McCrory was one of

15

those people that observed Judge Marano counting the

16

ballots.

17

The method of inspection was

That's my understanding of the method.
The method by the Judge

and I think it's

18

pertinent here to mention that there was quite a bit of

19

discussion in that March hearing related to the prized

20

status of the ballot, the secret ballot in this country,

21

in this county, in this case.

22

we see is that there's been a conflation continually

23

between ballots and envelopes.

24

Mr. McCrory's affidavit and views the ballot envelope

25

copies that are attached with it, what the Court will
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1

see is that there's no mention of Mr. Kennedy.

2

no mention of Mr. Brannon.

3

knowledge of the way those ballots are shown in the

4

envelopes, and, in fact, they're not.

5

There's

There's no mention of any

Judge Simpson found earlier that when the

6

ballots are separated from the envelopes, they're mixed

7

into the pool for that precinct and therefore you would

8

have to look at all the ballots in the whole precinct in

9

order to figure out which were the absentee and which

10
11

were not.
And now my understanding is, from reading the

12

case filings, is that those ballots are now

13

irretrievably mixed; that you really wouldn't be able to

14

tell an absentee ballot from a ballot that was cast on

15

the day in the election booth.

16

conflation here where suddenly my client is being

17

accused of somehow undermining this court's ability to

18

analyze a ballot situation, which is the claim in this

19

case, because of anomalies he noted in the envelopes.

20

And we just don't think that's applicable at all.

21

The next thing is counsel for Defendant

So there's been a

22

Kennedy says that there has been some sort of injury to

23

his client by publication in the paper or some --

24

perhaps the public filing with the Court once it becomes

25

public record, there's been some injury, but there's no
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information presented to the Court about how he's been

2

injured by my client's rendition of his inspection of

3

envelopes.
My client did not inspect the ballots.

4

In

5

fact, I'm not aware that Judge Marano has tendered to

6

this court any information about the actual ballots that

7

he inspected.

8

at all to Defendant Kennedy.

9

what we have is it would be proper for the Court to see

And so we're not seeing any injury here
And I still believe that

10

that this is really a contract breach claim by an

11

implied third-party beneficiary, Kennedy, because

12

Kootenai County didn't say that he violated the

13

agreement.

14

Certainly there's been no pleadings here by

15

Kootenai County.

16

standing whatsoever.

17

Court.

18

the Web.

19

process could be injured by my client's rendition of

20

ballot envelope anomalies.

21

Christa Hazel appears to have no
I haven't seen her before the

She submitted an affidavit that said she surfs
It's very difficult to see how this court's

And so we have all that, your Honor, and then

22

we have the pleadings of Defendant Kennedy in this case.

23

And, for example, there's a brief in motion of support

24

of summary judgment filed by Mr. Kennedy on August 2nd,

25

brief in support of motion for summary judgment, and on
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page 10, Defendant Kennedy states, "Affidavit of William

2

L. McCrory regarding his observations with copies of

3

some absentee ballots."

4

ballots.

5

be determined for which candidate any absentee ballot

6

was cast, there is no issue of material fact."

7

Defendant Kennedy has said, On my behalf, I'd like this

8

court to recognize that Bill McCrory's affidavit

9

presents the Court with no issue of material fact, even

Actually, he did not view

He viewed ballot envelopes.

"Since it cannot

And so

10

where they say he viewed ballots when he didn't; he

11

viewed envelopes.

12

And this actually occurs at several cases.

On

13

page 12 of that brief, Defendant Kennedy talks about and

14

cites a case Noble v Ada County Election Board, and it

15

talks about hand delivery and it talks about ballots.

16

And it says, you know, the Court would not -- the Court

17

would not cancel those ballot votes that were made

18

because they didn't want to disenfranchise the electors,

19

but it says nothing about ballot envelopes, which have

20

absolutely no information for this court for plaintiffs

21

or defendants in this case related to the gravamen of

22

the case, which is a 5-ballot difference, as I

23

understand it.

24
25

And so, your Honor, we're not seeing any
situation where there's been either a violation of a
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1

known order -- and frankly, your Honor, I need to say

2

that, frankly, I'm surprised at Kootenai County and

3

counsel for plaintiff in this case and defendant in this

4

case attempting to really hijack this court's remedy for

5

violations against this court, and say, If you do

6

anything with these materials, you'll be subject to

7

contempt of court.

8
9

Well, I just don't think anybody has that
power in Idaho, your Honor.

I think the Court has that

10

power and the Court's -- the Court should dismiss this

11

case, and perhaps this is back to my contract cause of

12

action here, but I just don't see any benefit to the

13

Court to allowing parties believe that they can go out

14

and write a third-party contract unviewed by the Court,

15

some -- call it a method of viewing discovery which has

16

been ordered by the Court, and then hijack the Court's

17

remedy for a violation of the Court's process, the

18

court's orders.

19

that we don't want to see taken in any case much less

20

this one.

21

your Honor.

This seems to me a step down a road

And so that's all I have to say presently,

22

THE COURT:

23

Crawford stipulated dismissal?

24
25

Do you have a response to the

MR. MACOMBER:

My understanding of the

response is that the dismissal is stipulated with each
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1

party carrying their own fees and costs; is that

2

correct?

3

MR. REED:

That's correct.

4

MR. MACOMBER:

All right.

Your Honor, I'll

5

need to counsel with my client briefly and then respond

6

if that's all right.

7

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you want to have a

8

moment to do that or is it something you need

9

something you're prepared to --

10

MR. MACOMBER:

Well, I think we can just take

11

a moment and do that right now.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

If you think -- if you have

13

sufficient time to make the decision, fine.

14

don't, I mean, that's understandable, too.

15
16

MR. MACOMBER:

not

If you

Your Honor, my client has

decided to reject the offered stipulation.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

18

Now, in terms of the -- your argument of the

19

powers of the Court and hijacking the remedy and so on,

20

just on a generic question, parties want to jointly

21

discover some sort of records.

22

they -- there's confidentiality issues, secrecy issues,
they--

23

for whatever reason, whether it's antitrust.

24

make any -- just a very generic question.

25

stipulate to an order allowing the parties to look at
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1

these items and then hold that information in

2

confidence, then the Court so orders based upon the

3

stipulation orders the discovery to go forward and the

4

parties hold the matters in confidence.

5

One of the parties then publishes that

6

information on the Internet.

Would the Court have the

7

power to step in at that point and -- I mean, your

8

point, you know, there's no damage.

9

know, there's no affidavits and so on.

There's no, you
But under the

10

inherent powers of the Court, could the Court hold the

11

party that inspected these items pursuant to an order of

12

confidentiality and then turn right around and publish

13

them on the Internet, could the Court hold that party in

14

contempt?

15

MR. MACOMBER:

Your Honor, I think the power

16

of the Court in the pending case is plenary, and if the

17

Court finds something that occurred in a case that it

18

can act sua sponte regarding any belief that it has,

19

that there has been a disruption of the process or a

20

contempt has occurred.

21

believe that Judge Simpson issued this order or ever

22

actually saw the stipulation or that the stipulation

23

said here's a copy of our confidentiality agreement and

24

thereafter approved it.

25

THE COURT:
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1

talking about -- I'm aware of those issues, but I am-am --

2

in the absence of an order

3

stipulation of confidentiality here, and my question

4

talks about an order being then entered based upon that

5

stipulation to confidentiality.

I mean, there's a

There's no question that that order, that

6
7

order was not entered.

And the reference by Mr. Reed is

8

backed by prior orders by Judge Simpson and so on and so

9

forth, and so we bog down the facts of this case.

But

10

my question is just, I mean, would not the Court have

11

the power to hold that party in contempt?

12

know, I said you could look at these box of records and

13

subject to confidentiality and not disclosing it to

14

third parties, I'm looking at an Internet publication

15

here of the items you just inspected pursuant to my

16

order.

17

in contempt?

18

Saying, you

Don't you think the Court could hold that party

MR. MACOMBER:

I think if the Court found that

19

the nature of the method agreed upon by the parties was

20

clear enough, that it would indicate to the Court that a

21

contempt should be found, but then I think as Counsel

22

Reed has stated, then it turns into a criminal sanction

23

as opposed to a civil because now McCrory cannot

24

avoid -- he can't unring the bell.

25

THE COURT:
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1

okay.

2

as best -- as best you could.

3

Fine.

The -- I guess you answered the question

Well, we don't have a stipulated agreement to

4

dismiss the contempt proceedings.

5

course, a power to award attorney fees or those kinds of

6

decisions is obviously a decision by the Court.

7

The

and, of

So certainly I don't need to have -- don't

8

have to have a stipulation in order to go ahead and

9

basically dismiss the contempt proceedings.

There are

10

some very meritorious arguments here raised by

11

Mr. Macomber with regard to the technical inadequacies

12

of this particular contempt proceeding.

13

And I'm not certain that we necessarily need a

14

trial for the Court to resolve those.

15

hand, the Court has a concern in this litigation about

16

the rights of the citizen voters.

17

litigation which may be and no doubt is and should be

18

important in litigants has a ramification upon the

19

average voter that in the view of this court is not a

20

salutary connotation.

21

On the other

This type of

And there's been arguments even made in open

22

court that because this is an election case, a court

23

should exercise extraordinary powers never used in civil

24

litigation before in the history of American

25

jurisprudence and haul citizens back at their own cost
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1

into court for a hearing for trial because they voted.

2

That's very disturbing to this court.

3

The wisdom of the American democracy is not

4

delivered by the fiercely partisan voting.

The wisdom

5

of the American democracy is delivered by the average

6

citizen that goes down to the voting place on the day of

7

the election and votes as they see best to serve their

8

community and does so out of public duty.

9

they have some crusade or some test point that they want

Not because

10

to prove, but because they want to see their community

11

work.

12

To have litigation, publishing voters' names,

13

calling in whether their affidavits are correct, whether

14

they're legal or illegal, whether they can be hauled

15

into court, grilled by a judge with regard to their

16

votes, is an anathema to everything about our democratic

17

process.

18

So the secrecy, the confidentiality, the

19

privacy of the voter is of paramount concern to the

20

Court, and some apparent disregard of those issues by

21

litigants or participants is of concern to this court.

22

I think that Judge Simpson's order was very

23

clear.

The confidentiality, the most important duty of

24

the Court is to assure the voter of their right to vote

25

and do so freely and free of interference and certainly
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1

free of the threat of litigation.

I recognize all the

2

procedural difficulties, and I'm going to have to deal

3

with that.

4

this court has advised Mr. McCrory that the Court's not

5

going to pursue criminal sanctions if Mr. Reed's

6

correct.

7

position where the Court is going to dismiss the

8

proceedings.

9

thing left are criminal remedies, and the Court itself

And there may well be issues that indeed

I guess the Court has worked itself into a

Because according to Mr. Reed, the only

10

advised Mr. McCrory that there were only civil

11

sanctions.

12

the case based upon the orders of the Court itself.

13

So may be that the Court needs to dismiss

But I'm certainly -- and if there was a

14

stipulation and agreement, the Court would not have any

15

essence to do so, but the concern here of -- I recognize

16

all the technical difficulties.

17

difficulties are very real.

18

technical difficulties now are created by the Court in

19

which Mr. Reed argues today, and we may not be able to

20

proceed.

The technical

Indeed, some of the

21

On the other hand, in a very broad picture, we

22

have a spirit of confidentiality, if not a letter of the

23

law.

24

far as this court can see, it was utterly, blatantly,

25

intentionally, recklessly violated.

But certainly a spirit of confidentiality.
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1

taken likely.

2

its own decision.

3

Court will do that.

4

The Court needs to consider this and make
Parties not having stipulated, the

But the matter remains set for trial on the

5

17th of September.

I have -- I'm obviously going to be

6

focusing on issues in this case, but it may well be,

7

during the course of the trial, may well -- and who

8

knows, the trial of the case may still be going on on

9

Friday and perhaps all we would do is address procedural

10

issues on the time set of 9:00 o'clock on 17th of

11

February -- September.

12

On the other hand, I'm going to look at the

13

particular issue here raised by Mr. Macomber here

14

which -- and Mr. Reed, which basically says, well,

15

really, this is only a criminal contempt proceeding at

16

this point.

17

advised Mr. McCrory that the Court's only advancing with

18

regard to civil contempt, the Court may well just decide

19

to dismiss the proceedings and be done with it on its

20

own motion between now and September 17th.

21

that's obviously the first thing we would be addressing

22

at 9:00 a.m. on September 17th.

23

And if that's true, the Court, having

If not,

So at this point, we'll just take the matter

24

under advisement and pending further rulings of the

25

Court or be addressed again at 9:00 a.m. on
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1

September 17th.

All right?

2

MR. REED:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. REED:

Your Honor.
We're in recess.

Well, yes?

Just to make it formal of record

5

for the reasons I have stated on behalf of my client, I

6

would move to dismiss the proceeding with the

7

understanding that the costs and attorney's fees would

8

not be involved, but I felt very strongly that we should

9

not be going through a criminal trial and there doesn't

10

seem to be any alternative to that based upon these

11

orders, so I present that to the Court for your

12

consideration.

13

THE COURT:

Mr. Macomber, you agree, I think,

14

with Mr. Reed's position at this point, correct?

15

mean, as far as if the -- if we do proceed in this

16

matter, you would agree with Mr. Reed that contrary to

17

the Court's advice to Mr. McCrory at our last hearing,

18

indicating this was a civil contempt proceeding, the

19

Court is actually limited to having to proceed for as a

20

criminal contempt, and that's -- you agree with Mr. Reed

21

on that point, do you not?

22

MR. MACOMBER:

Yes, your Honor.

I

The case of

23

Camp v East Fork Ditch, 137 Idaho 850, is quite clear on

24

this point.

25

to a point where I need to notify the Court that I have
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no idea about Idaho criminal law.

2

fit not to dismiss the case, then I will be submitting a

3

motion to look for substitute counsel because I -- the

4

case goes into quite a bit of detail about the criminal

5

protections that become attached, if you will, to these

6

types of sanctions.

7

Honor.

8

so I will find myself at sea

9

And if the Court sees

And I am a property lawyer, your

I have no idea about Idaho criminal defense and

THE COURT:

All right.

10

MR. MACOMBER:

11

THE COURT:

in such an environment.

Well, we can -- again, I'm going

12

to take it under advisement and it may well -- may well

13

be able to resolve the matter.

14

through and prior to September 17th.

15

at 9:00 a.m. on September 17th, if for some reason the

16

Court is up for the notion that it is, in fact, a

17

criminal contempt proceeding and we are going to proceed

18

in the criminal contempt proceeding contrary to what the

19

Court advised Mr. McCrory at the initial hearing, if, in

20

fact, you wish to move to continue at that point in time

21

in order to substitute counsel and address the issue

22

that would, of course, be granted.

23

it's a different -- you would find yourself dealing with

24

a different proceeding on the morning of September 17th

25

than you had been advised by the Court if it was, in
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fact, going to occur.

So if you needed additional time

2

for that purpose regardless of whatever objections might

3

be raised by the other side, you certainly would be

4

granted that right to do that.

5

MR. MACOMBER:

6

THE COURT:

7

right.

I

Thank you, your Honor.
understand your position.

All

Then court's in recess.

8

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at

9

2:31 p.m.)
2:31p.m.)

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25
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1

STATE OF IDAHO
SS:

2
3

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
I, Keri Veare, a notary public and duly

4

certified court reporter in and for the State of Idaho,

5

DO HEREBY CERTIFY:

6
7
8
9

That the foregoing proceedings was taken on
the date and at the time and place herein stated;
That the foregoing is a true and correct
transcription, to the best of my ability, of my

10

shorthand notes taken down at said time and place in the

11

above-entitled litigation;

12

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any

13

of the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have

14

no interest in the outcome of said litigation.

15
16

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and seal this 9th day of September, 2010.

17
18
19

KERI VEARE, RPR, CSR 675

20

Court Reporter, Notary Public for the
State of Idaho, residing in Coeur

21

d'Alene, Idaho.
22
My Notary Expires:

23

5/6/2011

24

25
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n. pl. a·nath·e·mas
1. A formal ecclesiastical ban, curse, or excommunication.
2. A vehement denunciation; a curse: "the sound of a witch's
anathemas in some unknown tongue" (Nathaniel Hawthorne).
3. One that is cursed or damned.
4. One that is greatly reviled, loathed, or shunned:
"Essenualisrrr-a belief in natural, immutable sex differences
-is anathema to postmodernists, for whom sexuality itself,
along with gender, is a 'social construct'"
construct''' (Wendy Kaminer).
[Late Latin anathema, doomed offering, accursed thing, from
Greek, from anatithenai, anathe-, to dedicate: ana-, ana+ ti thenai, to put; see dhe- in Indo-European roots.]
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npl-mas
1. a detested person or thing he is anathema to me
2. (Christianity 1
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curse of excommunication or a formal denunciation of a doctrine
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noun abomination, bete noire, enemy, pariah, bane, bugbear
Violence was anathema to them.
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To a people of ttis nature the Homeric epos would be
inacceptable, and the post-Homeric epic,
epiC, with its
conventional atmosphere, its trite and hackneyed diction,
and its insincere sentiment, would be anathema.
Collection Of Hesiod, Homer and Homerica by Homer

View in context
Paurs perfection, that he would wish to be anathema
from Christ, for the salvation of his brethren, it shows much
of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity with Christ
himself
The Essays by Bacon. Sir Francis View in context
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1 message
stan.kelso@frontier.com <starr.kelso@front!er.com>
To: kelsolawoffice@gmail.com

Sun, Sep 12, 2010 at 12:17 PM

sal-u-tar-y
sal•u•tar•y
'seal ye,lEr
ye,tEr iShow Spelled[sal-yuh-ter-ee]
'seel
Spelled[sal-yuh-ter-ee) Show IPA
-adjective
1.
favorable to or promoting health; healthful.
2.
promoting or conducive to some beneficial purpose; wholesome.
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
.· Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
83 816
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261

fD-·R I ~~~DEP~UW

Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,

CB-09-10010
Case No. CB-09-1001O

Plaintiff,
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ruDGE HOSACK PURSUANT
TO IRCP RULE 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) and (4)

vs.
D'ALENE,
ALENE, IDAHO,
CITY OF COEUR D'
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney Starr Kelso, and
Ru1e 40 (d) (2)(A) (1) and (4) moves this Court to
pursuant to Idaho Ru1es
Rilles of Procedure Rille
disqualify himself for and based upon the grounds of (1) interest and (2) bias and/or prejudice
against Plaintiff Brannon and this election contest as being not a salutary connotation to the legal
Alene and an anathema to everything about our American
d'Alene
voters of the City of Coeur d'
democratic process.
This motion incorporates, as if set forth herein word for word, the affidavits, transcript of
the Contempt Hearing held on September 7, 2010, and the Memorandum of Law filed herewith.

Starr Kel 0,
o, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Michael Haman attorney for Defendants
ciz
CiZ and Weathers and Scott Reed and Peter Erbland attorneys for Defendant Kennedy on the
13 day
o~ember, 2010.
dayo~ember,

0~~
O~~

Starr Kelso
1

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ruDGE HOSACK
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Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
rd
923 N. 33rd
Street
P.O. Box 2155
Alene, ID 83816-2155
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Telephone: (208) 667-6287
Facsi!!lile: (208) 676-1683
ISB # 4784

+-6--~EPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene/Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-2009-10010

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE,
D' ALENE, et al,

DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendants City of Coeur d' Alene and its Clerk, by and through their
counsel of record, and hereby submit their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the
Court's Pre-Trial Order. Said Defendants adopt the Findings and Conclusions submitted by the
Defendant Kennedy. In addition:

FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

On August 18,2009,
18, 2009, the City Council for the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene entered into an

Agreement with Kootenai County whereby the Clerk ofthe District Court of
ofKootenai
Kootenai County would

DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -1
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d'Alene
2009, under
conduct the general municipal election for the City of Coeur d'
Alene on November 3,
3,2009,
the supervision of the City Clerk for the City of Coeur d' Alene. Said agreement was authorized
pursuantto Idaho Code§§
Code §§ 67-2332,67-.2326, et. seq., and 34-1401. This Court has concluded that
the subject contract was legal and valid.
B.

On November 3, 2009, Kootenai County supervised and conducted the County Bond

election as well as general elections for various municipalities, including the general election for the
No.22 for the City of Coeur d'
City of Coeur d' Alene, which included election for Council Seat No.
Alene.
C.

On November 9, 2009, the Elections Manager for the Office of Kootenai County

Elections, under the supervision of Dan English, Clerk of the District Court of Kootenai County,
prepared a report of the election results and presented the same to the City for the final canvass of
votes for the November 3,2009,
3, 2009, general election for the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene.
Alene. This final election
results was presented to the City Clerk for the City of Coeur d' Alene.
D.

On November 9,2009,
9, 2009, the Mayor and Council for the City of Coeur d' Alene met per

Idaho Code § 50-467 for the purpose of canvassing the results of the City of Coeur d' Alene general
election. The City Council voted to accept the canvass of votes and authorize the City Clerk,
Defendant Susan Weathers, to sign any and all necessary documents formalizing the election results
as set forth in the canvass.
E.

On January 5, 2010, the City ofCoeurd' Alene installed those candidates who were

declared elected by the City Council for the City of Coeur d' Alene.

DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW --22
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F.

On March 3,2010,
3, 2010, the Court dismissed all claims levied by the Plaintiff against the

City of Coeur d' Alene, and in doing so declared that the City's contract with the County of Kootenai
to oversee, supervise and conduct the City of Coeur d' Alene's General Election was valid and legal.

G.

On May 25, 2010, the Court Ordered that the City of Coeur d'Alene
d' Alene and
a.nd its Clerk

shall be proper parties to the subject lawsuit for purposes of carrying out and executing any and all
orders issued by the Court relating to the Plaintiff's claims. No other claims levied by the Plaintiff
against the City of Coeur d' Alene were reinstated. Further, the Court reaffirmed the validity of the
subject contract and declared that the County oversaw, supervised and conducted the subject
election.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

d'Alene,
Alene, or any of its employees, violated
There is no evidence that the City of Coeur d'

any provisions of Title 50, Chapter 4, or Title 34 in relation to the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene
d'Alene
Alene
General Election. And, moreover, as noted the subject contract between the City of Coeur d'
and the County of Kootenai regarding said County's supervision and conduct ofthe subject election
was valid and legal.
B.

There is no evidence that Kootenai County, a non-party, or any of its employees,

violated any provisions of Title 50, Chapter 4, or Title 34 in relation to the 2009 City of Coeur d'
Alene General Election.
C.

There is no evidence that the County knowingly received any illegal votes; and, there

is no evidence of any error committed during the City's canvass or in declaring the result of the
election.

DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF
FACT
OFF
ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 3
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D.

There is insufficient evidence ofillegal votes cast that would alter or change the result

of the subject election for Seat 2 for the City of Coeur d'
Alene.
d'Alene.

E.

There is insufficient testimony from any alleged illegal voter regarding which

Alene General
candidate said witness voted for in regard to Seat 2 in the 2009 City of Coeur d' .Alene

Election, as required under I.C. 34-2017.
F.

The Defendant Mike Kennedy was lawfully elected and installed to Seat 2 for the City

d'Alene
Alene in the 2009 General Election for the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene.
Alene.
Council for the City of Coeur d'
G.

d'Alene
The Amended Complaint filed against the City of Coeur d'
Alene and its Clerk, of

which the claims against said Defendants were dismissed on March 3, 2010, was pursued against

said Defendants frivolously and unreasonably.

2

Dated this _!_l_ day of September, 2010.
HAMAN LAW OFFICE

.-----/
------/

By
//
L -..... ._______
By~~~-----~---------_-

Michael L. Haman
Attorneys for Defendants City/Clerk

DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OFF
OF FACT
ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWLAW - 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING

this/~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
/ ~ day of September, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by the
method described below to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 664-6261

u.S.
- - - U.S.

Scott Reed
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 765-5117

- - - U.S. First class mail

Peter Erbland
Paine Hamblen
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101
P.O. BoxE
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 664-6338

First class mail
--Fax
--___ Hand Delivery

,.......
/' Fax
___ Hand Delivery

---

U.S. First class mail
,./".
_./. Fax
--___ Hand Delivery
----.,---,-

H~
Michael L. Haman

DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWLAW - 5
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Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
rd
Street
923 N. 33rd
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155
Telephone: (208) 667-6287
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683
ISB # 4784
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, Weathers

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-2009-10010
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al,
aI,
Defendants.
COMES NOW the Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene and its Clerk, by and through their
counsel of record, and hereby submits the following list of exhibits identifying those exhibits the
Defendants anticipate offering at the trial of this matter. The Plaintiff
Plaintiffhas
has previously been provided
with copies of these exhibits, or has inspected them, or may inspect them upon reasonable request.

A.

Resolution No. 09-033.

B.

Agreement between Kootenai County and City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene dated 8-18-09.

C.

Designated Polling Places 2009.

D.

Correspondence and correction sheet re designated polling places dated 8-31-09.

DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - 1
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E.

Canvass of Votes prepared by Kootenai County for and presented to City of Coeur
d' Alene dated November 9, 2009.
d'Alene

F.

City Council Meeting Minutes for November 9, 2009.

G.

2009 Election Manual for City Clerks

H.

Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant City's Interrogatories dated July 9, 2010.

I.

Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant Kennedy's Interrogatories dated July 9,2010.
9, 2010.

Defendants reserve the right to supplement this disclosure and to utilize as exhibits any
exhibits offered by the Plaintiff and admitted. Defendants also notify the Court and all parties that
it will utilize at trial any and all relevant and material pleadings submitted and filed in this case.
The Defendants reserve the right to modify andlor
and/or supplement this disclosure as discovery
warrants and upon Plaintiff's compliance with the Court's Pre-Trial Order. The Defendant further

andlor the Defendant
reserves the right to utilize any and all exhibits identified by the Plaintiff and/or
Kennedy.

tbis ~
Dated this
_jJ__ day of August, 2010.
HAMAN LAW OFFICE, P.c.
P .C.

BYd~·
a~·

By
Michael L. Haman
Attorneys for Defendant

DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING

_]j_ day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3.L
of the foregoing Defendants' Exhibit List by the method described below to:

Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600
Coeur d'
Alene, Idaho 83816
d'Alene,
Fax: 208 664-6261
Scott Reed
401 Front Ave.
Ste.
205
Ste.205
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene,
d' Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 765-5117
Peter Erbland
Paine Hamblen
P.O. BoxE
Coeur d'
Alene, Idaho 83816
d'Alene,
Fax: 208 664-6338

u.S. First class mail
U.S.

-t/---,.~ Fax
-t7~~Fax

___ Hand Delivery

u.S. First class mail
U.S.

V
t/ Fax
---=------"---

___ Hand Delivery

u.S. First class mail
U.S.
Fax
___ Hand Delivery
U.S. First class mail
- - - Fax
___ Hand Delivery
---Hand
J

Michael Haman

DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - 3
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LIST OF EXHIBITS
CASE NUMBER

CV 09-10100

DATE

8/31/10

TITLE OF CASE D' ALENE,, ET AL.
___
-_
- BRANNON V. CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE

D
D
D

PLAINTIFF'S ExHIBITS (list numerically)
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (list alphabetically)
THIRD PARTY EXHIBITS
Description

No.

A

Resolution No. 09-033.

B

Agreement between Kootenai County
and City of Coeur d'Alene
d' Alene dated 8-1809.

cC

Designated Polling Places 2009.

D

Correspondence and correction sheet re
designated polling places dated 8-31-09.

E

Canvass of Votes prepared by Kootenai
County for and presented to City of
Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene dated November 9, 2009.

F

City Council Meeting Minutes for
November 9, 2009.

G

2009 Election Manual for City Clerks

H

Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant City's
Interrogatories dated July 9,2010.
9, 2010.

I

Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant
Kennedy's Interrogatories dated July 9,
2010.

SC 38417-2011
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Reserve
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Peter C. Erbland, 158
ISB #2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, llP
LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Phone(208)664.S115
Phone (208) 664a8115
FAX (208) 664w6338
664..S338
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P. O.
0. Box
BoxA
A
Coeur d'Alene, 10
ID 83816
664-2161
Phone (208) 664·2161
FAX (208)
(208} 765-5117

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,

Case No. CV·09·10010
CV-09-10010
)

V,.
Vs.

Plaintiff,

SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
#2;
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2i

Defendants.

)

)
)
)
)

)

/-/
,

CORRECTED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE
SEPTEMBER 10,2010
10, 2010

)

)
)
)

On March 22,2010
22, 2010 defendant Kennedy filed a Motion in Limine with supporting brief
to exclude all evidence related to Tammy Farkes, Monica Paquin and Alan Friend all of
whom cast votes from Canada and all of whom were named in the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff has since added to the list of challenged absentee voters Kimberly Gagnon
and Denise Dobslaff who voted absentee from British Columbia. Each of the five is a
registered voter within the City of Coeur d'Alene,
d'Alene.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

1
SC 38417-2011
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The plaintiff's Preliminary Witness List identifies the five as witnesses but none will
appear. (Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Plaintiff's Preliminary Witness List Names other
18, 24, 25, 26 ,27,
28, 49 and 50) to testify as to residence and/or
witnesses (Nos. 17, 18,24,25,
,27,28,49

conversations with one or more of these five voters.
As set forth in the initial brief in support, each of these persons mailed an absentee
ballot which was received, properly checked against registration and counted along with
all other absentee ballots. Idaho Code Section 34-107 (3) allows for absentee votes from
qualified electors,
electors. The Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, cited and
attached to the opening brief, allows out of state and out of country absentee voting.
As stated under oath in their respective applications for absentee ballots, all of
these five persons retain residence in Coeur d'Alene for voting purposes.

All of the five

had the right under federal and state laws to vote in the Coeur d'Alene City Election on
November 3, 2009.
The actions of the county election officials was purely ministerial. Deedie Beard as
the Election Manager and her staff had a "clear legal duty" to accept the absentee ballots
as received without any discretion to investigate or to reject the same. Utah Power &Ught
Companyv. Campbell, 1081daho
108 Idaho 950,953,703 P.2d 714,
Dairy Products, 107 Idaho 6,9,684
6, 9, 684 P.2d 983,

(1985), Dalton v.ldaho

(1984).

The federal and state law is clear and explicit. Plaintiff in the five months since this
motion in limine was filed has presented no contrary legal authority and for good and
sufficient reason. There is none.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

SC 38417-2011
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The proposed testimony of witnesses Nos. 17, 18,.
18,- 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 49 and 50 is
irrelevant and should be excluded along with any and all testimony or evidence offered
relating to any of these fiVe
fIVe voters.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1Oth
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served
selVed by fax, this 10th
day of September, 2010 to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P. 0.
O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 664-6261
Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office
P. 0.
O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 676-1683
Arthur B. Macomber
Attorney at Law
408 E. Sherman Avenue - Suite 215
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
FAX (208) 664-

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK09131 OA
Session Date: 09113/2010
09/13/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob.
Officer(s):
Prob.Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0002
Case number: CV2009-1 0010
00 10
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Defendant: Eta!,
Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant( s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0003.
09/13/2010
09:19:16
Recording Started:
09:19:16
Case called
09:19:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
This is the time set for court trial. I've
discussed in chambers some
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09:19:46

ligisics. There are some preliminary motions.

09:19:59

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

09:20:05

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott

09:20:23

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We'll take the Motion to DQ first.

09:20:37

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 40d. I've
received information from
various attorneys that Judge Hosack used to
represent City of CDA. At the
contempt proceeding against McCrory, I was not
present. This case was
vilified by Your Honor. I got a transcript of
the hearing, reads from
transcript.
What the Court is saying is that you don't see
this as beneficial to the
voter of
ofCDA.
CD A. It's the responsibility of
ofthe
the
court to call voters back to to

09:21:41
09:22:20
09:22:49
09:23:58
09:25:33
09:25:49
09:27:00
09:27:40
09:29:02
09:29:26
09:30:28
09:31:25
09:32:38
09:33:53
09:34:19
09:35:18
09:36:13

09:36:29

Argues.
Words show what deep seeded feelings are.
Statute requires publishing voters
names.
The secrecy and privacy ofthe illegal voter is
not paramount.
It wasn't known you possessed deeply seeded
emotions.
The Court is well aware of what election
procedures require.
In a prior hearing you referred to anarchy.
Election contest is anything but
anarchy. Sancity of free elections is a
cornerstone of democracy. You cannot
poceed, you have shown personal bias. You cannot
decide this case. We ask for
and demand a hearing on this, and that you
recuse yourself.

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
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I've never seen anything like this. I don't know
he has to yell. He heard
throgh some lawyers that you use to represent
City of CDA. Cites cases, that
does not provide reason the recuse yourself.
Bell v Bell, there have been
adverse rulings, we live with that. Just because
we disagree with the ruling
doesn't mean the Court is biased. I don't take
lightly the attack on this
Court. I'm embarassed for Mr Brannon. Anyone who
disagrees is a member of a
conspiracy.
When people take the voting process and turn it
into a circus.

09:37:01
09:37:27
09:38:04
09:38:23
09:38:39
09:39:12
09:40:03

09:40:29

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj.

09:40:32.
09:40:32·

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
The court commented to what the court had
observed. They don't want to go to
trial today because they're not ready, they
don't have the evidence. I urge
this Court to know that when people take shots
like this at the Court, it's a
serious matter. Ask the Court to deny the
Motion.

09:41:33
09:41:45
09:42:02

09:42:18

09:42:46
09:43:11
09:43:40

09:44:10

09:44:32
09:44:49

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
You last represented the Court in 1996-97,
thirteen years before the
election. You had no involvement with any
election issues. The mayor now is
not the mayor from then. You sat on Sanders
Beach cases, argues. On behalf of
the city, concurr with the comments ofMr
Erbland.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Issue had nothing to do with representation of
CDA, I only pointed it out. It
was brought today because we didn't get a
transcript until Sat. We're not
complaining about adverse rulings. Sup Court
case, should be without bias.

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A

SC 38417-2011

Page 5, ...

Page 2144 of 2676

09:46:21

Issue is does this election case proceed with an
unbiased judge.

09:46:38

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I've know Mr Kelso for probably 30 years, I
don't feel it is an attack upon
the Court, is an advocate for client. As Mr
Kelso points out the contempt
proceeding had nothing to do with his client.
Comments were made in the
context of a conempt proceeding, and were made
hypothetical to Mr McCrory's
attorney. The issue before the Court was an
alleged court order regarding
confidentiality, then publishing that
information. For purposes of that
hearing, we had a party obtain information and
publish it on the internet.
Nothing was said about illegal voters. Mr Kelso
wasn't there and missed the
ofthe
the conversation. A lot of people
context of
don't like litigation.

09:47:17
09:47:45
09:48:10
09:48:47
09:49:48
09:50:32
09:50:51
09:51:12
09:52:06
09:52:44
09:53:28
09:55:21
09:55:52
09:56:25
09:57:27

09:58:27
09:58:47

Mr Kelso may have some personal involvement as
to the preparation of the
affidavit. Mr Brannon has no involvement.
Comments were focused to that issue.
Now the Motion in Limine. This deals with, under
the statute, voters to be
listed 3 days prior to trial, 34-2017 b.
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Elections are subject to human error. Volenteers
at precints and in clerks
office. We are willing to stip and concede that
two people voted ilegally and
voted for Kennedy. Nancy White operated a
business here.

09:59:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Question re: names on the list.

09:59:51

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
There are two people who voted not on the list.
The persons named in the
Amended Compliant are the five.

10:00:47

~
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10:01:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
How do you know they're legal voters, he had to
call them as a witness.

10:02:04

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
As a matter of law they are legal voters.

10:02:13

Judge: Hosack, Charles
How do I know that, Mr Kelso has to call his
witness. That's what the trial
is for.
I am not going to preclude the PL from calling
witnesses.
Motion deneid.

10:02:34
10:03:05
10:03:22
10:03:26

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to exclude witnesses.

10:03:48

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
We don't agree, discretionary with the court.

10:03:57

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Absent an agreement of the parties, will not
exclude witnesses. Do you wish
to make an opening?

10:04:31
10:04:40

10:07:50
10:09:01
10:09:46
10:10:10
10:11:01
10:12:09
10:13:06
10:14:18
10:14:51

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes. Opening comments. This case is about
ofthe
the election.
fairness of
We have no list as requested of ballots,
received, absentee. Three days
after the election, there were 2047 ballots.
Five were deemed void, and
Harris voted twice. Ten more ballots were run
through the ballot machine. The
2047 includes Harris twice. The five were voided
because they voted twice.
The 2051 comes from Deede Beard. The difference
in the race is five votes. On
Nov 6, elections department was aware numbers
didn't match.
About Nov 13, Mr McHugh is alerted of this by
email. About Nov 15, he
responds and says you have to file an election
contest. On Nov 16 another
list was run. That list shows 2049 absentee
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10:15:25
10:16:34
10:17:46
10:18:44
10:19:23
10:20:03
10:20:31
10:21:34
10:23:01
10:23:30
10:24:45
10:26:23
10:34:17
10:35:10

ballots were received, 7 were
voided. On Nov 24, another list is run, it shows
2056 absentee ballots were
received, 7 are voided as received after the
election, untimely. Then you
have to take out one of the two Harris votes. On
Aug 19, 2010 another list is
done by Ms Phillips, approx 2,180 ballots were
received. 169 were void, or
late or something wrong. 2019 absentee ballots
received. There is no
were received.There
record that shows 2051. We're saying there
weren't 2051 ballots. Each machine
has a printout, they reflect absentte ballots
were run in machine 2 and 3.
They reflect 2051 ballots. Machine 2 reflects
"dups". Judge Marano will
testify there were 17 duplicates. Those aren't
included in any totals even
though they reflect they were run through the
machine. We have attempted to
subp illegal voters who listed CDA residence.
Statute requires a fixed home
or abode.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Which are covered by section b?
Let's take a break and get the list.

10:36:00

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That's the list, I don't know how I can be any
clearer.

10:36:37

10:39:31
10:40:46

Judge: Hosack, Charles
This list is not the list under 34-2017b, which
individuals are on that
list? This is a list of 53 people.
Mr Kelso develope the list, then we'll meet in
chambers and talk about this.
may or may not
Giving me 53 names, some of whom mayor
be on the list, does not meet
the requirement. Please give me the list.
Recess.

10:40:55

Stop recording

10:37:03
10:38:01
10:39:14
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11:07:40
Recording Started:
11:07:40

Record
Etal, City of CDA

11 :07:44
11:07:44

Stop recording
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK09131 OA
Session Date: 09113/2010
09/13/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0003
Case number: CV2009-1 0010
00 10
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant(s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0002
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0004.
09/13/2010
11:07:46
Recording Started:
11:07:46
Case recalled
11 :08: 10
11:08:10

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back on the record. The Court has again met with
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11 :09:09
11:09:09
11:09:27
11 :09:57
11:11:15
11: 12:46
11:12:46

13 :51
11: 13:51

11: 18:27
11:18:27

counsel to identifY the
persons to be listed as to alleged illegal
votes. Mr Kelso has now gone
ofthe
the 53,
through his list and identified 21 of
identified as allegedly cast an
illegal vote. The Court has the list and will
mark it as Court exh A. Reads
list. No testimony shall be received as to
illgal votes on anyone other
than those just listed. Will go back to Mr
Kelso's opening statement.

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We were at county residences. Continues with
opening.
We'll show that some people were given the wrong
ballot and voted.

11:
19:56
11:19:56

State Attorney:

11:20:14

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Opening statement. Mr Kennedy believes the count
is legitimate.
Some witnesses won't be here, some can't
remember who they voted for. Canvas
shows there were 2051 ballots run through the
machine. There will be alot of
critizism of how the election was conducted.

11:22:36
11 :22:36
11 :22:55
11:22:55
11 :23
:23:40
:40
11:24:13

11 :25: 12
11 :26: 16

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Opening statement. The City legally contracted
for the election. It was well
conducted and supervised. Final vote of 2051 was
presented to city counsel.
Evidence will show canvas was correct.

11 :26:30
11:26:30

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Susan Weathers

11:27:07
11 :27:07

Other: Weathers, Susan
Sworn by clerk. I'm city clerk. I'm Chief
Election Official. I'm familar with
Ie
IC 50-403. I'm to exercise general supervision
ofthe
of
the election, to achieve
correctness. We did contract with the county.

11:28:31
11 :28:31
11 :33: 12
11:33:12

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A

SC 38417-2011

Page 11, ...

Page 2150 of 2676

11:36:58
11:37:23
11 :37:23

Municipal Elections manual. CDA
Municipal code is Title 50 Ch 4.
Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj.

11:37:27

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain

11:37:40

Other: Weathers, Susan
If you look through the code it refers to Title
34 in certain situaitons, it
it just Title 50. This is the handbook the city
utilizes.

11:38:10

11:39:16

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj, Court already ruled the city contracted to
the county.

11:39:36
11 :39:36

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR,
0/R, as foundation.

11:39:52

Other: Weathers, Susan
Under 404 a contract was entered into with the
county.

11:43:04
11 :43:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will mark City Exh B as admitted and work with
that copy.

11:43:28
11 :43:28

Other: Weathers, Susan
Reads from City exh B.

11 :44:53
11:44:53

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Are we going to have her read the whole
document? Let's go with questions.

11:45:09

Other: Weathers, Susan
Prior to the election process I published legal
notices, received notices of
candadicy, reviewed names on the ballot. Worked
with tabulation of the votes
and typed minutes. I took the copy Deedie Beard
sent me and presented it to
the council. Exh 86 is the tabulation of the
election which shows 2051. I did

11:45:35

11:45:55
11:46:27
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11:48:29

not look at the ballots.

11:49:01

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 86.

11:49:08
11 :49:08

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
NO obj.

11:49:11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 86.

11:50:16

Other: Weathers, Susan
IC 50-451, I've read it. It's contracted with
the county to maintain the
absentee list. From Nov 3 through close of polls
I did not ask to see the
record the county keeps.

11:53:31
11 :53:31

11:55:23
11:55:29

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj., calls for legal interpretation.

11 :55:34
11:55:34

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain

11:55:39

Other: Weathers, Susan

11 :56:27
11:56:27

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
She is the chief election official, I want to
know this witnesses
understanding.

11:56:51
11:57:00

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Renew obj.

11:57:04
11 :57:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
She's testified what's happened, sustain.

11:57:18

Other: Weathers, Susan
My understanding is that the county maintained a
record, I've not seen it.
Dan English and Deedie Beard told me they kept a
record for absentee ballots.
I did not ask specifically your question as to
maintaining the records under
IC 50-451. Through Nov 9 I was not provided a

11:57:52

11:58:16
11 :59:42
11:59:42
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12:00:56
12:04:45
12:06:01

record of
the canvas. Pursuant
ofthe
to subp I brought records. Exh 85, I received on
Nov 9. I received exh 86 on
Nov 9. Exh 87 is the minutes from canvas of
votes. I prepared that document
after the council meeting.

17
12:07:
12:07:17

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 85 and 87.

12:07:25

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj

12:07:29

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj

12:07:31

12:07:47

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 85 and 87. We're into the noon hour so
will take a lunch break, return
by 1:15.

12:08:12

Stop recording

13:20:14
Recording Started:
13:20:14

Record
Etal, City of CDA

13 :20: 19
13:20:

Stop recording
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Court Minutes:
,
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Session: HOSACK09131 OA
Session Date: 09113/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0004
Case number: CV2009-1 00
0010
10
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant( s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0003
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0005.
09/13/2010
09/1312010
13:20:22
Recording Started:
13:20:22
Case recalled
13:20:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session. Continue with witness
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examination.
13:22:27

13:24:31
13:27:10
13:28:24

Other: Weathers, Susan
Exh 87 are the minutes I prepared. Both exh 85
and 86 were provided by
Kootenai Co. IC 50-414, Kootenai County acted as
the registrar. IC 50-445 the
County did that, checked absentee ballots. To be
qualified you must
registered and be a resident. Reads definition
for a resident.

13:30:27

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

13:30:30

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Rephrase the question.

13:30:47

Other: Weathers, Susan
A person must meet each requirement. The County
is the registrar for the
city. I can't tell you what they prove for
residency. They ask for proof of
residence. Exh 85 indicates "canvass". The city
accepted the documents the
PI Exh 5, I've not seen that
county provided. Pl
before. It's the county report
on absentee ballots dated 11-6-09.

13:32:15
13:32:39
13:36:17
13:38:19
13:39:08

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, she says she hasn't seen the document
before.

13:39:25

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The exh hasn't been admitted.

13:40:08

Other: Weathers, Susan
Exh B, my signature is on the last page. The
County does not do a canvass,
the county tabulates the votes.

13:41
13 :41 :06
13:42:46

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

13:42:48

Judge: Hosack, Charles
To the degree it's calling for a legal
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13:43:09
13:43:22

13:45:38
13:46:57

conclusion, the court already made a
finding.
Other: Weathers, Susan
The County is not required to do a canvass, they
do a tabulation. The canvass
consists the two documents from Beard and
English. Between Nov 3-9 I was not
aware of an absentee ballot report.

13:48:28

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
oB]
oBI

13:48:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The city has independently contracted.

13:49:18

Other: Weathers, Susan
My duties were contracted away for the election
process.

13:50:51

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

13:50:53

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain, the Court has ruled the city can
contract.

13:51:16

Other: Weathers, Susan
I do not recall if the city established an
absentee voting precinct. In the
contract it provides for absentee votes. A
consolidate holding precinct is
where you take two precinct and put them at one
precinct.
IC 50-447, was contracted to the county also.
50-449, I didn't to that, the
county was supposed to. Exh 1, resolution. I did
not review poll books. I
reviewed Mr Brannon's petition for canidacy. IC
50-452(4), I don't know if
there was an absentee record and poll book,
you'd have to ask the county. IC
50-458. I was in the building, not where the
voting machines were operated.
!don't
Idon't know what ballot codes are. I have a copy
of the municipal codes the

13:53:41
13:55:45
13:58:33
13:59:59
14:05:19
14:08:19
14:08:50
14:10:05
14: 10:05
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14: 11: 14
14:11:14

city follows.

14:12:18

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

14:12:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
0/R if she can answer the question.
OIR

14: 12:53
14:12:53

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No questions.

14:12:57

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
CROSS

14:13:09

Other: Weathers, Susan

14:13:29

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj

14:13:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
0/R
OIR

14:13:43

Other: Weathers, Susan
The poll books were kept with the county. We
were anticipaing a recount, we k
ept them at a secure location which was with the
county. There never was a
recount. No one filed for a recount. The County
said they maintained the
absentee ballots.

14:14:14
14:14:33
14:15:20
14:15:26

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

14: 15:30
14:15:30

Other: Weathers, Susan
The night of the reelection, I told Mr Brannon
he had the right of a recount.
It would be through the Sec Gen, they oversee
it. I'm not aware of anyone
asking for a recount, not through me. Kennedy
did ask for a recount, I think
after the Nov 9 meeting.

14:16:00
14:16:45
14: 17:04
14:17:04

14:17:38
14: 17:38

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Dan English
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14:17:57
14:
17:57

Other: English, Dan

14:18:10
14:
18: 10

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Could we take a break?

14:18:18

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OK, ten minute recess.

14:18:39
14: 18:39

Stop recording
(On Recess)

14:31:40
Recording Started:
14:31:40

Record
Etal, City of CDA
Eta!,

14:31
14:31:54
:54

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session. The witness was sworn.

14:33:12

Other: English, Dan
Sworn by clerk. I live in Rathdrum. I'm the
elected county clerk. I was here
when Ms Weathers testified. Exh B is the
contract, my signature is on the
last page. The election was run under Title 50
and 34, its a combination,
both titles have application.
IfDeedie Beard testified it was run under Title
34 I would not disagree. IC
50-451, I'm familar with it generally, title 50
is the city code. Most of my
familiarity is with title 34, county code. I
supervise the supervisor of the
elections, I don't deal with the code as much.
The persons who requested an
absentee ballot are entered into a state data
base. The data was entered
into the state data base. I don't think a list
was run Nov 3. The earliest
list I'm aware of is Nov 6. Exh 5 is the printed
absentee report. I don't
know for sure if its the one Mr Spencer
obtained. I've never run a list, the
staffwould
staff would have run it. Exh 91 is a statute.

14:33:48
14:35:08
14:36:47
14:37:45
14:40:18
14:41:30
14:41:50
14:42:36
14:43:40
14:45:40
14:46:53
14:47:24
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14:49:49

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, mistates his testimony.

14:49:56

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

14:50:02

Other: English, Dan
The record would have been available within the
system.

14:51:51

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, its maintained within the data base.

14:52:16

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Rephrase the question.

14:52:39

Other: English, Dan
As of
ofNov
Nov 4, 2009, the information was kept in
the electronic date base, I'm
not aware we printed it out. It's a state wide
data base, maintained in real
time which is mandated by federal law. So its
subject to changes. So the
information was there. We might have printed one
out. This would be the first
time I've seen exh 5 in its entirety, I've seen
the last page. On 11-3-09 at
8pm an absentee list would be in the date base.
There would be a signed
absentee envelope, and a form. IC 50-449, I
wouldn't be the person to answer
that. IC 50-447, when we receive them back
ballot would be date stamped. I
beleve
bel eve the ones that came back through the mail
system were, and the ones
walked back were date stamped. We might not know
the date or hour, the key is
that they are there by 8pm on election day.
Anything after wouldn't be
counted. There's a running tally in the system
when they're logged in. The
process is when its received its looked up in
the state date base, confirm
its a registered voter and there might be other
elements. Idaho Voter
Registration System is the real time system,

14:53:21
14:53:39
14:54:13
14:56:33
14:58:32
15:00:19
15:02:54
15 :05 :21
15:05:21
15:05:35
15:06:14
15:06:34
15:07:55
15:08:10
15:08:37
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15:08:57
15: 11 :29

controlled by Idaho. That's the
same system that would run the reports. I've
responded to different
affidavits. Review of English Affd from Sept.

15:14:14

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj,

15:14:49

Other: English, Dan

15:15:55

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

15:16:01

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'll allow him to answer.

15:16:33

Other: English, Dan
I don't know all the specific steps of how they
check absentee ballots. Prior
to Nov 9 I can't say specifically as to the
date, in the general time frame,
there was a page that had a different amount
than the 2051. I can't say
there's a report, we have the ballots and we
know how many went through the
machine. I can't verify exh 5 was prepared by an
employee of
ofKootenai
Kootenai county.

15:18:05
15:18:25
15:19:50
15:20:06
15:21:40
15:22:22

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Ask for a break to find an original document.

15:22:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Are there other areas of examination?

15:22:42

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'm proceeding down a line, explains.

15:22:57

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I hate to stop in the middle of testimony, we
can go back to that point.

15:24:34

Other: English, Dan
A consolidated election is when two or more
districts have an election on

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA

SC 38417-2011

Page 21, ...

Page 2160 of 2676

15:24:55
15 :26: 11
15:26:11
15:27:12
15:29:11
15:29:56
15:31:33
15:32:34
15:33:50
15:34:30
15:35:29
15:35:48
15:37:05
15:38:01
15:41:
15 :41: 17
15:41:55
15 :42:20
15:42:20
15:45:31
15:48:49
15 :48 :49

the same day and share polling cites or
staffing. Poll books are lists of reg
istered voter for each precinct.Each
precinct. Each precinct
has a poll book. I've seen a
CDA precinct numbers. There was an Affd
list of
ofCDA
that had reference to two
different lists, if that's what you're talking
about I do recall that. The
Affd would be what I believed to be true. IC 50403, I heard the city clerk
testify they contracted to the county. I
exercised general supervision. IC
50-445, the stafflooks up each ballot that
comes back to verify as a
registered voter. When they look them up in the
system, it verifies
information. The data base system tracks
registered voters, boundaries,
addresses, helps generate letters. A card is the
physical card they fill
out. They scan in the signature. Would verify a
person had an absentee ballot
on file, request made on a yearly basis, except
for under the overseas act.
IC 50-402(C), I'm familar with it generally, its
a city code. If a requst is
to go to Canada, staff would make sure absentee
request is on file, and they
feel this is their last place of abode and they
intend to return we've been
intructed to count as a valid request. Reviews'
Reviews ·
IC 34-104, defines a qualified
elector. One deals with the state or county,
one is the city. IC 50-402,
definition of a resident.

15:49:18

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj,

15:49:20

Judge: Hosack, Charles
0/R
OIR

15:49:35

Other: English, Dan
Habitation is fixed could mean a house, some
connection to the community.
Some people are RVers. This is where they refer

15:50:17
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15:51:40
15 :51 :40

15:54:08

to as home. For a person in
an apartment, a person can still intend on
returning to this area. Affd
signed Dec 27, five names were authorized to
vote.

15:55:13

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

15:55:29

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

15:55:39
15:55:59
15:56:58
15:57:39
16:00:43

Other: English, Dan
In the case of those voters they were determined
to have absentee requests in
place. They would have signed a form that they
swore to the information. To
my understanding there isn't a time limit for
federal. So I believe they were
valid registered voters. Hurst letter refers to
Constitution, and Title 34. I
Hurst letter doesn't refer to title 50.

16:01:01

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'm done for today.

16:01:06

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We're at 4:00 so we'll take evening recess.

16:01:33

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Offer 91.

16:02:13

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Statutes are not generally exhibits, its the
law.

16:02:29

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The Court would make its own determination, for
011.
the purpose of 34-1 0
11.

16:03:48

Stop recording
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK09131 OA
Session Date: 09/13/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0005
Case number: CV2009-10010
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant( s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0004
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0006.
09/14/2010
09114/2010
09:08:22
Recording Started:
09:08:22
Case recalled
09:08:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Calls, court trial continues. Mr English retake
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the stand, still under oath.
09:09:59

09:11:37
15 :24
09:15:24
09:
09: 18: 13
09:18:13

Other: English, Dan
Explains positions and departments I supervise.
The supervise at that time
was D. Beard. We bring other staff in as we get
closer to election. You asked
for the people who worked on the election and I
have that. Exh 92A and 92B,
list of poll workers and list of accts payable
for workers.

09: 18:28
09:18:28

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit.

09:18:32
09:
18:32

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
NOobj

09:18:36
09:
18:36

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
NOobj

09:18:39
09:
18:39

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 92A and 92B.

09:
19:29
09:19:29

Other: English, Dan
Explains how absentee ballots are processed.
They have to give name &
address, signature. They can fax request to us.
Check to see if they're in a
district, we mail an envelope with instructions.
Two envelopes, one comes
back to elections with the Affd they sign.
Another envelope says voted
ballot. When we are open for early voting they
can vote early. Every absentee
balllot has an envelope. The ballot addressed to
that person is intended to
Ifthere
there wasn't a signature it
that person only. If
wouldn't be counted or a
valid ballot. Election Dept would try to contact
that voter to have them sign
by election day. I personally don't do it but
when the envelope comes back
signature would be verified. If
there's a doubt
Ifthere's
for the signature then its
if it
referred to D Beard to make the call ifit

09:19:57
09:20:26

09:21 :06
09:21:06
09 :21 :28
09:21
09:23:37
09:29:26

09:30: 12
09:30:12
09:30:38

09:32:01
09:33:59
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09:35:05
09:36:39
09:37:08
09:40:00
09:42:48
09:45 :27
09:45:27
09:46:01
09:46:35

matched or not. Temps frequently
handle absentee ballots. IfMs Beard determines
the signatures are not the
same she would contact the voter to have them
come in to verifY, make every
attempt to contact the voter in order for the
vote to count. The person would
be required to do something to satisfY D. Beard
for the signature. Reviews
exh 92A and 92B for the name Donald Boehm, I
don't see his name. It would be
important to have a record of each person who
has touched a ballot.
Reviews document, I've seen this before. It's an
Affd from Donald Boehm, exh
93.

09:46:56

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Stip to admission.

09:47:03

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj.

09:47:06

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 93.

09:47:59

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj to just reading it into the record.

09:48:34

Judge: Hosack, Charles
If you want to read it outloud that's fine.

09:48:45

Other: English, Dan
Reads Affd, exh 93.

09:50:01

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Is this the original filed with the Court?

11
09:50:
09:50:11

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes.

09:50:13
09:50: 13

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Let's just stip?

09:50:21

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes.
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09:50:42

09:52:33
09:53:19
09:54:20
09:56:10

Other: English, Dan
Reads body of
ofBoehm.
Boehm. Boehm opens absentee
ballots. Only one ballot per
envelope.
He says he opened every absentee ballot. There
should be same number of
envelopes and ballots. My understanding ofthe
canvass is when they actually
accept the numbers provided for the vote. I'm
familiar with Title 34-2001-6.

09:58:36

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, legal conclusion.

09:58:42

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain, rephrase.

10:00:31

Stop recording
(On Recess)

10:00:58
Recording Started:
10:00:58

Record
Etal, City of CDA

:02
10:01
10:01:02

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Approach?

10:01:09

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We can step out.

10:01:14

Stop recording
(On Recess)

10:06:22
Recording Started:
10:06:22

Record
Etal, City of CDA

10:06:27

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session. The Court has had a discussion
with counsel, all are in
agreement, the motion was made to exclude
witnesses and the court denied

10:06:43
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10:07:37
10:08:20
10:10:11

that. These are open proceedings. Demonstrations
are made, counsel is aware,
gestures, demonstrations of disagreement or
agreement, can't do that. May
proceed.

10:10:14

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Continues with direct.

10:10:20

Other: English, Dan
Exh 8, Affd of Dan English.

10:12:37

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Counsel are in agreement these are exh I and J
as referenced in exh 8.

10:13:13

Other: English, Dan
Yes, they're the same thing.

10:13:18

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 8.

10:13:23

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

10:13:28

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj

10:13:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 8, and exh I will become 8A and exh J
will become 8B and admit.

10:17:38

Other: English, Dan
Exh 5, absentee ballot report. last page is
where I gained the information
for my Affd number 5 and 6.

10:20:13
10:25:04

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 5.

10:25:09

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

10:25:14

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj
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10:25:16

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 5.

10:25:45

Other: English, Dan
Exh 8a reflects 5 ballots voided, Exh 8b
indicates 7 ballots voided. Criteria
was the same for both reports. Report run on Nov
6,2047
6, 2047 ballots input and 5
voided. The report prepared on Nov 16 reflects
2049 ballots with 7 void. Page
106 ofexh 5, and first page shows the codes for
the document. Page 106
106
indicates one void, page 136 indicates a void,
page 154 indicates a void,
page 159 indicates two voids.

10:29:11
10:29:
11
10:31
:26
10:31:26
10:34:12
10:38:11
11
10:38:
10:41:27
10:41
:27
10:44:37

Judge: Hosack, Charles
This is a good time for a break. Will take
morning recess for ten minutes.

10:44:58

Stop recording
(On Recess)

10:58:35
Recording Started:
10:58:35

Record
Etal, City of CDA

10:58:38

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back on the record.

10:59:15

Other: English, Dan
I don't see other ones that were marked void.
Page 66, name Harris has same
voter ID number. The code "01"
"0 1" is "in person
absentee". The second entry
indicates "IP" stands for "in person absentee".
Her name shows up twice with
different codes for absentee. Same voter ID.
Neither vote shows a void. Page
159, two entries for Thomas, Beulah, one entry
indicates a void. For Thomas,
Paul, same voter ID number, reflects a void. One
vote was counted, one was
void.

11:01:24
11:02:52
11 :02:52
11:03:35
11 :03 :35
11:05:19
11 :05: 19
11 :06:43
11:06:43
11:07:14
11 :07: 14
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11:07:24
11 :07:24

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, we're talking about ballots, not votes.
It's a distinction.

11:07:51

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I understand the distinction, it's an entry on
the data base.

11 :08:50
11:08:50

Other: English, Dan
For Harris it reflects two entries. I'm not sure
why its a double entry. In
some cases there'd be a void. One Harris should
reflect void on this report.
Exh I (8A) indicates 5.

11 :09:31
11:09:31

11:13:13
11:14:08
11: 14:08

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj to the language votes.

11:14:19

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I understand its a data base.

11: 14:39
11:14:39

Other: English, Dan
One Harris entry should have shown up as a void.
M Spencer requested a report
of absentee voters.A ballot is not necessarily
synomous with a vote. A ballot
is not the same thing as a number of votes.

11: 16:24
11:16:24
11: 17:25
17 :25
11 :20: 15
11:20:15

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Is a ballot, in Kootenai is a ballot a piece of
paper?

11:20:38

Other: English, Dan
Yes.

11 :21: 14
11:21:14

Judge: Hosack, Charles
A vote is received by a piece of paper called a
ballot. Can we agree?

11 :21 :40

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes.

11 :22:38
11:22:38

Other: English, Dan
The data base can fluctuate on a daily basis.
Exh J (8B) I don't know if
Kootenai County possess the full 175 page

11:25:56
11 :25:56
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11:28:08
11:30:51
11:31:33
11:33:57
11 :33:57
11:38:03

report. Exh J (8B) report generated
on Nov 16, the number went up by two. It shows
2049, 7 voided. Leaves 2042,
less one that should have been voided, leaves
2041. I don't recall a Nov 24
report. I have what we refer to as out training
manual and some other
material. THis is a red manual/instruction used
by election department. Gives
written direction on election procedure. This is
the manual from my office.

11:39:22

Prob. Officer:

11:39:23

Judge: Hosack, Charles
It's the original which is why we're going to
make a copy. It's listed as exh
89, but then as agreed by counsel a true and
correct copy will be given to
the court to be used as an exhibit, the original
to stay with the elected
officer.
Admit 89. Who is going to make a copy? Counsel
can advise the court.

11:39:42
11:40:04
11:40:21
11:40:29

11:41:37

11:42:56
11:44:40
11 :44:40
11:46:38
11:48:26
11:49:25
11:49:53
11:52:35
11:57:08
11 :57:08
11:58:22
11 :58:22

Other: English, Dan
Reviews Table of Contents. Procedure 6 is
Entering Absentee ballots for
Mail-out. They run a report daily, is with the
other items we have. I didn't
bring those. Election Data Information document,
I didn't prepare this, I
believe it's part of a Power Point presentation.
Judges/clerks manual used in
training. I don't know if it was used for the
election. Flip Chart, I don't
know if it was utilized in the election. Poll
Book Clerk flip chart, I don't
know if it was utilized in the election. Exh 81,
reviews. I don't believe
if-- Exh 91.
I've seen this before. I don't know if
Can't go back and recreate a
report, that is my understanding. IC 34-1011
describes what the clerk is to
keep. The information was available to run. It's
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11 :59:30
11:59:30

not the same as the list
that I would run today.

12:00: 17
12:00:17

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

12:00:20

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Concurr, I don't see the relevance.

:03
12:01:03
12:01

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

12:01:12

Other: English, Dan
I don't know if Idaho Secretary of State has
given any information about
50-907. Exh B, I agree as clerk I do the duties
of the city clerk.

12:01:50

12:04:04

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
This is a good time for recess.

12:04:10

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will recess.
Return by 1:15.

12:04:17
12:04:25

Stop recording
(On Recess)

13:20:56
l3:20:56
Recording Started:
l3 :20:56
13:20:56

Record
Etal, City of CDA

13:20:57
l3:20:57

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

13:21:29

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Continues direct of Mr English.

13:22:12
l3:22:12

Other: English, Dan
Information is entered manually or barcode, into
the state data base. Was
entered by one ofthe employees. It can be
affected by someone outside the
county, explains. Exh 25, I recognize it as

13:23:44
l3:23:44
13:24:17
l3 :24: 17
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13:26:45
13:27:09
13:29:41
13:30:25
13:31:48
13 :31 :48
13:32:30
13:35:05

Susan Smith Affd.
Explains what ballot codes are, they are a code
that tell what the ballot is
associated with. One individual received a wrong
ballot, Rahana. She received
-I
- I believe there was a ballot mixup. She should
have gotten a county only
ballot, and she got a CDA ballot. I'm not
Precinct is a
personally aware if
ifPrecinct
split precinct. Reviews document. Precinct 22
was a split precinct based on
this. This is an Affd from myself. The poll
books are available. I believe
,
they are in the building. Exh 94, is'an
is' an Affd
from myself dated 8-10-10.

13:37:27

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 94.

13:37:36

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj

13:37:40

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj

13:37:42

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 94

13:38:31

Other: English, Dan
I visit many precinct during the day, it would
have been briefly. Reviews
Precinct 38 book. Was a split precinct. The book
lists names, the ballot code
indicates county or city. For some names the
code is not preprinted. It
doesn't indicate whether they received a ballot
for the city or the county.
There is no record that Kootenai County has that
verifies which ballot some
voters received. I was not aware of this on
election day, it wasn't pre
printed in the book. I've taken the position
they were provided the right
ballot. The Secretay of State recomm the book be
preprinted with city
or county.

13:39:26
13:42:14
13:47:21
13:49:16
13:49:55
13:52:20
13:53:48
13:56:36
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13:58:43
13:58:51
13:59:52

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'm finished.
Just a housekeeping, Mr English indicated we
could use the instruction manual
as the exhibit, they have another.

13:59:59

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Mark as exh 89.

14:00:11

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

14:00: 17
14:00:17

Other: English, Dan
The preprinted ballot book has codes. Same day
registration is if a person
comes in and wants to vote, the poll worker
checks photo ID, checks address,
confirms they are in the correct precinct.

14:01:31
14:01:52
14:02:54

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj

14:02:56

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

14:03:01

Other: English, Dan
They are given the appropriate ballot for their
address. The two best
individuals to know the data base is D Beard and
Susan Smith. Exh 8 Affd,
indicates report will not reflect absentee
ballots. Mr Brannon did not
request a recount. I'm aware the ballots were
recounted by retired Judge
Marano. I remember Don Boehm was not on the list
of poll workers. I asked for
of those who had worked and been paid.
a list ofthose
His salary would have come out
ofthe
of
the maintainance dept.

14:05:45
14:06:47
14:07:47
14:08:20
14:09:05
14:09:23
14:10:04

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
CROSS

14:10:10

Other: English, Dan
The county provided the city the final counting.
Canvassing is the formal
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14:10:47

procedure of accepting the numbers. They city
voted to accept the results.

14:11:17

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj.
Withdraw the obj

14:11:22
14:11:28

Other: English, Dan
The vote was consistent with the count of the
county.

14:11:52

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT
I need to see poll book 54.
And 57.

14:12:15
14:13:16
14:14:27

14:16:37

Other: English, Dan
Precinct poll book 57, I don't see Rahana
Zellers. As I recall there were
adjacant precincts, I see her in precint 54.

14:17:24

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I guess we need to see Precinct 56.

14:19:30

Other: English, Dan
I see her name with a notation for 57. It
doesn't have a ballot code.
Rahana Zellers in Precinct 56 has a signature.

14:20:48
14:22:15

14:22:33
14:23:13

14:25:04
17
14:26:17
14:26:
14:28:33
14:32:36
14:32:56

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Who spoke up - that person needs to leave. That
is exactly what the court was
talking about.
Other: English, Dan
Precinct 56 is not a split precinct. It appears
to be city. Rahana Zellers
was a county resident, and listed in a city poll
book. She is in 54 and no
signature. Precinct 54 is a city only. Her name
was in city poll books.
Precinct 54, Dustin Ainsworth, page doesn't have
a page number on it. For
same day vote he would have had to prove he was
a resident as his residence
for 30 days prior. Photo ID and something with
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14:34:42
14:35:58
14:36:54

the address. The individual
poll worker is not listed. A registration card
has printed on it that they'd
be guilty of perjury if
ifthey
they stated otherwise.
There is a warning about
perjury on the voter registration card.

14:37:36

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Request a break so we can pull up a registration
card for Mr Ainsworth.

14:37:55

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Let's go ahead, we need to move this along.

14:39:51

Other: English, Dan
Exh 95, a blank voter registration card.

14:41:23

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit.

14:41:27

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj

14:41:30

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

14:41:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 95

14:41:38

Other: English, Dan
Reads under penalty portion. It doesn't ask if
he's been a resident of the
city of CDA. Kootenai uses this for every voter.
We use a form prescribed by
the state. The Sec of State has oversight and
guidance over all election
ofthe
the state. I believe D. Ainsworth
officials of
was given a city ballot.

14:42:35
14:43:27
14:44:20

14:46:58
14:47:09
14:47:55
14:48:24

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You can make a copy, we'll admit it
Admit as 38, and make a copy you can agree on.
It's identified on the page as
Ainsworth.
Will take afternoon recess for 10 minutes.
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14:48:39

Stop recording

15:02:22
Recording Started:
15:02:22

Record
Etal, City of CDA

15 :02:31
15:02:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

15:02:37

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.
No question.

15:02:44
15:02:52

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You should have copies of#38 that was admitted.

15 :03 :20
15:03:20

State Attorney:

15:03:32

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Susan Smith

15:03:53

Other: Smith, Susan
Sworn by clerk. I live in Post Falls. Employed
by Kootenai Co in the
elections dept. I am an elections clerk, since
1997. I use the Sec of State
data base alot. Exh 5, I have seen the last
page. Exh 8B is only the last
page, not the entire report. It looks like a
voided and handwritten,
handwritten , I don't
know how that came to be. I believe I printed an
absentee report on Nov 16.
Exh 25 is an Affd by myself. A list run on Nov
24, I prepared the document.

15 :04: 14
15:04:14
15:05:02
15:08:44
15:09:07
15:09:51

15: 11:13
11 :13

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 25 and 1 which is the disk.

15: 11 ::34
34

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj

15:11:40

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj
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15:12:07

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Does the court have the information?

15:12:33

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We can reproduce a hard copy.

15:13:47

Other: Smith, Susan
Was prepared by me on Nov 24. It reflects 2056
absentee ballots on the
document. All ballots from 11-4 thru 11-5 on
that page would be void. It
could be sorted in any manner. Seven are void
because they're late. Page 102
of exh 5, shows a void. Page 136 shows a void.
For Stormogipson - one entry
was void. Thomas was voided are 10-22, the 10-30
one is valid. Exh 5
indicates void. One P. Harris would have to be
void. As of
ofNov
Nov 24, the data
base reflects 2043 absentee ballots by active
voters. Exh 2 as attached
to my Affd does not have the names we just went
through. Three reports, Nov
6, Nov 16, Nov 24. I don't recall if it was a
request or ifl
if! was directed to
make this list, dated Nov 24. I'm not aware of
other reports.
A report was compiled for absentee voters about
2 weeks ago. I am aware C
Phillips prepared a report, I was on vacation.
Nov 6 report as exh 5 was
prepared at the request ofMr Spencer. I
probably glanced at it to make sure
it was in the correct format. I did not keep a
copy. I'm sure I told my supv
I prepared this report, my supv D Beard, I'm
sure it would have been on the
same day. I do not recall telling her of
ofthe
the
absentee number of2047. I
would most likely have told Mr Spencer that the
report is not exact, no
report is considered final until the canvass had
taken place, that it is a
live report and changes. I would not have told
him this was the final drop
dead report. We do make reports, no report is

15:15:15
15:18:14
15:21:42
15 :21 :42
15:26:11
15:29:11
15:32:05
15:33:51
15:35:38
15:36:32
15 :40:21
15:40:21
15:42:22
15:43:33
15:44:00
15:44:57
15:45:13
15:46:08
15:46:40
15:46:54
15:47:10

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A

SC 38417-2011

Page 38, ...

Page 2177 of 2676

15:48:28
15:50:26
15 :51 :30
15:51
15:54:29
15:55:50
15:57:49
15:58:14
15:59:02
15:59:19
15:59:54
16:00:50
16:02:50
16:04:24

final until after the canvass
ofthe
of
the vote. I believe the canvass of
ofthe
the vote
was Nov 9. Exh 85, this is the
canvass of the vote. These are in house reports
of people who request
absentee ballots, they change. Exh 5 is not a
final absentee list. I've been
told the canvass is when the number of votes is
accepted. As the information
16 - that would
was in the live data base on Nov 16be the report. Regarding the
Nov election I helped with registration,
absentee, answered the phone,
mailing labels. I would not have doing all the
entry into the data base,
temps and other people who work in the office
would. Anybody in the office
has access. There is a code word, each person
has an access code. The supv
gives the access code. I don't know the exact
number of temp workers. Approx
8 workers, a total of8 people. Approx 12
computers. From Nov 3 to when I did
the report I can count 13 computers. Exh 96,
witness draws diagram of the
election office.

16:04:55

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will take a stretch break.

16:05:04

Stop recording
(On Recess)

16:13:25
Recording Started:
16:13:25

Record
Etal, City of CDA

16:13:36

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session, diagram is complete.

16:14:11

Other: Smith, Susan
Explains diagram. Fourteen computers. They all
could access the data base.
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16:20:51

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 96 for illustrative purposes.

16:21:06

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj

16:21:14

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj

16:21:
16:21:17
17

Jndge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 96.

16:21:48

Other: Smith, Susan
Nov 16 report, the last page show my initials. I
prepared the report. I do
not recall why I prepared it. I don't recall the
date I first saw exh 85. It
does not reflect who prepared it. This is done
on a reporting system, I'm not
familiar with it. D Beard is familiar. I think
Dan English and C Phillips
have used it some. I don't recall the date I
would have known the absentee
number. Exh 86, I've seen it before, signed by D
Beard. Dated 11-9-09. The
first I saw it was 11-9-09. I would have typed
the document for D Beard. I
don't remember doing it but I'm pretty sure I
did, that is our ususal method.
It reflects 2051 absentee ballots. D Beard
provided me the information.!
probably handed it to her. I didn't mention to
Deedie that the report didn't
match, not that I remember. PI exh 89, I'm
familiar with it. I've never been
told by D Beard or Dan English to not raise
questions. The 2051 is the number
counted by the machine. The other report is
purely inhouse report on a system
that changes every moment of every day. 2051 is
the number counted absentee
by the machine. and the number of envelopes that
came back with the correct
signature. An accepted signature. And absentee
ballot request form filled out
by voters. We also had absentee reports. I had

16:22:36
16:23:44
16:24:01
16:24:21
16:25:39
16:27:12
16:27:49

16:28:05
16:29: 11
16:29:11
16:31: 14
16:31:14
16:33:47
16:35:06
16:35:24

16:36:46
16:37:09
16:39:52
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16:46:54
16:50:10
16:50:45
16:51
16:51:04
:04
16:52:30
16:53:09
16:53:51
16:54:47

16:55:00
16:55:16

not counted the envelopes. I
did not review the absentee request forms.
Exh 5, Mr Spencer asked for the report. I
believe he should have filled out a
public request form. Usually we charge a nickel
a page. Sometimes right after
an election we do not, we allow people to have
results. By Nov 16 we probably
charged pursuant to public records request. We
maintain public records
if the Nov 24 report
requests. I don't recall ifthe
was requested by a patron or
something my supv asked me to do.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Ask that we take a break until tomorrow.
tomorrow.l'd
I'd
like to question this witness
about those receipts. I have another witness
scheduled for 9:00 tomorrow. Or
I could reserve the right to recall her,
however.

16:55:42

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You're asking her to go back to the office and

16:55:57

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
She says they're maintained there.

16:56:16

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The Court doesn't normally direct discovery
during litigation, order a
witness to conduct

16:56:30
16:56:38

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
She's not my client.

16:56:48

Judge: Hosack, Charles
If you want to try recalling her I'll give you
that leaveway. Any cross?

16:57:16

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Yes, the morning would be preferable.

16:57:26

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We'll take the evening recess, we're now two
days into trial. Getting a
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16:57:42
16:57:56

little concerned about the pace, ask that
counsel join me for a couple
minutes. Recess.

16:58:05

Stop recording
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK09131 OA
Session Date: 09/1312010
09/13/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0006
00 10
Case number: CV2009-1 0010
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso; Starr
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant( s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0005
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0007.
09/15/2010
0911512010
09:05:56
Recording Started:
09:05:56
Case recalled
09:06:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Court in session. Parties present. Couple
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09:07:06

housekeeping things, Exh 25, Smith
Affd and DVD, I was distracted about reading the
info DVD, Court intention is
it was admitted, correct?

09:07:38

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter

09:06:35

Yes.
09:07:54

Other: Smith, Susan

09:08:08

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Ms Smith was on the stand, still under oath.

09:08:24

09:10:07
09:
10:24
09:10:24
09:10:55
09:12:07
09:13:46

Other: Smith, Susan
Gives training and experience. Explains "real
time" data base and how changes
can be made in another county. The voter ID
number stays the same no matter
where they are in the state. You can register as
soon as you arrive in a
different county. We get a monthly list from
Vital Stats, obituaries and if a
person says spouse has died to update the data
base. I've seen different
numbers for the absentee ballots.

09:14:03

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj

09:14:05

Judge: Hosack, Charles
O/R
0/R

09:14:18

Other: Smith, Susan
We would use the 2051 number, not the data base
report.

09:14:44

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj

09:14:46
09: 14:46

Judge: Hosack, Charles
0/R,
OIR, I'm taking it as information this witness
has.

09:15:06
09: 15 :06

Other: Smith, Susan
It would not be appropriate to use the absentee
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09:15:34
09:
15:34
16: 11
09:16:11
09:
09:
17:08
09:17:08

ballots count from the data
base report. I was never told to not raise any
kind of question. I was told
the opposite, and I do do that. There was no
reason to talk to D Beard or D
English about the numbers.

09:17:19

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

09:17:22
09:
17:22

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

09: 17:36
09:17:36

Other: Smith, Susan
I was a little unclear about bringing request
for public records. I tried to
reach people. The only appropriate number is the
one from exh 85. I'm not
familiar with code sections pertaining to
elections.

18: 11
09:18:11
09:
09:21:06
09:21
:06

09:21:23

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

09:21:57

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Argues

09:22:24

Judge: Hosack, Charles
She's testified she didn't know the statute,
let's go to something new.

09:22:53

Other: Smith, Susan
You can acces a report at any time.

09:24:05

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Object to continued use of writing everything
she says - its taking so much
time.

09:24:32
09:24:35

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Agree.

09:24:37

Judge: Hosack, Charles
It's true, but Mr Kelso said he might be able to
wrap up today.
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09:25:06

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
These are going to be used for further exam of
witnesses.

09:25:22

Judge: Hosack, Charles
It's very laborious. You've not cited any case
that says election cases
should be under other manner.

09:26:06
09:26:16

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Continues with redirect.

09:26:26

Other: Smith, Susan
Any election employee could have entered the
data base and entered or taken
information out at 8:01 on Nov 3. Exh 25 shows
the names that had been purged
system - by our office. As election
out of the systemclerk I am to achieve and
maintin correctness.

09:27:13
09:28:37
09:30:26
09:30:31

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
I have a couple questions.

09:30:38

Judge: Hosack, Charles

OK
09:30:43

:05
09:31:05
09:31
09
:31 :31
09:31
09:31:39
09:31
:39
09:32:07

09:32:53
09:33:18
09:33:38
09:34:21

Other: Smith, Susan
I maintain correctness to the best of my
ability. Exh 25, reads last
sentence.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Reserve right to recall.
Call Eugene Marano
Other: Marano, Eugene
Sworn by clerk. I reside in Kootenai County,
Senior Magistrate Judge.
At the request of Barry McHugh and yourself!
agreed at great discomfort to
myself! counted ballots on June 22 at the
election office. Pursuant to order
of Judge Hosack. I went to the election office,
viewed a video and with the
help of
ofyour
your son I counted ballots. The absentee
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09:34:54
09:35:34
09:36:05
09:36:38

envelopes were provided to
me, from the CDA 2009 election. C Phillips put
them in front of me and Matt
and I counted them. Total number was 2086. Four
were of question as to city
or county. I was there just to count, they could
not determine city or
county. My notes are sealed in the file, could I
have those?

09:37:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Let's take a break and get those.

09:38:23

Stop recording
(On Recess)

09:39:03
Recording Started:
09:39:03

Record
Etal, City of CDA

09:39:17

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

09:39:36

Other: Marano, Eugene
When I go to a total, I don't distinguish the
four out. I also counted
ballots themselves. I counted 2027, which does
not include 17 duplicate
ballots. I was there to count only and not draw
any conclusions. I arrived at
2027 absentee ballots. I was called back to
count ballots that were located,
that was July 2. A ballot box labeled CDA write
in was given to me by
D. Beard. Pl
PI exh 77,

12
09:41:12
09:41:
09
:41 :48
09:41
09:42:54
09:43:34
09:44:20
09:45:26

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 77.

09:45:30

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

09:45:34

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj
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09:45:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 77.

09:45:55

Other: Marano, Eugene
We counted some on July 14. I was handed ballots
by C Phillips, I counted the
ballots given me. It doesn't show what they
were. There were 17 ballots
labeled duplicates, there were 16. And two
handed to me by Van Pallen. They
were numbered 1-16, but there was no number 2. I
don't know what they
represented. I was there on 3 ocassions. I
counted 2027 ballots. I was called
back to count 7 more ballots, 7 were represented
as invalid.

09:46:41
09:47:27
09:48:54
09:49:12
09:49:
12

09:50:23
09:50:50

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj,

09:51:19
09:51:
19

Judge: Hosack, Charles
That would be the best evidence.

09:51:29
09:51
:29

Other: Marano, Eugene
Exh 77 says invalid 7. I took it as to count
whatever was put in front of me.

09:52:16

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
We'd stip he was ordered to count.

09:52:23

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That's what we'd like to see.

09:52:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm not going to keep getting the court file to
pull out documents, obj is
sustained. I don't see the relevance.

09:52:47
09:52:58

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Argues re: relevance.

09:53:07

Judge: Hosack, Charles
His testimony is what he counted.

09:53:30

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'm done with this witness.
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09:53:41

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

09:53:53

Other: Marano, Eugene
Hands notes to Mr Erbland for review.

09:54:17

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Returns notes to witness.

09:55:16

Other: Marano, Eugene
I was asked to sign an Affd, I haven't yet. I'm
willing to sign, I have it
here. The part after July 2 is not entirely
accurate. We met at election
office, Matt Kelso was there to help out. I
counted 2086, 4 undetermined. I
was not there to determine which was city or
county. I do not know if the
2082 were solely for the county election. I then
began county absentte
ballots. C Phillips opened a box from machine
3A. I counted 977. Then
Phillips unsealed box from machine 3B, I was
told some were duplicates. I
counted 640, not counting the 15 duplicates.
Then machine 4, advisedd 2 were
duplicates. 410 not including the duplicates.
Total2027.
Total 2027. To add the
duplicate ballots I come to 2044.

09:55:44
09:56:49
09:57:09
09:57:36
09:58:18
09:59:05
09:59:48
10:00:48
10:02:32
10:03:38

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj.

10:03:44

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Hold it, let's maintain a degree of
professionalism.

10:04:09

Other: Marano, Eugene
On July 2, Starr, Matt Kelso, McCrory, and
Brannon there. Envelope with
writing on it was handed to me. Seven ballots in
it.

10:04:52

10:05:30

•

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj, this witness was to count only.
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10:05:46

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Let it go ahead.

10:06:06

Other: Marano, Eugene
2044 plus 7 is 2051.
Of
Ofthe
the 15, number 2 was out of sequence, 2 is
missing. I was handed ballots
to count by Van Pallen, two. Phillips handed me
410 from machine 4, not
counting 2 duplicates.

10:07:09

10:08:30
10:09:10
10:09:20

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
May we have the judges' notes marked as an exh.

10:09:35

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
No obj

10:10:23

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit J, judges' notes.

10:11:04

Other: Marano, Eugene

10:11:51

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT. Exh 97, E. Marano Affd.

10:12:02

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

.

10:12:09
10:12:11

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj

10:12:13
10:
12: 13

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 97, as unsigned Affd.

10:12:32

Other: Marano, Eugene
If it helps I can sign it now. I was sworn.
Signs Affidavit.

10:13:10

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj to his signature.

10:13:18

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj.
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10:14:43

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

10:15:26

Other: Marano, Eugene
Reviews Affd, I was there to count. I draw no
conclusion as to what Ms
Phillips said.

10:18:37
10:19:10
10: 19:57
10:19:57
10:20:30
10:22:38
10:24:32
10:25:25
10:25:59

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm only one person, but there's a lot of
repetition here. It's the same
thing I've heard 3-4 times before. I just
mention that.
Other: Marano, Eugene
Continues with review of Affd. Some ballots are
kicked out by the machine,
that is what was represented to me by Deedie
Beard or Carrie Phillips. I
received an email that there were more ballots
to be counted. On July 2 I
counted ballots
ballots-- there were 7. No further
absentee ballot envelopes were
counted.

10:27:08

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, cumulative.

10:27:14

Judge: Hosack, Charles
There's been a lot of
ofthat.
that.

10:27:59

Other: Marano, Eugene

10:28:54

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That's all I have. Will take the morning recess.

10:29:23

Stop recording

10:40:40
Recording Started:

10:40:40

Record
Etal, City of CDA

10:40:47

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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Back in session.
10:41:35

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Carrie Phillips

10:41
10:41:59
:59

Other: Phillips, Carrie
Sworn by clerk. I reside in Hayden. I'm the Supv
of the Elections Dept. I
was learning the position during the 2009
election. I've worked for the
county 9 years. Prior to election office I
worked in the recorders office. I
started in the election office Aug 3, 2009. Exh
26 is my Affd date Aug 2010.

10:42:25
10:42:40
10:43:03

10:44:13
10:44: 13

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit.

10:44:20

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj

10:44:23

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj

10:44:26

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit26.
Admit
26.

10:45:03

Other: Phillips, Carrie
The Exh 26 disk is the absentee ballot request
for 2009 election. From the
Sec of State live data base. It shows 2185 names
on the list. You need to
take one name off as line 1 has other
information, total would be 2184. D
Beard retired Nov 30, 2009. Out ofthe 2184
requests, as of the date this was
prepared.

10:47:06
10:48:21
10:49:04
10:50:32
10:53:13

10:53:29
10:53:45

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I propose to give this witness a list, let her
review and recall this witness
back.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
You're
Y
ou're asking to hand her a document and then
proceed with your questioning?
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10:54:05

lfyou
If you have the document go ahead.

10:54:22

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
It has to be reflected on the wall or printed.
I want her to verify our numbers.

10:54:35
10:55:03

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Give her the document while we're on the record
so its clear.

10:55:56

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Hands document, four pages.

10:57:10

Other: Phillips, Carrie
You want me to compare the number on this
(paper) list to the list up there
(displayed on the wall.)

10:57:32
10:58:03

10:58:26

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We'll excuse this witness for a moment, and Mr
Kelso can call another
witness.

10:58:29

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
You can plug in a computer whereever you want.

10:59:01

Judge: Hosack, Charles
If she's not prepared then she can't answer your
question then we go on with
another witness.

10:59:18
18
10:59:
10:59:42

11 :00:23

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
She can use that computer, we'll call our next
witness.
Call Dustin Ainsworth

11 :00:40
11:00:40

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Is he present?

11:01:03

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I don't see him.
Call Nancy White

11:01:16
11:01: 16
11:01:25

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Present?
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11:01:31
11 :01:31

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I've never laid eyes on her, she's subp.

11:01:42

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We're going to assume then that if the person
doesn't respond they're not
here.

11 :02:07
11:02:07
11:02:15
11 :02: 15

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Barry McHugh

11 :02:36
11:02:36

Other: McHugh, Barry
Sworn by clerk. Reside in Kootenai Co. Current
position is County Prosecutor.
I am the elected county prosecutor. John
Cafferty is an attorney in the
civil division. I recall being contacted about
ballot count, I was contacted
by email. If I recall the email was from Larry
Spencer. Exh 47 is the email
and my two responses, dated Nov 16.

11:03:26
11 :03 :26
11 :03:52
11:03:52
11 :05:05
11:05:05
11:05:44
11:06:13

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
7.
Move to admit 447.

11 :06:28
11:06:28

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

11:07:02

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj

11 :07:05
11:07:05

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 47.

11:07:09

Other: McHugh, Barry
Reads email from Mr Spencer.
I responded, reads email. After email from Nov
16 I eventually contacted
election dept. I responded to Mr Spencer again
email. I've
on Nov 17, reads emaiLI.ve
had alot of contact with the election office, I
don't recall who I contacted
first. I believe I've only seen the last page of
the Nov 6 report. I may have
discussed the email with Dan English before this
Compliant was filed. Prior

11:09:
11: 09: 13
11:10:45
11: 10:45
11: 12:42
11 : 12:5
12: 56
11:15:03
11: 15:03
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11:
II: 15:44
15 :44
11:
II: 16:04
11:
II: 17:00
11:
II: 17:40
11:
II: 18:27
18 :27
11:
II: 18:44
18 :44
11
II :22:26
11
II :22:43
11
II :23
:23:29
:29
11
II :24:25
11
II :24:58
11
II :25:
:25:18
18
11
II :27:24
11
II :27:50

to the filing of the suit there may have been
conversations with Dan English
or Deedie Beard, I'm not sure. Exh 48, I don't
recall seeing it before but I
may have, its dated Dec 1.
I. It's directed to Mr
Cafferty. I believe Mr
Cafferty communicated to me about a meeting, I
don't recall the date. My
memory is that he contacted me to tafk about the
meeting of counsel to talk
about the Complaint, counsel for defendants.
The Kootenai Pros office has no
position as to who they'd like elected to this
seat. Kootenai County would be
neutral. I didn't ask Mr Cafferty is Mr
Brannon's attorney would be invited
to the meeting. We would have met with anybody's
anybody's
counsel. We were invited to
the meeting. I don't know that there is a
written summary of what happened at
the meeting. What I recall, there was a
discussion of filing answers,
discussing the claims generally. There's been
communication of different
sorts. Exh 50, I don't see that this was copied
to me, not sure if I've seen
it before. At that point, I'm not sure ifl
if!
knew.

11
II :31:35
:31 :35

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

11
II :31:37
:31 :37

Jndge: Hosack, Charles
He's already testified he didn't have knowledge
of the email.

11:32:20

Other: McHugh, Barry
On or before Dec 9 I don't recall I had
knowledge ofMr Cafferty
communication with other attorneys. We had a
discussion about him being lead
attorney in this suit. He kept me advised on a
regular basis, to discuss how
to go forward. Exh 51, I'm not sure I've seen it
before. Exh 55, I've seen
this before, I don't recall when. I'm aware an

11:33:
11 :33: 11
II

11
II :33
:33:35
:35
11
II :34:22
11
II :38:04
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11 :39:47
11:39:47

11:40:16
11 :40: 16
11 :40:35
11:40:35
11 :41: 16

Amended Compliant was filed.
We recieved the Amended Complaint, I don't
believe Kootenai was served the
Amended Compliant, not sure, Kooteani wasn't a
party on the Amended
Complaint. We were neutral after we weren't a
party. Neutral as to
litigation. I was aware Cafferty communicated
with Reed.

11 :42:59
11:42:59

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

11:43:02
11 :43:02

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Concurr

11 :43: 11
11:43:11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

11 :43:21
:43 :21

Other: McHugh, Barry
I don't recall any specific communication of
that.

11 :44:46
11:44:46

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

11:44:50
11 :44:50

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

11 :44:52
11:44:52

Judge: Hosack, Charles
What is the relevance?

11 :45 :09
11:45:09

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Goes to

11:45:21

Judge: Hosack, Charles
There are discovery disiputes all the time.

11 :45 :30
11:45:30

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
He's testified that Kootenai is neutral, we will
show Kootenai has actively
participated in doing everything possible to
obstruct in obtaining
information, goes to showing Kootenai knew
ballots were not correct.

11 :45 :51
11:45:51
11 :46:08
11:46:08
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11:46:59
11 :46:59

Judge: Hosack, Charles

11 :47:29
:4 7:29

Discovery disputes in this case is known to the
court, what is that going to
prove to me?

11:47:38

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Exh 55

11 :48:35

.ludge:
.Judge: Hosack, Charles
Wouldn't it be more useful to talk to Mr
Cafferty about this?

11:48:50
11 :48:50

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I will, argues.

11 :49:28
11:49:28

Judge: Hosack, Charles

OK
11:49:44

11:50:11
11 :50: 11
11 :51 :02
11:52:14
11 :52:14
11:52:31
11 :52:31
11:53:36
11 :53 :36
11:54:29
11: 54:29

11:55:30
11 :55:30

Other: McHugh, Barry
I testified I'd seen it before, just not the
date of when.
I believe Deedie made a comment about her
computer being cleaned, or Carrie
did. My memory is that that took place within
the last six months. I didn't
know when it happened, I know if there's a
standard protocol with our
information department. It didn't raise any
concerns. I don't know what was
deleted or cleaned. I'm can't recite statute
wording, but I'm aware there are
statutes relating to keeping election documents
for a year.

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

11:55:42

11 :56:29
11:56:29
11:57:20
11 :57:20
11:57:44

Other: McHugh, Barry
Exh 47
4 7 and exh 5. I've been in court while the
elections clerk testified to
it. Exh 5 is dated 11-6-09, its 175 pages. It
shows 2047. Elections people
would best be able to tell what report is. It is
common for attorneys of
co-defto meet and discuss. I know of
ofno
no rule
against that. I've believe it's
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11:58:18
11:58:48

good practice, I think it's appropriate. My
office has responded to requests
of Affd being signed, office has cooperated.

11:59:09

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

11:59:12

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

11:59:18

Other: McHugh, Barry
Kootenai's interest has been to ensure the
validity of the election. I know
there was a point about providing the
ballots/envelopes and I became involved
in that process. It was in the process of
happening.

12:03:55
12:04:14

12:04:48

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We're at the noon break. Return at 1: 15. Recess.

12:05:38

Stop recording
(On Recess)

-.
-,
13:19:39

Recording Started:

13:19:39

Record
Etal, City of CDA

13:19:51

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session, where isMs
is Ms Smith?

13:19:52

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We can proceed with a different witness. Call
Timothy Hurst

13:20:37

Other: Hurst, Timothy
Sworn by clerk. Chief Deputy of Sec of State
office. Our responsibility is to
make sure election laws are correctly
intrepreted. I'm familiar with IC
34-1011 and 50-451, they're basically the same.
The data base is a voter
registration for Idaho. If they register in one
county it can notifY the

13:22:10
13:23:12

13:24:36
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13:25:05
13:27:45
13:28:27

other county. I did not issue a directive that
50-451 was not required.
Information is required to be kept for each
election. They keep track of the
amount of ballots kept after election night.

13:30:26

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

13:30:28

Judge: Hosack, Charles
0/R, I'll note the obj.
OIR,

13:30:40

Other: Hurst, Timothy
The main purpose of the record is to make sure a
person doesn't vote twice.
Also to validate the number of absentee ballots.
Exh5.
Exh 85, tells how many ballots were counted.
Based on exh 5

13:31:18
13:33:52

13:38:10

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

13:38:11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'll let the witness answer.

13:38:20

Other: Hurst, Timothy
If all the info was entered when the ballot was
received, the system is only
as good as the people who enter the data. Exh 8,
8a and 8b. The number from
exh 8 would flucuate, it would include
additional ballots recieved after Nov
3. It should say somewhere on the report whether
or not they were counted, or
ifall
all info was
voided. Based on data base, if
204 7 minus five were
entered, 2047
oftwo.
two.
received. Nov 16 report shows increase of
Exh 85, doesn't match the
number entered. Data base shows 2047, deduct
five for void. Total received
was 2042, according to the document. The only
evidence I've seen is exh 5 for
the total received, which reflects 2042. Sec of
State's office doesn't have
juisdiction over 50-451. A record under 30-1011

13:38:45
13:43:24
13:44:07
13:44:22
13:47:21
13:48:53
13:50:18
13 :51 :29
13:51:29
13:52:24
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13:53:01
13:53:43

should be kept, under
statute.
Apparantly not doing his doing if not keeping
the records.

13:54:21

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

13:54:24

Other: Hurst, Timothy
Exh 5 could not be accurate because another
county could have put info in or
remove. Could remove info, that could explian
reduction in the number. I
haven't seen all the evidence in this case. The
purpose of recounts is to
count the ballots. The reports are dependent
upon the person entering the
record. As far as the count - the best evidence
if the ballot themselves. A
person could count the ballots. You could look
at the envelopes to know how
many were received. Compare it to see if it was
valid, and when recieved. If
you want to know how many ballots were run
through the machine - you count
them. Our office was not asked to get involved
in the ballots or
registrations. I've given opinions on whether
certain voters were valid
under state law. This document is a letter I
wrote to Dan English re:
eligibility re: four people. Exh K

13:55:19
13:56:07
13:56:40
13:57:12
13:57:37
13:58:20
13:59:58
14:00:12
14:00:44
14:02:16
14:03:04
14:04:50

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Noobj

14:04:53

Judge: Hosack, Charles
AdmitK

14:04:58

Other: Hurst, Timothy
Exh K is a letter from me to Dan English. When
someone is outside the county,
away for temporary purposes, with the intent of
making Kootenai their home
they can vote in accordance with state law.

14:05:50
14:06:17
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14:07:18

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

14:07:24

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

14:08:29

Other: Hurst, Timothy
Exh K, I had a copy of voter registration card
for each person. That was it.
IC 34-1075 provides for residency in state or
county. There's only one voter
registration and that's through county. It
doesn't mention municipality. For
a municipal election same as a county election,
resident of
ofthe
the city for 30
days prior to election. Exh 95, voter
registration card. It doesn't ask about
resident of
ofCDA,
CDA, it only asks about resident of
the county.

14: 10:40
14:10:40

14:11:31
14:12:15
14:12:39
14:14:54

14:15:27

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
ofCDA
CD A
We agree a person has to be a resident of
for city election.

14:16:14

Other: Hurst, Timothy
Exh K, I only had voter registration card.
According to the address on the
card, it said they were resident ofCDA. I'm
speaking from memory. Gregory
Proft should not have been considered a resident
ofCDA.
of
CD A.

14:17:26

14:19:09
14: 19:09

14:19:31

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Stip to that.

14:19:36

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The court is accepting no stip by counsel unless
formally accepted by the
court.

14:19:56
14: 19:56
14:20:14

14:21:22

Other: Hurst, Timothy
IC 50-402, describes residence. Number 2 says
they don't loose their
abode if out on a temporary time.

14:22:27

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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How is this going to help me? Let's go to
evidence we can work with.
14:23:06

Other: Hurst, Timothy

14:23:45

Add Ius: Erbland, Peter
Obj

14:23:47

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

14:23:56

Other: Hurst, Timothy
Based on evidence I've seen in court, best
evidence is the Nov 6 report. The
absentee envelope should be stamed date and time
when received. If it doens't
have the signature it doesn't count. If the
envelope doesn't have a date/time
there isn't proof of when received.

14:24:36
14:25:13
14:25:56
14:26:21

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, he's being asked to speculate.

14:26:30

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'll let you ask.

14:26:40

Other: Hurst, Timothy
The system does not let you issue new ballots
for absentee after the day of
voting. We determined the number of people who
moved out of Kootenai, the
number who voted in city election. There were 4.
We did not determine if they
voted absentee.
The data base doens't hold the time, they enter
the date. If they use the bar
code it automatically scan the date. The data
base itself didn't generate
that, it was drug out and put in a spread sheet.
If an envelope doesn't have
a date received the date is whatever date its
put in the data base. The law
in 2009 a recount consists of running the
ballots thru the machine again. A
recount would have given the number of absentee

14:27:55
14:30:14
14:31:02
14:35:18
14:36:40
14:39:45
14:41:00
14:42:36
14:43:44
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ballots. Exh 47,

14:47:14

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

14:47:17

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Counsel is not taking any attention to the
court's comments. At the close of
tria! today we will meet and discuss time
limits.

14:47:42
14:47:59

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

14:48:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You'll have time to discuss that.
OIR
0/R

14:48:22
14:48:43

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That's all I have.

14:48:52

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will take our afternoon recess for ten minutes.

14:49:09

Stop recording
(On Recess)

15:03:40
Recording Started:

15:03:40

Record
Etal, City of CDA

15:04:45

Stop recording
(On Recess)

15:21:04
Recording Started:

15:21:04

Record
Etal, City of CDA

15:21:05
15:21 :05

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

15:23:23

Stop recording
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(On Recess)

15:27:16
Recording Started:
15:27:16

Record
Etal, City of CDA

15:27:44

Stop recording
(On Recess)

15:27:52

Recording Started:
15:27:52

Record
Etal, City of CDA

15:28:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

15:28:12

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We've met and believe we have a resolution re:
three of
ofthe
the people. Kennedy,
Brannon and the city agree, that they were not
qualified electors, two voted
for Kennedy and one for Brannon.

15:28:34
15:28:55
15:29:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I have to relate it to my list from the
trial.
oftrial.
beginning of

15:29:29

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Nancy White voted for Kennedy, Dustin Ainsworth
voted for Kennedy,

15:29:51
15:30:07

Phdntiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Gregory Proft voted for Brannon, not qualified
to vote.

15:30:34

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
He's not on the list.

15:31:11
15 :31: 11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The effect of that stip is that the Court should
find those three were not
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15:31:29
15:31
:29
15:
15:31:54
31: 54
15 :31 :58
15:31:58

15:32:29
15:32:43

15:33:05
15:33:12
15:34:05
15:34:32

15 :35: 16
15:35:16
15:36:59
15:39:49
15:41:43
15 :41 :43
15:42:25
15:43:49
15:44:10
15:44:29
15:45:10
15:45:36
15:46:03
15:46:24
15:47:33

qualified to vote Nov 09, and those votes should
not be counted. That stip
will be accepted.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to amend the Compliant to conform with the
evidence, malconduct based on
Mr Hurst testimony, documents were not kept.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'd just as soon address that when we take legal
arguement, you're not
waiving anything.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
OK.
Call John Cafferty.
Other: Cafferty, John
Sworn by clerk. I reside in Kootenai County,
employed by Kootenai County as
deputy prosecutor, assigned to civil division. I
was here when Mr McHugh
testified. Exh 47, I've seen this. Standard
practice is when I receive
something like this I contact Mr McHugh. I can't
pin point exactly when I
discussed it. The city adopted their canvass,
they adopted this, we've been
in discussion for some time, I don't know when
the discussion started. I
can't tell you what happened the two weeks of
Nov 17 to Dec 1. A recount was
anticipated because of
ofthe
the five vote difference.
They not meant to be the
same things so they don't match. They're drawing
different data. I probably
the suit the day it was
ofthe
first became aware of
filed, with the county we're
provided a courtesy copy. I may have read it in
the newspaper. I'm not sure
service was ever affected, we discussed that we
would accept service, we
would waive formal service and accept it
informally. I wouldn't imagine I had
discussed this case with the other atty re:
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15:48:34
15:50:39

15:51:18
15:51:54
15:54:54
15:55:36

15:56:48
15:57:51
15:58:33
15:59:21
16:00:16
16:01:05
16:01:53
16:03:51
16:04:22
16:07:26

this case prior to Dec 1.
Exh 48, email re: election meeting. I attended a
meeting, I have no reason to
believe it wasn't Dec 1. My invitation was from
the city, I was defending
the county in that suit. It didn't give me pause
the other defense attorneys
would be there. After the meeting I prepared a
proposed answer to the
the Complaint, I provided a copy to the other
attys. Exh 50, an email to
other atty on Dec 10. We were neutral to the
outcome of
ofthe
the election, we were
a named defendant in the suit. We're interested
in the fairness and
correctness of the election. As a courtesy, I
send a copy of the answer to
defenseatty, as it turns out it was never filed
as you amended the Complaint.
I didn't know Kootena was no longer a defuntil
the judge ruled. I anticpated
Kootenai would be named given the allegations.
The Amended Complaint alleges against Kootenai.
Exh 51, email from Gridley to
Reed, Erbland and Cafferty. As of May 2010 I was
still concerned Kootenai
would be brought in as a def. I couldn't tell
you when Deedie retired. I know
she is retired now. Exh 98, is a response to a
request, a letter from me to
you.

16:07:47

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Offer 98

16:07:52

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj

16:07:53

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj

16:07:55

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 98.

16:08:20

Other: Cafferty, John
Reads letter.
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16:09:36
16:10:17
16: 10: 17

Deedie is no longer there, I relayed info from
my client. Information Systems
could pull up information for past two years.

16:10:31

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

16:10:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain

16:10:37

Other: Cafferty, John
The computer was cleaned sometime before May 6.
The emails are not gone,
they're not on that computer. Dan English
reviewed what he had and gave you
what he could find. A more thourough search is
available to you. Exh 55, ale
a Ie
tter I recieved from S. Reed.

16: 11 :44
16:11:44
16:12:16
16:14:10
16:14:24

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

16:14:26

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj

16:14:29
16: 14:29

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit.

16:14:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 55.

16:15:51

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Reads letter.

16:15:57

Other: Cafferty, John
That is what the document indicates.

16:16:18

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj,

16:16:23

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

16:16:57

Other: Cafferty, John
I don't know what Scott Reed was thinking. This
was the Aff you had been
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16:17:18
16:18:28

16:19:48

16:20:21
16:20:38
16:21:34
16:21:40

16:22:00

solicitating around this time, was around the
mediation. We did prepare the
Affd. I sent the Affd to Mr Reed, that's what
the document states.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I just have to say here, you're asking questions
about sending faxes to other
attorneys, its just attorney chatter.
At the moment it doesn't tie to anything.
Tell me where you're going.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I've made a motion re: 34-1011 re: malconduct,
it may lead to fraud and
corruption.

16:22:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
What does this tie to?

16:22:07

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
The Affd of English as to what the county should
say or not say.

16:22:44

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm lost.

16:22:49

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'll go back. I had sent an Affd for English to
sign, Cafferty sent it to Ree

16:23:41

Other: Cafferty, John
I can't tell you why I sent it to Reed, if I had
my notes maybe I could tell
you. There are other Affd floating around. The
Affd English signed is the one
we prepared. I don't know what was in Mr Reeds'
mind. My recollection was
that the case was worked out because of
mediation.

16:24:16
16:24:33
16:25:35

16:27:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I did follow where you were going.

16:27:27

Other: Cafferty, John
I would have liked to have seen all the Affd. I
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16:31:47

16:33:30

16:33:45

have a recollection of an
ofBeard
Beard and English filed not prepared
Affd of
through me.
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, attorney - client communications.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
It does appear to raise that, do you want to

16:34:07
16:34:27

16:35:20

16:36:12
16:36:57

assert? Is is something other
than that?
The relevance is cumulative, and it does get
into privilege. Sustain
Other: Cafferty, John
I had communication with Kennedy's attorney re:
what testimony would be at
trial. We met on three times, not so much to go
over testimony. There were
questions about documents, like exh 5. Exh B.

16:38:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We'll take a stretch break, off the record.

16:38:52

Stop recording
(On Recess)

16:44:01
Recording Started:
16:44:01

Record
Etal, City of CDA

16:44:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back on the record, continue.

16:44:24

Other: Cafferty, John
I've reviewed Exh B. I did not play
playaa part in
its drafting. It may be a from
document from the county or prepared by the
city, I don't know.

16:44:53

16:46:42

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
and Mr Erbland: obj

16:46:53

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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What is the relevance?
16:46:59

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Goes to prejudic~ of all the county witnesses.

16:47:24

Judge: Hosack, Charles
It's in evidence.

16:47:35

Other: Cafferty, John
The city has not made a claim - that I know of.

16:49:46

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

16:49:49

Judge: Hosack, Charles
What's the relevance?

16:49:55

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
OK.
That's all the questions I have.

16:50:04
16:50: 13
16:50:13

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

16:50:17

Other: Cafferty, John
There are also Affds in the record that bear the
letterhead of Starr Kelso.

16:50:44

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

16:50:51

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Next witness?

16:50:58

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'd prefer to start at 9:00, not 4:50.

16:51:
11
16:51:11
16:51:51

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I need a list of witnesses and a length of time,
I need that. We're 3 days
into a 4 day trial. Will recess until 9:00
9:00AM.
AM.

16:52:35

Stop recording
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK091310A
Session Date: 09/13/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0007
Case number: CV2009-1 00
10
0010
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Defendant: Etal,
Eta!, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant( ss):
):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0006
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0008.
09116/2010
08:36:11
Recording Started:
08:36:11
Case recalled
08:36:21

Judge: Hosack, Charles
On the record. Counsel have shown up early to
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08:36:40
08:37:07
08:37:30

08:38:50

discuss some evidentiary issues
we were discussing yesterday. One issue became
the ruling re: witnesses
listed by the PL. They are witnesses not alleged
to have cast a ballot, but
witnesses PL wishes to call. PL wishes to call
re: residence and vote.

08:39:28

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
RE Pacquin, farkes, Dobslaff, Friennd and Gagnon
there are Affd of
nonservice.

08:39:28

State Attorney:

08:39:30

Judge: Hosack, Charles
PL attempted to serve them in Kootenai Co?

08:39:46

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Correct.

08:39:50

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
We are prepared to argue on the substance that
they are legal voters, we
don't care about the service.

08:40:15
08:40:24

08:40:48
08:40:52

08:41:36
08:41:58

08:42:17

,

'I.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Court will accept the stip that PL has attempted
to serve them in Kootenai
and no service.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Re: Dobslaffthere is an additional factor,
there has been an Affd filed with
the Motion to Amend, the third time.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Court can take judicial notice of what's filed.
You can draw the court's
attention to that.

08:42:46

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Obj to judicial notice.

08:42:52

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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08:43:13

I think there's case law on looking at another
file, I think I can look at
the file being tried.

08:43:31

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

08:43:41

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Witnesses include Jenkins, Johnson,

08:43:57

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I wouldn't address those, we're discussing
Parkes, Friend, Dobslaff
Pacquin, Farkes,
and Gagnon. If they don't show we're calling
others

08:44:16

08:45:01

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Who are the others? Jenkins, Johnson,
Johannessen Gossart?

08:45:26

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes. Also Currie, Mrs Currie, Gagnon, Powers,
Parker, Gibson.

08:47:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Others are being called as to their legal
residence as to their vote?

08:47:43

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Correct. Based on treatise of American Election
Law.

08:50:26

Judge: Hosack, Charles
One issue is their residence and can evidence be
introduced as to residence?
Next issue is if a person was a legal voter,
this Court is not going to grill
a voter as to how they voted, that's a
Constitutional prohibition. Do the
residence first.

08:51:08
08:51:35
08:52:00
08:52:05
08:52:07
08:52:52

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Correct.
Johannessen is the apartment manager where
Pacquin says she lives. Gagnon is
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08:53:13
08:53:34

the resident of the residence that Gagnon claims
as her residence and is her
daughter in law.

08:53:41

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Let's discuss that - its a defined issue.

08:54:01

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
There are two issues, residence and then the
vote. Mr Reed will discuss the
residency.

08:54:35
08:54:38

08:55:32
08:56:21

08:58:39
08:58:48

08:59:13
08:59:38
09:00:55

09:01:08

09:01:37
09:02:38
09:03:15
09:03:35
09:04:59
09:05:19

Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
I have put together a brief the I think
Ie
establishes them as legal voters. IC
34-450 and 54-15, absentee provisions.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I need some evidence, what evidence is there?
What is your position re: the
ofthe
the evidence.
admission of
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
The testimony as residence is not the best
evidence. Best evidence would be
the testimony of each person. Mr Kelson filed
that he was going to take
depositions, he did not do so.
The opportunity was there and I guess I have
nothing else to offer.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm not sure about the probative weight, you can
call that person and we'll
see. It has arguable relevance.
The next question is, I'll have to make an
interlocutory ruling, make a
finding that the person was not a resident and
becomes an illegal voter. Then
the prohibition about asking as to how they
voted does not apply.
We know they voted, no disagreement about that?
Other: Parties:, All
Agree.
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09:06:13

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You want to call people as to how she/they
voted?

09:06:24

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes. There is information published on the
internet and a recorded phone call
as to how Pacquin voted. A Huckelberry blog.

09:07:01
09:07:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
This is for illustrative purposes.

09:07:44

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes, I'm still relying on the treatise, argues.
Page 143, number 2, the
person who cast a ballot may be called. You can
prove the vote based on
circumstantial evidence. It'll go to the weight.

09:08:50
09:09:28
09:09:57

09:10:30
09:11:05
09:11:32
09:11:59
09:12:23
09:12:45

09:13:08

09:14:33
09:15:14

09:17:17
09:17:42

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
We're talking about admissability of extraneous
evidence. PL wants to admit
recorded phone calls, blogs. Audio is
inadmissable unless the person is
present in court. If the declarant is not
present then the audio is not
admissable, hearsay.
The treaty is saying the circumstantial evidence
can be considered, but it
must pass the authentication test, it still must
be admissable. The treaty
does not trump the rules of evidence. It's
inadmissable, is for impeachment.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
ev_idence. In
I would agree, under the rules of ev.idence.
para 2, reads. I don't see how
it applies.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Argues re: para 2, showing the ballot is
illegal. To get to who they voted
for we have to get to the illegal vote first.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I understand the argument and the language of
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09:18:19

the treatise. That's before
women could vote.

09: 18:24
09:18:24

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We're not challenging that.

09:18:30
09: 18:30

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Rules of evidence the Court always applies. You
don't change the rules of
evidence because of
ofthe
the nature of
ofthe
the case. I'm
not going to make that
exception on my own. Will apply the normal rules
the person
of evidence. If
Ifthe
- there's no issue.
hasn't come in to testify -there's

09:19:01
09:
19:49
09:19:49
09:20:03
09:20:49

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Can I prepare an order on this because there was
a Motion in Limine.

09:21
:02
09:21:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Well, that the ruling of the Court. Let's get
started.

:23
09:21:23
09:21

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Ask for a short break?

:36
09:21:36
09:21

Stop recording
(On Recess)

09:27:02
Recording Started:
09:27:02

Record
Etal, City of CDA

09:27:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session. Call your witness.

09:28:22

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I have procedural clarification, my
understanding of your ruling is that we
can present testimony as to residence, but
limited on how they voted. My
question is we can present witnesses to
establish non qualification and then
let those people go, then its for no purpose.

09:28:48
09:29:08
09:29:36
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09:30:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Ifthe
If
the parties can stip re: witnesses.

09:30:27

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

09:30:30

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Maybe we should spend five minutes working this
out.

09:30:50

Judge: Hosack, Charles
If I determine they're illegal then what am I
going to do with it?

09:31:
14
09:31:14

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Right, maybe we should work it out.

09:31: 19
09:31:19

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Recess.

09:31
:22
09:31:22

Stop recording
(On Recess)

09:46:29
Recording Started:

09:46:29

Record
Etal, City of CDA

09:46:29

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back on the record.

09:46:36

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Mike Gridley

09:47:06

Other: Gridley, Mike
Sworn by clerk. I reside in CDA. I'm the city
attorney for 8 years.Exh B,
I've seen it before. I'm generally familiar with
it. I don't recall how it
came to be prepared, it's standard form used for
a number of elections over
the years. The city has not filed a claim.

09:47:57
09:48:14
09:48:33
09:49:34

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj
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09:49:36

Judge: Hosack, Charles
0/R
OIR

09:49:42
09:51:08
09:51
:53
09:51:53
09:52:20
09:55 3: 17
09:

09:53:55

Other: Gridley, Mike
I recall making a presentation in re: to
Mcgoverns inquiry.Mr Wilson is Chief
Deputy Civil Atty. I vaguly recall a letter from
you to the mayor, I don't
recall my response. I do recall that you, like
any other citizen, can make a
presentation of 3-5 minutes. I don't recall the
exact contents of the letter.
I responded to a letter you sent. I recall
something like a public comment,
unless council wants to hear more. Exh 48, email
that I sent.

09:55:53

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit 48.

09:56:00

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No obj

09:56:03

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No obj

09:56:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 48

09:56:24

Other: Gridley, Mike
In the email I ask other attorneys to attend a
meeting. I don't recalll when
I first learned Mr Erbland agreed to represent
Mr Kennedy. The meeting did
occur. Kennedy was one of my clients, Mr Brannon
was just a man on the street
at that point. You sued city counsel, I went to
the meeting - to the extent
of the suit. I organized the meeting, I think it
was the right thing to do. I
don't care who wins or looses, I care about a
suit that claims things were
done illegal. Exh 47, I don't see my name on it
so I don't think I've seen
it. I may have read in the newspaper of
ofMcHugh
McHugh
telling Spencer remedy is an

09:57:04
09:57:26

09:57:52
09:58:39
09:59:09
09:59:27
10:00:51
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10:01:29
10:02:29

election contest, I think that's the remedy
under Idaho law. I contributed to
Mr Kennedys' campaign.

10:02:36

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

10:02:38

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
obj

10:02:41

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm going to take the position that city
attorneys meet with their clients.

10:03:08

Other: Gridley, Mike
Reviews document. (Exh 99)

10:03:21

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
I don't know what he's showing.
Obj

10:03:59
10:04:02

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Goes beyond the scope.

10:04:08

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain.

10:04:35

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
It's foundational, trying to get to a point.

10:04:55

Other: Gridley, Mike
John Bruni name appears, and Ron Edinger. I
don't know who made the motion as
to vote totals.

10:05:31
10:06:02

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, the treatment of this witness should be
respectful.

10:06:14

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

10:06:17
10:06: 17

Other: Gridley, Mike
I didn't say that.

10:06:23

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
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I didn't hear.

10:06:27

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
I didn't hear.

10:06:30

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm well aware the parties don't like each

10:06:46

other, it makes no difference to
me.

10:07:03

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I asked a question.

10:07:19

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

10:07:21

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain

10:07:37

Other: Gridley, Mike
I give the city counsil my legal opinions.

10:08:01

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

10:08:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain

10:08:14

Other: Gridley, Mike

10:09:45

I didn't suggest to the city they should count
votes, that was delegated to
the county.

10:09:54

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No questions

10:09:58

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

10:10:08
10: 10:08

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Carrie Phillips

10:10:17
10: 10: 17

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You're being recalled, still under oath.

10:10:45

Other: Phillips, Carrie
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10:12:08

When I was last on the stand I had a list to
compare.! was looking at items
on the list that did not have a valid return
date.

10:12:27

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
From her affd exh 26.

10:12:43

Other: Phillips, Carrie
I briefly went through it yesterday, there were
about 165. Exh 100

10:14:19

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj

10:14:22

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Let's have it identified.

10:14:47

Other: Phillips, Carrie
exh 100 is a list of numbers that correspond to
no ballot returned or
received after the election. I don't recall the
dates, I wrote the dates on
the CD, it's for ballots requested for Nov 09
elecction.
There were 2184 requested, 165 not received back
or after election date. 2019
sounds about right, for returns. For Orville
Benjamin shows date requested,
and date issued. The last column does not have a
recieved date. Exh 5, I've
located his name. This report shows absentee
request was in person, from
10-14-09. I think we're on the wrong line, his
name is on there two times, he
may have been entered in incorrectly, needs to
be voided. He's only on this
report one time (exh
(exh 5). Page 31 of exh 5,
Comfort, Mary, shows she was
issued two absentee ballots. I don't know the
search parameters for each
report, I don't know if they were the same.
She voted in person, that's why the dates are
the same, Mr Benjamin did also.
If a person requests a ballot then votes in
person the first one would be

10:15:38
10:16:17
10:17:45
10:18:39
10:21:35
10:23:25
10:24:10
10:25:29
10:25:48
10:27:44
10:28:01
10:28:17
10:28:37

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A

SC 38417-2011

Page 81, ...

Page 2220 of 2676

10:29:27
10:31:44
10:31 :44

spoiled. Exh 5 was run based on a received date,
the one I ran was for all
.,
absentee ballots. Ifwe
If we reissued him a ballot we
would void the first one.

10:33:21

Judge: Hosack, Charles
What's the county source document?

10:33:50

Other: Phillips, Carrie
Search parameters are different. Exh 5 are for
ballots received. That report
shows ballots requested. The state system gives
you everything.

10:34:25

10:37:46

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

10:38:13

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj

10:38:20

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The testimony has been data base shows
everything.

10:38:34

Other: Phillips, Carrie
The report attached to exh 26 is an example of
live data base. I wrote the
date on the CD I created. This report would not
show people who moved away.
We don't know how many that is. It would not
show people who passed away, or
who were disquaified because of being convicted
of a felony. The 2019 is just
the number on the report. It is not necessarily
the number who received a
ballot for the 2009 election. Orville Benjamin
shows up twice on exh 26, one
was not received back, it cannot become a vote.
Mary Comfort entered twice,
one ballot did not come back, if it doesn't
become a vote. Beullah Thomas
entered twice, on exh 5 one was voided, she was
in person in our office requested it be mailed. If it's voided it can't
become a vote. I was here
when Judge Marano testified. I was present

0:3399:21
110:
:21
10:40:04
10:40:21
10:40:40
10:41:12
10:41:
12
10:42:10
10:42:
10
10:42:57
10:43:44
10:44:53
10:46:12
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10:47:20
10:47:51
10:48:14
10:49:28
10:49:50
10:50:32
10:51:45
10:51 :45
10:52:47
10:54:19
10:54:45

during that process. During that
process representatives ofMr Brannon were
there. I advised Judge Marano
there were duplicates. Explains what duplicates
are, unreadable by the
machine, duplicate done so it can be run through
the machine. I recall there
was a location of write-in absentee ballots. I
wasn't there when they were
counted. Explians write-in ballot. The ballot is
counted, and taken to a
board to declare. If invalid it's still a
ballot. By definition not a void.
2051 went through the machine and counted as
absentee. Original duplicates
were later viewed, and counted. When Judge
Marano came it was not determined
that some were determined to be county. Mr Kelso
and Mr McCrory looked at
those. There was discussion about 2086 absentee
envelopes.

10:55:41

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter

10:55:46

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

10:55:49

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

10:56:44

Other: Phillips, Carrie
Ballot box 3A was in a locked sealed ballot box
when presented to Judge
Marano. Box 3B also. Also #4 was a locked and
sealed ballot box. On June 22,
ofthe
the records. Also
2010 I was custodian of
election supv. Those ballots were
kept at a storage faciilty at the sheriffs
dept, a locked facility. Exh 97,
affd of Judge Marano, #6, at that time that was
correct.
I was present when Chief Sec of State testified.
I recall he testified that
four people had been eleminated from the data
base.

10:57:16
10:59:03
11 :00: 13
11:02:00
11 :02:00
11 :02:42
11:02:42
11:04:07
11 :04:07
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11:05:48

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

11:05:57
11 :05:57

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The Court will not that 4 added to 2019 does
equal
2023.
equal2023.

11 :06:30
11:06:30

Other: Phillips, Carrie
When you add those together you get that number.
Exh 97, #4 the only part I
dispute was that there was only one tub, but
there were multiple blue tubs in
the room. I was the custodian of the tubs at
that time. They'd been under
lock and key at the sheriffs office.

11 :08:26
11:08:26

11:08:49
11 :08:49
11:09:28
11 :09:28
11:12:21

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No questions.

11:12:27

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

11:12:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will take a short break before next witness.
Recess.

11:12:47
11:12:56
11:
12:56

i

Stop recording
(On Recess)

11:24:25
Recording Started:
11:24:25

Record
Etal, City of CDA

11:24:27

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Recall, I show ex 100 as admitted, clarifies.
That's the attorneys'
understanding?

11:25:01
11 :25:09
11:25:09

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Correct.

11:25:10

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Correct.
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11 :25: 11

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Conect.

11:25:13

Judge: Hosack, Charles

11 :25: 16

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Ask for sidebar.

11 :25:21
:25 :21

Stop recording
(On Recess)

11:33:07
Recording Started:

11:33:07

Record
Etal, City of CDA

11:33:08
11 :33 :08

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

11:33:14

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Rahana Zellers

11:34:14
11 :34: 14

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Record will reflect no one is responding.

11 :34:46
11:34:46

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Let the record reflect she was served a subp. a

11:35:07
11 :35:07

Judge: Hosack, Charles
And a return filed?

11:35:15

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
If it hasn't been it will be.
Call Marte Chamness.

11:35:33
11:35:46
11 :35:46

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Do you know this person?

11:36:02
11 :36:02

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
She was here, I believe Tues. We tried to
contact her, left a message.

11:36:25
11 :36:25

Judge: Hosack, Charles
She's not present, same finding, she is not
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11 :36:44

present but apparantly was here
Tus.

11:36:46
11 :36:46

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Julie Chadderton

11:37:00
11 :37:00

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Do

11:37:21
11 :37:21

Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
She is not in the courtroom.

11:37:30

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
She was subp, will be a return.

11:37:37

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Representation are that she was subp.

11:37:58

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Approach

11:3 8:53
11:38:53

Stop recording
(On Recess)

11 :39:37
11:39:37

Recording Started:
11 :39:37
11:39:37

Record
Etal, City of CDA

11 :39:56
11:39:56

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The next five are in a group, can call in a
group.

11 :40:
:40:10
10

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Parkes, T Friend, D Dobslaff,
Call M Pacquin, T Farkes,
K Gagnon.

11:40:37
11 :40:37

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Does anyone on behalf of the PL know these
people?

11 :40:52

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Would not physically recognize them. No contact
during the trial.
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11:41:16

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Record would show

11 :41 :27
11:41:27

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Four absentee ballots to Canada, one to CA.

11 :41 :45
11:41:45

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Physically out of state or country.

11 :41 :57

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
There are affd of nonservice.

11 :42:03
11:42:03

Judge: Hosack, Charles
There has been no service of the subp within the
boundaries of
ofKootenai
Kootenai Co.
And no one present when called as a witness.

11 :42:34
11:42:34
11 :43:01
11:43:01

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That covers the record.

11:43:06

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
That covers the record.

11:43:08

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
That covers the record.

11:43:14

11 :44:34
11:44:34

Judge: Hosack, Charles
There are some other legal issues to discuss.
Counsel suggested an early
break and then start early. Return at 12:45. And
if counsel could join the
Court briefly.

11 :44:45
11:44:45

Stop recording

11:43:30

13:03:40
Recording Started:

13:03:40

Record
Etal, City of CDA

13:03:41

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

13:06:04

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Deedie Beard
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13:06:28

13:07:15
13:09:11

Other: Beard, Deedie
Sworn by clerk. I reside in CDA. I worked in
elections department, I was
supervisor. I worked through the 2009 election.
Exh 101 and 102, I recognize.
Exh 101 Affd of mine, file stamp 1-5-10 & Exh
102 is stamped 8-2-10.

13:09:26

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Move to admit both.

13:09:27

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noobj

13:09:28

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Noobj

13:09:30

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 101 and 102

13:11:07

Other: Beard, Deedie
Exh 102, Affd says McKinley, that is a typo, its
McCory. I've seen the
agreement between the city and the county, I was
acting as the election
manager for CDA for that election. I'm pretty
familiar with the election
laws. My Affd says Title 34, not Title 50
applies. If an absentee envelope
comes back I check signatures. I felt that was
my responsibity, not a temp. I
was the only one that made the final call. If
there was no signature we would
try to notify the voter and ask them come in and
sign. If unable to come into
the office a staff would take it to their house
let them sign and return it
so it would count. Some are scanned in with the
barcode and some put in by
hand. A staff or temp staff would enter info,
either scan or hand enter. I
usually had two temps assigned to that. I don't
know if the barcode pops up
on screen, or just the signature. If the
signature on the envelope doesn't
match the signature on screen, if the last name

13:13:17
13:13:35
13:14:13
13:16:27
13:17:15
13:17:57
13:18:11
13:18:33
13:19:10
13:20:26
13:21:00
13:22:04
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13:22:47
13:23:55
13:24:28
13:25:06
13 :25 :06
13:25:39
13:27:26
13:28:19
13:28:53
13:30:28
13:30:45
13:36:11
13:3 7:17
13:37:
17
13:37:38
13:38:19
13:39:00
13:40:25
13:42:20
13:44:49
13:45:28
13:45:56
13:49:21
13 :51:30
:30
13:51
13:52:11

is the same and date the same
then my instruction was to accept it, explains.
The labels are optional,
nothing says we have to do that. That helps us.
If it comes back with no
signature we contact the person because the
ballot would not count. Exh 66,
front and back of a valid envelope. The last
names are the same as the
barcode. The signature is not Israels, its
Donna. If they came in at the same
time, then we'd accept it. We probably would not
call in this instance. I've
kept a phone log, but I might not be the person
that made a call. I don't
think any envelope indicates who processed it.
We have a process of counting
50 envelopes at a time and processing them.
They're held all day until tally
is done and then put in ballot box. They don't
check signature, when they put
the persons name it info comes up. My
instructions from the Sec of State is
that when a person signs a poll book they're
signing an Affd that address is
correct. When an application is received we put
name in and it pulls them up,
it has the taxing district, etc so they know
what ballot to give. The address
data base is kept up on a daily basis. The data
base is in the system, when
you put the address in it brings up the taxing
codes. The information comes
from the voter registration card that had been
filed some time previous. We
presume a person is at that address, we would
have no information different.
If a person is voting in person the clerk would
ask them, if not they would
re-register. We presume that's the address 30
days prior to election. Exh 5,
page 123, Pacquin has Garden Ave address. The
Garden address would come up on
the screen. It tells the district for which
ballot should be sent. Quebec is
where the absentee ballot be sent. Based on
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13:52:51
13 :52:51
13:53:28
13:54:33
13:54:50
13:55:22
13:55:54
13:58:25
13:59:12
14:00:08
14:02:13
14:04:10
14:04:41
14:05:55
14:07:42
14:08:08
14:09: 11
14:09:11
14:11:04
14: 11 :04
14:11:20
14:
11 :20
14:14:45
14:17:19
14:17:39
14:18:30
14:
18:30
14:18:51

address, its determined a eDA
CDA
ballot. I don't know if a clerk would think
about that address, we mail to
addresses all over the world. There is no
procedure to investigate if a eDA
CDA
address is still the correct address. I said
we're not the election police,
that was a quote from the Sec of State's office.
That came up with election
day registration, the question came up and that
was stated to us. We don't
go out and check addresses. Page 39, Dobslaff,
CDA
Denise. It shows a eDA
address. Balllot would be based on the
registration card. There application
would also have the address. New election year
you would have new election
process. Her application date was Jan 11, 2008.
Page 123, Pacquin application
9, 2008. According to this report.
requested Oct 9,2008.
To stay active you have to
vote once every four years. Depending when the
application came it - it could
be 2 or 4 years. They would not have to send in
a new application. It would
be automatically sent. Page 47, Parkes,
Farkes, I don't
know who that person is.
Request received in April
2009, its a request
Apri12009,
form, no affidavit goes with
that. It's not like a registration card. On
Friend, page 53, his went out
automatically also. Ie
IC 34-1003 the registration
card makes them eligible to
vote, as long as 30 days prior to election. They
would have to continue to
vote to maintain the registration. With Mr
Ainsworth I'm assuming the poll
clerk made a mistake, explains. I don't remember
the exact date I learned Mr
Ainsworth voted in the city election, its just
been in the last little while
I learned about it. My understanding was that
the judge said Title 34 was
involved. Title 50 runs almost identical to 34.
I was at the hearing, that
was my understanding that he made that
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14:19:45
14:23:56
14:25:53

statement. There's different
residency, they're pretty close. IC 50-402C. If
a postcard comes back we
delete them. We don't make an investigation to
the residence 30 days prior to
election.

14:26:00

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Ask for recess.

14:26:26

Stop recording
(On Recess)

14:34:27
Recording Started:
14:34:27

Record
Etal, City of CDA

14:34:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

14:34:58

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Julie Chadderton

14:35:50

Other: Chadderton, Julie
Sworn by clerk. live in Fernan Village. I voted
in 2009 at Lakes Middle
School. I was provided a ballot. There was a
question raised as to the
ballot. I told them my name, handed a ballot, I
said this is the wrong one,
they handed me the correct one.

14:36:15
14:36:43
14:36:58
14:37:22

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

14:37:25

Other: Chadderton, Julie
I voted the correct ballot.

14:37:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You may be excused. Recalll Ms Beard

14:38:01

Other: Beard, Deedie
I knew about a week ago about Ainsworth vote. I
learned from office staff, I
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14:38:37
14:38:53
14:39:07

knew that he might not have shown proof of
residency for 30 days. I heard
about N. White some time ago, that she had been
turned over to the pros for
investigation, I believe the county pros, I may
be mistaken.

14:39:34

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, this is not discovery deposition.

14:39:44

Judge: Hosack, Charles
What was the question?

14:39:57

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
No stipulations.

10
14:40:
14:40:10

Other: Beard, Deedie
I heard some time ago that Nancy White was being
investigated for not living
in the city. Exh 101, signed Dec 2009, page 7
para f. I generated the report
from software from the county machine. You put
the disk in to print out that
ofballots.
ballots.
data. It identifies count and number of
A disk is taken from the
machine and put in the computer software. Exh
85, appears to be the printout.
2051 were the ballots that went through the
machine. I ran report during the
day. We prepared for the canvass the next day.
You account for all the
ballots, when we prepare for the canvass we go
through all the stuff. I
didn't compare 2051 for a total. I'm familiar
with 34-1011. Kootenai didn't
print out such a record immediately after the
election. The girls were
running reports the next day. Exh 5, run on Nov
6. I've never seen this full
document, first I saw was when you presented it
in court. I don't know what
ofthe
the 2047 instead of2051. I
date I was aware of
don't remember who told me
about the difference. Exh 86, sometimes I did
this, sometimes Susan Smith did
this. The information would have come from me. I

14:40:27
14:43:42
14:44:12
14:45:05
14:47:16
14:47:54
14:48:24
14:49:12
14:49: 12
14:50:46
14:51:15
14:52:01
14:52:41
14:53:18
14:54:30
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14:55:32
14:55:55
14:57:59
14:58:21
14:59:05
14:59:34
15:01:49
15 :03 :29
15:03
15:04:20
15:05:40
15 :05 :40
15:06:50
15:07:26
15:07:41
15:08:02
15:08:43
15: 11 :41
15:12:01

didn't compare it with the
state registration system because you never know
if its correct depending on
what's been done. We have absentee voting in our
office. Precinct 73 was for
absentee voting, that's where I was reviewing
the documents. At the polling
place there's ajudge
a judge and clerk. They don't
count the ballot. Each precinct
has a poll book, except for absentee. But
absentee doesn't have registered
voters so you can't make a poll book. IC 50-450,
we're a central count
county. It would be the same as Title 34.IC 341008 - but we're a central
count county so that doesn't happen in Kootenai.
For absentee date/stamp is
for mail in. If
Ifthey
they walk in we put it in the
system. 34-1005, county
statute. I don't know of a statute to tell me to
do that, and I've talked to
ofthe
the
the Sec of State. If they sign in front of
clerk. I think that's a vague
code. When I don't understand it I go to the Sec
of State's office who has
never told me I need to time stamp them. They
say it is a vague code. I've
talked to them about it. Tim Hurst did not say
in-person envelopes have to
be time stamped. IC 34-1011 pertains to the
record. If
Iftwo
two ballots are in one
envelope we have counted both, that was not done
in this election because
there were no multiples. I can only recall one
time that that happened.

15:12:48

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

15:12:50

Judge: Hosack, Charles
It has no relevance of what we're talking about.

15:13:06

Other: Beard, Deedie
IC 50-440 -2, we don't do that, we're a central
count precinct.
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15:15:03

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter

15:15:09

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj, that's not the statute in effect at the
time.

15:15:27

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, relevance.

15: 15:41
15 :41

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Argues re: absentee ballot numbers. It's very
relevant.

15:16:11

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj, statute says "may", discretionary.

15:16:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Can answer as to what she does.

15:17:51

15:19:45
15: 19:45
15 :20:23
15:20:23
15 :20:36
15:20:36
15:20:58
15 :21 :51
15:21
15:22:33
15:23:49

15:24:35

Other: Beard, Deedie
.· IC 34-1
34-1011,
0 11, if any ballot is rej
rejected
ected it remains
in the sealed envelope. I
heard testimony about the Nov 16 record. The
main it might have increased is
that ballots come back a day or so after the
election and they're put in and
voided. You can't add anybody after the election
day, the system won't let
you. Exh 5 was run on Nov 6, you cannot add
voters after the date. You can
'
scan in evelopes.
eve lopes. You can't add new voters, you
can accept ballots and scan
them in.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
It doesn't do any good to have this witness
assume, its nonprobative. I've
heard your arguement for the last 2-3 days.

15:24:50

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'm finished.

15:24:56

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS
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15:25:02

15:25:57
15:26:20
15:27:31
15:28:03
15:28:31
15:28:51
15:29:40
15:30:23
15:30:53
15:31:07
15:31:51
15:32:30
15:33:09
15:33:51
15:34:08
15:34:32

Other: Beard, Deedie
IC 34-435, deals with purging registration every
Ie
4 years who have not voted,
that's the law. IC 34-431 the law that allows
someone to challenge the
registration. 34-1002 is the statute under
It allows for a federal type form, I've seen
many. I've sent out many
absentee ballots under that. I give workshops to
poll workers as to what
they're to do. They're to ask for ID and
something to show they've lived in
the city for same day registration. There is
only one registration. For 2009
poll workers were instructed. We do not check on
people on where they reside.
I've not been instructed by Sec of State to do
write-ins,
that. I'm aware of
ofwrite-ins,
I know there were 7, I looked at that
personally. You have to be a declared
write-in for that to count. Machine verifies
info. The ballot counts in the
machine.You
machine. You have to declare it to be a write-in,
there's a time frame for
that. It's still a valid ballot. A dup ballot is
a ballot that is damaged and
the machine won't read it, the machine is
stopped, explains. There were 17
duplicate ballots, I looked at that personally
and verified that. I've been
doing elections a little over 27 years when I
retired. My opinion is that the
ballots counted by Judge Marano came out the
same as the machine.

15:34:54

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
CROSS

15:34:58

Other: Beard, Deedie
There's a software reporting program, there's a
precinct report on the
machine. The reports on the machine add up to
the 2051, I check the audit
trail. Exh 86 is my final tabulation that I
presented to the city clerk. I'm
not aware of any illegal accepted votes.

15:35:22
15:35:52
15:36:24
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15:36:42

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

15:36:57

Other: Beard, Deedie
I was here when Tim Hurst testified. I agree a
ballot counting machine
counts the number of ballots put through the
machine.

15:37:20

15:39:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will take a short break and work on stipulation.
Counsel will join me.

15:40:01

Stop recording
(On Recess)

16:06:02
Recording Started:
16:06:02

Record
Etal, City of CDA
Eta!,

16:06:03

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.
Proceed to your next witness.

16:06:49
16:07:02

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Ronald Pryor

16:07:47

Other: Pryor, Ronald
Sworn by clerk. My primary place of abode is
Avondale Loop. That was my
primary home by Oct 3, 2009, we moved in a few
weeks prior to that. We cast a
vote in the 2009 election. We were registered at
Industrial Way, that's our
business location.

16:08:12
16:08:55
16:09: 19
16:09:19
16:10:28

16: 11 : 11
16:11:11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Wait a minute, there's nothing in the record if
he's a legal resident of CDA
not.The
or not.
The Court has not made a determination as
to residence, we need to
have a record.

16:11:17

Other: Pryor, Ronald

16: 10:48
16:10:48
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16:11:56
16: 12:26
12 :26
16:13:30

Primary residence is on Avondale
A von dale Loop,
officially the city of Hayden. The
address on voter registration card was
ofCDA.
CDA. That has
Industrial Way, city of
since been changed, the business address because of 911. I didn't sleep
there from Oct 1 or after.

16:13:55

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I've not done this before so will allow cross.

16:14:08

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No question re: residence.

16:14:17

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No question re: residence, but it may be best
for the next inquiry to come
from the court.

16:14:32
16:14:35

16:15:08
16:15:31

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I've read the statute, it would be appropriate
to let attorneys inquire.!t
inquire.lt
would seem the testimony is that's he lived in
Hayden. Does anyone want to
argue?

16:15:33

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No dispute on that.

16:15:37

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Find that he did not meet the 30 days
requirement, moved into unqualified
voter.

16:16:09
16:16:17

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Inquires.

16:16:21

Other: Pryor, Ronald
We were deposed at your office in Jan, I do not
remember who I voted for. I
remember a phone call in which the person that
talked to us, tried to get me
to state who I voted for. He tried to lead me. I
didn't know then, and I
don't know now. I said I might have voted for
the incumbant, I might have. I

16:16:58
16:17:15
16: 17:35
16:17:35
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16:18:00
16:18:24
16:18:38

voted for somebody.
I didn't know what incumbant was, I was
concerned with other things on that
ballot.

16:18:44

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No questions.

16:18:48

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
CROSS

16:18:51

Other: Pryor, Ronald
I was under oath at Mr Kelso's office, as I am
today.

16:19:03

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Susan Harria

16:
19:39
16:19:39
16:20:05

Other: Harris, Susan
Sworn by clerk.
My primary place of
ofhome
home is Avondale Loop,
Hayden Idaho. I voted in Nov 2009
election. I used business address as permanent
address.

16:20:27

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Mr Kennedy would stip as to testimony being the
same as last witness.

16:20:45

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Concurr

16:20:49

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Accept stip.

16:20:53

Judge: Hosack, Charles
To be consistent, court would make the same
ruling, you can inquire as to
nature of the vote.

16:21:08
16:21:14

16:21:34
16:21:50

Other: Harris, Susan
I do not clearly remember who I voted for. I
didn't know the name of the man
that called, got me upset and confused. He was
talking about ballot being
absentee. I was upset. I don't know what was

.·••
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16:22:37
16:22:59

said, I was upset, I didn't know
who incumbant was. I might have said anything
to make him go away. I really
don't remember.

16:23:06

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No questions.

16:23:09

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
CROSS

16:23:12

Other: Harris, Susan
I was under oath at deposition, and today.

16:23:44

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Rahana Zellers again.

16:23:56

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Once again nobody responding. Court will make a
finding, as previously, Ms
Zellers is not here for purposes of testifying.

16:24:21
16:25:14

Stop recording
(On Recess)

16:32:36
Recording Started:
16:32:36

Record
Etal, City of CDA

16:32:38

Judge: Hosack, Charles
IN session.

16:34:24

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REvisiting Rule 804(5). I'd ask the court to
reconsider based on Rules.

16:36:39

Judge: Hosack, Charles
There's nothing pending so I'm not sure ..

16:36:48

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
The ruling on hearsay.

16:37:16

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reconsider the ruling re: proffered testimony?
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16:37:30
16:38:14

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'll proceed. The ruling this morning was we
wouldn't be able to offer
statements as to who these people voted for.

16:38:40

Judge: Hosack, Charles
RE: the five and who they voted for?

16:39:06

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes.

16:39:10

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Not a statement against interest, ruling remains
the same.

16:39:53

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Beatrice Johannessen

16:40:28

Other: Johannessen, Beatrice
Sworn by clerk. I live at E Garden, CDA. I'm
self employed, its a residence
and 11 units that I rent out. I rented to Monica
Pacquin. That was her
address in unit 3 from 2006 thru 2007. She left
that unit in fall of 2007. I
rented that unit to another person. Ms Pacquin
contacted me but never said
she wanted to come back to unit 3.

16:41:16
16:42:18
16:42:50
16:43:37
16:44:19

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

16:44:21

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Join

16:44:24

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The next question would have to be analyzed
independtly.

16:44:50

Other: Johannessen, Beatrice

16:45:05

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

16:45:08

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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Sustain

16:45:19

16:45:38

Other: Johannessen, Beatrice
That unit is presently rented to someone. It was
rented to someone during Oct
Ms Pacquin, an
toMs
2009. I've sent letters to
address in Canada.

16:46:10

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj.

16:46:15

Judge: Hosack, Charles
She said "yes."

16:46:24

Other: Johannessen, Beatrice
One letter was returned as not deliverable. I
had not put on the apt number.
A letter was written prior to Oct 2009, I
forwarded a package to her. I don't
have her phone number. I mailed papers to her
probably sometime in 2008. She
was employed in CDA, on 11th Street.

16:47:28
16:48:09
16:49:30
16:50:22

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

16:50:26

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Would have to have some foundation.

16:50:34

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'm finished.

16:50:40

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
No questions.

16:50:45

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

16:50:48

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Wileen Gagnon

16:51:27

Other: Gagnon, Willeen
Sworn by clerk. My primary place of abode is 9th
Street. I've lived there 11
years. I know Kimberly Gagnon, she is my
daughter in law.

16:52:07
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16:53:07
16:54:14

I correspond with her, address is CA. My husband
lives with me, same primary
residence. No one else resides with us during
those 11 years.

16:54:47

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

16:54:51

Other: Gagnon, Willeen
My son is John, he's in the Coast Guard, for 24
years. My daughter in law is
a house wife, was in the military. They
've been married 21 yrs, they use our address.
They plan to move her when
retired in 6 yrs. Daughter in law is disabled,
she served 3-4 years. They
both use our address for registration purposes.
Son was raised here. To my
knowledge they do not vote anywhere else. Approx
6 years ago daughter in law
became sick, I don't recall her staying with us.
She has stayed with me for a
period of time.

16:55:19
16:55:33
16:55:59
16:56:19
16:56:40
16:57:00
16:57:22
16:57:28

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

16:57:31

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

16:57:36

Other: Gagnon, Willeen

16:57:59

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Nothing.
I'd like to call Marte Chamness again.

16:58:28
16:58:43

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Is anybody present?

16:58:54

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
She was here on Tues and told she would not be a
witness on Tues. She was not
told she was released from sub. Phone calls have
been left. I've just been
informed from her husband I need to reserve her,

16:59:09
16:59:28
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16:59:51

I don't think that's true
but that's what I've heard.

16:59:58

Judge: Hosack, Charles
That's more than we had last time.

17:00:31

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We subp call Yvonne

17:01:20
17:01
:20

Other: Kindall, Yvonne
Sworn by clerk. I reside in CDA. I own Lake City
Medical Billing, office on
Gov't Way, CDA. I moved in Aug 2009. It's a home
converted to office space.
Garage has been converted to office space, I
lease one. Nancy Powers is the
landlord. Nobody resides as primary place of
abode at that address. I've not
met Allen Friend. Art Bistline leases the big
house, Nancy Powers shares
office space, and another offfice spaced lease
to Janelle Simpson. They were
leasing in Oct 2009.

17:01:47
17:02:33
17:03:02
17:04:02
17:04:48
17:05:20
17:06:03

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
NO questions.

17:06:07

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

17:06:38

Other: Currie, Richard
Could I be excused? I need to be someplace.

17:06:52

Judge: Hosack, Charles
He's here.

17:06:56

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Before I go down that road I need to confer,
there's an issue.

17:07:19

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You're not going to call him today?

17:07:28

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A

SC 38417-2011

Page 103, ...

Page 2242 of 2676

17:07:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Why don't we take a moment and see. Recess.

17:07:57

Stop recording

17:14:03
Recording Started:
17:14:03

Record
Etai, City of CDA

17:14:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session. The Court's understanding is
with regard to Elmer Rick
Currie, the service of subp is for Senior Mr
Currie, so you're not under
supb.

17:14:38
17:
14:38

17:15:03
18
17: 15:
15:18

Other: Currie, Richard
There is no

17:15:29

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm advised there is no service upon you.

17:15:59
17:
15:59

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Also note for the record, this Currie's mother
was also served.

17:16:16

Judge: Hosack, Charles
That's another problem the Court can't do
anything about. Neither the elder
Curries are present so they will not be called.

17:16:36
17: 16:36
17:17:36
17: 17:36

17: 18: 11
17:
19: 17
17:19:17

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Called Denise Dabsloff, subp was returned with
no service, Mr Brannon has
stip to entry of Affd of Proft, Exh 103 affd of
Dobslaff. Should be admitted
d into evidence.

17:19:29

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
In observing the rules of evidence, obj on basis
of hearsay.

17:19:47

Judge: Hosack, Charles
It is hearsay, comments regarding hearsay, it is
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17:21:05

not admissable. We don't try
cases with affidavits. Obj is sustained, affd
will not be admitted.

17:21:51

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Argues, Ijust
I just want it part of
ofthe
the record.

17:22:40

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Trials are trials, rules are rules. As far as
I'm concerned, it's reversable
error, it's clearly inadmissable.

17:23:05
17:23:14

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
May I make a comment? Fairness is in the eyes of
the beholder.

17:23:36

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OK. There isn't another live witness we're
calling? I understand you still
have the offers of proof.

17:24:10
17:24:14

17:24:41

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes, and the exhibits. We'll seek appropraite
relief for Chamness, and elder
Mr Currie and his wife.

17:25:48
17:26:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
You haven't rested. If nobody is here at 9:00 we
move on. In terms of
testimony, we'll go into evening recess.
If counsel would join the court in chambers.

17:26:48

Stop recording

17:24:53
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK09131 OA
Session Date: 09113/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0008
Case number: CV2009-1 0010
00 10
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant(s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0007
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0009.
09117/2010
09:11:50
Recording Started:
09:11:50
Case recalled
09:12:23
09: 12:23

Stop recording
(On Recess)
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09:15:35
Recording Started:
09:15:35

Record
Etal, City of CDA

09:15:37

Judge: Hosack, Charles
In session. Counsel have met and advised the
court re: three exhibits. As I
understand these can be offered and admitted
w/out obj. Exh 104, 105, 106.
These are admitted?

09:16:02

09:18:23
09: 18:23
09: 18:28
09:18:28

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes

09:18:32

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Yes

09: 18:33
09:18:33

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Yes

09:18:40
09: 18:40

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Hands actual exhibit.

09:20:51

Judge: Hosack, Charles
As I understand you were going to call R.
Zellers

09:21:02

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That isn't hooked up yet.
Ask Mr Cafferty to get poll books, and I'll call
Marte Chamness.

09
:21: 15
09:21:

09:22:09

Stop recording
(On Recess)

09:24:33
Recording Started:
09:24:33

Record
Etal, City of
ofCDA
CD A

09:24:34

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We have have the books. Have witness come
forward.
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09:25:13

09:25:48
09:26:35
09:28:01
09:33:33
09:35:30
09:35:46
09:36:06
09:37:09
09:37:58
09:38:15
09:39:46
09:40:09
09:40:22

Other: Chamness, Marte
Sworn by clerk. Gives full name. My primary home
is CDA Place. In CDA, Idaho.
I've lived there two years. I moved there in
2008. Prior to that I lived on
CDA. I did
Stonehendge Ave. in city limits of CDA.
vote in the 2009 election.
Reviews poll book for Precinct 37 and 38.
Book 37, page12, shows my address. shows old
address and new address. Note
says I asked to check my address after I voted.
I went to vote and was told I
needed to go to Woodland School to vote. I
believe I wanted to change my
address after I voted. Precinct poll book for
38, page 47, it says Chamness,
John, that is my husband. I was not with my
husband when he cast his vote. I
walked in, showed my ID, driver's license, it
had Stonehendge address, I
voted. When I showed my identification, I asked
to have my address changed.
At the time I voted I told them my address was
not the same. I presumed
everything was fine.
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
At this stage I'd direct your attention to IC
50-458(3)(4).

09:41:32
:56
09:41:56
09:41

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I've read the statute.

09:42:50

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
I object to procedure, arguement with evidence.

09:43:11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I don't know how else to do this, re: asking a
constitutionally illegal
question.

:38
09:43
09:43:38
09:45:03

09:45:28

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I would challenge the persons' vote for not reregistering and at proper
precinct.
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09:45:44

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
May I inquire of the witness?

09:45:52

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Yes.

09:46:01

Other: Chamness, Marte
For 30 days prior to election I was a resident
of CDA. Moved into house in
2008, moved into the first residence in 2006.
I've been a resident of CDA for
4 years. I voted one time in this election. I
informed the people at the
precinct of my new address.

09:46:21
09:46:40
09:47:03
09:47:09

09:47:46

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
I'd like to respond to the challenge now. This
is a legal voter, argues.
Statute doesn't say she has to re-register.

09:48:12

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

09:48:37

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Noble v Ada County, reads.

09:49:27

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
This witness didn't do anything intentionally
wrong. Goes to a qualified
elector is. If they change their residence they
have to reregister, her
husband voted at the proper precinct. Unde the
law, because of failure to
reregister, doesn't meet statutory requirements.
Failure of election official
s to administer the code.

09:50:01
09:50:26
09:50:45
09:51:09
09:51
:09
09:51:14

09:51:45
09:51
:45
09:52:06
09:52:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reviews statute, there is no showing here, she
did everything she thought she
was supposed to do. There's no way I can find
anything wrong. Courts should
honor the right to vote, technicality should not
deprive right to vote. Find
no basis to find her vote illegal. She's a legal
voter.
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09:53:03

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
And failure of poll woker.

09:53:14

Judge: Hosack, Charles
That does not disquality the legal voter.

09:54:07

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
While Matt get the next witness hooked up I
could do an offer of proof on the
nonservice returns.

09:54:36
09:54:44

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Ok.

09:54:47

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
The originals are in the file, maybe the court
could take judicial notice.
I don't have the originals.

09:55:01
09:55:11

09:55:32
09:55:53
10:00:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The Court is not going to go through 12 files,
you can prepare an offer of
proof. The record can reflect there are records
of nonservice in the file.
We're attempting to call a witness through the
marvels of modern technology.
We'll go forward.

10:00:42

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Call Elmer Currie.

10:01:06

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Is Mr Currie present?
bailiffhas
The bailiff
has checked the hallway, no one
responded.

10:01:25

10:01:39

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Or Mrs Currie?

10:01:46

Defendant: Etal, City of CDA

10:01:51

Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
They're not present.

10:02:01

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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Mrs Elmer Currie was called and is not present.
Call your next witness.
10:02:18
10:02:37

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Our next witness is Rahana Zellers.
Denise Dabslaff and Kim Gagnon are not available
until this afternoon.

10:03:04

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Other than those three, any other witnesses?

10:03:25

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I may call Aaron Jenkins and Johnson depending
on the offer of proof.

10:03:48

Judge: Hosack, Charles
That can be made at any time. We need to give
the defense a shot.

10:04:37

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
No other witnesses.

10:04:45

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Is the defense ready to call a witness?

10:05:15

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I do need to call Mr Jenkins re: impeachment.

10:06:06

Other: Jenkins, Aaron
Sworn by clerk. Office address is Cornerstone
Drive.

10:06:39

Other: Jenkins, Erin
I conducted interviews. I contacted Prior and
Harris by phone. I talked to
both of
ofthem
them and two occassions. And one time I
spoke with Susan at her home.
I discussed the primary abode of Susan Harris
and Ronald Prior. I discussed
if they voted in the 2009 election. Harris
provided information as to who she
voted for. Prior provided information as to who
he voted for. I recorded the
conversations with a digital recorder. I have a
copy of the recording with me
today. I recall what they told me.

10:07:15
10:07:37
10:08:47
10:09:55
10:
10:10:45
10:45
10:11:57
10:
11 :57
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10:12:57
10: 12:57

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Could we stop with this witness and go with
Rahana?

10:13:14

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Let's go with this witness.

10:13:31

Other: Jenkins, Erin
Harris told

10:13:53

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj,

10:14:08

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Offered for impeachment?

10: 14: 17
10:14:17

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes.

10:14:21

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Impeachment can't be substantative evidence, not
relevant.

10:15:09

Judge: Hosack, Charles
As far as I can tell, it's impeachment evidence,
for whatever the weight.

10:15:30

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Then he should play the tape for the court to
determine credibility.

10:15:59

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Impeachment is a collateral issue. He doesn't
need to play whatever
recordings he recorded.

10:16:34
10:16:42

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Continues direct.

10:16:48

Other: Jenkins, Erin
Conversations were on 1-26-10 with Harris, and
at her home on 1-28-10. On the
26th she had agreed to sign an affd, I took it
to her home. Then she didn't
agree to sign. Then she was served a subp, when
she didn't sign the Affd. On

0: 18:26
18 :26
110:
10:18:48
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10:19:34
10:19:56
10:20:13
10:20:37
:05
10:21:05
10:21
10:21:29

1-26-10 she told me she voted for Kennedy. The
first time I spoke to them on
the phone, they both said they weren't sure and
couldn't remember. On calling
them back, he said he voted for the incumbant,
and Ms Harris said she had
done the same thing. She also said she'd seen a
newspaper article and
recalled the person she voted for won.
The purpose for the subp was for a deposition.

10:21:50

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Is Ms Zellers ready?

10:22:04

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
I don't have much.

I

i

10:22:11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Go ahead.

10:22:15

Other: Jenkins, Erin
I was not here when they testified. I've not
reviewed their testimony. I had
digital recorder. I did not advise them I was
recording the conversation. I
did not place them oath. In the first
conversation Harris said she did not
recall who she voted for. She said they voted
republican. In the first
converstion he said he didn't remember who he
voted for. He said they vote
republican. There was some confusion that they
voted absentee. Harris
communicated some concern that she was an
absentee vote. I clarified that
that was a mistake. Prior said incumbant. On the
28th Harris told me to
leave. She said they were not going to sign the
affd. The affd had to do with
where they live and who they voted for. She told
me this was beyond the pale.
Then I served subp.

10:22:50
10:23:05
10:23:23
10:24:08
10:24:21
10:25:14
10:25:45
10:26:22
10:26:58
10:27:14
10:27:22

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
CROSS
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I 0:27:25
10:27:25

10:27:56
17
10:28:
10:28:17
10:28:31

Other: Jenkins, Erin
The affd, she was there, her husband was not. I
don't remember if the name
Kennedy was on it. She said something like this
was some kind of lawyer
trick. Only she refused to sign. I never
presented him with an affd. They
both said they didn't know who they voted for
when I first talked to them.

10:28:48

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

I0:28:52
10:28:52

Other: Jenkins, Erin
The deposition was scheduled the next day
because they were leaving for
Mexico the next day.

10:29:12
10:29:34
I 0:29:34

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Ms Zellers?

10:33:18
I0:33:18

Other: Zellers, Rahana
Attempting video hookup.

13
10:34:
I 0:34:13

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We'll go off the record, but the attorneys will
stay here so that when she's
on we can go.

10:34:27
I0:35:I4
10:35:14

Stop recording
(On Recess)

10:40:08
Recording Started:
10:40:08

Record
Etal, City of CDA

10:40:16
10:40:I6

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Resume.
Comments to
Ms Zellers.
toMs

10:40:37
I0:40:37
10:40:47
I0:40:47

10:41
:38
I 0:41:38

Other: Zellers, Rahana
I'm in Portland OR. I'm in my house. I
understand I'm being called to testify
at a trial. I see the attorney. I understand the
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10:42:16
10:43:27
10:44:43
10:45:42
10:46:55
10:47:11

attorneys will ask
questions. The clerk will swear you now.
Sworn by clerk. Before Oct I lived at 515 W
Garden. As of Oct 1, I lived at
Spingview Dr., CDA. In Kootenai County. I went
to polling place to vote Nov
ifl
3. I received a ballot. No one inquired if!
lived in the county. I
understand the poll worker provided me a city
ballot instead of a county
ballot.

10:47:17

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Can I proceed to the next inquiry?

10:47:28

Judge: Hosack, Charles
This establishes not a qualified voter.

10:47:39

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
We agree.

10:47:50

Judge: Hosack, Charles
She moved to a location outside the city but
within the county, would not
have satisfied the 30 day requirement.

10:48:06
10:48:41

Other: Zellers, Rahana
I didn't hear the judge.

10:48:48

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
He said I can ask this next question.

10:48:56

Other: Zellers, Rahana
I'm not sure who I voted for, I ususally vote
democratic, probably Mr
Kennedy.

10:49:21
10:49:23

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

10:49:27

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Obj

10:49:28

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'll take the first go round of answers.
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10:49:38

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Others will ask you questions

10:49:49

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

10:50:10

Other: Zellers, Rahana
It's fair to say I'm not sure who I voted for.
It's almost always the
democratic. There was no indication who was dem
or rep on the ballot.

10:50:51

10:51:10

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

10:51:13
10:51: 13

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
No further questions.

10:51:37

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Except for offers of proof and checking the
exhibits, and the calling of
Dabslff and GAgnon, the PL can now rest?

10:52:02
11
10:52:
10:52:11

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes, reserving the Motion to Amend.

10:52:26

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The PL resting allows up to move to defense.

10:52:48

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
It may not be necessary to call witnesses,
depending on exh., explains.

10:53:50

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will take a recess, then counsel can advise the
Court.

10:54:14

Stop recording
(On Recess)

12:05:08
Recording Started:
12:05:08

Record
Etal, City of CDA
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12:05:08

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

12:05:18

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
We have met with counsel and have reached an
agreement on exhibits. Stip to
admission of PL 11-15

12:06:14
12:06:27

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 11-15

12:06:50

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Stip is that I will ask Ms Beard a couple
questions on those documents.

12:07:06

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Also exh G, city election manual. Exh A, And PL
exh 90, and 56-60, that they
were not located in Kootenai for service.
AS an offer of proof, Mr Kelso would like the
additional facts in those
documents put in the record.

12:08:50
12:09:00
12:09:18
12:10:00

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I think that's already of record.

12:10:09

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Yes, explains, the portion that they were not
located in Kooteani County.

12:10:39

Judge: Hosack, Charles
As to the circumstances of nonservice.

12:11:03

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
With the testimony ofMs Beard we would have no
further evidence.

12:11:22

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Ms Beard retake the stand, you are still under
oath.

12:12:05

Other: Beard, Deedie

12:12:08

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Stipulation is that Mr Kelso can ask Ms Beard
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some questions.
12:12:25
12:
12:25

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OK.

12:12:47

Other: Beard, Deedie
Exh 11 pertains to M Paquin. There is no address
information filled in.
Indicates she is outside the city indefinately.
Exh 12, Dobslaff, If you
don't have a license number you put the last
four of your social. Explains
absentee ballot request. I don't know how they
got the address.
There was no application for 2009 absentee that
they could find. remember
them searching for an absentee request. I do not
know where the address came
Parkes. It has no indication of
from. Exh 13 for Farkes.
year/months in Idaho. Exh 14
for Friend. No indication of years/months in
Idaho. He marked he was a US
citizen residing outside the US indefinately. No
license or ID. Exh 15 for
Gagnon. Rec'd in 2004, not sure of the date, I
can't make it out. She
indicates a member ofthe uniform services or
merchant marine or spouse. No
ID number. Address is in CA. Different people
recieve and review the
document, Susan, Sherry Van Patten and temps.
Exh 14 Friend, its a UOCAVA and
they wouldn't investigate it further. The last
four of the social was put on
it, the state system checks that. UOCAVA is
federal. Idaho does not have
permanent absentee status, other states do. No
inquiry is made as to voting
in Canada, the affd states they're not
requesting a ballot in any other
jurisdiction or state. IC 50-, reads.

12:16:32
12:18:13
12:19:47
12:21:06
:30
12:21:30
12:21
12:22:09
12:24:35
17
12:27:
12:27:17
12:28:59
12:31:01
12:31:45
12:32:37
12:33:25
12:33:50
12:36:08
12:36:56
12:37:16
12:38:57

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj,

12:39:03

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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I can read the rest of the statute.
12:40:01

12:40:18

Other: Beard, Deedie
The addresses on the registration card are
within the city and that's what
we'd go by.

12:40:23

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That's all.

12:40:29

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

12:40:34

Other: Beard, Deedie
Not having the year/months on a UOCAV
VA
A person
does not concern me. For
Pacquin there is form 76 which is a federal
form. Pacquin filled it out, its
an affd.
She's authorized to fill it out.
For Dobslaff, she filled out a UOCAVA card.
Farkes filled out a registration
Parkes
card, asked for an absentee ballot, resides
outside the US and not voting
outside this area. Friend is also a form 76 and
affirmed. Gagnon shows there
is a form 76. She affirms a member of service or
a spouse.

12:41:31
12:41:56
12:42:36
12:43:00
12:43:21
12:44:03
12:44:35

12:45:17

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
CROSS

12:45:22

Other: Beard, Deedie
Exh 12, based on my information they are
qualified to vote in 2009, same with
exh 15.

12:45:43
12:45:49

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

12:45:57

Other: Beard, Deedie
I don't know re: federal law.

12:47:48

Jndge: Hosack, Charles
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12:48:09

Other: Beard, Deedie

12:48:14

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Obj

12:48:16

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain

12:48:25

Other: Beard, Deedie
Obj

12:48:28

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Sustain
That completes evidence on behalf of the
defense?

12:48:38

12:48:50

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Yes.

12:48:52

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Concluded with witness testimony except for
Dobslafff and Gagnon.

12:50:05

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Two more exh, 50 and 51 stip to those.

12:50:25

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Admit 50 and 51.

12:50:52

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Exh 11-15, we substituted some copies for the
exhibits, the Court does not
have those.

12:51
:45
12:51:45
12:51:47

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Right, whatever is with the clerk are the
exbhits.

12:52:03

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Rest.

12:52:29

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
The city rests, save for something striking with
Dabslaff and Gagnon.
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12:53:02

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Right. Let's go off
offthe
the record and see if
Dabslaff can go at 1:00.
1:00.

12:53:44

Stop recording

14:04:45
Recording Started:

14:04:45

Record
Eta!, City of CDA
Etal,

14:04:48

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back on the record. Afther the close of
evidence, there's been a pending
motion to amend and the court has reserved
ruling.
One thing, the county records have been in the
jury room and a jury starting
Mon. I'm going to have the bailiff contact the
Mr Cafferty and remove them
sometime this afternoon. At present, I think
we'll continue to tomorrow
morning.

14:05:10
14:05:24

14:05:42
14:06:09
14:06:46
14:06:47

14:08:19
14: 10:34
14:10:34

14:10:56
14:11:37
14:12:14
14:12:42
14: 13:23
13 :23

14:14:22
14:15:51

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
On Motion to Amend, IC 34-2001. There was a
failure of duty. Chief Deputy
Hurst stated that. 133 I 139, July 1999, there
were counting errors. In that
case the court found there were a number of
discrepancies. Proper remedy was
to have a new election. That sums up this case.
For malconduct, if there is
error ofthejudges of any precinct, Ms Beard
testified there was no daily
the votes, no comparison to the daily
count of
ofthe
reports, to arrive at a
ofthe
the
figure. Ms Beard accepted to count of
machine. The only way to determine
that then is under 34-1010,
34-1 010, so that you can go
to a box and do a count. City
clerk testified she accepted the number handed
to her. The only number that
has validity is the Nov 6 document. Hurst
testified he never told any county
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14:16:35
14:17:52
14:22:14
14:23:06
14:23:22
14:30:27
14:31:01
14:31:11

14:31:46
14:32:38
14:33:08
14:33:33
14:34:35
14:36:50
14:37:14
14:38:12
14:39:23

14:40:18

14:41:21
14:42:19
14:42:46
14:42:52

not to comply with statutes. He testified this
is an election contest
situation.
You can't just rely on what is stated on a voter
registration card.
What we've seen through this trial is that they
didn't follow the law, and
most didn't know the law.
Failure to maintain 34-1011 and 50-451 is
malconduct. That record wasn't
kept.
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
The arguement Mr Kelso made is one that you will
hear again tomorrow. The
arguement is one that's been made before. In
Noble v Ada, errors made in the
clerks office could not disinfranchize the
voters. Mistakes made here were
from people who had no ax to grind, three votes.
There's no showing of
malconduct or fraud. Recount was done, and we
came up with an accurate count.
No evidence the duplicate ballots were not legal
ballots. IC 34-1011, doesn't
have anything to do with the conduct of the
election. The ballot count was in
the machine, just not printed. They went through
the ballots and had the
actual and that was given to the city counsel.
Everything was done
thouroughly. No basis for amending the
Complaint.

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Failure to keep a record, if true, isn't
malconduct. Malconduct, if it's
exists, would lie with Kootenai County, which is
not a party to this suit. At
this point, they've only gained one vote, they
need four more. Malconduct
isn't proven.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
You have a couple minutes to cover a response.
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14:43:13

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We've submitted documentation of what we believe
is malconduct.

14:43:45

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Malconduct is not fraud or corruption. Just what
malconduct is remains
somewhat foggy. Nothing that I heard argued
would be excluded if argued on
closing. I don't see how adding the word
malconduct would change any of the
arguments. If there was anything there, it would
go to the county. This
Court has ruled the city can contract with the
county. I mean no disrespect
to Mr Hurst, but on the issues I'm deciding he
couldn't add very much. His
role is extremely limited. It's machine voting,
who owns the machines, the
county controls that. There isn't anything
legally incorrect with the city
contracting. The county is not a party. Deny
Motion to Amend.

14:44:19
14:44:58
14:45:33
14:45:56
14:46:40
14:47:20
14:48:51
14:50:04

14:52:55

14:53:19
14:54:40
14:55:07
14:55:32
14:56:55

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
On behalf ofMr Kennedy, Motion to Dismiss.
Looking at the light most
favorable, remaining ground under 34-1011, five
vote difference. Votes given
up, now a margin of four. Who are the illegal
votes such that it would change
the vote? Harris and Prior testified they can't
remember. Impeachment
evidence but not substantive evidence. If you
take Zellers, Dabslaff, and
Gagnon - that's only three. Case should be
dismissed - now.

14:57:13

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Adopt Mr Erbland's argument.

14:57:22

Judge: Hosack, Charles
It doesn't address subsection 6, not a
determinitive argument. On subsection
5, can't do that, deny.
Will take a break, and see if Dabslaff is on

14:57:47
14:58:35
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standby.
14:59:04

Stop recording
(On Recess)

15:06:02
Recording Started:
15:06:02

Record
Etal, City of CDA

15:06:18

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

15:09:11

Stop recording
(On Recess)

15:17:29
Recording Started:
15:17:29

Record
Etal, City of CDA

15:17:39

Judge: Hosack, Charles
In session.
the process.

15:19:06
15:19:33

15:21:07

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
I understand I'm in court. I understand I'll be
sworn.
Sworn by clerk.

15 :21: 13
15:21:13

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
DIRECT

15:21:18

15:23:
15 :23: 13

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
My primary home in Vernon BC. From end of Sept
2009 to present residence was
Be. I received an absentee ballot in
in Vernon BC.
the mail. It was just sent to
me, I did not ask for it. When I received it I
thought I was entitled to
vote.

15:23:32

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

15:22:10
15:22:43
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15:23:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Any cross?

15:23:44

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

15:24:26

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
A few years ago I applied for absentee for
presidential election. I did not
know I was entitled to a ballot for the next two
general elections. I did
vote in the presidential election by absentee.
At that time I was living in
BC. I'm a US citizen, over the age of 18. I
lived in CDA until I was 24 yrs
old. When I'm in CDA I stay at my brothers'
11 th Street. I own maybe
house on 11th
ofhis
his property, part of an
one percent of
inhereitance. When I signed the
absentee ballot it was true to the best of my
knowledge.

15:25:02
15 :25 :29
15:25:29
15:25:53

15:26:26
15:26:59
15:27:29
15:27:58

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
No questions.

15:28:34

Judge: Hosack, Charles

15:29:01

She's testified that information is correct,
should put in the record what
tha is.

15:29:18
15:29:22

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Continues cross.

15:29:36

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I have a question. Approach?

15:30:08

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OK.

15:30:55

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Continues cross.

15 :31 :05
15:31

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Obj, need to clarifY what affd.
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15:31:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
OIR
0/R

15:31:44

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
I don't know what a form 76 is. I remember
filling out a form. I said I
resided outsided the US, indefinately, because I
don't know when I'll be
coming back. I'm an American. For now, I'm
married to a Canadian. I haven't
decided if after he retires we'll move to the
States. I would like to be able
to vote in presidential elections. I voted in
CDA city election.

15:32:45
15:33:04
15:33:52
15 :33 :52
15:34:
15:
34: 13

15:35:00

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
REDIRECT

15:35:12

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
I signed an affd and mailed it to your office in
CDA. I said primary abode
was in Vernon BC.

15:36:28
15:36:36

15:36:46

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I need to ask the court for a ruling.
Question to witness.

15:36:52

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
I'm a landed immigrant in Canadal,
Canada!, I'm only
leave-- explains.
allowed to leave

15:37:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
She's testified she's livinng in Canada, but
wishes to vote in presidential
elections. does she wish to keep CDA as place to
vote and registered to vote
anywhere else?

15:37:56
15:38:24
15:38:33

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Questions witness with judges' question.

15:38:53

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
I live in Canada, my wish is to continue to vote
in presidential election
even though I live in Be.
BC.

15:39:31
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15:40:04

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I have an objection.

15:40:49

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
That's what I understand from the consulate, I
use the last address. I'm 46
yrs now. I left when I was 24. I moved to Canada
in July 1988. I've been a
landed immigrant. I can leave for 3 months every
5 years. I've not registered
to vote anywhere other thann Kootenai.

15:42:13
15:42:41
15:44:55
15:45:07

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
CROSS

15:45:16

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
When I come down I come to CDA, that is where my
mother and brother abode, I
have friends and family there. I stay at the
house I have a small interest. I
I intend to keep CDA as the place where I vote.
When husband retires I would
like to return to CDA, I don't know what he'd
like.

15:45:34
15:45:50
15:46:23

15:46:58

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
No futher questions on reidency issue.

15:47:10

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Does anyone want to argue?

15:47:24

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
IC 50-402. I have more questions for witness.

15:47:56

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
I'm not employeed. Husband works in the lumber
industry, in Armstrong, north
of Vernon. Family receives income in Canada,
ofVernon.
about 50% goes to taxes. We file
joint taxes in Canada. I have an automobile,
Vern on, BC, I have
registered in Vernon,
a license in Be.
BC.

15:48:29
15:49:02
15 :49:02
15:49:38
15:51:14

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Argues, residence for voting allows a person to
be absent for a period of

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A

SC 38417-2011

Page 127, ...

Page 2266 of 2676

15:51:30
15 :51 :30
15:51:50
15:51
:50
15:52:04

time, regardless of duration, form 76 is
consistant with that. That allows
her to continue to vote. She intends to return,
and would like to keep her
voting status here.

15:52:09

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Another question.

15:52:18

Other: Dobslaff, Denise
When I moved in 1988 it was a question if it
would be temporary. After I got
my landed immigrantcy I had to make this my
residency. Landed immigrantcy .·
means I don't have to deal with the political
stuff here.

15:52:52
15:53:32

15:54:19

15:54:42
15:55:50
15 :56:41
15:56:41
15:58:08
15:58:24
15:59:16
15:59:47
16:00:04
16:00:46
16:01:05
16:01:24

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Now I have the facts, I need to face the legal
argument. UOCA VA has been
adopted by Idaho. It addresses overseas citizen.
UOCA VA rules appear to be
addressing this. Would still like to maintain
right to vote in CDA. Municipal
statute is slightly different, reads. The ruling
is going to be that under
the federal witness had done what's necessary to
continue to vote federally.
Idaho has adopted that, municipal seems more
restrictive. As a trial court,
I'm disturbed to make a distinction to vote
dependent on the office. A person
has done what's necessary to vote for president,
I'm not comfortable making a
legal ruling not extending that to city
election. Going to rule compliance
with the federal statute makes that person a
qualified elector, as long as
they meet that requirement. My call is that she
was a legal voter in
returning the ballot to CDA.

16:01:46

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'd like to ask a question.

16:01:54

Judge: Hosack, Charles
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OK
16:01:57

Other: Dobs1aff,
Dobslaff, Denise
When I moved I went right to Vernon from CDA.

16:02:47

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We'll go off the record while we try to find our
next witness.

16:03:01

Stop recording
(On Recess)

16:13:54
Recording Started:

16:13:54

Record
Etal, City of CDA

16:13:55

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.
Ready to call the next witness.

16:14:03
16:14:13
16:14:34
16:14:58
16:15:02
16:15:43
16:16:03

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I've been informed by the coast guard office
that Ms Gagnon is not available
at this time. And if I would pay her ticket to
fly up here she'd come visit
her family.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
The ruling would be same as for a local person,
with that the chance to call
that witness is past. Any rebuttal?
Evidence is at a conclusion?

16:16:16

Other: Parties:, All
yes.

16:16:34

Judge: Hosack, Charles
We can discuss where we go from here off the
record. We've lined up a court
reporter for tomorrow. I do want to hear your
argument, and I have a jury
trial next week. I appreciate counsel willing to
come tomorrow. I was
thinking about 9:30, the bailiff
will open the
bailiffwill

16:16:50
16:17:16
16:18:18
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door at 9:00.
16:19:40

Other: Parties:, All
Agree.

16:19:49

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Adjourn.

16:20:10

Stop recording
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK09131 OA
Session Date: 09/13/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie

Division: DIST
Session Time: 08:22

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0009
0010
Case number: CV2009-1 00
10
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott
Co-Defendant(s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0008
09/18/2010
09118/2010
09:34:38
Recording Started:
09:34:38
Case recalled
09:34:48

Judge: Hosack, Charles
IN session, closing arguement.
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09:35:05

09:35:31
:31
09:35
09:35:34

09:36:07
09:39:35
09:40:08

Other: NOTE:
Allison Stouvall is the court reporter for
19, 2010, closing
Saturday, Sept 19,2010,
arguments.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Thanks attorneys for coming in on a Saturday,
very much appreciate the
courtesy of parties, comments. Has been a
difficult case all the way around.
I reviewed notes this morning. I want to review
where we are on illegal voter
issue, subsection 5, to make sure we're all on
the same page.

09:40:51

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
That's where my closing is.

:29
09:41:29
09:41

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I think it might be helpful for counsel if I
tell them where I am on this,
for purposes of determination of an illegal
vote. And legal votes re:
Dobslaff and Chamness. Is an issue for the Court
on Paquin, Friend and
Gagnon.

:54
09:41:54
09:41
09:42:41
09:44:39
09:45:35

09:46:49
09:47:29
09:47:50
09:48: 17
09:48:17
09:48:49
09:49:32
09:50:51
:40
09:51
09:51:40

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I'm focusing on subsection 5 and 6. IC 34-2018,
if inspection of a ballot in
necessary, the balllot box is to be delivered to
the judge unopened. Three
sealed bins were presented to Judge Marano. From
those bins he counted the
ballots from each locked box. He arrived at 2027
ballots counted by him.
Seventeen duplicates, which are ballots that
could not be run through the
machine. 2010 can be run through the machine.
Another ballot is prepared to
run through the machine, to get back to 2027. If
we add in the seven void,
you have 2034. Susan Smith testified one
absentee ballot return envelope
equals one ballot. Boehm affidavit, 2086
envelopes were counted, 4 were
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09:52:51
09:53:22
09:53:59
09:54:40
09:55:05
09:55:38
09:56:05
09:57:08
09:57:51
09:58:53
09:59:21
09:59:55
10:00:39
10:02:11
10:02:48
10:03:11
10:03:49
10:04:07
10:04:35
10:05:06
10:05:50
10:06:10
10:06:44

unknown as to city or county. That leave 2082.
For this analysis I'll presume
county. Two weeks later, Judge Marano counted
counted 32 of the 2082 that
were said to be county. 2050 absentee ballot
ifwe
we
envelopes are left, if
presume they are all county. That's not 2051
that were counted. 2050 existing
envelopes, they are ballots that have to be
determined void or not. On 11-6
there were 5 voided, one person counted twice,
so left with 2044, that's
seven votes different. Now, let's start with
2086, 4 city, 32 were county, so
left with 2054 absentee ballot envelopes, which
doesn't include the 5 voided.
Less 6 is 2048. One final way, 2086 envelopes,
let's presume for argument,
less 2 for county, leave 2084 envelopes. Take
the 32 that are county
balllots, end up with 2052. Out of2052 you have
to deduct the known void
ballots of 6, leaves 2046, that's five votes.
Regarding those, we're not
arguing Ainsworth, and Croft. It's a five vote
election. Three reports done
in Nov, on 6, 16th, and 24. Nov 6 has 2041 valid
ballots. Nov 16 report
reflects 2049 total, without taking out the void
ones. Nov 24 report reflects
2056 total received, reflects seven after
election. Take that out for 2049,
the five that were voided before are still in
this number, take that out, and
the one that one person voted twice, end up with
2043, that's 8 different.
Still not including Ainsworth, White and Croft.
The three known reports that
we have reflect 2041,2041
2041, 2041 and 2043. Each of
these reports came input into
computers from election officials. None ofthe
daily reports were produced or
put in evidence. These numbers should equal out
to the daily report, that was
never compared. All these are more than the
difference between the

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A

SC 38417-2011

Page 133, ...

Page 2272 of 2676

10:07:24
10:08:17
10:10:02
10:11:18
10:12:16
10:12:43
10:13:49
10:15:05
10:16:19
10:18:01
10:19:15
10:19:59

canidates. Carrie Phillips report, searching for
absentee request, after
deducting the 165, total was 2019. Hurst
testified four voters had moved and
were deleted from the database. End up with
2023. Four less than Judge
Marano's count. 28 less than the amount run
through the computer. Defense
uses 2051 number ofJudge Marano's count of
2027, add in 17 duplicates, and 7
voids for 2051. 2051 matches the machine count,
but not any other number. The
problems lies in the 17 duplicates. You don't
add the duplicates back in. If
you don't add the 17 duplicates twice, you get
2034. Illegal votes were
received and counted. Let's talk about the
canvass subsection. Gridley
testified the city counsil did not count votes,
the county did. Treatise
election law, page 64, states the roll of city
counsil is minisqual, but are
required to count votes.

10:22:11

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I understand you're argument on this, I've ruled
on this.

10:22:31

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
The city was to count the vote, not recount.

10:22:46

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Aren't you rearguing the ruling of the court?

10:22:58

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
No. Argues.
Based on Nelson v Irrigation District, 1999,
election was set aside.

10:23:58
10:24:39
10:27:32
10:28:52
10:29:20
10:29:57

Treatise, Court has power to order new election.
Removing this person from
seat 2 will not impact the business of the city
of CDA.
CDA. Sup Court upheld
Judge Moss' order for a new election. We're not
asking you disinfranchize any
ofCDA.
CD A. We're saying everybody
voter of the City of
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10:30:21
10:31:01
:31
10:31:31
10:31
10:32:39
10:32:50

10:33:37

gets to vote in this new
election. This Court should so order. Sup Court
said that was proper in
Nelson case. We're asking for a new election for
seat 2. Let the voter's
decide. Let every legal voter vote. It would be
a simple matter to add seat 2
to the Nov election.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Exh 86, which is the canvass, we don't have any
evidence for ballots cast on
voting day?

10:33:44

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We've never disputed 2051 counts from machine,
but count should be 2041.

10:34:32

Judge: Hosack, Charles
All evidence is with regard to absentee?

10:35:09

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
We didn't go through the 4000

10:35:21

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Will take a short break. Recess.

10:35:33

Stop recording
(On Recess)

10:45:51
Recording Started:
10:45:51

Record
Etal, City of CDA

10:45:55

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Back in session.

10:46:02

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr
I've advised Mr Erbland I wanted to make a
clarification. Exh 94, re:
non-absentee ballot voters, the poll books do
not reflect whether they
received a city or county ballot.

10:46:30
10:47:04
10:4 7:04
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10:48:25
10:51:10
10:52:31
10:52:48
10:53:09
10:53:59
10:54:16
10:54:47
10:55:30
10:56:35
10:57:45
10:59:42
11:02:53
11 :02:53
11:03:20
11 :03:20
11:04:49
11:07:43
11 :07:43
11:11:26
11:11:50
11:13:59

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Closing argument.
The margin today is four. IC allows reliefwhen
relief when
challenged. AS far as Paquin,
Friend and Gagnon the court has not determined,
it is our position that that
is moot. It's never been proffered as to how
they voted, they were legal
residents for voting purposes. We don't know how
they voted. Harris and Prior
are not legal voters, they testified they could
not remember who they voted
for. Impeachment evidence was Harris said
Kennedy and Prior said incumbant in
conversations with Jenkins. Argues regarding
impeachment testimony, not subst
antive evidence, it's black letter law. Zellers
said I think Kennedy, but not
sure. The margin remains at three. If you deduct
Harris and Prior, still have
one. IC 34-2101(5) allows a challenge. We look
to see if any of this would
change the result.
The Brannon team prevailed upon the Court to
inspect absentee
ballots. Prevailed on a judge to do the
Ifwe
we want to know the orig
counting. If
ianl
ian! count we look to Eugene Marano affd and
notes.
Reads from Eugene Marano affidavit.
Ballots received Nov 3, 2009, was in a sealed
envelope, the seal removed in
front of Judge Marano, not an invalid ballot,
but a invalid write-in. You add
the seven and get 2051.

11:14:35

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Exh 86, questions re: figures.

11:19:59

Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Comments regarding a damaged ballot, machine
kicks it out, hasn't counted the
ballots. Duplicate ballot is made and the
machine then counts it. The
damaged ballot is fixed then counted.

11:20:23
11 :20:23
11:21:21
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11:22:14

11:22:52

11:27:57
11:31:27
11:32:41
11:34:25
11 :34:25
11:34:44
11:35:04
11 :35:04
11:36:03
11 :36:03

Judge: Hosack, Charles
In the court's mind sometimes the 2051 includes
the 17 duplicates and
sometimes it doesn't. Questions re: how
duplicates are counted.
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter
Argues.
Noble v Ada County,
There is not such thing as a perfect trial, and
there is no such thing as a
perfect election. Sup Court has made it clear,
and election should not be
overturned based on allegations of
irregularities. That applies to this case,
ask the court to dismiss the case and find for
defendants.

11:47:27

Add Ins: Haman, Michael
Closing argument.
2044 absentee ballots were submitted, 17 were
flawed, the machine didn't
count them.The
them. The machine originally counted 2027.
The 17 were corrected and run
through the machine bringing it to 2027, then
the write-ins of7 bringing it
to 2034. Stipulated to 3 illegal votes. It's
gone from a five vote difference
now one. Case is about significant errors to
change to vote. PL focus was on
illegal votes. Kootenai county had an open door
to explain the process to us.
There were no secret meetings, PL was as some of
the meetings. It was determi
ned it was a correct election and the right
person won. The best evidence is
the count by Judge Marano. It comes to 2051, his
count validated testimony.
There were irregularities. All the workers did
what the Sec of State
instructed them to do. The city could not know
of any irregularities. It
wouldn't change the results.

11:49:08
11 :49:08

Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr

11:36:17
11:37:28
11:38:23
11 :38:23
11:38:43
11 :38:43
11:39:09
11 :39:09
11:41:09
11:41:54
11 :41:54
11:42:21
11:43:27
11:43:47
11:45:03
11 :45:03
11:46:47
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11 :52:32
11:52:32
11:53:10

Final closing.
Court has the power to order a new election. The
electors will be able to go
to ballot box and know their vote was properly
counted.

11:58:36

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I know I'll have 50% of the population thinking
I failed. The decision here
will not make a difference in the running of the
city, no dispute that both
canidates would do a good job. I am not going to
be able to rule in this, one
of the issues I want to think about is legality
as to remaining votes that
have been characterized. I think the task of the
Court is to decide the
disputed issues.
I can't let letting this be added into the Nov
election be at issue. I'll
write, but if that gets bogged down, I may call
you back into court and put
it on the record. I appreciate the presentation.

11:59:32
11 :59:32

Stop recording

11:53:53

11:54:18
11:55:02
11:55:37
11:56:16
11:56:38
11:57:39
11:58:19

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A
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f'>l? IDAHO
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I.ND
~.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTE
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.1
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000
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AM
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CLERK OJ \HE DIS:RI~ COURT
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BY
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DEPUTY

)
) Case No: CV-2009-0010010
)
)
)
) NOTICE OF TRIAL
)
)

TIM
nMBRANNON
BRANNON

vs.
VS.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, ETAL.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for:

12, 2010 at 04:00
04:00PM
Court Trial Scheduled Tuesday, October 12,2010
PM
Contempt issue.
Judge:
Charles W. Hosack
Additional Presiding Judges: Charles W. Hosack; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Lansing L. Haynes; Fred
M. Gibler; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, III; George D. Carey.
23, 2010.
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Thursday, September 23,2010.
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LXJ Faxed

ARTHUR B MACOMBER
FAX: (208) 664-9933
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SCOTTW. REED
FAX: (208) 765-5117
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PETER C. ERBLAND
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[ ] Mailed

[ ] Hand Delivered

[X] Faxed
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DISTRI~WH-;;;_
DISTRI~WH~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOO-r-ENAI
KOOT·ENAI

JIM BRANNON,
PLAINTIFF,
Vs
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE,
al,
IDAHO, a municipal corporation, et ai,
DEFENDANT(S).

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2009-10010
MEMORANDUM DECISION

ISSUES

This is an election contest case pursuant to Idaho Code Section 34-2001.
The issues presented are (1) whether there were sufficient illegal votes cast to
change the outcome of the election and justify the Court in setting aside the
election results under Subsection (5); (2) whether there was an error in counting
the votes sufficient to change the outcome of the election and justify the Court in
setting aside the election results under Subsection (6); and, (3) whether there
was any evidence of malconduct supporting the Motion to Amend filed by the
Plaintiff seeking to set aside the election under Subsection (1).

I. ILLEGAL VOTES

On the issue of illegal votes under Subsection (5), Plaintiff listed, as
required by Section 34-2017(b), twenty-two (22) potential illegal voters. Eleven
(11) were qualified voters who were registered to vote and did cast a ballot. Ten
(10)
(1 0) of these were absentee voters, and one was a registered qualified voter who
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!

voted at the polls on election day. Although there are some irregularities as to
how nine (9) of the absentee ballots were received or the form of the return
envelope, no claim was made at trial that any of these votes were illegal. As to
th
the 10
1oth
absentee vote (of Patricia Harris), no evidence was presented that the

voter voted twice. As to the one election day voter, (Marte Chamness), the Court
has determined Chamness to be a legal voter.
Of the remaining eleven (11) individuals listed by Plaintiff pursuant to
Section 34-2017, Subsection (b), as allegedly illegal votes, the votes of six (6)
voters have been found to be illegal. The votes of Nancy White, Dustin
Ainsworth, and Gregory Proft have been deemed illegal and for whom the vote of
each was cast was determined by stipulation. Two of those votes were for
Kennedy, and one was for Brannon. Therefore, the vote difference between
Brannon and Kennedy has been reduced from five to four.
There remain three illegal voters who testified as to how they cast their
vote. They are Susan Harris, Ronald Prior, and Rahana Zellars. The Court has
not yet made a determination as to how they voted. Susan Harris and Ronald
Prior both testified that they did not recall who they voted for. Rahana Zellars
testified that she believes she probably voted for Kennedy.
With regard to Susan Harris and Ronald Prior, the only evidence that
contests their testimony that they do not remember who they voted for is the
impeachment testimony by an investigator who interviewed them following the
election. The investigator testified that both individuals indicated to him that they
voted for Kennedy. However, the investigator testified that when he first
contacted each of those two individuals, they both stated that they did not recall
who they voted for. It was during continuing questioning by the investigator that
statements were made about how they voted.
Both individuals testified at trial that the private investigator's statements
that they had told him that they had voted for Kennedy were not an accurate
summary of their comments to the investigator as to the true nature of their
knowledge. The Court finds the testimony of each that they do not remember to
be credible. It is therefore unnecessary to rule on the legal issue raised by the
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defense that the impeachment testimony is not substantive evidence and cannot
be used as a matter of law to determine that Harris or Prior voted for one
candidate as opposed to the other. The Court concludes that Susan Harris and
Ronald Prior are credible with regard to their in-court testimony which is that they
do not recall for whom they voted in the Kennedy-Brannon
Kennedy-Bran non race.
Rahana Zellars testified that she was uncertain as to her vote, but she
also testified that she thought she probably voted for Kennedy. A statement that
someone thinks they "probably" voted for someone does not necessarily mean
one is certain enough to swear under oath as to whom they may have voted. The
statement that one "probably" voted for a candidate could be immediately
followed by another statement that the voter is nonetheless not at all sure.
Certainly one who thinks something might be probable may be unwilling to swear
under oath that it is in fact true. However, the nature of Rahana Zellars'
testimony, and the way she gave it, with the apparent degree of certainty upon
which she stated her "probability" of having voted for Kennedy, causes the Court
to conclude that she did in fact vote for Kennedy. While the reasons given (she
thinks she voted for Kennedy because she always votes for the Democrat) are
not clear to the Court, since the race was nonpartisan and no party affiliation was
shown on the ballot, nonetheless the Court finds that, for whatever reason, Ms
Zellars was comfortable enough about the degree of the probability of her
recollection that the Court can find that her statement that she probably voted for
Kennedy is a correct statement of how she voted.
Regarding the aforementioned three (3) illegal votes in question, the Court
finds that two cannot remember how they voted and one voted for Kennedy. This
reduces the vote total for Kennedy by one, so the vote difference is now three
(3).

The above discussion still leaves still five (5) individuals as potential illegal
voters pursuant to Subsection (b). These are five (5) UOCAVA voters. (Paquin,
Farkes, Friend, Dobslaff, and Gagnon). The Court has determined Dobsloff to be
a legal voter, pursuant to the applicable UOCAVA criteria.
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With regard to Paquin, Farkes, Friend, and Gagnon, there is the threshold
issue of the legality of their residence. Defendants claim the residency issue is
moot because there is no evidence as to how anyone
any one of the four voted. Even if
all were found to be illegal residents, because there is no evidence of how they
voted, any illegality of their residence cannot impact the outcome of the election,
and is therefore irrelevant.
Nonetheless, the issue of UOCAVA votes by Paquin, Farkes, Friend, and
Gagnon arguably relates to alleged irregularities in the election process. The
Court will therefore examine the legality of the residence of the four (4)
individuals to determine the legality of their voter status.
As to Monica Paquin, there was essentially no evidence other than the
fact that she was no longer living at the Coeur d'Alene address given. However,
UOCAVA,
under UOCAV
A, Paquin was legally entitled to vote absentee. She was living
overseas and had listed her last place of abode as her place of voting. She did
not testify at trial, nor was there any evidence that would indicate that she was
living abroad other than temporarily. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record
for the Court to find her vote illegal.
With regard to Kimberly Gagnon, the testimony at trial established that she
is a spouse of a current member of the military and is a legal voter under
UOCAVA. The evidence at trial only further supported her legal status to vote
absentee pursuant to her UOCAVA application.
With regard to Friend, he listed a commercial office as a residence
address on his UOCAVA paperwork. The commercial nature of the address was
established by evidence introduced during the trial. The fact that the location is a
commercial space was not evident from the voter information. Apparently, the
building was formerly a residential house, and has been converted to office
space. Again, under UOCAVA, Friend was living abroad and entitled to list Coeur
d'Alene as his voting residence as long as that was his last place of residence.
While there may be an issue over listing what is apparently a commercial space
when asked to list a residential address, there is no evidence showing that he
was not a qualified voter and legal resident of the City of Coeur d'Alene prior to
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moving abroad. Friend did not testify. Therefore, under the UOCAVA criteria,
there is no evidence upon which the Court could make a finding that he was an
illegal absentee voter.
As to Farkes, no evidence was submitted during trial disputing her
UOCAVA status as a legal voter. The UOCAVA paperwork submitted to the
County shows that Farkes met the UOCAVA criteria, and the Court finds Farkes
to be a legal voter. Mr. Hurst's opinion that Farkes was a legal voter, even though
that opinion was based solely upon her registration and UOCAVA application, is
therefore correct.
Therefore, the Court finds that Paquin, Friend, Gagnon, and Farkes, were
legal voters.
While the Court understands the Plaintiff's concerns over election officials
relying upon the UOCAVA criteria to qualify absentee voters, the County is
simply following the law. The Court does not find there was an obligation on the
County to check the address listed by Friend to see whether it was a commercial
location or a residential location. A failure to investigate the accuracy of the
information submitted for UOCAVA status is not any kind of irregularity by
election officials. There is no duty to investigate. Any failure to do so does not in
any way constitute an irregularity. This Court can hardly find the County at fault
when it relied on the UOCAVA criteria.
While Plaintiff did not prevail on the UOCAVA issue to establish illegal
votes, the Plaintiff does raise legitimate concerns. The Court held on reviewing
Dobslaff's status that meeting the UOCAVA criteria for valid absentee votes for
federal and state elections would also satisfy the requirement for municipal
elections. As Plaintiff points out, the statute regarding the municipal residency
requirement is slightly different than for federal or state. The Court could find no
applicable case law, and held that UOCAVA was meant to be applied equally to
a citizen's right to vote absentee, and that therefore this Court would not
differentiate the right to vote absentee based upon whether an election was
federal, state or municipal. The issue will remain unsettled without further
clarification by either a legislative body or appellate court.
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The Court concludes that Paquin, Friend, Farkes and Gagnon are legal
voters. The final tally of the twenty-two (22) individuals listed as alleged illegal
voters pursuant to Section 34-2017(b), after striking the votes found to be illegal,
leaves Kennedy with three (3) votes more than Brannon. The illegal votes
received are insufficient to change the election result.

II. ERROR IN VOTE TALLY
(a) In Person Voters

Plaintiff has presented evidence as to certain unknowns regarding in
person voting on election day. For example, Plaintiff points out that for fifty-three
(53) votes at the polls on election day, no record exists as to whether the voter
received a City or County ballot. Plaintiff argues this inadequacy of record
keeping is an irregularity which justifies the Court in finding the vote tally
untrustworthy.
There is no evidence that any of the fifty-three (53) in person votes were
by unqualified voters. A failure to keep a record is not proof of an illegal vote. The
burden on a party challenging an election result is to prove facts that would have
made a difference. There is simply nothing in the record that would support any
finding that any of these fifty-three (53) in person votes were illegal or that, even
assuming there were illegal votes, such votes were cast in a manner that would
have made a difference.
The issue of the inaccuracy of the vote tally is limited to the dispute over
the count of absentee votes. Idaho law holds that irregularities in election
procedures do not disenfranchise legal voters. The evidence regarding in person
voting, if it demonstrates any irregularities, does not in any way cast any doubt
on the validity of the in person votes, (other than was discussed in the above
section regarding alleged illegal votes).
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(b) Absentee Ballots Cast

The alleged error is that the final tally of absentee ballots cast (2,051), as
adopted by the City in declaring election results (Plaintiff's Exhibit 86), is a larger
number than the number of absentee return envelopes actually received. Since
each return envelope contains only one ballot, Plaintiff claims that there must be
an error in the vote tally, because the County ran more absentee ballots through
the machine than the County had actually received from voters.
Where the alleged error is that there were more ballots counted than there
were voters, it is not necessarily required to establish how the "extra" ballots
were voted. How the votes, if any, were cast on the alleged "extra" ballots cannot
be determined. No voter ever existed, and no inquiry can be made. Under the
Subsection (5) alleging illegal voters, it is necessary to determine how the illegal
voter voted, so a determination can be made as to whether the illegal votes
made a difference. Under Subsection (6), the test is not a mathematical count,
but whether there were "extra" ballots counted in an amount great enough that
the votes could have made a difference. By way of illustration, if 1,000 people
voted in an election and 2,000 ballots were counted, and candidate A had 1,001
votes and candidate B had 999 votes, a court could declare a new election based
on an error in vote counting (1,000
(1 ,000 ballots that did not get cast by voters were
erroneously counted as votes) that made the difference in the outcome. This
conclusion could properly be made under Subsection (6), even though no
determination could be made as to how the 1000 extra ballots were in fact voted.
In this case, Plaintiff claims that in a 6,370 vote election, of 2,051
absentee ballots cast, ten (or more) were not ballots that voters filled out. Even if
only the absentee vote is considered, an alleged ten extra ballots would be only
% (one half) of one percent of the 2,051 ballots. Nonetheless, in a five (5) vote
election, (out of 6,325 votes counted), although no one could know how the
alleged ten or more "extra" ballots were filled out, the Plaintiff's claim raises the
mathematical possibility that if all ten ballots contained votes for the race in
question, and if all ten votes were cast for the winner, then the error in counting
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these extra ballots in the vote tally made the difference in the election. Therefore,
this allegation states a claim that requires a trial. (The same issue over counting
more ballots than there were voters could arguably be addressed as an
irregularity constituting malconduct under Subsection (1), but the Court has ruled
that this issue is more properly raised and decided under Subsection (6).)
The Court finds Judge Marano's ballot count of 2,051 for physically
existing absentee ballots to be accurate. The 2,027 ballots, in boxes 3-A, 3-8,
3-B,
and 4 which were run through the machine, were counted by Judge Marano on
June 22, 2010. The seventeen (17) duplicate ballots which were run through the
machine were counted by Judge Marano on July 2, 2010. The seven (7) write-ins
were valid ballots which were run through the machine and were counted by
Judge Marano on July 14,2010.
14, 2010. The sum for ballots cast is 2,051.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 85 is a County generated document for the City
General Election printed on November 4, 2009. It shows 2,051 absentee ballots
cast in the city election. The County then prepared a document (Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 86) to present to the City for the purpose of the City Council accepting the
election results. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 86 states the number of absentee ballots is
2,051. The City accepted that number when accepting the results of the election
as presented by the County election officials.

(c) Discrepancy Between Absentee Ballots Cast and Absentee Ballots
Received

The central issue at trial was whether the Plaintiff has established that the
County's figure of 2,051 absentee ballots cast was greater than the amount of
absentee ballots actually received, and, if so, what was the amount of the
discrepancy.
Plaintiff argues that there are various documents in the record that
establish that the actual number of absentee ballots received was substantially
less than 2,051. While the number of votes cast will logically be less than the
number of ballots (many voters may not bother to vote on all offices or issues
appearing on a ballot), where the number of ballots run through the voting
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machine exceeds the number of ballots actually received from voters, there is the
potential that votes have been counted and included in the final vote tally that
were on ballots that had not been filled in and voted by actual voters. The greater
the number of "extra" ballots, and the closer the election, the greater the potential
for "extra" votes to change the outcome of an election.
Plaintiff's claim is that records in evidence show that the machine count for
(1 0) more) than the number of
absentee ballots cast is greater (perhaps ten (10)
absentee ballots that the County actually ever received. In an election decided by
five (5) votes, Plaintiff's claim that the true number of valid absentee ballots
actually received from voters may be substantially less than the 2,051 ballots
shown as cast on the final vote tally raises a meritorious issue. Although there is
no way to tell if the "extra" ballots resulted in "extra" votes for a certain candidate
in the race in question, the potential exists. Although no one could ever know
how an "extra" ballot was voted, Plaintiff argues that, since the election was
decided by only five (5) votes, and given various other irregularities, a new
election should be held.
The allegation of more ballots having been counted than ballots received
raises a potentially meritorious issue as to the accuracy of the vote tally. And
when the vote difference is five (5), this alleged discrepancy of ten or more
"extra" ballots may be large enough to arguably have made a difference,
depending upon all the circumstances.
As consistently pointed out by Plaintiff's counsel, the problem is that if ten
or more ballots are included in counting the final vote tally, which such ballots in
fact were never filled in by a voter, a recount is of no help. The ten ballots that
should not be counted are automatically included in the recount, and the recount
will simply repeat the mistake. The statistical data of the recount does not
produce any information.
The Court holds that, if there were ten or more ballots counted, which
were "extra" ballots in fact never sent in by a voter, then the potential of ten
"extra" votes could be sufficient in a five vote election under Subsection (6) to
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establish an inaccurate vote count that made a difference, depending upon all
the circumstances as shown by the evidence at trial.

(d) Absentee Return Envelopes

The Court finds that the number of 2,051 is an accurate count of ballots
actually ran through the machine (absentee ballots cast). The evidence at trial
was undisputed that there was only one absentee ballot contained within each
absentee return envelope received. The dispute is about the number of valid
absentee return envelopes that the County actually received from voters.
During the litigation, the County produced 2,086 absentee return
envelopes, which Judge Marano counted. Four of these, for some reason, could
not be determined as City or County. Judge Marano subtracted all four, arriving
at a total of 2,082 absentee return envelopes received. At trial, the County
presented evidence that thirty-two (32) of the return envelopes presented to
Judge Marano were from the County. The Court finds that the County has
physical custody of 2,050 valid absentee return envelopes received for the City
election.
The discrepancy over the number of valid absentee return envelopes
received is created by the existence of the Secretary of State database. This is a
system for the entire State, under the control of the Secretary of State's office.
Each county is required to participate. It is a centralized system, designed to
provide up to the minute data on registered voters in the State of Idaho. The
Secretary of State database shows voter identification, voter name, absentee
code, residence address, mailing address, precinct, request date, issued date,
received date, and, if voided, the reason.
The database depends upon each County to input the data. The database
for absentee ballots cast in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene election was inputted
by Kootenai County election workers.
The entries of most importance in this case are the request date for the
absentee ballot, the issued date, the received date, and whether the ballot in the
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received envelope was voided. This information tracks the record that the
election official is to keep pursuant to Section 34-1011, Idaho Code, (or 50-451).
As testified to by Mr. Hurst, a data entry system only provides information
based upon the entries of data into the system. If the data is bad, or the entries
are inaccurate, the usefulness of the information produced by the data entry
system is reduced.
There are several different versions from the State's database which are in
evidence. One is dated November 6, 2009, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Another is dated
November 16, 2009. A third is dated November 24, 2009. The fourth is dated
August 19, 2010. The most important is the November 6, 2009, database.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). Mr. Hurst testified that, of all the databases, that would
probably be the most accurate. Furthermore, it is the November 6, 2009,
database that prompted Mr. Spencer's inquiry about the apparent discrepancy
between the 2,051 tally of total absentee ballots cast in the City Canvass and the
2,047 absentee return envelopes ballots received as shown on the November 6,
2009, database. Furthermore, it is Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 that shows that, after
deducting out the voided entries, the total of valid absentee return envelopes
drops to 2,042. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Since the November 6, 2009, database
shows that one entry was mistakenly made twice, this number drops to 2,041,
the number probably most often referred to during the trial.
The potential of "extra" votes is based upon the City tally showing 2,051
absentee ballots cast, when the November 6,2009,
6, 2009, Secretary of State database
shows only the 2,042 valid absentee envelopes returned. This has been in this
case since the filing of the Complaint. Subtracting for the discovered duplication,
the 2,041 figure for absentee return envelopes, or the potential of a ten (10) vote
discrepancy, was established during trial.
The Court does not find the databases other than Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 to be
very useful. The system is in real time, so the further a database is removed from
the date of election, the less reliable. The August 19, 2010, data base is
apparently from a different search parameter, which merely underscores the fact
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that the answer produced by the Secretary of State's database changes,
depending upon when and how the question is asked.
Furthermore, relying upon the database system is not justified, because,
as Mr. Hurst testified, the system is only as good as the data entries. If any entry
is omitted or duplicated, the data system simply reports invalid information.
Mr. Hurst was quite clear that the State's database system was not
intended to replace the record that the law requires the election officials to create
and retain. However, Ms. Beard seemed to be under the impression that the
Secretary of State database was in lieu of the County keeping a Section 34-1011
report and that the database was the only report the County had.
Ms Beard, however, also testified she relied upon the machine count
shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, and not on the database, because the database
was not accurate. Furthermore, Ms Beard testified daily reports of the absentee
ballots were made. Ms Beard appeared to be testifying that the County had the
required information to make the report, but did not need to independently
produce the report, and could instead provide a copy of the State database as
the "record".
Providing a database known to be inaccurate, and then not being able to
provide the Section 34-1
34-1011
add ressing the discrepancy when noted by
011 record addressing
an inquiring citizen, has been a factor in this litigation. If,

when

a

citizen

requested a report on November 6, 2009, regarding the November 3, 2009,
election, the County had produced the record showing 2,051 absentee ballots
cast and the 2,050 absentee return envelopes received, the issue of the one
missing absentee return envelope could perhaps have been resolved.
There was no evidence produced at trial showing that the stack of 2,050
returned envelopes does not include all 2,041 valid names on the November 6,
2009, database report. The record contemplated by Section 34-1101 turns out to
be the stack of 2,050 absentee return envelopes. The nine (9) names that do not
appear on the State's database would be on nine (9) of the return envelopes that
physically exist in the custody of the County.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Brannon v City of Coeur d'Alene, et al CV2009-10010

SC 38417-2011

12

Page 2290 of 2676

The Court is well aware that there is no Section 34-1011 report in
evidence, and that there is no such report because no report was made. If such a
record existed, that record could have been compared to the Secretary of State
database. Instead, the 2,050 absentee return envelopes were apparently not
available to the Plaintiff prior to discovery responses in July 2010.
In fact, the 2,050 is the number arrived at during the September trial by
subtracting the thirty-two (32) return envelopes identified by the County as being
County ballots from the 2,082 figure counted by Judge Marano.
The comments about the timing of disclosures of documents constituting a
record is not a criticism by the Court of any of the parties (including the County)
or their attorneys. Election litigation is very complex. The statute has been on the
books since 1890, before women had the right to vote. Times have changed.
Litigation under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure bears no resemblance to
litigation in 1890. Society is much more mobile. The statute requires a trial in
thirty (30) days, which in modern day society and modern day litigation has
proved unworkable, at least in this case. The Court finds the parties and counsel
did their best in litigating a difficult case.
Nor does the Court fault the County election officials regarding the Section
34-1011

record.

Reliance

upon

the

Secretary

of

State

database

is

understandable, and the database is accurate enough that only in an extremely
close election could any discrepancy create an issue. Having listened to six days
of testimony, the Court is impressed by the complexity of the election process,
and at how well the County ran the election. Notably, there was no evidence at
trial, including any testimony from the Secretary of State's office, as to how just
exactly County election officials were to create and maintain this record in
municipal elections. Nonetheless, the fact that this determination of what the
record would have shown can only be made after six days of trial underscores
the need for election officials to maintain the statutorily required record.
In short, the Court finds that the discrepancy between the 2,041 return
envelopes shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 (November 6, 2009, database) and
2,050 return envelopes physically counted by Judge Marano is most probably
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explained by the failure to input the nine (9) envelopes in the stack of 2,050 along
with the names that do appear on the list of 2,041 valid absentee return
envelopes shown on the Secretary of State's November 6, 2009, database.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof, and there is no
evidence before the Court that the nine (9) envelopes in the stack of 2,050
absentee return envelopes kept by the County are anything but absentee return
envelopes of valid absentee voters. There is no evidence that nine (9) of the
envelopes in the stack of 2,050 bear names of people other than qualified voters
who actually voted.
The Court finds that the County did receive 2,051 absentee return
envelopes with each envelope containing one valid ballot. Whether the missing
return envelope was lost, or was mistakenly left out of the City stack and put in
the County stack, is not in the record of this trial. Whether the missing return
envelope is one of the four return envelopes that could not be determined as City
or County but were all removed and subtracted by Judge Marano from the 2,086
counted in order to come to 2,082 is not known. Despite the absence of a
Section 34-1011 record, the Court finds that County election officials performed
well and in good faith. The Court finds that the most likely explanation for one
missing return envelope is that it got lost through clerical error, and that the
County did in fact count 2,051 valid absentee ballots sent in by 2,051 valid
absentee voters.
The fact that there is one missing absentee return envelope is simply
insufficient for the Court to find an error in counting the vote. Even though there
is an "extra" ballot (in the sense that there is one more absentee ballot than there
is absentee return ballot envelopes), the evidence causes the Court to conclude
that it is the return envelope being misplaced, and not a ballot that a voter never
cast being counted, that explains the discrepancy between 2,050 and 2,051. This
is particularly true where there is a complete absence of evidence, or even a
suggestion, as to how an "extra" ballot could have been created, by whom or
why.
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The existence of more absentee ballots cast than absentee return
envelopes physically existing in the custody of the County election officials does
not, on the facts of this case, create an error in tallying the vote that would have
changed the outcome of the election.

Ill.
III. ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES DO NOT CONSTITUTE
MALCONDUCT

Plaintiff has asserted through a continuing motion to amend the complaint,
that irregularities in the election process amount to malconduct, requiring this
Court to set aside the election. Idaho case law regarding malconduct in
association with electoral procedure is limited. However, a review of these cases
reveals that irregularities must be sufficient and substantial enough to have
potentially changed the outcome of the election, such as through fraud or illegal
voting, for such irregularities to constitute sufficient grounds to set aside an
election.
In Chamberlain v. Woodin, 2 Idaho 642, 23 P. 177 (1890), the court
provided a working definition of malconduct:
Our statute does not define what constitutes malconduct of the officers of
election, but it must be held that any proceedings which result in unfair
elections, that deprive the qualified elector of the opportunity of peaceably
casting his ballot and having it counted as cast, or that permit illegal votes
to be cast and counted, are within the statutory provisions.
Id.
/d. at 645, 23 P. at 178. The Court therein determined that the malconduct,

preventing legal votes, in conjunction with allowing illegal votes, justified the trial
court's declaration of a new winner in the election. Id.
/d. at 650, 23 P. at 180.
However, Chamberlain is highly distinguishable. The acts constituting
malconduct included the arrest of legal voters, illegal votes, threats against legal
voters who challenged illegal voters, intimidation of legal voters, and similar

/d. at 645, 23 P. at 178. Here, such blatant and fraudulent elective
behavior. Id.
practices are neither present nor alleged. Additionally, the potentially large
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volume of illegal votes played a role in the Court's determination where, as here,
the alleged illegal voters were identified before the Court and evidence submitted
during trial, and, as explained in this memorandum, the illegal votes were not
sufficient in number to independently result in a new election or reversal of the
election results.
Irregularities alone, without proof of fraud or corruption, have not been
held sufficient in the State of Idaho to be considered malconduct for which an
election should be set aside, nor was counsel able to provide the Court with
authority to the contrary.
20 P.3d 679 (2000),
In Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495,
495,20
the court expressly held that "[a] showing that election officials failed to follow
every election procedure precisely, without more, is insufficient under I.C. § 342101(1) [to show malconduct]." Id.
/d. at 504, 20 P.3d at 688. Therein, the court
rejected as malconduct a number of irregularities, including ten illegally counted
votes, the failure of election officials to place time stamps, date stamps, or names
and addresses of persons delivering absentee ballots, the failure of an election
official to keep track of the number of ballots from prior elections taken from and
then returned to a warehouse, discarding voter sequence cards, and the
changing of poll books after the canvass to ensure absentee voters received
credit for voting. Id.
/d. at 503,
503,20
20 P.3d at 688.
Similarly, Ball v. Campbell, 6 Idaho 754, 59 P. 559 (1899) involved many
irregularities which appellant/contester argued were sufficient to declare him the
winner of the election. There, irregularities included, among other things,
individuals voting outside of a private, enclosed space such that spectators could
view for whom votes were cast, voters discussing candidates with one another at
the polls, voters sharing voting stalls, voters procuring ballots and subsequently
leaving the enclosed space and the building without voting and while still in
possession of a ballot, and one person was allowed to vote without being
registered. Id.
/d. at 756-57, 59 P. at 560. Therein, the Court explained,
[b]efore the court will assume to set aside the expressed will of a majority
of the electors, it should well be satisfied that there has been such a
disregard of the provisions of law enacted for the conduct of elections as
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taints the entire poll with fraud. It is not every irregularity that will justify the
court in invalidating the poll of an entire precinct.
Id.
/d. at 758, 59 P. at 560. The court continued:

Should a judge of election, after his attention had been called to an
infraction of the law, refuse or neglect to proceed at once against the
derelict then, indeed, might there be some ground for charging him with
malconduct. But to say that a judge of election is guilty of malconduct
because of the commission of irregularities (and none of the acts charged
in the complaint amount to more than irregularities, except the voting of
one person ... without being registered) of which he did not have, and
cannot reasonably be supposed to have had, any knowledge, when such
charge involves such serious consequences as the disfranchisement of
many hundred voters, is a proposition we cannot entertain.
Id.
/d. at 759, 59 P. at 561. Therefore, the Court held that the trial court properly

sustained a demurrer to appellant's complaint, as such complaint did not

/d. at
sufficiently set forth specific facts to warrant the relief therein requested. Id.
760, 59 P. at 560.
Assuming, without deciding, that it is possible for cumulative irregularities
apart from any showing of fraud or corruption to provide a court with discretion to
set aside an election, such is not present here. Here, a number of election
procedure irregularities have been alleged, including allowing illegal votes and
errors in taking the vote tally and keeping records. Neither Idaho case law, nor
any argument by counsel, provides authority for this Court to cumulatively treat
such irregularities as an independent grounds for finding malconduct and thus
set aside the election, particularly when the alleged acts are exclusively acts of
the County, which is not even a party.
Plaintiff cites Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation Dist., 133 Idaho 139, 983
P.2d 212 (1999) as support for the proposition that cumulative irregularities
provide grounds for a court to conclude that the election process was not "fair",
and, particularly where the election outcome is close, for the court to step in and
set aside the election and let the voters decide. This Court views the holding of

Big Lost River very differently.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Brannon v City of Coeur d'Alene, et al CV2009-10010

SC 38417-2011

17

Page 2295 of 2676

In Big Lost River, the appellant had lost the November 5, 2006 election by
two votes (241 to 239). The appellant brought suit on December 30, 1996. Trial
was held by Judge Moss on February 12, 1997. At trial, Judge Moss found that
qualified voters had been turned away from voting by election judges' improper
challenges. Of the identified voters who had not been able to vote, ten testified
for whom they would have voted. Judge Moss found three more would have
voted for appellant rather than respondent. As the result of the trial, the appellant
(the loser, with only 239 votes) was therefore found to be the leading vote getter,
with 245 votes compared to 242 for respondent.
The trial court declared the election contest between appellant and
respondent void, refused to declare a winner, and ordered a new election
between the two. At the second election, held on May 27, 1997, the respondent
was again elected. On August 19, 1997, appellant filed an appeal.
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court had discretion to order a
new election. If the trial judge was in error in refusing to declare a winner
following the trial, the appellant (the loser at the November 1996 election, 241 to
239, and also the loser in the second election on May 27, 1997) would be able to
argue he should be declared the winner, based upon the vote count at the
February 1997 trial of 245 for appellant and 242 for respondent.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion to order the new
election, when the number of votes had been found at trial to be sufficient to
change the result. Big Lost River only addresses the issue of the trial court's
discretion to refuse to declare a winner and order a new trial as a remedy, after
the court has declared the election void based upon the vote count determined
by the court at trial. Big Lost River does not stand for the proposition that, even
though the illegal votes do not change the election outcome, a court can
nonetheless set aside an election based upon cumulative irregularities.
This Court has denied the motion to amend on the grounds the County
was not a party. However, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence in
the record as a matter of law to find malconduct, and that the motion to amend
can also be denied on the alternative grounds that, even if the County were a
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party, the irregularities alleged in the proposed amended complaint simply fail to

§ 34-2001(1).
state a claim for malconduct under
under§
CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that there were insufficient illegal votes cast to
change the outcome of the election. The Court concludes that there was no error
in counting votes that would change the result of the election. The Court
reaffirms, on alternative grounds, its denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. The
Court confirms the election result of Mike Kennedy's election to Seat #2 on the
City Council for the City of Coeur d'Alene in the November 3, 2009, Municipal
election.
Counsel for defendant Kennedy may prepare an appropriate Judgment.

,--

DATED this

~

day of October, 2010.

,.~
..~

CHARLES W. HOSACK
DISTRICT JUDGE
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AtTorney for William L. McCrory
IN TIm
Tim DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON;

) Case No: CV-09-10010
)

Plaintiff, )

vs.
SUSAN 1(.
K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDENTITY
OF ACCUSER AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORTTHEREOF
SUPPORT THEREOF ~

Date: October 12,2010
12, 2010
Time: 4:00p.m.
4:00 p.m.
Location: Judge Hosack's Courtroom

Defendants. )

COMES NOW Respondent William L. McCrory, through his attorney Arthur B.
Macomber, with this threshold motion to determine the identity ofms
of his accuser in these
contempt proceedings.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintifrs Amended Complaint filed December 10, 2009 in this action included

the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, an Idaho municipality, defendant Mike Kennedy as "a
member of the City of Coeur d'Alene City Council, and Mike Kennedy ''in his capacity
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Maromber Law PLLC

No.
No.0472
0472
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as the incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene Council Seat #2." (Am.
CompIt.,
Complt., Dec. 10,2009
10, 2009 at pp,
pp. 1-3,)
1-3.)
On March 3, 2010, Judge Simpson issued his Order to Dismiss, among others,
Mike Kennedy in his official capacity as member of the City Council for the City of
Coeur d'Alene,
d'Alene.
On May 25, 2010, Judge Hosack in his Order on Motions confirmed defendant
Kennedy's dismissal in his capacity as City Councilman "as to any cause of action based
upon Idaho Code section 34·2001(1),"
34-2001(1)," but apparently not as to other matters,
matters. In that
same order, plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider was granted "as
''as to any cause of action as to
Seat 2 based upon Idaho Code section[s] 34·2001(5)
34-2001(5) and 34.2001(6)
34-2001(6) ... and that the
motion to dismiss defendant Kennedy be, and it is hereby, denied as to any cause of
action as to Seat 2 based upon Idaho Code section[s] 34·2001(5)
34-2001(5) and 34-2001(6) ..
....,,"''
Finally, that Order granted plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider the dismissal of the City of
Coeur d'Alene, which had been ''properly named a party defendant.
defendant.'',.

In their June 7, 2010 Brief, counsels Erbland and Reed for defendant Kennedy
characterize in their caption their representation as "Mike Kennedy, in his capacity as the
incumbent Candidate for the City Of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2,"
#2,'' such
representation thus apparently avoiding a potential conflict of interest wherein the City's
outside counsel Haman concu.aently
concUllently represented the City's Councilperson Kennedy.
Messrs. Erbland and Reed for defendant Kennedy confmn their representation by stating,
"Mike Kennedy is a proper defendant as incumbent" on page S
5 of their Brief in Support
2, 2010.
of Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 2,2010.
On August
AugustS,
S, 2010, defendant Kennedy motioned the court to hold Mr,
Mr. McCrory
in contempt, but did not state in what capacity he brought that charge, that and

subsequent filings retaining the caption infonnation naming Kennedy,
Kennedy , "in his capacity as
the incumbent Candidate for the City Of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene Council Seat #2,"
#2."

Ill
/II
Ill
III
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ARGUMENT

The Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment provides: "in
''in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ....
" State v. Shackleford
.. .."State
ShacklefordJJ No. 27966,31928 (lDSCCR
(IDSCCR 2010); citing Davis v.

541 US 813, 821 (2006) and U.S. Const., Am. 6.
Washington, 547
In this case, Mr. Kennedy motioned through his co\UlSel
cOlUlSel for Mr. McCrory to be
held in contempt, based upon the affidavit of Christa Hazel. However, there was never

any clarity based on the capacity in which Mr. Kennedy brought his motion, whether he
was bringing the motion "in his capacity as City Councilman" or "in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2." I have also become
aware of, but have found no pleading or order related to whether Mr. Kennedy brought

the motion to find Mr. McCrory in contempt in Kennedy's capacity as an individual.
While I believe Mr. KeJUledy in his capacity as City Councilman or incumbent candidate
for Seat #2 would have standing to bring such a motion, I believe he would lack standing

as an individual, based on defendant City of Coeur d'Alene's arguments against the
intervention of Mr. McCrory found in its filing dated June 8, 2010.
CONCLUSION

Prior to the beginning of trial on October 12, Respondent McCrory hereby
requests this Court clarify in what capacity Mr. Kennedy brought his motion for
contempt.
DATED this

k.

g+ day of

0

c.'-\o~,
2010.
c.40~ .2010.

Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney for
William L. McCrory

SC 38417-2011

Page 2304 of 2676

3

Oct. 8. 2010 4:54PM

Mil"omber Law PLLC

No. 0472
04 72

P. 4/4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the g+k day of October 2010, I caused to be
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se.IVed a true and correct copy of the foregoing:
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDENTITY OF ACCUSER
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
Peter Erbland
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke &
&; Miller, LLP
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101
P.O.BoxE
P.O.
BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816·0328
83816-0328
Main Phone:
664-8115
664-6338
FAX:
Defondant Milm Kennedy
Attorney for De~ndant
Michael Haman
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
676-1683
FAX:
Scott Reed
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
664-2161
Main Phone:
765-5117
FAX:
Attorney/or
for Defendant Mike Kennedy
Starr Kelso
P.O,
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
664-6261
FAX:
Attorney/or
for PlaintiffJim Brannon

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail~ Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
[XXJ Facsimile: 664-6338

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
lXXI Facsimile: 676-1683
[XX]
[ ] U.S. MaU, Postage Prepaid
[XX] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
765-5117
[ ] Facsimile: 765·5117

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S.
U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
[XX] Facsimile: 664-6261

Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney for
William L. McCrory
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816·0328
83816-0328
Phone (20S) 664-8115
Phone(208)664-8115
FAX (208)
{208) 664-6338

Scott W. Reed, IS8#818
JSB#818
Attorney at Law
P. 0.
O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, 10
ID 83816
(208} 664-2161
Phone (208)
765-5117
FAX (208) 765·5117
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,

Case No. CV"()9·10010
CV..OS-10010
)

Plaintiff,

Vs.
Va.
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, In her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerki
Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT KENNEDY
IN RESPONSE TO McCRORY MOTION IN
LIMINE RE: IDENTITY OF ACCUSED
Date: October 12, 2010
Time: 4:00 p.m.
Location: Judge Hosack's Courtroom

8, 2010, at 4:52
4:52p.m.,
On Friday, October 8,2010,
p.m., the undersigned received by fax from

Respondent William L. McCrory, through his attorney Arthur B. Macomber.
Macomber, a Motion in
Limine. Defendant and Petitioner Mike Kennedy will make this response recognizing
that the Court will receive neither of these pleadings until the day of the hearing.

Contempt proceedings are unique being governed by Rule 75, Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure and the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court previously cited.
MI;MORANDUM OF KENNEDY
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I
I
i

was. indicated in the Notice of Trial dated September 23.2010,
23, 2010, that the
It was,indicated
contempt issue is set for court trial without
;;i jUly.
juty.
without;;l

This proceeding was not initiated by a judge but by defendant Kennedy following
the initiation procedure set forth in Rule 75(c) (2), (3) and (4) and Rule 75 (d). In an

counsel, made appearance and
open court hearing, respondent McCrory, through his counsel.

denied contempt. Rule 75(f) and(g). The trial is set before the court without jury as
provided in Rule 75(i)(1).
Defendant and Petitioner Kennedy at all
alt times has characterized the proceeding
as civil and has never sought criminal sanctions nor incarceration for any period of time
as a sanction.
Ttlig
Thit:; Ig
tg not a eAse where one party to a litigation is initiating contempt to compel

wrth an order or judgment directing the opposing party to
the opposing party to comply with
take action that he or she has refused to do.
Instead, the contempt charge is that a non-party, William L. McCrory.
McCrory, violated
Instead.

the confidentiality imposed upon him and accepted by him by signing the Confidentiality
Agreement to protect the constitutionally created privacy for voters.
The unique nature of this alrea~y unique contempt proceeding is caused by the
inexplicable refusal of counsel for plaintiff Jim Brannon to amend his complaint to name
Kootenai County.
County, which conducted the election, as the real party defendant.
This Court in its Memorandum Decision, has decided the case dismissing the
3, 2009 city election.
election, so that issue is moot.
complaint and confirming the November 3,2009

However, the Confidentiality Agreement is the result of the confrontation
between Kootenai County and plaintiff Brannon as related in the county's Memorandum
MEMORANDUM OF KENNEDY
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in Support of IRCP 26(c) Motion for Protective Order, and the subsequent Order of
Judge Simpson made March 2,
2010 quashing the plaintiff's subpoena duces tecum.
2,2010
See Brief of Defendant Kennedy in Opposition to McCrory Motion to Dismiss Contempt
Proceedings dated August 30, 2010.
This is a civil proceeding. Kennedy has not initiated any criminal prosecution
which could be subject to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America. The introductory paragraph to Rule 75
establishes that contempt is an incident exclusiVely to a civil lawsuit:
Rule 75. Contempt.
This rule shall govern all contempt proceedings brought in connection with
a civil lawsuit or as a separate proceeding. It shall not apply to the
prosecution of misdemeanor contempt under section 18-1801, Idaho Code, or
any other criminal statute.
The last section of Rule 75 explicitly negates any criminal rules:
Rule 75(n). Other rules of civil procedure.
Rules regarding discovery and other rules of civil procedure, to the extent that
they are not in conflict with this rule, shall apply.
applY. to nonsummary contempt
proceedings. The Idaho Criminal Rules shall not apply. (emphasis supplied)
A petition for contempt not committed in the presence of the court and not initiated
by the Court can be brought by anyone. Defendant Kennedy in this proceeding is the
petitioner and non-party McCrory is the respondent or contemnor:

MEMORANDUM OF KENNEDY
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Rule 75(a). Definitions.
(1)
(2)
(3)

Petitioner. A petitioner is the person or legal entity initiating a
nonsummary contempt proceeding.
Respondent. A respondent is the person or legal entity alleged to have
committed an act of contempt
Contemnor. A contemnor is a person or legal entity adjudged to have
committed an act of contempt

As the pleadings have repeatedly set forth and as the Court has recognized in its
Memorandum Decision and in oral comments during trial, this case involves political
actions not limited to the election alone, but continuing thereafter from November 3,
2009 to this date and no doubt hereafter.

The filing of the McCrory affidavit and the subsequent publication to the world on

the McCrory website openCDA.com the was hurtful to defendant incumbent
11
Affidavit:
Councilman Kennedy. The Coeur d'Alene Press extensive story headlined IIAffidavit:

Many Ballot Irregularities" alleged many errors by the Kootenai County election
department. Respondent McCrory's list of muttiple "anomalies" in the introductory
openCDA.com UWho
uWho Decides VVhen Violations Matter" could be perceived by readers
and viewers as evidence that Kennedy was illegally elected. That was injury and
damage to reputation.
Rule 75 gives some evidentiary guidelines. It is not necessary to show that
7S(c) (3). The
respondent's failure to comply with the court order was willful. Rule 75(c)
petitioner and the respondent each have the burden of proving the charge and of
proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of evidence. Rule 75(h) (2) and
Rule 75 (j)(1).
MEMORANDUM OF KENNEDY
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The broad scope of contempt was described in State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds
131
Idaho 112,952
112, 952 P.2"d
p.2"d 1249 (1998) previously cited.
1311daho
Trial courts are vested with the judicial power of contempt to vindicate their
Vehlow,s 105 Idaho 560, 566, 671
jurisdiction and proper function. Marks v. Vehlow
P.2d 473, 479 (1983). The contempt power has its source in the Idaho
105 Idaho at
Art. V, 2, and the common law. Vehlow, 1051daho
Constitution, Id.
ld. Const Art,
566,
671 P.2d at 479. McDougall v. Sheridan, 23
231daho
Idaho 191, 128 P. 954 (1913)
566,671
(inherent contempt power). This power is also recognized by statute. Vehlow,
105
Idaho at 566,
566,671
1051daho
671 P.2d at 479. As provided in I.C. § 1-1603(4), every court
has the power to compel obedience to its orders. See also I.C. § 1-1901 (Every
1. C.
judicial officer has the power to compel obedience to its lawful orders); I.
1..1902 ("For
(UFor the effectual exercise of the powers conferred under [I.C. § 11901 a judicial officer may punish for contempt."); I.C. §§ 7·601 to 614.
(Contempts).
1311daho
131 Idaho at 119.
Counsel for respondent McCrory has subpoenaed and petitioner Kennedy will

call as witnesses in support, Christa Hazel, who signed the affidavit, prosecuting
attorney Barry McHugh and County Clerk Dan English who has the major interests and
undertook the procedures to protect the secrecy of voters in the municipal election.
There is no need to determine the status of Mike Kennedy. He is the petitioner
and his attorney is an officer of the court who had the right to have this Court determine
whether the respondent William L. McCrory, in signing and filing his affidavit and in the
subsequent publication on his website, is in contempt and therefore subject to civil
sanctions as decided by this court.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of

, One of the
For Respondent Kennedy

MEMORANDUM OF KENNEDY

5
SC 38417-2011

aiL 'd
S!L

L6L9 'O0NN

Page 2310 of 2676

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax this 11th day
of October, 2010 to:
Starr Kelso
P. 0,
0. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAJ((208)664-6261
FAJ(208)664-6261
Michael L.
l. Haman
Haman Law Office
p,
O. Box 2155
P. 0.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 676-1683
Arthur B. Macomber
Attorney at Law
408 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 215
Coeur d'Alene, 1083814

<S;:~~J
Scott

,Reed
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Court Minutes:

Session: HOSACK101210P
Session Date: 1011212010
10/12/2010
Judge: Hosack, Charles
V eare, Keri
Reporter: Veare,

Division: DIST
Session Time: 15:45

Courtroom: Courtroom 1

Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0001
00 10
Case Number: CV2009-1 0010
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA
Pers. Attorney:
Co-Defendant(s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
10112/2010
16:30: 18
16:30:18
Recording Started:
16:30:18
Case called
16:30:23

16:30:47
16:31:09
16:31
:09

Judge: Hosack, Charles
Calls, parties present. Continuation of a
contempt proceedings. The last
contact was during the trial and I set this in
order to have a date as we
weren't going to interrupt the election triall.
We agreed to vacate that

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK101210P
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16:31:34
16:31
:34
16:31:55
16:31
:55
16:32:32
16:33:03
16:33:26

16:33:46

16:34:03
16:34:28
16:34:56
16:35:26
16:35:57
16:36:15

16:36:44
16:37:15
16:37:39
16:37:53

hearing and I did an amended notice. I set this
for 4:00 which is obviously
not a good time to start a court trial. As far
as I was concerned this is a
status conference, in off the record discussions
there may be a resolution.
How are we proceeding? What is the issue we are
grappling with? Mr Reed has
indicated he doesn't wish to continue. What is
the issue here?
Add Ins: Macomber, Art
Mr McCrory has two issues he'd like to resolve.
We've come so far we'd like
to go to trial, withdraw the Motion to Dismiss.
We'd like the opportunity to
pt the facts in the record. And we remain unsure
of what Mr Kennedy basis thi
on. Is it Mike Kennedy in his official capacity,
or in no capacity or Mr Reed
that brought this as an officer of the Court.
We'd like to get clarity on
that. And to withdraw the Motion to Dismiss.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
For contempt of court, proceeding is addressed
to the court, and the remedy
is up to the Court. There is a procedure, if
that person is not interested in
proceeding, and the Court is not interested in a
trial unless the Court was
inerested in prusuing. At this point, the Court
is not intersted in purseing
contempt. So why would I want a trial?

16:38:17

Add Ins: Macomber, Art
The issue is that he believes there are not
facts to bring the charge.

16:38:33

Judge: Hosack, Charles
But if a person dismisses, the dismissal is the
end, the proceeding
doesn't exist anymore. I don't understand the
request.

16:39:00

16:39:25

Add Ins: Macomber, Art

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK101210P
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It's the grounds for dismissal.
16:39:32
16:39:56
16:42:28
16:43:43
16:43:56
16:44:10
16:45:06
16:46:35
16:47:56
16:48:45
16:49:01
16:49:20
16:49:40
16:50:18
16:50:36
16:50:52
16:51:15
16:51:50
16:51
:50
16:52:09
i6:52:25
16:54:01

Judge: Hosack, Charles
There are lots of grounds, the Court would have
to back track. Why do I wannt
to go back and start all over again. Whatever
the publication was on the
internet, and it was never an issue at trial.
Comments re: dismissal of
contempt proceedings. Where are we going?
Add Ins: Macomber, Art
Everything you've said makes sense to me. We'd
like to see a Motion to
Dismiss, re: the grounds. He believes the
contempt was baseless. When we come
back for atty fees it could be an issue. We
recognize that in Id there is no
such thing as slap-statutes. We don't believe
he's criminally liable and
shoul be sanctioned at all. We look to the
Court for justice. Where do we
look for atty fee/costs?

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I presume there are a great number of under
currents the Court is not aware
of. I see this as another swirl ofthe
of the under
currents, that is not the
Court's concern. All we want to do is deal with
the merits. On the face of
this is not frivilous, there was an Order of
Confidentially, he signed a
stipulation. And then he published on the
internet what he was to keep
confidential. If
Ifyou
you think 1"m
I"m going to sign an
Order saying it was frivious
then you miss the earlier comments. Does that
mean the contempt was
frivilous? No. The contempt stated something the
Court needed to consider.
Why, in heavens name, was the Affd filed? It was
never mentioned again in the
proceedings. Why would he then publish the
information he obtained? The Court
made a mistake, I was not concerned about

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK101210P
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16:54:26
16:54:48
16:55:34
16:56:01
16:56:18
16:56:26
16:56:42
16:57:11

16:58:24

16:58:41
16:58:47

17:00:00
17:00:17

criminal contempt. I was focused on
the merits. Now, apparantly the Court was wrong,
I don't do contempt
proceedings very much. The Court advised Mr
McCrory inaccurately of his
rights so the Court dismissed the proceedings.
This needs to come to an end.
The Petitioner isn't inteested in pursuing
proceedings, the Court isn't
interested.
I'm going to dismiss the contempt proceeding
because I inaccurately advised
ofhis
him of
his rights. I'm in control and I'm
dismissing the contempt
proceedings. I'll prepare an Order saying what I
just said.

Add Ins: Reed, Scott
to say anything. I'd ask
Sometimes it's best not t6
you enter the Order based on
what you just said.
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Costs/fee don't enter the Court's mind when
entering an Order.
Do you need a 54B certificate? If somebody wants
that you'll have to ask for
it.

17:00:19
17:00:
19

Add Ins: Macomber, Art
If your entering a final judgment we'd ask you
certifY it.

17:00:39

Judge: Hosack, Charles
If its a final order I don't need to certifY it.

17:01:17

Add Ins: Macomber, Art
I'm not sure if it should say dismissed with
prejudice.

17:01:38
17:01
:38

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I'm entering the Order and I'm done with it..

17:02:21

Stop Recording

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK1 0121 OP
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8 East Sherman Avenue. Suite 215
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October 19, 2
208-664-4100
Telephone: 208·664·4100
Tol1~ftee:
Toll~free:

866-511-1500

Facsimile! 208-664-9933
Web: www.macombc:r1aw.c:om
www.macomberlaw.c:om

Hon. Charles W. Hosack
First District Court ofIdaho
ofldaho
Kootenai County Courthouse
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83816-9000
Re:

Kennedy v. McCrory,
McCrory. Case No. CV~09~10010

Your Honor,
I realized this morning as the prevailing party in the contempt proceedings, that pursuant to your
usual practice of requiring the winning attorney to generate a proposed judgment you may expect
me to provide one for your review. However, I also realized that I have no knowledge of the
grounds upon which you may decide the case, given that your statements in court the other day
related to those grounds are in error, for which error I must reluctantly take credit.
Additionally, I have no knowledge of the true identity of the person bringing the charges against
my client, as stated on October 12, and thus no ability to construct a proposed judgment against
an unknown party. Tbis
This is because 1 remain in the dark as to whether Kennedy, as an individual,
Councilperson "in his capacity" as such,
such. or whether Mr. Reed as an officer of
Kennedy, as a City Councilperson
the court is responsible for the contempt charges.
Specifically related to the grounds for dismissal being in error, I was informed by Scott Reed at
the September 7 hearing that my proposed stipulation to dismiss was in error, due to the August
17 hearing providing sufficient notice to my client of
ofhis
his rights in the matter. For your
understanding of that fact, I enclose for your review the face page and pages 10 and 11 of the
Court's transcript of that August 17 hearing, which shows that the rights required to be given by
I.R.C.P. 7S(f)(1)
75(f)(1) were in fact given, thus the charges cannot be dismissed on those grounds.
Further, my client's contention is that the proper grounds for dismissal remain that, if brought by
Further.
Kennedy in his capacity for the City, that McCrory is due his attorneys' fees and costs because
the action was brought "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" pursuant to Idaho Code section
12-117, or, if brought by him as an individual or Reed, tbatthe
that the proceedings were brought
12·117.
"frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation," pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 and
I.R.C.P. S4(e)(1).
54(e)(l). To that contention, and in addition to sufficient evidence in the Court's file as
to both the facts and the law on that contention, I submit to you the enclosed evidence of Affiant
SC 38417-2011
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Oct. 19. 2010 9:17AM

Mar~~ber

Law PLLC

No. 0487

P. 3

Hazel's glee at her successful abusive of this Court's process, along with my assurance to you
that I have not as of today received the funds back from said Affiant.
Sincerely,

~
Arthur B. Macomber
Attorney at Law
Ene.
Enc.

Face page of Aug. 17,2010
17, 2010 Court Transcript. and pages ten and eleven
Huckleberries Online Article dated October 11. 2010 (2 pages)

cc:

Scott Reed
Client
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
--ooo---000--

JIM BRANNON,
)

Plaintiff,

CERTIFIED COpy
COPY

)
)

)

vs.
VB.

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et
al.,
al. ,
Defendants.

Case No. CV 09-10010

)
)

)
)
)
)

CONTEMPT HEARING

AT:

Kootenai County Courthouse
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho

ON:

August 17, 2010, 3:03p.m.
3:03 p.m.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Charles W.
w. Hosack

APPEARANCES:
For Mike Kennedy:
SCOTT W. REED, ESQ.
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT W. REED
Post Office Box A
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
For City of Coeur d'Alene:
MICHAEL L. HAMAN, ESQ.
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
Post Office Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

Coeur d'Alene Reporting
Court
court arulf})eposition ~eporters
SC 38417-2011Phone: 108-765-3666

"'

Fax: 208-676-8903
Ton Free 888-894-CDAR (2327)
www.cdareporting.com
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STATE OF IDAHO

,

pouN~Y OF KOOTENAI!SS
10UN~Y
KOOTENAIlSS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Ti'hfD·
TiMO.

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAIZOI-O
KOOTENAIZOf-6 OCT
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
Incumbent candidate for the City of
d'Alene
Alene Council Seat #2;
Coeur d'
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~: ..ft88
20 PH
PH~:

ClERKOJSrRICT
CLERK DJSi'RICT COURT

~w{,,~
~WLI/~
CASE NO. CV-09-10010
AFFIDAVIT OF
SERVICE

STATE OF IDAHO )
)) ss
SS
County of Kootenai )
I, KALEB TRINKLE, am over the age of 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of
Washington, County of Spokane, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING
FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following:

7, 2010 I received the following document for Christa Hazel:
1. On October 7,2010
SUBPOENA FOR CHRISTA HAZEL TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL.

2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 1: 1100 pm, I personally served said documents to
a female over the age of 18, who identified herself to me as Christa Hazel, and made claim that
the serve was invalid because there was not a witness fee attached with the documents. She also
informed me that she was an attorney. I picked up the witness fee from the attorney's office and
went back to Christa Hazel's residence and delivered the witness fee to her. I asked her what
state that she practiced law under and she informed that she didn't. When I asked her about

SC 38417-2011
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telling me that she was an attorney she said "bye" and shut the door in my face.

3. Said Service was completed at Christa Hazel's primary place of residence located at
3795 N. Jimmy St, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815.

KALEB TRINKLE
.. '

~.~
~- ~·.

•....

~····'
~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
,2010.
2010.

Oc\.oboC
Oc\.obo c ,

ll
11 day of

I

SC 38417-2011
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~6t~\r6~(\WTE~AI}
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 6fFEf¥IE.
6fFf#¥:IE· ..
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEifll8
KOOTEifU.a OCT
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'
Alene City Clerk;
d'Alene
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
Incumbent candidate for the City cf
d'Alene
Coeur d'
Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~: ItO
ft(t
20 PM
PM~:

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

ffW~lxuA
,~lxuA

" EPt.lTY;~
CASE NO. CV-09-10010

1
f

AFFIDAVIT OF
SERVICE

)

)) ss
SS
)

I, ERIN JENKINS, am over the age af 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of
Idaho, County of Kootenai, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING
FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following:

1. On October 7, 2010 I received the following document for Starr Kelso: SUBPOENA
FOR STARR KELSO TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL.
~~'

~.r-(>
~:r-(>

:~0
:~o

l;'
tt·
~+

,

2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 1:15
1: 15 pm, I personally served said documents to
a male over the age of 18, who identified himself to me as Starr Kelso

rd
3. Said Service was completed at Starr Kelso's office located at 1621 N. 33rd
Suite 600

Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, ID.

SC 38417-2011
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c::~
c:::~
ERIN JENKINS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

U day of October, 2010.

Notary Public
Residing at.----':.....L>...."".;"'-\'~"'f_;;!;~_.___.__:_
Commissi on expires :--'-Lf--'-=----'-+-'-"--¥-

SC 38417-2011
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ss ·

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT CJlR.tru~
CJlR.tBI~ 0,
O . ,OTENA','
.OT.ENAJ. ' ,<,i
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTE1!WDOCT
.~:
KOOTElfWDOCT 20 PH
PH·~:
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
Incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'
Alene Council Seat #2;
d'Alene
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK DISTRICT COURT
CASE NO. CV-09-IOOIO,
CV-09-10010,

·tlflf~
·tfr~~
EPUT

AFFIDAVIT OF
SERVICE

STATEOFIDAHO )
)) ss
SS
County of Kootenai )
I, KALEB TRINKLE, am over the age of 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of
Washington, County of Spokane, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING
FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following:

1. On October 7, 2010 I received the following document for Barry McHugh:
SUBPOENA FOR BARRY MCHUGH TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL.

1:50pm,
2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 1:50
pm, I personally served said documents to
a male over the age of 18, who identified himself to me as Barry McHugh.

3. Said Service was completed at Barry McHugh's place of work located at Kootenai
County Prosecutors Office 501 N. Government Way, Coeur d'
Alene, ID.
d'Alene,

SC 38417-2011
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KALEB TRINKLE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

()c±o'DeC,
2010.
O 'DeC,2010.
bc+

SC 38417-2011

U day of
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STATE OF IOAHO
STATEOFfOAHD
l
COUN.TY
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlr
KOOTENAI[ SS
5S

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRicti~P=THE
DISTRIcti~P:THE

KOOtitO.QCT 20 PH
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KootitOllCT20PH
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
Incumbent candidate for the City of
Alene Council Seat #2;
Coeur d'
d'Alene
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

·tt:
-It: ..ft(J0

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

ilfL~1~
1II£~1~
CASE NO. CV-09-10010
AFFIDAVIT OF
SERVICE

STATE OF IDAHO )
)) ss
SS
County of Kootenai )
I, KALEB TRINKLE, am over the age of 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of
~:

~·
'·;._;.
-'<-.;.
.·

~

Washington, County of Spokane, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING

,
'

FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following:

'.'

~
~

~~;;.
~~;<·

1. On October 7, 2010 I received the following document for Daniel J. English:

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM and SUBPOENA FOR DANIEL J. ENGLISH TO APPEAR
AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL.

2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 2:00 pm, I personally served said documents to
a female over the age of 18, who identified herself to me as Tina, and refused to give me her last
name. Tina took the documents from me and walked back to Daniel English's office and handed
the documents to Daniel English. Tina Wilde told me that Daniel English was walking into a
meeting and wanted me to know that he received the documents. I asked Tina for her last name
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and she refused to provide it for my affidavit. I asked her if she had a business card and with an
upset look she gave me her card that provided her name as Tina Wilde, Supervisor for the
Kootenai County Recorder's Office.

3. Said Service was

compl~ted

at Daniel English's place of work located at Kootenai

County Recorder's Office, 451 Government Way, Coeur d'Alene, ID.
0.,,,,,

"'"''

~L
O•H'"
'ON'·

KALEB TRINKLE

.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
CC)cbtf'C,
2010.
CC)cbt'eC ,2010.

U day of
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ORIGINAL

STATE OfJItAHO
OfJB'AHO
l
COUNTY{)ff;.fCOOTENAif
COUNTVbB:,f(OOTENAlr
SS
FtlE'O:
.·
.·
Fflf'D:

ZDI 0OCT 20 PH
·~t~ t. f
ZUIO
PH"~"
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

£ffrtrfr/~LuJ4
rmlrfr!~LuJ4
Arthur B. Macomber, State Bar No. 7370
Jonathan A. Burky, State Bar No. 8043
Macomber Law, PLLC
408 E. Sherman Avenue,
Avenue, Suite 215
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: 208-664-4700
Facsimile: 208-664-9933
Attorney for William L. McCrory

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)

JIM BRANNON;

Case No: CV-:09-10010
CV-:09-1001O

Plaintiff, ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF
vs.
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
Alene City Clerk;
as the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE OF
SUBPOENAS TO APPEAR AND
TESTIFY AT TRIAL FOR THE
FOLLOWING PARTIES: CHRISTA
HAZEL, STARR KELSO, BARRY
MCHUGH, AND DANIEL J.
ENGLISH

)
)
Defendants. )
)

th
19th
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19
day of October 2010, I caused to be served

true and correct copies of AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of SUBPOENAS TO APPEAR
AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL upon the following witnesses:
1. CHRISTA HAZEL;
2. STARR KELSO;
3. BARRY MCHUGH; and

SC 38417-2011
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4. DANIEL J. ENGLISH.
Said AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE were served upon the following parties:
Peter Erbland
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101
P.O.BoxE
P.O. BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328
Main Phone:
664-8115
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy
Michael Haman
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
[~ Facsimile: 664-6338

[ ]
]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 676-1683

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 765-5117

[

r4

Scott Reed
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
664-2161
Main Phone:
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy
Starr Kelso
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Attorney for PlaintiffJim Brannon

DATED~his

/Cf.'dayof
lCf.'dayof

[~

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

rxr
~

t}cfel-J£,t-V
$ofe0£,tY'"

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 664-6261

,2010.

o d-Davis, Paralegal
erLaw,PLLC
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,

)
)

PLAINTIFF,
vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE,
al,
IDAHO, a municipal corporation, et ai,
DEFENDANT(S).

CASE NO. CV2009-10010

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
(OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDING)

__________________________)
-------------------------)

The Court, having reviewed the record of the contempt proceeding
initiated by the filing of the Affidavit of Christa Hazel and being fully advised, and
having determined that the Court advised McCrory at the first appearance, that
this matter was not a criminal contempt proceeding, and the parties agreeing that
the matter was a criminal contempt proceeding, and the Court having determined
that it did not wish to proceed further with a criminal contempt proceeding, in that
the Court has determined that the issue of the Court imposing any remedy is
moot;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that the contempt
proceeding is hereby dismissed.
DATED this

00

day of October, 2010.

QillQQ

C~W HOSACK
C~w.

.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OFCONTEMPT PROCEEDING
Brannon v City of Coeur d'Alene, et al CV2009-1 0010
001 0

SC 38417-2011

Page 2332 of 2676

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
;;;_I
~/
day of October, 2010, that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/delivered by regular U. S. Mail,
postage prepaid, interoffice mail, hand delivered of faxed as indicated below:
Starr Kelso
Fax: 208-664-6261
Scott E. Reed
Fax: 208-765-5117
4-~8

4~1

4S'i'
Peter Erbland
4S'1
Fax: 208-664-6338

Mike Haman
Fax: 208-676-1683 4l(o
4qo

DANIEL J. ENGLISH
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

~~

DEPUTYCLERK

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OFCONTEMPT PROCEEDING
0
0010
Brannon v City of Coeur d'Alene, et al CV2009-1 001
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,
'

Coeur d'Alene
Reporting
Court

ana(j)eposition
(])eposition 1{eporters
CJ{eporters

October 27,
27,2010
2010

STA~E OF IO~HO
!O~HO
Ph.n08-765-3666
ph,a08-765-3666 Fax 208-676-8903
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI( Toll Free 888-894-CDAR (2327)
FILED:
110 'Wa{{ace}lvenue,
Wa{{ace}lvenue, Lower LeveC
Leve[
Coeur ti'}lfene,
d'}lfene, Id'alio 83814

2010 OCT 28 At1
AM 9:
9= 11

Dtt'Ul
DE.t'Ul T

www.cdareporting.com

U
u ----

District Court Clerk
Kootenai County Courthouse
324 West Garden Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alened'Alene - Case No. CV-09-10010
1
0/12/1 OContempt Hearing/Status Conference
10/12/10Contempt
Dear District Court Clerk:
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 25 pages, entitled Contempt
Hearing Status Conference dated 10/12/2010, has been delivered to the
following recipients:
A copy has been delivered to:
Arthur B. Macomber
Macomber law Firm
408 E Sherman Ave., Suite 215
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Scott W. Reed
Attorney at law
401 Front Street
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
The original transcript will be filed with the District Court.
If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Coeur d'Alene
Reporting at 208-765-3666.

cc: Original transcript
Court Clerk
All Counsel

Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible
Depositions ~ Court
Court~
~ Conference Room ~ E-Transcript
E- Transcript~
~ Video
SC 38417-2011

~Realtime
~
Realtime
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I[)Al-10
STATt UF I[)Al10

} - -.'
}

f,OL~!TY o::
V.OOTENA! SS i,
i , Iv
'v
fOL~!TY
0:: mOTENA!
,,*~:70
*~ :]0 CVCv-

,-;LEL;
'-;LEL;

2010 (JrT
(WT 28 B.M 10: 32
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

0.~
~,-A
,'
0'~~'A
~. ~>.A.L Iv
Jv r ~ITL\r-.-O
~ITL\r-..-0

OEPU.. .
DEPU

\) C:"-i
\:"-i

IN
lN TlJE
TJJE DISTlllc"r
DISTRIC"l' C~OlJRT
C~OURT FOR THE FJRST .JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STAfF OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON.

Case No. CV
CV-()9-IOOIO
-09-100 I()

Pla.intin:
Plaintin:
\'S.

OBJECTION TO DEFENI>AN"l'S'

CITY OF CO"':\
COE\ JR O'
D'ALENE.
ALENE. IDAHO
lD/\HO
u rnuniciptll
rnunicipttl curpunllion.
curpunilion. I:t.al.
~:t.al.

PROPOSED JUJ)GMEN'l'
JUDGMEN'l' FORM

Dcl~ndanl.s.
Dcl~ndanls.

COMES NOW
proposed

Jud~mcnl
Jlld~mcnl

counsel what is

th~
lh~

submillcd 10
sl.Ibmilled
to the Court by Ddcndallts,
Ddcndants. PlaintitThns suhmitied
suhl11il1ed to
tn Ddtmdants'
Dt:f'tmdants·

bd.ic·v~:d
bd,ic'v~:d

A copy (If
A
l,f the sam\.':
saml.':

Plaintifl: by and through his ottomcy,
Plainlin:
ol10l'llcy. and
\lnd ohject"
object" to
tn the entry of
nl' the

nf Judgment ill
in this statutory election contest.
to he the appropriate fhrm of

i~ alhlch~d hl::n:to
h~::n:to

or

I()\'
I(H th~ cnnvenicnc~ of the Court.

Thc
ol'this ObjecLion
Objection is us 1()lIows;
f()llows;
The basis orthis
1. I.e.
I.C.

:~4-2f)1
:~4-201 :·~
:'~

provides Ihat
proviues
that Ihc
the ldaho Rules
Rulcs ol'
01' Civil Procedure only apply to how the

"The pmCI:~dings
pWCI..:.;t\ings shall be hdd."
"'")

I.e.
I. C. 34-:2021 spec,iiies
spcc.ifics the .."l-"o11n
Fonn ur.Juugmcnt."
uLJuugmcnt. ''

.1. I.c,
I,)rth "Liability
I.C. 34-7.020
34-7.0:?.0 (a) ~pccitically :M::;
:Ms '')rth
''Liability for Costs:"
Costs:·
4. In Noble

~··, Ada
Adu COUnlJ'
Coum_v A'h·clions
/Jom·d. 135 Idaho 495 (2001)
~,',
A'h'CljOI1S !Jom-d.

Court :-;Li:llt.xl
:-~Lalt.xl lhat
that ··costs
"costs do not include attorney

incluucd in the dl;.:/inition
incluued
d~:.:linition or
ol' the lcnn cusls.
cUSls.
dCIll(Jn~lr''I!t.:d
dcmon~lr<'ltt.:d

l~cs
/~es

the Idaho Supreme

unh:ss "norm:y
unless
<~Llorm:y k(:::;
Jb.::s arc expressly

Th~ k~ghd::ILurc's
k~ghd::tLurc's awar~ncss

or Lhis ruk
ruk~ is

by its
ilS authoriatti(lll
authllriallj(1I1 (If
t1WtUU:S of cosls
(lf t1warJ:s
costs and all(lrm:.y
auorrH.:.y fcl..:s.
fc~..:s. When Ule
U1c

Jcgislaturl:
JcgislaturL: has intended th~1l1hc
th~ilthc Lcnn
Lt.::nn cosL-;
COsL"i covcr!'i
cover:-; allnmcy
allumey lees, it h~IS
h~1s so provided." ld
Id
01
(1/

504,
504.

The Dclcndant.s· p"oposcd
p1·oposcd judgm~nt
judgnll.!nt
dcction

~..~ontL~~~
I..~onll~~l

::-:tatutc
::-:!aWte lhat
that

att<~mprs
att'~mprs

spl~ei1ic'illy
SpL~ciiic<illy

expand the spcci11c provisions of the spcciJic
to expanu
spedJie

provides l{)r
/()r '"co.st::;''
'''c(,)~t::;'' and specilically

dO~$
do~$

not
nOI rclimmcl:!
rclimmc~::

I OHJEC'flON
OHJECflON T<) DEFENDANTS'
DEFENDANTS" PROPOSED JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT; REQUEST FOR BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND REQUEST' FOR ORAl. ARGUMI::NT
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armrncy tees, hy
~xpand
~xrand

I'\:.~f~r~ncing
l't.~f~r~ncing

KELSO LAW OFFICE

Rule

S~
s~

~
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(a) of the Idaho Rules or Civil Proccdun,:. They also sl!l!k
SI!Ck to

the clear and unamhiguolls
unamhiguous statut.e
statute languagt! or
nf LC
LC. 34-2020(ti)
34-2020(<:~) by submitting language to

the Court in its proposed Judgment that costs
I.he
'lcctll'dam:~
'lCCtll'dam:~

with

andf~·es ... bc

awankd
tll the
awan1c.u III

pr·~.~vailing
pl'l.~vailing

pani.;s ... in

aN'IiI.:a"h~
rule .... and ,\'latutcs
,\'lall.11cs f~(
(~( th(!
fll(! Stale (~f"d£lllO.
apr,Jit.:ahh~ rules
f~/1dulm. inc/Ullin.!!
inc/mJin.!! .lclaho Code .\'(:'.ctiOf1
,\'(:'.elion

34-2020(£1).
II is submitted lhm
that the pl'Op(ls~!d
pi'Opos~!d Judgment, atwched
attached heret(),
heret(\, suhrnincd by PI.ainl.i
Pl.ainl.i II
IJ is the

~llffC~o:librm
~llfre~llbrm of Judgment
Judg.ment in t.his
this ca.'le
ca.-;e ru1-suan1
j1Ul"'SlIatll to the specific statutory p\'Ovisi()n~.'
provision~.'

If Ihe
the Courl.

d1oosc~
dlOOSC~

to consider the l>cfcndantl''
Defcndantl" pr()posed
proposed JudgmtmL
Judgmt:nL

dcn.::rminc to not enter the proposed
propnsed .Judgment
Judgment suhmillcd
suhmiucd hy Plaintitr.
Plaintitl". it is

lhat
that

rh~ Comi
COllli

m~t disrcg~~rd
TJ(~l

r~.~srcclli.JIIy
rl.~srcelli.llly

pcnnit [)l'icting
pennit
lwieting on
011 the issues raised in this Objection and furthe.r
furlhe.r

il.,
iI., and
Hnd

requested

requc~ls

Oral
Oml

argument prior 10
to 1h!.:
1h~.: Court cnl~!ring
cnl~~ring any .Judgment.
Judgmen1..

DATEJ.)-1J)i'··~·. .l~·;'" day ~rOc\'ohcl'.
~fOcl'ohcr, 2010.
))ATEj.)-1l1i'··~·"·2~·;'h
~
',,
"
. . .-._. . . . . . . . . .,;~:~:
;~~~:. ~.~t:.~.~:{~{<:_~···.·
~.~t:5<~:{~{(~J··.·. . . . .. ... . . . . . . . ""_.. . . . . .,.

Sl~lrr
St~trr

Kdso, ;\ltomcy
i\uomcy lor PJainti1T
PlaintiiT
1
1h

II HEREBY CERTlFY
CERT1FY Thm
October, 2010, II caused to he sl.:rved
l~Opy oflh~~
Oflh~~
that on I'h~
rh~ 28 h dlJy
d1.1y of
ofOctober,
s~.:rved a l~opy
t~)rcgoing
t~1rcgoing

on the fnl\owing,
following hy filx:
fi1x:

Peter C. 1-:.rbland
r.rbland
Paine l·Jtunblcn
l·1tunblcIl LLP
P.O. Box F

Coeur d'Alene.
d'Alene, Idabo
ldnbo
Fax: 664-6338

M ichncl IJ•. Hfllllan
Hnman
Iltlman
I Iaman Law Onk~
011k~
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho

83~16

J'

Scott W. Reed
at
1.~1w
(11 1.~IW
P. n.
0. Tlox
nux A
Coeur d'Alene.
d' Alenc. Idaho
Fax: 765~5 117
A.Uorn~y

:nlo;
:n~o; 16

Fax: 679.~~J.68J
679.-:-~1-683

~nx

I()
I ()

. . . . . .~z.3l~~~.':::!~:i~\:=~:_·
~Z.3l~~~.':::!~:i~\:::~:_·"'.·_ .

Starr Kelso

_-------

............- ..
I The !irsl
lirslllm~c
'Im~c para/:,.raph);
para/:'.raph); ol"lhc I.kli;ndtinls'
l.kli:ndtmls' proposcd
proposed .Il1dgm~nl
.ludgm~n1 wcr~ drafted by Phlin1ifr~
Phtin1ifr~ ('ollns~1.
couns~l. The limll
lim1l

1

pamgmph
pamgl'aph ,~r
,~f Ihei,'
their· 1""'P,)scd
l"'''pclscd Judgmen1
Judgment is Ih,~
rh,~ 1)(,il1l'
J)Ctilll' or
of comenricm.
ct.lmcnl'iCIJl, 1"lairlliff~
J.'laimiff'~ cOlIllsd
counsd sllbrnil1ed
subrnined lht~ language in lhe
l'imrlh
p<mtgruph orthc
ol"lhc Pbintilrs propo);CcJ
propo);Cc.J Juclgrncrll. attached
allachcd hcrCIn
herem (which is consi.~lcnt
with lh..:
sccnnd uncllhird
IImrlh P,Jnlgruph
c()nsi.~ICI\I wilh
lh~ sccllnd
unclthird
paragrarhs prcp11red
prepared hy Plaintitrs counsel) becu\l!;(~.
(eter:; to 1he
:,lal:ll1e. Thi~~
bccuu!a~. il
it specifically rcters
lhe specific relevan1
relevant :,taune.
langu;'lgc. W~IS
langu;igc.
w~1s r~jecl\!t1
r~j~.:ch.:tl by Dcf'cnuanl
Dcf'cndanl Kennedy\
Kennedy's counsel.

" OBJECTION TO I>ErENDAN'fS'
I>ErENDAN'rS' PROPOSED JLlKiMFNl;
JLIKrMFNl; REQUEST FOR BRIEFINU
S(
:llI-:DU
LJ::
AN
D
R.J.~QUEST
FOR
ORAL
ARGUMENT
S<:IJEDULJ:: AND RJ~QUEST
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IN TilE DlSTKICT
DlSTI{ICT COURT FOR THE FIRST Jl.IDJCIAI.
JUDJCIAI, DISTRICT OF
S'J't\TI~: OF lDAIIO,
ST/\TI~:
IDi\110. 1N hND
J\ND FOR 'THE
lHE COl JNTY OF KOnTr~:NAI
KOOT.r~:NAI

THE

Casl:
Cas~: No,
No. CV -09-100
-09-l 00 I 0

.11M
JIM KRANNON.

Plaimiii
PlaimiiI
Jl.lDGMEN'1'
Jl.JDGMEN'I'

VS.

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE.IDAtlO
D'ALENE.lDAtiO
aa municipal C(I\V~')I'~lJ.i()n,
cl'I\1.'(11'~Hinn. ~L
~L;.tl.
..tl.
Defendants.
Dctcndan1.s.

___...............................................
--_
Thi~

.

Illnllcr
mnllcr l:~Hnc
l:~nnc on for trial bd'im:
bd'(m: Lhc
the Honorable Charles W,
W. llosack. Senior'
Senior· District

Judge. on Septcn"lber 13 lhrough
through 1R.
R, 20 10.
I 0. Plainli
PlainLi IT .lim Hnmllon
Brannon was rcprCst~lllcd
rcprcst~nlcd by Stal'r Kelso.

Defendants
Defendnnts City of"
ol"COClIl'
Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alcne and Susan Wealhcrs
WeaLhcrs City Clerk of the City orcol!ul'
ol"Co&:ur d'Alene

\V1ichacl L. J humm.
Mich;.1cl KCJUlt:dy
Kcmtt:dy Wi\::;
wa::; 1'(!j)l'csenLt!d
I'C!prcsenLt!d by Scou
was represented hy lV1ichacl
hll1"l<m. Defendant
Dcfendant. Mich"1cl
Reed nnd Peter Erhlalld,
Erhland.
defenses and

prCS(~tnc.:d
prcs(~lnc.:d

its Memorandum

Wht:l'~llpOil
Wht:l'~lIp(ln

()l'al
ol'al

D~~.:ision
D~l.:jsioll

the parties presented
prc::;cmcd I:vid\:.':ncc
~:vid~.:.":ncc in supp('111:
SUpP('\lt or their claims and

'-lrgum~~nt
"'rgtlm~~nt

Whcr·eupon Ihe
the Cour·t
issued
at the cnnclusion
conclusion or the trial. Wher'euron
COUl't isslIed

Octo her 5. 20 I 0.
on Octohcr
(),

NOW TllEREHJRE.
THEREH.>RE. IT IS HEREBY ORDER1m.
ORDERl:O. AD.1l
AD.Il JDOEn
JDGED AND DECREED,
pursuanllo
CilY of
ofCot:lJr
pursuantlo Idaho Code section 34-2021. that the Cily
Coeur d'Alene's 'November
November J. 2009
<.h::ncr·al
r..:onfirmcd.
<'h::nc"al Flection i!"
i~ r..:onfil'Jllcd.
Fl.1R'T"IIER ORDERED. ADJlJDCiED
IT IS Fl.JR'T"IIER
ADJlJDfiED AND DECREED. pursuant to Idaho C()d,~
Cod<~
s~clion

:34-2021. l'hnt
rhnt JudgmenL
Judgment

i~

entered that
thai Mike Kennedy i$ dech1fcd
declc.1rcd a::; ~.:"k~cl·cd
t.:'k~CI·cd 10
to Lhc
the Seat :2

POSiTion
position on the City ofC(lcur
of(\u:.ur d'Alt:nc's
d"Ait:nc's City Council.
CounciL
IT lS
IS flJRTllER
flJRTIIER ORDERED. ADJIIJ)(mD
AD.IIIJ>(iED AND DECREED, pursuam to Idaho COlk~
Colk~
judgment. for costs shall br.: rt·ndt:l\.:d
section 34-2020 (a), that
thaljudgmcnt.
rt'l)dt:,\;d against the contestant. Plaintitl.lim
PlaillliJl.lim
Brannon, Said costs. upon Court approval, shall he p~lid
Brannon.
p~1id to Ih(;.~
th<:.~ exl",nl
exl~.;nt available from the

JUDGMI·:NT
JUDGMI':NT
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p(J:-;I.t:d in this I11tlllcr
mtlllcr by PlaimitT Brannon,
Brannon. lf
CX(;eed
$5.000.00 hond. P(J:-;I.t:u
If the approved costs do nol
n01 ex(;eed

h()nd amnunt
balance shall be released to Plaint.i
PJaint.i IT Brannon.
the posted hond
al110unt any rc.mnining halance
......... _day
2010..
day ofOctoht::r. 20)0
EN'l'ERED this .___..........
M""U
.....
'•••••••
' ' ' ' '''_
' - - M_
UUU
O

'''""'<MOo
...... 'M •• ___
"
___ .......
,,,,,,,

•••••0
_
". --o\"'"'"'''''"""''"'''""''
__ .\"." .......................... .
0
0 0_
0 - -...

Charks W. Il [osack.
rosaek, Senior D;strict
District judg~
R\JLE 54 (h) CERTIFICJ\l'E
RULE
With rcspecllo the h:sucs det.ermined
Judgment, it is hereby CERTIFIED. in
determined by the ahove
ahnvc Judgment.
~lccon.l41ncc
~1ccon.luncc
Ihcr~
thcr~

with T~l!h.~
oi'C;vil
T~uh.~ 54 (b). Id::lho
kl::~ho Ru\e:-;
Rule:-; of
Civil Pn)(:cdure.
Pm<:cdure. that the Court 11ft!:'
ho!:' determined thai
that

is no just reaS(H\
reastm for the dclny of
nf the

c.~lltry
c.~ntry

or
or i.\i.l linnl
linn I j1.1dgmcnt
j1.ldgmcnt and that rhc Court has and

docs hereby dircl~l
dircl~' that the ah<W(~
l.1rn)V(~ judgm1,1,t
judgml.1lt .shall he
be~~
~I final,iudgmc-nt
final.iudgmc-nt upon which exccut:ion may
issu~

appt.::al n1(lY
nu1y hI;;
b~;; taken as provided hy ldah(l
and an app(:al
Idaho Code section 34-2025 (h).
day (l
n r Octo her. 20 10.
I 0.

l::N-rERED this
t.his
1::N·rERED
..........

.""'0". , ...... _ _ _ _

···~

"'~

~_

... '"

. . . . . . ,..

·······----~-···

..............
•........

..

_____ ...

~------

".".~

CIIARLFS W.
w. HOS.'\CK, :'knior
~knj(lr Distric[
District Juugc

CLERK'S CERTlFlCATE
CERTlFJCATE OF SI.::RVlCE
I HEREBY CERTlF't'
that on the_day
CERTLF't' thut
thc_day ofOcl.nher. 201(),
2010, I calls~d
caus~d to he served a lrue
lruc

and

COI..-I:cl
COITI:Cl

c.opy of
the l"orcgoin.g
rnrcgoing ny the method lndicatcd below.
below, and
oft.he

Sian
Starr Kelso
Altorn~y at Law
P.O. Box 13.12
P.o.
kk1ho R3816
Coeur d'Alene, kklho

Fax: 664-6261
llam~m
Michncl lI ..,_ l1am~ln
1l hunan 1.<\w
I.•\w 01licc
P_O_ Box 2155
21 S5
P.O.

Coeur d'l\hme,
d'Ahme,
Fa.x:
\:: 676-1683

ld~1ho
ld~\h()

to lhc
lhe
addr~sscd lO

Petc::r C. t-::rhlnnd
Paine H.umblcn
H.amblcn LLP
P.O. Box E
d' Alene. ldah.o
Coeur d'Alene.
Fax: ()(j4-633~
664-633~

f(ll1owing:
f(JJiowing:

~J R
S1(;
l<i

Scott W. Reed

Atlomcy at
al Law
Auomey

83816

P. O. B~)x
P.o.
n~1x 1\
A
Cocur d' A knc. Jdnho
Jd(lho R3 ~ 16
Coeur
Fax: 765·5117
765-5117

By: ..................................
......................................................
___..... .
····················----·····

:22 .llJDGMEN'T·
JlJDGMI::N'T·
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
rr ·' \ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTf
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000

FILED 1111/2010
111112010 AT 01:33
01:33PM
PM
KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAl
CLERK DJiliEDIST:ucncoURT
DJTHEDIST:UCJ)COURT
BY

)
)
)
)
)

JIM BRANNON

vs.
VS.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, ETAL.

~_J\A.~-J\A.- ~ =-""""

SS

DEPUTY

Case No: CV-2009-0010010

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for:
Status Conference
re: Entry of Judgment
Judge:
Courtroom:

11:00 AM

04,2010
Thursday, November 04,
2010
Charles W. Hosack

1st,
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on November 1
st, 2010.

Plaintifrs
Plaintiffs Counsel:

Defendant's Counsel:

Starr Kelso
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1312
Mailed
Hand Delivered

,_,-..,.
'-""

~Faxed (208) 664-626 ~')IJ
~1;

Michael L. Haman
PO
P 0 Box2155
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-2155
Mailed

Hand Delivered

ff]Faxed (208) 676-1683
fr]Faxed

't'-

1'-

s-~

Scott W. Reed
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814
Mailed

Hand Delivered

\(JFaxed (208) 765-5117
S:Sf
52?

Peter C. Erbland
P.O.
P.O.BoxE
BoxE
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814
Mailed

Hand Delivered

)v,Faxed
MFaxed (208) 664-6338
S.:s9
.5'.39

('{
f'{

Dated:

01,2010
Monday, November 01,
2010
Daniel J. English
Clerk Of The District Court

By:

Shari Rohrbach, Deputy Clerk

CV Notice Of Hearing
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Court Minutes:
Session: HOSACK110410A
HOSACKII04IOA
Session Date: 11104/2010
II/04/20 I 0
Judge: Hosack, Charles
Reporter:

Division: DIST
Session Time: 10:50
I 0:50

Courtroom: Courtroom9

Clerk(s): Burrington, Talisa
State Attorney(s):
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

c_/)
L/li)

~ /J

---------~--e~~~At,.,~,
-----------f-e~~~~-~,

(J.cc
~

Case ID: 0001
OOOI
Case number: CVI989-9999
CV1989-9999
Plaintiff:
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: TEST, MIC
Pers. Attorney:
Co-Defendant(s):
State Attorney:
Public Defender:
11104/2010
ll/04/20IO

II:00:54
11:00:54
Recording Started:
II:00:54
11:00:54
Case called
11:04:15
11:04:I5

II :05
:05:26
11
:26
11:06:14
II:06:14

Judge: Hosack, Charles
ATTORNEYFEESHEARING.STATUSCONFERENCEHEARING
ATTORNEY
FEES HEARING. STATUS CONFERENCE HEARING
STARR KELSON, PETER EBERLIND, MIKE HAMON PRESENT
Other: KELSO, STARR
CITES IDAHO RULE. LANGUAGE DOESNT COMPLY WITH
THAT. COSTS AND FEES. STATUE

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK11 041 OA

SC 38417-2011

Page 1, ...
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·11 :06:55
11:07:39
11 :07:39
11:08:39
11 :08:43
11:08:43

11:09:20
11 :09:20
11:11:29

PROVIDES FOR THE LANGAUAGE WE SUBMITTED. VERY
- IT IS
SPECIFIC LANGAUGE -IT
APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE.

Judge: Hosack, Charles
WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS. A PHRASE
REFERRING TO COST AND FEES IS
APPLICABLE - THAT IS MY JOB. CITES 2020A RULE.
WILL BE LOOKING AT APPLICABLE
RULES. NO POINT OF SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN RAISED.

11:12:00
11: 12:00

Other: EBERLIND, PETER
LOTS OF STATUES. THAT IS WHY I SUBMITTED LIKE I
DID.

11: 12:27
11:12:27

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I DONT KNOW WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN ON COSTS PURSUANT TO RULE 58 - WHO
PREVAILS. I THINK THAT PHRASE NEEDS TO BE
OBMITTED.

11:13:08

11: 13:41
13 :41

Other: EBERLIND, PETER
I AM FINE WITH THAT

11:13:47

11:16:30

Judge: Hosack, Charles
I WILL SCRATCH THAT OUTOUT - WILL INERLINEATE. RULE
54 CERTIFICATE. THIS IS A
FINAL JUDGMENT.
I WILL WRITE DENIED AS MUTE. WONT ISSUE A 54B
CERTIFICATE. COUNCIL TO
APPROACH BENCH TO EXAMINE PAPERWORK. THIS IS THE
FINAL JUDGMENT.
ALL PARTIES AGREE. WE ARE ALL WORKING ON THE
SAME PAGE. COPIES TO BE FAXED
OUT TO ALL PARTIES.

11:16:49

Stop recording

11:14:26
11:14:49
11:15:13
11:16:03

Court Minutes Session: HOSACK11 041 OA
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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

12086646338

p.2

STATE bF
OF IDAHO }
COUNTY OF

0 E

FILED:
AT

SS

D
·,

.·

O'GLoe.';
O'CLOC.\

cA:~
CA:~~~rRE;~uR
~~rRE;~UR

M

DEPUTY

IN THE OJ
D1STRICT
STRICT COURT OF THE FIRST
FiRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM
J1M BRANNON,

CV 09-10010
) Case No. cv
09·10010
)

Plaintiff,
Vli,
Vli.

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO. a.
munic:ipal corporation, et al.,
municipal
aJ .•

~

JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)

~
_____________________________
Defendants.
)

--------------------------------)

This matter came on for trial befote
before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, Senior District

Bran.non, was represented by Starr
Judge, on September 13 through 18,
18. 2010. Plaintiff, Jim Bran.non.
Kelso. Defendants, City of Coeur d'Alene and Susan Weathers, City Clerk of the City of Coeur

d'Alene, were represented by Michael L. Hanum. Defendant, Michael Kennedy, was represented
by Scott Reed and Petel' C. Erbland. Whereupon, the parties presented evidence
evldence in support of
their claims and defenses and presented oral argument at the conclusion of the trial. Whcroupon.,
the Coun issued its Mc.morandum Dceision on October S
511 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
ORDERED~I ADJUDGED AND DECREED,

Ij --

pursuant to Idaho Code § 34-2021, that the CitY of Coeur d'Alene's November 3, 2009 General

Election is confirmed.

,I

i,.,-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, pursuant to Idaho Code §
34-2021, that Judgment is entered that Mike Keruledy
Keru1edy is declared as elected to the Seat 2 position

on the City of Coeur d'Alene's City Council.

J\)tlCM~T.l
J\JtlCM~T-1

SC 38417-2011
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I

G~t
Q~t

28 2010 10;S9AM
10;59AM

PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

12086646338

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED. p\U'suant
p\\lsuant to Rule SS(a),
58(a),
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, that judgment be

entered in favor of the defendants, and that the

plaintiffs claims nnd causes of action against the defendants be dismissed in their entirety and
with prejudice, and that costs and fees, if any,~'
any,~· B'W6fEled
B'Wtu'Eled to tile defendaMs as the prevaililtg

parties, thG amollJit,
parties.
amollJl1, if any~ be determined by the court in accordance with applicable rules and
Idaho, including Idaho Code §
statutes of the State of Idaho.

34~2020(a).
34~2020(ft.).

Hpproved costs do not
If the f\pproved

exceed the posted bond amount of $5,000.00.
$5,000.00, any remaining balance shall be released to plaintiff

L
A1.
/'
1jL JJV
lilt)
IIItJ IJ#fifJA/
l/#flfJA/

Brannon.

.J_ day o~oJO.
o~OJO.
this..i

ENTERED this

CHAR!Yw. HOSACK, SenlOr
Sen10r
District JUdge
RULE 54{b) CERTIfICATE
CERIIEICATE
With

respe~t

to the issues

det~rmined

by the above

ttl accordance with Rule S4(b).
in
54(b). Idaho Rules of

that there is no just reason for the delax

gment, it is hereby CERTIFIED.
gment.

.· 'I'1 Procedure. that the Court has determined

the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has

Judg1nent upon which execution
and does he[eby direct that the a ve Judgment shall be Ita fmal Judglnent

may issue and an appeal

be taken as provided by Idaho Code § 34-2025(b).

day of October. 2010.
this _
this_

CHARLES W. HOSACK, Senior
District Judge

JUDCMEN'I'-~

SC 38417-2011

Page 2343 of 2676

p.3

Gee 28 2010 10:59AM

PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

~ERK'S

12086646338

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_ day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _
__
ttue
and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below. and addressed to the following:
ofthe

Starr Kelso

o0

EMAIL tostarr.kelso@frOntiq.com
to starr.kelso@fronJiq.com
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 208765-3260
208 765-3260

o0

to m.lhaman.law@gmail .com
EMAIL tomlhaman.1aw®gmail.com
TELBCOPY (FAX) to: 208 676-1683
TELECOPY
676.1683

Attorney at Law
Attomey

~

Michael L.
L, Haman
Haman Law Office

~

Peter C. Erbla11d
Erblal'ld
Paine Hamblen LLP

Scott W. Reed

Attorney at Law

~
Jxx
J

EMAIL to peter.erbland@pains:ha,mblen.com
peter,erbland@pains:ha.mblen,cQm
.Q-.Q-- TELECOPY (FAX) to: 208 664·6338

o0

EMAIL to:scottwreed@frontier.com
to: scottwreed@frontier.com
g.--TELECOPY (FAX) to: 208 765
76S .. S
5117
117

H:\CDAOOCS\371 01\00001 \PU3A.DIC037834
H:\CDAOOCSI,371
\PU3A.D\C037834

JVOCMRNT-]
JVOCMRNT-1
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Phone (208) 664-8115
FAX (208) 664-6338

I~
~~

I

Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P. 0.
O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, 10
ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-5117

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-09-10010

JIM BRANNON,
)

Plaintiff,

)

~.
~-

)

SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

)

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS OF
DEFENDANT MIKE KENNEDY

)

)
)

Pursuant to Rule 54 (d) (1), I.R.Civ.P. defendant Mike Kennedy as a prevailing party
makes claim to the following costs as against plaintiff Jim Brannon:

(C)
1.

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

Amount

Court filing fees:
Court filing fee

$58.00
$ 58.00

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

1
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2.
Actual fees for service of any pleadings or document
In the action whether served by a public officer or other
person:
3.
Service by Steve Reed, AAYS of contempt pleadings
upon William R. McCrory.

~ ,:;:Q
hQ " "
'+'
vv.vv

4.
Witness fees of $25.00 per day for each day in which a
witness, other than a party or expert, testifies at a
deposition or in the trial of an action:

None

5.
Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private
transportation, other than a party, who testify in the trial of
an action, computed at the rate of $.30 per mile, one way,
from the place of residence, whether it be within or without
the State of Idaho:

None

6.
Expenses or charges of certified copies of documents
admitted as evidence in a hearing or trial of an action:

None

7.
Reasonable costs of the preparation of models, maps,
pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in
evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action,
but no to exceed the sum of $500.00 for all of such
exhibits of each party:

None

8.

Cost of all bond premiums:

None

9.
Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who
testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an action not to
exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert witness for all
appearances:

None

10.
Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition
taken in preparation for trial of an action, whether or not
read into evidence in the trial of an action:

None

11.
Charges for one (1)
( 1) copy of any deposition taken by any
of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the
action:

None

Total Costs as Matter of Right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 (d) (1) (C):

$ 116.00
2

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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D.

DISCRETIONARY COSTS

Defendant Kennedy seeks discretionary costs as provided in Rule 54 d) (1) (D) for
the following necessary and exceptional costs.
FOR TRANSCRIPTS OF COURT HEARING
February 12, 2010 Joann Shaffer, Court Reporter

60.42

June 19, 2010 Anne McManus

62.40

October 27, 2010 Coeur d'Alene Reporting

73.75
$196.60

Total:
JUSTIFICATION

The hearings always involved multiple motions filed by plaintiff. Transcripts were
necessary to verify the Court's various rulings in this complicated case.
FOR INVESTIGATION OF VOTERS
Bill Marlin,
Morlin, Marlin
Morlin investigations April to September, 2010

$ 5,387.50

JUSTIFICATION
The number of net illegal votes to change the result was six (6) out of 6,375.
Investigators for plaintiff commenced interviews by telephone and in person as soon as or
before suit was filed and continued to date of trial.
Plaintiff in response to discovery requests provided names of over Fifty (50)
questionable voters. It was necessary to check these voters with the election office and
to interview or investigate. In addition, a concerted effort was undertaken to endeavor to

3
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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find persons who had voted illegally for plaintiff. These were leads did not produce any
questionable voters.
All of this investigation peculiar and unique to this case constituted costs that were
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred.
$5,584.16

Total Discretionary Costs
RECAPITULATION OF COSTS

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

$ 116.00

DISCRETIONARY COSTS

$5,584.10
$5.584.10
$ 5,700.10

TOTAL COSTS

The foregoing statement of costs actually incurred by defendant Mike Kennedy
in this action is correct and in compliance with Rule 54(d)
54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
th
5th day of November, 2010.
Dated this 5

~"""-::;~~-L--,-~ ~
~~~~~L!-----'-~
~
Sco W. Reed, One of the
Attorneys for Defendant Mike Kennedy

IDAHO )
STATE OF IDAHO)
)ss.
County of Kootenai )
Scott W. Reed, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
That I am one of the attorneys for defendant Mike Kennedy in the above-entitled
matter and as such am better informed relative to the above charges than said
defendant, that the charges as above shown are correct the best of my knowledge
and belief, have been necessarily incurred in'
Ion
in ·
1on an are claimed in accordance
with all provisions of Rule 54(d)(I),
54(d)(l), I.R.Civ.P.

4
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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th
5th
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5
day of November, 2010.

\1\\If II/I II
/1/I 11///II///~\\\ enG.B.
e(1G.8. ~

~\f~c;~~~~~
~\f~o~~~~~
.::::::
_
·: ::::::

~:
~ :

§ ~

j ~
-==-u;;.
-==-u;;.·......
.....~U8Ll~./O~
~uau~./o~
-'/"Y/';
-'/"Y/'; .............
············· rt~
rt~
1

•

%,t~~~)~\\\\'\
%.t~~I)~'\\\'\

f ~~ ~
//
~

/

/

. OTARY PUBLIC for Idaho
Residing at Coeur d'Alene
My Commission Expires: 9/1/11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by first class mail,
postage prepaid, this 5th day of November, 2010 to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P. O.
0. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 664-6261
Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office
P. O.
0. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 676-1683
Art Macomber
Attorney at Law
Avenue408 E. Sherman Avenue
- Suite 215
Coeur d'Ale:::,n~e~,
d'Aie~n:e~,.tfld~g~';J/IJ_.
~ld~g~:JjJ'"
FAX (208 ~

1

5
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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10/27/2010

10:14

0000
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morlinvestigation~
Bill Morlln lilvtmlgariva
lnvtmlgariva rere/1n:/r
rerean:lr (I/ld
t~nd jQlIm(tI/$/11
jollm<:llsm
S09.9l11.00%
b01orlln@grnall.com
509.9£11.00% bmorlln@grnall.com
p.o.eOl( 18781 Spok<ln~,WA9922S
P.O.Bmc
Spokan~,WA9922S

October 5,2010
5, 2010

TO: SCOTTW. REED
Scott W. Reed Law Office
401 Front StTect. P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES for August and September 2010
re: Mike Kennedy 2009 Coeur d'Alene City Council election
HOURS
~40

Aug. 22 - interview D.Ainsworth; research other names on plaintiffs'
list; confer with MKennedy, SReed and CDA investigator
Aug. 33 - additional research ofu.ames on plaintiffs' list; conference
calls with CDA investigator, MKennedy,
MK.ennedy, SReed
Ejections Office to get poll books and confer.
Aug. 44 - trip to Kootenai Elections
with elections officials
Aug. 14 - prepare CD of Kootena Co. voters an.d deliver to City of CDA
Investigator
Aug. 3030 - contact by Haman law and city investigator re: names on list
Sept. 11 - various attempts to contact Rawana Zellers
Zt~ners per counsel
SUMMARY:

2.0 HOURS @ 40.00 -HOURS@
@ 75.0014.0 HOURS

(unpaid balance from Aug. 16~ 2010
for work done in March and .Tu1y
I 0) July 20 10)

~75

7.0
3.0
2.0

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

$80.00
$1050.00

$2945.00

~DUE:$407~
PAYABLE TO: Morlinvestigations LLC
P.O. Box 18781
Spokane, WA.

SC 38417-2011
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02
132

u"JoooIIi~tions
andjournalism
Bill Morlin lnvestlgativeresearch andjollmalism
509.981.0096 bmorlin@gmail.com
bmorlin@gmail.corn
Poe.
P.O. Box 18781 Spokane, WA 99228

May 5, 2010

TO: SCOTT W. REED
Scott W. Reed Law Office
401 Front Street, P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
re: Mike Kennedy 2009 Coeur d'Alene
d' Alene City Council election

HOURS
@40.00
16 - travel Spokane-Coeur d'
d'Alene-Spokane
Alene-Spokane
March 16March 16 - case review with Scott Reed and Mike Kennedy
March 1717 - research, phone calls 2009 election
March 18 -travel Spokane-Coeur d'Alene-Spokane
- pickup voter data Kootenai Co.; confer with Kennedy
March 18 -pickup
research data base, phone calls; find five voters who
March 19 --research
registered after 11-3-09
March 22 - case review and telephone calls; confer with Scott Reed
March 23 - calls to obtain mortgage purchase records and review
- research, phone calls, e-mails re: 2009 election
March 26 -research,

SUMMARY: 4.0 HOURS
@ 40.00 -HOURS@
17.5 HOURS
HOURS@
@ 75.00--

@75.00

2.0
1.5
1.0
2.0

4.0
5.0
2.0
2.0
2.0

$160.00
$1312.50

PAYABLE TO: Morlinvestigations LLC
PAYABLE
P.O. Box 18781
Spokane, WA.
99228
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scottwreed

i

From:
"Mike Kennedy" <mike@idaho~ennedys.com>
To:
"'scottwreed'" <scottwreed@frd,ntier.com>
<scottwreed@frd.ntier.com>
Sent:
Wednesday, October 27,2010\1:21
27, 2010\1:21 PM
Reed(Kennedy)5-10.doc
I
O.doc
Attach:
Reed(Kennedy)S-1
Subject:
FW: first bi/ling
billing
I
FYIFYI - the numbers are what! sent earlidr,
Scott.
I
1

From:

[~~nt~:b~orlin@gmail.corJ
Biaml Morli~ [~~ilt~:b~orlin@gmaiI.COr]

Sent: Wednesday, October 27,2010
27, 2010 12:52 PM
To: Mike Kennedy
Subject: first billing

Mike:

I

I
\

Jn May 5. It totaled $1,472.50, but I was only paid
Here's the first bill I sent to Scott Reed In
$1312.50; the $160 balance was carrie~ over to the August bill and then to the September bill
which he just paid.
I
I

Thanks again for the opportunity to work for you guys.
I

- Bill Marlin
Spokane

SC 38417-2011
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Regarding:
Morlin Billing

-;;;~~'~"'~'u''''''''''m.,. . ·-b-er-f-~;·;~;=·i·~"'·~'''=. ~-,. ,~,. . .p-:-

O
_"_:'I':_~) .p:~,:. . -..__-.,.,. .~____ ".__---'1762-~~5 ext.
.:. r.:

01

:=:'~'::~:'-'

If-.-,,,...,..
..

11

"

Comments:
Scott,
I'm attaching one invoice for $4,075.00. The other invoice was for $1,312.50.
Unfortunately I cannot find a copy of that invoice, though I got the amount from
my campaign account check register. Both checks were made out to Scott Reed
Law Office, as Bill was hired by you to do the investigative work.
Thus the total invoiced by Bill Morlin was: $ 5,387.50.
Let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks,
Mike
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STATt:. Or IDAHO
STAll::.

COUNTY OF V,QOTENAI
V-OOTENAI

}

SS .·

FILED:

20 I0NOV - 8 PH 3: I 4 n

K. ELSO
STAI~R K"ELSO

::tt Law ifl,:145
if2,:145
Attorney ::It
P,O,
13 12
P.O. Hox 1312

IU

""'\

1:

Coeur
Cocur d·Alcn~.
d'Aicn~. lda!w
Jda!w 83816

<1'; I
L' 'v"

COURT' .~

Tel: 20X-7tl5-:tU,O
20X-7t15-:tu,o
Fax: 208-664-626!
208-664-6261
Anomcy for
t(w Plaint i IT Rraml(ln
AlIOI'llCY
Rral1l1(l1'l

IN TilE
TIlE DISTRICT COlJRT
COURT f'-OR
r:oR THE FIRS'I .IIJ1.>ICI!\L
JtJI.>ICI!\1. DISTRICT OF
THE STATE or
ANt) FOR Till·:
'1'111,; COUNTY OF KOOTl:::NAI
OF IDAHO. IN 1\Nl.>
Case No,
No. CV -09-100 I 0

.11M BRANNON.
.JIM
Plaintiff.

TRiM,.. PURSUANT
MOTION FOR J\ NEW TRIM
'ro lRep
·ro
IRCP RULE
Rlfl.t-: 551)1) (a) (6) and (7) OR IN
THE AI..:.I'ERNATIVb
Al...'.I'ERNATJVb MOTiON TO IN
JN THE
ALTERNATlVF
;\I.TI~R
Ol{ ,J\t\.tJ/.,:NJ.)
ALTERNATIVF TO J\1
TI~R Of{
.1\t\.tJJ.·:NJ.)
'I'IIE.l1
TilE .It JlKiMENT
JIKiMENT PURSUANT TO IRCP
lRep
RI)J.J::
Rt
Jl .E 59((:)
59( c)

\:'s.
vs.
()'ALEN.E. IDAlJO.
IDAIJO.
CITY OF COEUR ()"ALEN,E.

a
a municipal corporation. ct.ttl
cUtl
r.klend
an \':-.;,
r.klcndanl':-.;.

___

...............

_____

............ ..............................

,,,
,
,,,,
_,,,
''""""'
---"'"''''''''''''''---'-''''''''''''''''-''.''''''''',''''''',,''''''''''' """"'"

COMLS
PL/\IN'l'IFF. hy and through hi.s attorney. and pursuant
COrvtLS NO\\!
NO\V PL:\IN'l'IFF.

(a) (6) and (7)

n·wv(:~
ll'IOV(:~

this Courl ri)r
l'i'.lr a.:1 new trial

(lr
(Ir

in

t'h~:
I'h~:

alt'crnativc
alt'cr,mHivc

pu~u~ull
pu~u~Ull

t~~

IRe!>
IRCP Rule
Ruk 59

to lRep
lRCP rule 59 (e)

moves this entin'
CntJn· to niter ot·
01' amend its judgrrwnt and llt.lld
Iwld Ithat
hat t.he
the e1eclion
dcclion for
fiJr Scat 2 is void.
t\sid(~
usid(~

the dcction i<H·
j()r Se::Jt
Se::~t 2. and order a

,,~~W
n~~w d~clilln,
d~cl ion.

The cvidcn(~(:
insul'Jicicn1. tojustify
cvidcn,~e at trinl
trial is insui'Jicicnt
tojusl.ily
l)f
()f

sc.:~l
S(~(

Ih~
lh~

an error in the :.tppl
appl ication ofthc bUl'den
burden or proof hy

wrdict
anti it is :t!!ainsl.
:I!!ains1. the law
verdict and
th~
lh~

~s
;JS

a result

Court
COlll't in its dcci~iorL
dcci~jo!1.

The Court el'roneously
rJlainlifCs burdl,.':/l
cl'roneously determined
dctcr'lllincd tltnt
thnt il was Ihe
lhc l'•laintifCs
burd..::n of prllO/'
proof to produce:111
produce all
~on<~civ~lhlc
~1,)n<~CiV~lhJc
v:.~lid
v:.Jlid

t::vidcJKt' v.-hcthcr
t::vidCIKt'
whether prob;:~tiw.
prOb;:lliw. rdevan!.
rdcvant. or irrd~v~lJll:
irrd~v~tnl: as 10 lhc
the numhcr
mm1hcr ofjega!
oflegnl and

ahscnll:~e

hallor.s actually receivcd
received in
the ckctinll
ckctinn bcHm:."
the polls til
ttl 8:00 run.
hallo!.s
illlhc
ocnm;,· the close
c10sc of
ofl.hc
rU11.

Novt.>mbcr J. 2()09.
2009.
on Novt.'lllbcr

'l'h~
'rh~

Plaintiff inlToducl~d
inlroducl~d
Plainliff

~vidence.
~vidcncc.

hy what the Couri.
Cour1.

dct·crrnincd
it:~df del'ermined

usetiJ! dmnhnsc rcgllrding
rcgMding whall.hl!
whatl.ht:! Ilumbcr
number onega!
oflcgal and valid ahsc.mtec
ballots wcr~~
was the only lIsetiJ!
ah~(,mtec hallots
artually received. that. a total of 1041. or al
a1 mo:;t
kg.,.J and vaJio
valio
;!rl.Ually
/l'lo:;t 2042. kg;'!]
aclr,mlly rc(~t:ivcd
l'C(~t:ivcd in the electioll
election
aclually

hc1~wc
hc1~)I'c

ahscnl.l~t..~
ahscr;I,I;.~l~

ballots were
hallots

rhc
rile c:losc
dose ol'the
urlhe pol.ls and Ihul
t'hul Ihis
this l1uTllbcr
nurnbcr of legal
leg.al and

MOTION rOl{
AMEND
f.O'R NEW TRIAL OR IN ALT'ERNATIVE MOTION TO I\1.T'ER
/\LT'ER OR !\MEND
TJ II·:
II-: .IUDGM !:~NT
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valiJ tlbscnlce
tlbscntce hallots is

2051
lOSl

ab~tmtcc ballnts
ballots

~()nlrary
~ontrary

Lh~

to LhaL
that

voLe
tabulalioll lhal
vole c(Htnling mad}in(:
madlil'l(: tabulation
thai [clkcl:o;
n.:ll~o.:ct:-; that
thai

were run through it. ()n(:c
On(:c the Plaintiff introduced this

lIl'proorshifted
of
proof shifted to Defendant.s
Defendants

tt)
tt1

pl'()dll~~c I::vidcl1c,,;
produ~~c
~::vidcnc.,;

nfthc polls. The
ballots were received by the
t.hc ciMc
CIMC nfthe
what \\vas
. . as

introdw:.t~d hy
introdll(:.t~d

Envelopes hy

thuL ill
in Hli.:l 20S1
2051 k:J:!,fll
k:J;nl and valid
Dcl~nu;mts
DcI~l1u;mt::i

ore n01
not cvidcnc(!
cvidcnc(: (II'
ol' legal and valid

,::-;i~~l.(,,~m~c
'::-;i~~t.l~m~c

r~gan..l
r~ganJ

~in

was

as (In
(111 elec.rion
dcc.rion

introduced no

abs~llt~~
abs~nl~~

~~vidence
~~vidcncc

absentc;,~c

ab~(:nt~:,I..~
ab:o:;cnt~:.~,.~

other than
~xisted.
~xistcd.

b.:lllots.
b;:lllots. At' most it is

ora
of a valid.
vulid. or
nr invalid,
invalid. ballO!.
ballol. I.kkndants
l.kl.i.:ru..lant.s introdm;i.:'u
inlrodu~.:i.:'U no

whether all of the cnvclnpes
cnvc/npcs ~.~onwin~d
l.~onHlin~d lcgtll
Icgtll and v,llid
v<.tlid
Ihis
this

(~vjd,mcc. Ih~
th~ burd~n
(~\!jd'mcc.

Plaintiffthnt a number or envelopes counted by Judg~: Maran!)
Plain1'ifrthnt

thC'tnselv~!S
thcmselv~:s

t!videnc.c
the
~::videnc.c of
ofthc

Ill
III 002/004
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lnll.lots.
lntl.lots.

Thl.~
(lilly
Tht..~ (.lilly

evid~ncc
evill~ncc

as l.o
to

evidence W
..1S in
was

::rJ1davit. hy a person wh,)
:lrJldavil.
whl''l wn:::; !lot
not (l/'iginally
(ll'iginally idcnl.ilicd by Ckrk Dan English

w()rh~r.
wnrh~r.

that each envelope cflntnincd
()m.~ ball(lt.
n(l
cfmtnincd om.:
ballot. T'hl:re
'T'h~:re is nc..)

l~vidcncc

that each

I:!nvdop~~
~:.:nvdop~~

contained.
Ieg.al and valid ballot.. The only evidence bcl()r~
contained a legal
bcfbr~ the (nul't,
Coul't. contrary to tlw

statutory
stat.utory

rcquir~::nu.~nls
I'cquirI::ITH,~nls

l'egal'ding
regarding absclllcc ballots. is Lhat
that either
clther 2041 or
nr 2042 legal
lcgnl nnd valid

absentee ballot's
baiiOT.s ~~~ist(:d. The only t:vidt:n~c
ahsentee

.

2041. or 2042, lelI,ai
leu.al end valid
vnlid

[lhs~~Jltcc
nhs~~Jllcc

b~;.~fiJrc.
b!;.~fllrc,

the Cuurt establishes the exi::::1'encc
t'xi::::1'encc of only

hullnls.
hullots. This

1:."
1:.'- idt.:rK~c

.

evidencc
establishes. withoUl
without any
anv evidence

to lh~
th~ C(lIlt.l'W·Y
tl.'mt.rw·y presented hy Dctendan1.s.
Defendants. th:11·
th:l1' al
a1 h:~asl nil1"~
nin"~ (9). and probably 1t.'U
lt.'n (10),
(I 0), less
abs":nLL~c
abs"~nLl~c

hallot::: (that werc
were legal and valid) were received than
h"lIoIs

w~rc

pl"ced in the machine to be

mechanic,ully
mcchanic.ully c(lun1~d.
couni~d.
(:ommittcd errol'
error by I'cquiring
requiring the Plainti 1'n:1: dc!"pitc
de!"pitc 1'h~~
th~~ tc~tim(lllY
tc~timo•lY
The Court forrhcr
further (:ommitlcd
lJurst or
iJurst
of the Sect'(:irwy
Secl'(:i[II"Y (I/"Slt)t..:'s
(lf"Slat~.:'s Ol'lic~..~
Ol'lic~~ that no rdcvam change occurred during,
h.I
h.l lhl:
1h~:

Secretary of State's
Stll1'e' s database as

datuhase
datahase 'could

1101.
tWl.

have

b(;'~l!n'
bt.~l!n ·

rclkct(;,~d
rclkctt~d

l)f

Nnwmb,~r
Nnwmb(~r

Mr.

2009

1hflt th~
by 1,~xhibj,1
l.~xhibi.l S.
5. 10 intn)du,,~e
introdu"~c t!vidcnc,c
t!Vidcnc.c 1hnt

changed.

(WI'flr hy nol shift.ing
shifting the burden ol'pmoflo
u/'Pl'OoflO De1~~ndants when it
The Court. c.ommitted
c.ommincd (WI'or

hased
based its decision
counted by
abSl.!nCl~
absence..~

Judg~
JlIdg~

oJ'any
of
any

lh~ttthe
lh~!tthe

diiTerencc
dilTerencc

hctWC(~Il
hCtWCl~1l

Exhibit 5 (2041) and the nllmh~r
numh~r of envelopes

Marano "is most prnbahly''
prnb.:.hly'· \!xphlincd
~!xphtincd by

evidt;:~nc~

illl'he
int·hc

r(~(~ol'd.
r(~<.~ord.

~1 I~\ilure
l~tilure to inpl11'
inp111' n(lll1~~S,
n(llll~~s, (1/1
on th~~

e,g.
e.g. cnvc\opl:s.
cnvdop~:s. Addilionally,
/\ddiLionully, no evid(;n(:(~
evid(:tll:(~ was

prcscnl~d

thal each and every kgul and villid
b::t1I()(: W(l~
Clerk. low
valid ab:-;cntcc b::tllot
wo~ I1()t
not inpul by the Clerk
iow Iht.::
tht.:.: databasc.
database.
Thl:rc
Th~:rc was testimony ihnl the dutahnsc
dutahllsc could change. hut Mr. Ilurst"s
llurst"s testimony c~tHhlishcd that
lh~ chang.":s
chan.g.~..:s

mndc no
made

that did
Jid occm·
OCC1.ll' in the dnwhasc in thl:
the month ul'November 2009 hnd IlO
no

chang~.
ch(lnt..!.~, to

dT~ct~

and

the data in Exhibit
Fxhibit 5. Tht..:
Thl~ Court Hlilurc
Htiiurc lO
LO not shift the hnrdcn of prool~
pr(loJ~ allcr
alter

the presentation (lethe
ilkgal voles
of the evidence hy the Plaintilr
PlaintiiT Ithal
hal was sufticicnllo establish Ihat
that ilk:gal
1")

MOTlON FOR 'NEW TRIAl,.
/\i .TF.R
,TF.R OR AMEND
TRIAl . OR IN AI.TERNATIVE MOTI()N
MOTJC>N TO 1\i

nrr.
TlTr. JlJl)(,;MI~NT
JlJJ:>tiMl~NT
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in :.t numb!.!!'
numbi.!r sunki(.~llt
sul1ki(.~Jlt 1.0
t.o change the I'c::::ult
rc::::ult I)f1.h~:
ofth~: cl~~~tjon
ch;:~~tion 1(,,.
Se:H 2 wl..~n
w~..~n..~ wllt)tl..~d.
wuot~..~d. Wi:l~
wa~ ~lll
~Ill ,.:rrl)1'
t.:rrt)l'
in:.t
1(1/' Se:lI
tll'law."II was errol'
!~)r the COUI11.o
I'laintilJfililcd 10
Jll)
nl'law.
error !~lr
Cou111.o hold
hilld thatl'he
thatt·hc l'laintiiJfililcd
to mt.;~ct
m~.:~ct his i:)lIJ'(k~n.lhat
i:HrJ'(h.~n.lhat no
Dd~~l1dtlnt
Dd~~ndtmt ~v~r argu\.:d.
argt11.:d,
.)4~1101''
.)4~
I I() 1" ~~stahlisllcd

were actually

lhat
that

th~
th~.: nUlllbl.:r
numb~.:r

or ~nvdnrcs
~nvdnpcs was "th~ 1'I.!'cI)rd
I'I.!'CI)!'d Cl)llkmpitltcd
conh.:.mplntcd by S~~C1.j\Hl
St,;~cti\Hl

mer.:: (:ount of
ofcnvdopcs
Lh;.~.t 2050
205(llcgal
by a mer..::
cnvl:lopcs th;.!.!
legal

~111d
~lIld

valid
ahscnt.cc
val id absenl.ce

rcc~~h. . ~~d I'cgnrdingthc
rcgnrding the election.
I·cc~~h.·\~d
election,

The CO\lI1:
CO\llt cnmmit1cd crJ'()r
crmr hy its

I~lilttrl
l~liltm. ~

to shin the hunJcn of' proof' In

Ddcndant~ In
to

introdul:!.: evidence
cvid!.:ncc 11hat
hat' the
t.he November 6. 2009 report, Exhibit 5, had ht:\:11
hCCll changed in
nHHlllCrthat
nHlnnenhl."l1

billlol~
b(lllol~

imp~1d1..:d
illlp~'dl..:d

the
tht:

do~..~um~nlalion ()rrccciv~~i
ol'l'ccciv~~i
d()I..~Um~nlali(ln

Plaintiff intl'odu(:cd
introdu,:cd evidence rhm
rhnt no relevant

chal1g~
chang~

etbscn.tcc
"bscntcc
in

lh~
th~

b~lllut:s l()r
l(,r tlll~
till~
b~ll1ul:s

s()m~
som~

dcction when the

dalabasc had ocnll'.rcd in
database

N"')VI..~mbcl'
N~..w~..~mbcr

:2009.
2009.

This motion is ~lIppol'tcd
~upportcd by the
by

th~

M~m(lrandlll'n
M~morandmn

or
of Law lilcd hert.·with. J'j'[[ is also supported

Allid:Jvit
nfSlarr Kelso. which attadlcs
Allidavit nfSfarr
attadlCS a phutocopy of
or live (5) individu(ll
individual absentee hallot
ballot

return cnvdorcs I.h:H
t.h:H were l'~cdwd
r~cdwd I~ll'
I~H· the: declio!lth::lt
dectiouth::~t arc rn~trkcd as being ··void''
'''void'" and, on their

f:.tcc
f:lce ... refute
l'cfutc

th1.~
Ihl.~

fundamental hypothesis adoph::d by th,.;
thr.; Court. I.Jm)
J.Jm.l 2050 ~nvclopcs

h~en

irllmdll
irHmdu~..~e(.L
...~e(.L hy :ln1'
:.tny ! )cfcnd:lnl
)cfcnd:m1 in an a11cmp1
t:'IlIcmpt to meet and ClHJntc:r
Cl)UntC:f th~ Phlintirrs
Phlintiff"'s prima

t(~cic
l(~cic

1c
evidence or
of ilk.g.a! vot'es
vol'cs n~ceiwd
l'I~cejwd and counled.
counlcd. thes~
thcs~ cl'lvdopt.'s
cnvdopt.'s would rt.~fk-cr that at
a1 least fh
fhlc

th<..~ir 1::lcl:!
l::tcl:! document
thai. at
(5) envelope::: nn lh(..~ir
dOClIIllcnt Ihal.

there C()ult.l
best. thcre
c()ulll only have

b~cn

204€) legal and
20M)

1

vnlid ~Ihs~ntt.~t:
~ehs~ntt.~t: hallots
hal lots n.:~dvcd,'
n.:~dvcd. Assuming the Court's supposition I:hal.
t:hal. one {~nvclopc
t~nvclopc "got lost
Inst

t.ht·o·ugh
t.hl'o·ugh

is still

ck~ril:al error;' ba~..:d
ba~~d

Hv(~ (5)

upon lll..l
Ill..) ,.::vidence
\.widcncc in lhe
lhc record. is correct the differcnce
difference in numl.)CI'
numi.'lCI'

llw dim:rcm:.c in the number ..:ountcd
Ow
I.:ollotcd ballots in the Scm 2 r..Kt'.
r..ll'(;'.

wil'h the nine (9) or
Oi' ten
t.en ((I10)
0) ··void"" ballut:;
ballut.s n.:Jlcewd
n.:J]cewd by exhibits IIhis
his would
or fifteen (IS)
(I S) illegal votes received l.lnd
nnd

there WUS
was (l f.\Vfl
t\vn vow
VOW

d~(T~U~C in
d~(:r~u~c

seventeen(,
17) ilkgnl vote::st:venteen (,17)
VOle::;

lhc
the

r<..~ccivcd
r(..~ccivcd

counl1.~d.
c()unl~~d.

or

Wht:.~n

1\~suh
I\~$\lh

in

comhincd
comnincd
l()urtel:1l
li:wrte~n

((,14)
14)

Whm added
addcd Lo
lo the finding nfthc Court
Courr tha1

lll(ll'!:~i
l1l::l1,!:~i n OJ' dillcrcncc
di11cCCriCC thcn~
then~ WOUJd
would

he
be a tot.ai of !;ixtccn
!;iXtCCil (<.16)
!6) 01'

countc:d.
and c()untc:d.

On)1
On1l argument
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the

t~n.vdop~s
l~n.vdop~s

l~vidcncc
l~vjdcncc

cl()~e ol"polls.lk~pill!
()rpolls,lk~pil\!
clo~e

nf the actual

the fllCI.
thatth~
t:Jct.Lhalthc

HUnched
nltnched Lo
lo lh~~
Lh~~ slIbmiucd
submillcd anidovit
amdovit rellccl
relleel olhL~n.vi:-;<..~.
o(hl~l'\.vi!'K~, However.
Hm\•ever. th
th1.~
..~

absentee h:·lllor
r·durn envelopes, whclhc·r
whclhc.r 2086. 2054 or
h:·111ol" I'durn
01' 20)0 in number, vvwc
v"we not offered into
cvid,~nce
cvidl~nce

prima
primn

hy any

Ihc..~il~
lhc..~il~

~·f
~lf

the

Ddi..~ndnnt.s.
Ddi..~n(hmt.s.

cose,
thl::Y didn't,
cnsc. tht:y
didn't. The C01ll1.
CoUJ1. under the well cS\i:lblishcd
csli:lblishcd wles or the

r.o election C•)ntcsls.
C(llltc:sls.
applicnblc T.n
then plLlce
pluce thai
that

:)3

It was t.he
the burden or
or the lkfendanrs
Iklendanrs 10 n:blll
n:buL the Plainlilf'$
Plaintilf's-

bur·~kn
bltr'~kn

C<"ll"l
C,..,.l

not
thi.s
not. ignore lhis

Jt~ilurC'
ol'
Jt~i1\.1rC' or

pfOt)f on
I1rOt"Jf
(Ill

JXl.rt
th~ lX1Tt

bll('d~n
burd~n

or
of' proof

of I)dl;ndnnt~
DcH.:ndnnt~ nnd
(If

on th,,:
th~,.: Plaintiff

SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIA I, OR IN
SOPPORT
ALTERNATIVE MOltON TO AMEND OR J\J.:l'ER
AI.:rER JUD(;MENT
JUI)(iMENT
MFl\-tORANDUM
MFlYtORANDUM OF LA
LAW
W IN
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The Cnurt
Court'~
·~
(.'ourt's
(.'ourl·s

~rront.:~nus
~rJ'(lnf.:~nllS

dt~cision
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and .Iudg,1.l11:1l1
.ludg.m~:nl

ar~
aJ'~

Igj 004/004
lgj

based upon an \.~lTl)l'
I.~ITI)I'

or law lhal
that n.~suhcd

application or lh(,~
applicalion
the.~ bun.k:n of pronf and thc
the Court's rcsult.:.ml
rcsul1.:.ml hypothesis. bast:d

~.~vidence in the l\~(:ord,
return .;nvc)ope
.;nvclope c·onHlin.:d
c.onwin.:d not ju.st
upon fW I..~\iidcncc
l'l..~(:ord. that each ret.urn
on~

containc;;:d

fi·om lhl.:
fi'om
Ihl,;

[egol
/ego! and valid ahsentee
absentee ballot. Exhihir. 5. as Wl.'ll
wl.'ll as the

n1:11t~r
ntlx~r

lllll.':.
ll/l(;.

ballot. but
hallot.

database records

rdlt:Ci, in rheir
rhcir dm:u:nenlt:d numhcrs. !haL
thaL there wcre
were "void"
"void'' ballots. Cerlainly
Certainly lhc::::e
these "void"
"void''
rd1t:ci,

baliDLs were rCllImt:t1
rclllrt~t:d in cnvdnpes
ballllls
I:llvdnpes and thus

th~:
lh~:

numhcr
not b~~ the nne suggest~~d
suggcst~~d hy rh~
numher can nol

Court h)
h1 he 205ft
205(). Tht;rc is ahsolutely
absolutely no evidence 10 support the

hypoth~sis, th~rt
hyp()th~sis,
th~lt W[t$
w[t$

not Mgued

by any Dcli::ndaJ11..
I.h~ 2050 countl.'d envelopes
Dcli::ndant.. aniwd at
al. hy th(~ Court in its d~ei::;iot1
d~ci::;ion thal cac.;h or th~
musl have contaimxl valid <\nd
<rnd legal hallots.
ballots.
t''-~1lcctcd by
t',,~llcctcd

A:-;
~~nydopc:::;
~..~nvdopc:::;

I'hut
t·hat on

rh,~ir

thl!
th..: Aflidavit of Starr

Kcl~o
Kcl~(I

filed

her~;~w·ith
hert;~w'ilh

lhl..Tt::
thi..TC: exist ~tt
~rt k(l.';[
k(t•;t live (S)
(5)

r,,\:c indicutt:
jndicutt: rhat. they u "void." 'l'his numo!:r
l"a\:c
numh!:r or
of <.~nvdopcs i!' in addition

to the. six (6) "void"
dnClImcnte.d in Exhihil
"void'' ballots dncumcnte.d
Exhihit 5 n:sulting. in (he
lhe numhel' 2041.
l..~vidcl1c(:
~.~vidence:

The

in t.ht!
~vidcn~c had hccn
hccl1
the rc(.:ord,
rcl:ord, no!.
nol. what Defendants
Defemlanls might have shown irsoJ.)lc
il"somc olhei'
oth(;r ~vidcnc.;c

intmdul~cd·;. is dt:!drnimtlivc
dt:tdrninativc ofwht.."1hcr
ofwht.."lhcr the bunkn orpmof was ml;.~t.
mt~t. The PlnintiIT'$
PlnintilT's burden WftS
wrrs
inlmdtll~cd·;.

mel. The
":U$C.
,,:U$C.

Delt:nd~Hlls
nelt:nd~Hlls

olkrcd no
nn ev1dcncc:
t'vldcnc~ to meet and rehUI
rehut Pla.intitrs proof or irs prima

hypmhcsis lhal
Lhal thl.':
The hypOl'hcsls
th(:

and vtllid noscnlt.':l'
nhscnte<:.' bl'll.ll)l$
bal.ll)l$
did

l'lfll'
n(l\'

ctwelnp~s
clwelnp~s

wc.:~rc
w'~rc

l·trci'~
I·ttci,~

by thcm~clvcs: would sornchuw
sOl'l1chuw t:swblish th<.U
th •.u 2051 legal

"ccciveu
J'cccived is just thai.,
that.,

3j

hYJ)mht!sis,
hypotht!sis, and on~.~
onl..~ 1·hm
I'hm Ihl:!
rht! Dclcndanls
Dclcndants

even choosl:
choos<.: to
\(I argue or produc~ evidence I'egarding.
regarding.

The d~ci~::ioll
C:Olllt and lhe
MC nnt suppori~d
SllPp011~d by [he
law. A new tritrl
trii.tl
d~ci::::ion ur Ih~
lh~o: C:owt
Lhc Jud~l1l~nl
Jud~m~nl arc
lhc lnw.
~hould
~h()uld
n~w

he ordered, 1)r
l)r I.hc
t.hc Judgment allcrc:d
alLcr~d or am~ndcd In
tn void the I;!kclioll
l;!kclion for Seal. 2 and order a

election.
clccrion.

I)i\TJ':T> ....-r.'
lh1~
Di\TI':T>
th1~ ...... orNovcmbcr.2010
ofNovcmbcr.
2010 .
,'
....-;··

f

__. . ..L7lL"t<~::.~.~·l>~·...
..L?l-L"t<~::.~.~·l>~·...
Sturr
Stun Kclsn
Kelso

.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

CERTIFICAll':
I.:l)PY W~ts
w~rs lhxcd
Ihxcd to Ocl\.:nJam
l)cJ\.:nJam City d,a.J.·s
d,al. 's coun~1
coun~l Mike
CERTlFlCAll·: OF SERVJCE: A l.:l)py
Haman
Hamnn :md Dcli;:ndnn(
Dcli;:ndnnl Kennedy's counst:l
COUll SI;.: I Scoll
Sc(lll J{G~d
J{e~d a.nd
a.t1d PdeJ'
Pd.er F:rbh.tm.i
F:rbbm.i on the .. ~__ day of
or
N(.wl!t11h~r.
N1.WI!t11h~r.

1

20 I 0.
O.

Indeed the (\lufl r~.:.ie.d"d !ht' "ofl~r" ui"Ddcndant_Kenncdy's ~oun~c~l in d<•~ingnr~i~.Hillc:ntl·o "reopen'' 1hc trial.

4

MEMORANDUM
e)1{ IN
MEMORANDt !M or: LAW IN SUPPORT OF t\:10TION
t\:lOTION FOR NEW TRIAl. C>R
AI ;rERNATIVL MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTFR .ll.IDfll'vlENT
.I l.ID('1'vlENT
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STATE OF IDAHO

COUNTY OF KOOTEWII
KOOTEW\1
FILED:

QS

}

'J
lJ

2010 WIV
WlV -8 PM 3: 16

STARR KI·:LSO
l.,(IW 1f244)
Altom!,;)' ,II
Auorn~.:.y
'11 l..Hw
/f244)

(,
('

(o·~~ICT COUR.Tq:?~)
COUR.Tq:r~J ;/
\
'.-4/y()/l1'
I" .-4~',/ ~4
()I'~

P.O. 11ox
J)ux 1312
Coeur d~!\lcne, hbho :nR
R:lS 16

LEA' !
(O
LER
.

'I'd:
Td: 208-765-3160

1'f

2()8-664~62h 1
Fax: 208-664~62h

/

f)
I'~
\.\

A//
A

.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR TIlE
TllE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCl OF
ID/\HO, IN AND FOR 'fHE COUNTY or
OF KOOTE.N:\1
THE ST/\Tl.·:
STAT!.': OF
OFIDI\HO,
KO(nl~'N:\J

N<)..l. CV -09-10010
Case. N<.'
-09-1 001 0
AFFH)AVIT OF
AFF'IJ)AVIT

.11M
JIM BIV\NNON,
B1V\NNON,
Plai.t)I.ill
Plai.nr.ill

STARR KELSO
v~.

CITY or
Of COEl.lf\
COE1.lR D'ALENE,
D'ALENE. IDI\J
JD/\1 10.
JO.
lllUni...~ipnl '~("I'f-'n"mion,
,~t'll'f.10I';;Hion. ct.al
et.al
a nHlnh
I.)l~l~:ndanls,
Dt..~l~:ndanls.

STt\ TF OF ID/\TlO
,nATlO ")')

or

County
COUllly of Kooknai

)

S!arr K(.'+m.
Starr
K(..+m. br..:i.ng lirst duly SV,,'Ofll
svv·orn upon oath,
oath. IC$tilk:::
tc::;tilk::: as l'i)lIows:
t'l:lllows:
1. I am OVt~l'
OVl~r !h~
(h~ Hgt:
(lgl::

or 1R yt::ars,
yt:!<lI'S, competent to
sll.Il.cmcnl.s
f.n kstifY,
kstif)', lind
lll\d I make the hi,:,I(lw
h~.:•low Sll.ll.cmcnl.s

upon my own personal kn()\,vkdg~;
kr·lo\ovk:dg~;

"''1

/\1tnc.hed
A1tnc,hed h.~~n~ro n."
n.;: Exhibits 1,2.3.4.
I,:?.. 3. 4. rind
nnd 5 nrc
nrc: tl'lI'~
true~ and 1.~(lrrCCI
~.~orrcct phorncopil.~s
phorncopi~.~s of
abs~nl(:l.~ btdlot
abs~Il\(:I.~
'-'<dlol J'dUJ'Il
J'd\!J'll CJlv(~IOI,')CS
CJlV(~IOj.')CS "cl.~l.~iwd
I'CI.~I.~iwd rl.~gllf'djng
1'\.~garding IIK~
IlK~ Novcmber
November 3. 2009

City

or

Cocm d'Atcm~ (j(~I.h~ral
COCtJl'
(j\.~l.h~ral FII.~(1'i()n
Fl~.~(1'ion hy the Kool(:nai
Koot(:nai ('oullty
County ckc(ions
c.kctions dep(1rtm~~nr.
departm~~IH.
_th-is S>'
f. or
of November. 20 IJ 0.
DATED J,his
O.
~ l
~.
'

C:--:l
c:--:1

.

.............
f..) ... ·rJ.,~:~ . J
.e~::~:.~·.... ,. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .". .".. ..". . . ."". ...."".. ..". ."..""...
............ 'f..).>,'rJ.,~:~"
,t.:.l~::~:.~·
Slarr
S1arr Kd:::o

AFFIDAVIT f.W
f,W STARR KELSO
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undcrsig.n~o~d
lI11dcrsig.nl.~d

On lhis
this ,f'day ()r
\)r Novcmbl:f.
Novcmbl:r. 2010 bd()fI';: me lht,;
tht..:
Notary Publ
Public,
ie, personally
nppc::nrcd SWrr
Stnrr Kdsn known or
01' idcnt.itied 1.0
to me, to
t.o he the per~()n
per~on whose name is subscribl.!d
subscrib~o:d 10
Ihi.::
th~.:: within insl"lIm~n(,
inslrum~n(, and (lekn()wlcdgl.~d
(tcknowlcdg~..~d 10
to me I,hal,
t.hal. Ihl:
thl~ statements
stalcmcnl~ (~onjnintd
(~(mjnintd rhCl'cin
rhcr·cin nrc tl1le
t111e <and
currccq{i'lhe
hCSlorhis
hclkfand
Uwl
be cxccukd
the satll~.
currccqtfthe
hcstorhis
hclicfand
Umt
cxccutc:d
sam~.
,t'~,"
./1'"
/,..· / //.'
I/
,,"
/,..'./
,t'~ : '

~~
(~

~

KELSO LAW OFFICE

••' . •'
.
,

_..,..

"""'!·-<{<7'
' •' ..''A'<)~
""'!'-<
{<; i~- ,..d'-~-.,1
-~-"j ,.'
-")~ .../'. . . . . . . . . . . . · ·.
_. ',6:~~\YP"t]l31crt)r;t;l{j(i,\li<5
6:~~\~~P"l]1l1crt)r;t;1€i1i'\'i(5""""''''''''
".. ."
.../'

A(,./l/··:1f;~.~-.t
A<..t:Jt. ·'"fl;~.~-·t".
M'jvlIi.~f<~)~·txj}ij{jXs·~"::,?~k.~/tb
M'Mti.~f<~)~·tx1fij{-:txs·~
. ::.?.~k.~/tb

. ..

ESII)INfl
ESII>IN{1
M
My
Y co

CERTIFICAil.~ OF
CERTIFICAll.~

J~axcd to \J.)~I~ndanl.
\f.)~l~ndanl. City ct.aL's
counsd Mih~
SERVICE: A copy was J~lxcd
cl.aL's counsel
Ham~m and Defendant Kennedy's counsel Scott Reed and Peter F.rhlund on lilt;";
Ham~1O
tht: "l.",day
. day of
Novcrnb~.r. 2010.
N(lvcrnh~.r.
20 I 0.

2

l ..

AFrIDJ\VlT
()F STARR KELSO
AFrJDJ\VlT C>F
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STAT!: UF
Ur !DAti()
}} 8'S
S'S
!DAdO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
FILED:

#ifil
if-if/l

STARR KELSO
Attorney ot
III Law #2445

2010 NOV -9 PM 4: 16

~

C-ftLEf~

P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, idaho R3816
208-765-3260
Tel: 208·765·J260
[';· ..... .,'\(1
.,,\(1
[';'
l"""..IJ\
l·"·... J\....

/..~1!
F..~I!

i~""ll~
i~'"l/~

~\.10_\,,\,1~-\.f,.:.~'.l
~\,'O-\"
..,'~-\,"~~'.1

'V.
~~-.-=~~=~~
I

1

A

.-=~~:~~

\)

Allorncy f(>r
Anorney
i"()r .Pia.intitT
Plaintiff and Petitioner

IN THE
Ii'IRST JVI)ICIAI
IlISTIUCT 01'
01. TIU:
THF. DISTRICT COURT OF THE fi'JRST
JlJI)lCIAI .. lliSTIUCT
STATE OI,'IOAI-IO,
OI•'IOAHO, IN ANU
ANn FOR THf: COUNTY OF KOOTi';NAI
KOOTi!;NAI

Ca~c

.JIM
.HM BRANNON,

No.

CV·-09~10010
CV··09~JOOtO

Plajnriff~
Plaintiff~

Vs.
CITY OF COEi.ll( J>'ALEN
J)'ALEN"~,
..~, IOAHO, 1',:1'.
I··:T. AI .•.
.•• :
.Defendants.

NOTICE OF HEARING
ON ~)I..AINTWF'S
~,I .. AINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NI~W
TRJAL OR 11'
lN1 THE
ALTF.RNA TlVF.
T@VE MOTION

TOAMf~NHORAI...TF:R
TOAM"~NnORAI...TF:R
.n.JDG.MENT
.n,JDG·MENT
I>A
TE:
I> ATE:

TIME:

>...V
x.V

U

!)cccmber
l>cccmber 7, 201(a
20Ha
1
2:00 s.E.?M..
.M..

NO'l'lCE IS HEREBY GIVEN. that a hearing shaH
NO'fICE
sh~IH be held on TtJll~sday
Tut~sday
December 7, 2010 lit
ut 2:00 o'd~k p.m., bdorc the Honorable Chal'lc~ W, Hosack.
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Coeur d'
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261
Attorney for Appellant Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,
Appellant

Case No. CV-09-10010
NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
D' ALENE, IDAHO
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE,
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Respondents.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE;
D'"" ALENE; SUSAN K.
WEATHERS in her capacity as the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene City Clerk; AND MIKE KENNEDY
in his capacity as the incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene Council Seat#
Seat # 2; and
THE PARTIES RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS MICHAEL HAMAN, SCOTT REED, AND
PETER ERBLAND
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant, Jim Brannon appeals against the above named respondents to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered on November 4, 2010, Senior
District Court Judge Charles W. Hosack presiding and all interlocutory orders entered by
the Court prior thereto, simultaneously therewith, and subsequent thereto.
2. That the appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1)
I.A.R. and Idaho Code section 34-2025 (b).
3. Preliminary Issues on Appeal:
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the City and City Clerk were permitted
in 2009 to enter into a contract with Kootenai County and the Clerk of the Court
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whereby all responsibility for the conduct of the City's election, and duties of the City
Clerk, were delegated to the County and Clerk.
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint to set aside the entire 2009
Alene General Election and only retaining the contest for Seat 2?
City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
3. Whether UOCAVA residency statutes are applicable to municipal elections?
4. Wnether the faiiure of the County and Clerk to maintain an I.C. 34-1011 and I.C. 50451 absentee ballot record constitutes misconduct.
5. Whether the district court erred in holding that mere return envelopes, some of which
or marked "void" and some of which have no date and time stamp recording their
receipt, is compliance with the absentee ballot record required to be kept by the Clerk
pursuant to I.C. 34-1011 and/or I.C. 50-451.
6. Whether the district court erred by not adopting the November 6, 2009 absentee ballot
record (Exhibit 5) as being prima facie proof that more absentee ballots were counted
than were actually received by the Clerk by the close of the polls?
7. Whether the district court erred in holding, without any evidence in the record, that the
2050 return envelopes counted by Judge Marano each contained a legal and valid
absentee ballot when the absentee ballot record printed on November 6, 2009 (Exhibit
5) documents that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received prior to the close of
the polls.
8. Whether the district court erred by only requiring that the board of canvassers accept a
print-out of machine vote totals to meet their responsibility to "count votes" pursuant to
I.C. 34-2001 (6)?
9. Whether the district court erred by not entering its order requiring voters that cast
absentee ballots, who were not able to located within the city or the county for service
I. C. 34-2013?
of process, to appear at the trial as permitted by I.C.
10. Whether the district court erred in not considering prior recorded statements of voters
as substantive proof of who they cast their respective ballots for when they testified at
trial that, at that time, they can not remember who they voted for in the election?
11. Whether the district court erred in holding that Denise Dobslaff, a landed immigrant in
Canada, was a resident for the purpose of voting in the City's municipal election?

2
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12. Whether the district court erred in holding that the Clerk does not have an obligation
under I.C. 50-445 to determine whether an applicant for an absentee ballot is registered
and lawfully entitled to vote as requested by the applicant. (e.g. a resident ofthe city)?
13. Whether the district court erred in holding that Kimberly Gagnon, who has never
resided in the city, esd a qualified voter simply because she is the spouse of a current
military?
member of the miiitary?
14. Whether the district court erred in holding that Alan Friend, who listed his residence as
a commercial building and whose internet advertising claims he is a permanent resident
of Canada, was a qualified voter?
15. Whether the district court erred by not requiring, under I.C. 50-402 "residence", that a
voter living outside of the city must have a "fixed" principal or primary home or place
of abode within the city, to which he intends to return to as opposed to a general intent
to possibly someday return to the City?
16. Whether erred, when the evidence establishes that at least two voters were provided the
wrong ballots at polling places, by holding that in a "combined" election where more
ofballot
ballot a
than one ballot is to be voted and the poll books are to document which type of
person receives, that the fifty three "in-person" voters, for whom there are no records
documenting which ballot they were respectively given, that the each were provided
the correct ballot to cast their vote on when they appeared at the polls.
17. Whether there is substantial competent evidence that supports the district court's
holding that Judge Marano counted 2051 absentee ballots as being received.
18. Whether the district court erred by not shifting that the burden of proof to Defendants,
once the Plaintiff established that the only reliable absentee ballot record database
documented that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received by the Clerk and the
machine reflects 2051 absentee ballots were counted which difference in number is
five more than the difference in the vote totals attributed to Appellant Brannon and
Defendant Kennedy?
19. Whether the district court judge erred in not disqualifying himself given his pretrial
statements in open court, on the record, that election challenges established is bias if
election challenges were permitted would cause anarchy reign?

3
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20. Whether the district court erred in holding that the proposed, but previously denied,

I. C. 34requested amended complaint failed to state a claim for malconduct under I.e.
2001?
d' Alene General
21. Whether the district court erred in confirming the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene
Election?
22. Wnether the district court erred in declaring Defendant Kennedy as duly elected to Seat
d'Alene
Alene General Election?
2 in the 2009 City of Coeur d'
23. Whether the district court (Judge Simpson) erred in requiring Plaintiff to file a
$5,000.00 bond.
4. An order has not been issued sealing all or a part of the record.
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested.
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the reporter's transcript, including opening

statements and closing arguments. Also a transcript of the oral argument all pre-trial
hearings held except for the January 5, 2010 hearing.
6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: all motions for
summary judgment, memorandums of law/briefs, affidavits, and exhibits filed in
support thereof, or in opposition thereto, in this matter.
7. I certify:
((a)
a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested:
(b) The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of
the reporter's transcript.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule
D

this 15th
15 th day of
ofNovember,
November, 2010.

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant
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th
15th
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that a copy of the foregoing was faxed on the 15
day
ofNovember,
of
November, 2010 to:

Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office
P.O. Box 2i55
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
FPCK:208-676-1683

Peter C. Erbland, ISB#2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
d'Alene,
Coeur d'
Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
FPCK: 208-664-6338
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'
Alene, Idaho 83816
83 816
d'Alene,
FPCK:208-765-5117
Coeur d'Alene
d' Alene Reporting
Valerie Nunemacher
Keri Veare
Allison Stoval
100 Wallace Avenue
A venue
d'Alene
Alene ID 83814
Coeur d'
Fax 208-676-8903

JoAnn Schaller
Anne MacManus
Via fax: 446-1188

nJM1

C~inn
Byrl
BYrl~
Cinn
n~
753-3
Starr Kelso

5

V
v

NOTICE OF APPEAL

SC 38417-2011

Page 2375 of 2676

Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
rd
923 N. 33rct
Street
P.O. Box 2155
d'Alene,
Alene, ID 83816-2155
Coeur d'
Telephone: (208) 667-6287
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683
ISB # 4784
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene,
d' Alene, Weathers, Council and Mayor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Case No. CV-2009-10010
CV-2009-1001O
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D'
ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION
FOR COSTS AND FEES

vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE,
D' ALENE, et al,
aI,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendants City of Coeur d' Alene, its City Clerk, City Council and
Mayor in their official capacities, (and after May 14, 2010, the City as a proper party and its Clerk
in relation to Plaintiff's claim under I. C. 34-2001 (6)),
(6)), by and through their counsel ofrecord, Haman
54(d) and 54(
e), Idaho Rules of
Law Office, P.C., and hereby move this Court pursuant to Rules 54(d)
54(e),
Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code
Code§§
§§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and 34-2020, for an Order granting
said Defendants their costs and fees incurred in the above action as the prevailing party on said
10,2009,
Plaintiff's December 10,
2009, Amended Complaint filed against said Defendants. This Motion is
based upon the Order of the Court issued on March 2, 2010 (filed on March 3, 201
2010),
0), dismissing all

DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES
-1

SC 38417-2011

Page 2376 of 2676

14, 2010 (thereafter reduced to
claims against said Defendants, the oral pronouncement on May 14,2010
writing on May 25,2010)
25, 201 0) that the City and its Clerk were proper parties and in relation to any claim
I.C. 34-2001(6»,
34-2001(6)), the Court's October 5, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order in favor of
under I.e.
the City and its Clerk, and the November 4,
4,2010,
a1so is ba.;;ed on the
2010, Judgment. This Motion also

Record herein. This Motion is also based on Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees, and the
Affidavit of Michael Haman filed contemporaneously herewith in support of said Motion for Costs
and Fees. Said Defendants request oral argument.
DATED this

b/-5

~
ofNovember,
day of
November, 2010.

HAMAN LAW OFFICE

By:_/L
By:./L

------_.
-------·

Michael L. Haman, counsel for Defendants

DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE'S
ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;-5'day
ofNovember,
l-5day of
November, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D' ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR
COSTS AND FEES by the method described below to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 664-6261
Scott Reed
P.O.BoxA
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax (208) 765-5117
Peter Erbland
P.O. BoxE
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 664-6338

__~_U.S. First class mail
- - - Fax
___
_ _ Hand Delivery

~~ .S. First class mail
Fax
___
_ _ Hand Delivery

- --

~.
~- First class mail
Fax
___
_ _ Hand Delivery

--

Michael L. Haman

DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE'S
ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES
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Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
rd
923 N. 33rd
Street
P.O. Box 2155
d' Alene, ID 83816-2155
Coeur d'Alene,
Telephone: (208) 667-6287
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683
ISB # 4784

ZGlDr;OV
/6 AM 9:41
9: 41
ZG!DriOV 16
CL?:DISTRiCT COURT

OEPt~~~

Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, Weathers, Council and Mayor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Case No. CV-2009-10010
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE,
ALENE, et al,
aI,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY
OF COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION
FOR COSTS AND FEES

Defendants.
COME NOW the Defendants City of Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, its Clerk, City Council and Mayor in
their official capacities, (and after May 14, 2010, the City as a proper party and its Clerk in relation
6)), by and through their counsel ofrecord, and hereby submit
to Plaintiff's claim under I. C. 34-2001 ((6)),
their Memorandum of Costs and Fees pursuant to Rules 54(d)
54(d) and 54(e),
54(e), Idaho Rules of Civil
Code§§
and34-2020.
Procedure, and Idaho Code
§§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and
34-2020. Eachoftheitems of costs and
the statement of fees set forth below are reasonable and were actually and necessarily incurred on
behalf ofthe Defendants, and therefore should be awarded pursuant to the aforementioned Rules and
Code provisions.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S
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A.

Prevailing Party.

The Defendants should be entitled to costs and fees under Rules 54(d), 54(e), and Idaho
Code §§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and 34-2020 as they clearly prevailed in the matter. As the Court
Code§§
well knows, Rules 54(d)(1
a...;; well
)(1 ), a..;;
d)(l )(B) and 54(ee)(1

a...;;
a..;;

the relevant Code sections provide, in part,

that a party seeking costs and fees must establish that said party was the prevailing party in the

action. The determination of a prevailing party requires the consideration of various factors within
the discretion of the Court. In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141
Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
A determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the
trial court and we review the determination on an abuse of discretion standard. Idaho
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B) guides courts' inquiries of the prevailing party question. It
provides:

In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to
costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment
or result ofthe action in relation to the reliefsought by the respective parties.
The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable
manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.

!d.
Id. at 718-19, 117 P.3d 132-33 (citations omitted). In sum, the determination of a prevailing party
of"(l)
"(1) the result obtained
for awarding fees and costs involves the consideration by the trial court of
in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent
to which either party prevailed on each issue or claim." Joseph CL.
C.L. U Ins. Associates, Inc. v.

Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Idaho App. 1990).

AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S
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There is no dispute that the Defendants here prevailed on all claims brought against them by
the Plaintiff. The questions that remain are (1) the amount of the costs incurred as a matter of right,
(2) discretional costs, and (3) whether the Defendants are entitled to fees.
B.

d)(l )(C):
Costs Incurred as a Matter of Ri2:ht Rule 54( d)(1
(1)

Court filing fee ((Answer)
Answer)

(1 0)
(10)

Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition.
See Exhibit "A," attached.

A.

Ronald Prior

$42.00

B.

Susan Harris

$67.20

TOTAL COSTS ALLOWABLE
ALLOWABLE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
C.

$58.00

$167.20

Discretionary costs.

The Defendants also seek discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(1)(D),
54(d)(l)(D), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. As the Court knows, the award of discretionary costs requires a showing that the costs
incurred were not only necessary and reasonably incurred, but also exceptional. And, there must be
a showing that the interests of justice demand such an assessment. See Rule 54(d)( 1)(D);
1)(D); see also
Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,425,987
420, 425, 987 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1999). Here,

the Defendants seek additional or discretionary costs for photocopies, postal costs and faxes that
were incurred in the defense of this action.
It has been stated that "[d]iscretionary costs may include 'long distance phone calls,

photocopying, faxes, travel expenses' and additional costs for expert witnesses." Hayden Lake Fire

Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P .3d
3d 161, 168 (2005) (citations omitted). Here,
it is the Defendants' position that costs incurred for items such as copies, postal charges and faxes
AMENDEDMEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFDEFENDANTCITYOFCOEURD' ALENE'S
MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES - 3
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were necessary and exceptional given the complexity and novelty of the issues involved, as well as
the voluminous and perhaps unnecessary filings by the Plaintiff. This includes costs not only
incurred in the defense of the action, but those related to the Plaintiff's failed attempt to enjoin the
Defendants from installing the elected winners of the November 3,2009,
3, 2009, General Election.
Perhaps a better way to say it, this matter certainly was not an ordinary and common action.
Indeed, there are hardly any cases in Idaho pertaining to election contests. Plus, the complexities,
as well as numerosity, of claims turned this into an unusual and exceptional case. As did the detailed
and thorough preparation of all counsel involved. One need only consider the voluminous court file
and one can realize that this case was complex and unusual, and exceptional. Finally, the it would
serve the interests of justice to award discretionary costs.
In other words, the prevailing party, in this case the citizenry, should not have to pay for a
unnecessary and baseless challenge of an election. Indeed, the case was dismissed against these
Defendants as a matter of law because the Plaintiff, for all intents and purposes, sued the wrong
party. The statute was and is clear
- the County ran and conducted the election, and was responsible
clearfor the same. 1 In May, 2010, the City was brought back in as a "proper party," and also its City Clerk
was brought back in to this litigation to defend claims arising under I. C. § 34-2001 (6).
(6). The City and
its Clerk also found itself defending numerous attempts by the Plaintiff to amend and allege
"malconduct, etc." Clearly, all ofthe Plaintiffs' attempts failed and were baseless. Indeed, there was

1

lThere
There have been questions regarding whether a municipality can avoid responsibility for
errors that may have occurred in its own election. As the Court noted, controlling statutes place
responsibility, if any, on the entity that conducted the election. In this case, the County conducted
the City and County election, as well as elections of other neighboring municipalities. In sum, the
Plaintiff sued the wrong party.
AMENDEDMEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFDEFENDANTCITYOFCOEURD'
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no evidence ever elicited showing or even suggesting a violation ofI.C.
ofi.C. § 34-2001(6), let alone any
evidence of "malconduct."

In sum, in hindsight this litigation was unusually complex, exceptional (some might even say
that it was grueling at times), and unusual. As such, the discretionary costs of faxes, postal charges
and copy costs were necessarily incurred for the proper defense. Therefore, the Defendant requests
that the Court award the following items of discretionary costs incurred:
1.
2.
3.

Faxes
Copy Costs
Postal

TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS:

$471.30
$260.39
$3.46
$735.15

DISCRETIONARY): $902.35
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED (MATTER OF RIGHT AND DISCRETIONARy):
D.

Attorney Fees.

Under Rule 54(e)(l)
54(e)(1) and Idaho Code§§
Code §§ 12-117, 12-121 and 6-918A, an award of attorney
fees to the prevailing party is mandatory if the Court finds that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
was brought or "pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Rule 54(e)(1), IRCP.
Indeed, in the recent unpublished opinion by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Lightner v. Ada County,
2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 673 (Ct. App. November 13,2009),
13, 2009), the appellate Court stated:

An award of attorney fees may be granted under I. C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the
prevailing party and such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the
abiding beliefthat the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably,
126Idaho
944,945,
orwithoutfoundation.Rendonv. Paskett, 126
Idaho 944,
945, 894P.2d 775,776 (Ct.
App. 1995). Idaho Code Section 12-117 ... would similarly allow for the award of
reasonable costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party in this case.

Id. (Emphasis added.) See also Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163 177 P.3d 372,377
372, 377
(2008) ("Under that statute [I.C § 12-117], it would be entitled to an award of attorney fees if it

AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S
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prevailed and the Plaintiffs acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact in bringing the appeal.")
Obviously, the question before the Court in the instant matter is not whether the Defendants
prevailed. They did. Rather, the question is whether the gravamen of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit against
the Defendants was brought and pursued without a reasonable basis in law or fact, i.e., without
foundation. Clearly, it was.
The Plaintifffiled his Amended Complaint (dismissing the County) against these Defendants
on or about December 10,2009,
10, 2009, alleging various claims centering around the City of Coeur d'
Alene's alleged failures and conduct in conducting the November 3, 2009, General Election which
incorporated City and County issues. Shortly thereafter, these Defendants filed their Answer and
15, 2009. Therein, said Defendants took painstaking
Motion to Dismiss on or about December 15,2009.
efforts to explain to the Plaintiff that the City of Coeur d' Alene had lawfully delegated to Kootenai
County the conduct of the subject election, including referencing the authorizing agreements and
enabling legislation. Indeed, as the Court noted, Idaho Code § 34-1401, among others, clearly and
unequivocally provides and provided that a municipality can delegate its election to a county, and
when the same occurs the county clerk assumes responsibility. Honestly, it was like talking to a
wall as the Plaintiff ignored everything said to him by the City, by the County, by all involved.
Indeed, after initial meetings, the City again met with Plaintiff's representative on December
24,
2009, and again explained that the City had delegated the election to Kootenai County. There
24,2009,
can be no dispute about this meeting. And there can be no dispute that it was a waste of time as the
Plaintiffhad
Plaintiff
had little interest in listening. And, on or about December 31,2009, representatives of the
d'Alene
Alene and representatives of
ofKootenai
Kootenai County, including its Clerk and counsel, met
City of Coeur d'

AMENDEDMEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFDEFENDANTCITYOFCOEURD'
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S
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with Plaintiff and his counsel. At this meeting, the City of Coeur d' Alene again explained that the
conduct of the election was delegated by the City to the County per statute and agreement; and, that
the County accepted the same. This is undisputed. It also is undisputed that the Plaintiff again did
not care or did not listen.
Despite the clear and unequivocal language of Idaho Code§§
Code §§ 34-1401 and 67-2332, the
Plaintiff pressed forward with a Motion to Restrain the Installment of three council seats and the
al., filed a
Mayor. On or about January 5, 2010, the Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene, et aI.,
Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Restrain the Installment of the Elected
3, 2009, General Election. Likewise, counsel for Defendant Kennedy in
winners of the November 3,2009,
his individual capacity filed a supporting brief, and therein attached documents showing the
legislative purpose behind Idaho Code § 34-1401. That is, the Legislature intended for cities to
contract and delegate election duties to respective counties. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff pressed
forward.
ofbriefing
2010, hearing on the City's
In the Plaintiff's massive amount of
briefing prior to the March 2,
2,2010,
Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff failed to articulate a legal basis that would suggest that a
municipality could not delegate election duties to its respective county. The best the Plaintiff could
come up with is that Idaho Code § 34-1401 exempted municipalities from said statute. Of course,
the rest of the statute read that this exemption was not applicable if an exception applied; and, a clear
reading of the Statute provided that municipalities could contract. This was also confirmed by the
Secretary of State's Deputy Tim Hurst.
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This was again spelled out to the Plaintiff in said Defendants' Reply to the voluminous
briefing. Yet, the Plaintiff pressed forward without a legal basis in opposition to said Defendants'
meritorious position that it had delegated all duties to Kootenai County, and that under the law the
suhiect election
election_.
Countv therefore became resDonsible
resoonsible for the conduct of the subiect
County
.,
."

~

-J
J -- - --

- -- - -- --- -----

Throughout all of this, and during all of the meetings and briefing, it was painstakingly
explained to the Plaintiff and his representatives that there was no factual basis WHATSOEVER to
the provisions of Idaho Code
show or even suggest that the City violated any of
ofthe
Code§§ 34-2001. And,
at no time did the Plaintiff ever present any evidence that would show, suggest or even infer that the
City violated the aforementioned provision or its subsections.
In the end, the Court granted said Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, based in part on the fact

d'Alene
Alene lawfully contracted and delegated the conduct of the November 3,
that the City of Coeur d'
2009, General Election to Kootenai County, and that the County accepted the same.
In May, 2010, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider to bring the City and

its representatives (Clerk, Mayor, Council in their official capacities) back into the lawsuit. There
was no evidence whatsoever to support this frivolous attempt. The Court granted the Motion only
to the extent to bring the City in as a proper party, i.e., as an entity that could carry out the orders of
the Court, if necessary. At the begging of Plaintiff'
Plaintiff'ss counsel, the Court also brought back in the City
Clerk to defend a claim arising under Idaho Code§
Code § 34-2001(6), i.e., whether there was an error by
the Clerk in the canvassing of the election. No other official for the City was brought back in. And,
if memory serves, there were questions asked of the Plaintiff regarding why the County was not
being brought in. To date, those questions still linger.
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Nonetheless, the City and its Clerk thereafter vigorously defended the remaining claim.
Which, was not entirely difficult in itself because the Plaintiff never presented any evidence of any
error in the canvassing. Indeed, numerous witnesses testified at trial, including the County officials
Ph:tintiff
Citv
no
and the City
statinll
-At
-- - - - - did
----- the
--Phlintiff
- - - ----- .. - ., Clerk."' statin2:
......, that there was no error in the canvassinQ_
. -.. - ---- o· - ---- - time
--- - - - -ever
.,

#

......

•

-.

•.

-

----

34-200 I ((6)
6) was
present evidence or elicit any testimony to the contrary. The claim arising under I. C. 34-2001
pursued frivolously and arguably in bad faith in light of the numerous meetings and attempts to
explain the issues to the Plaintiff in December, 2009. Of course, the Court found that there was no
error in the canvassing and as such there was no merit to the Plaintiff
I.C.
34-2001I ((6).
C. 34-200
6).
Plaintiffss claim under I.
It should also be noted that on at least 4 perhaps 5 occasions the City successfully defended the

Plaintiffss failed effort to allege "malconduct, etc." Even the Court questioned why the Plaintiff was
Plaintiff
ofthe
the CountyCounty - the true proper party.
pursuing such an amendment, especially without the presence of
In Gallagher v. State of Idaho, 2005 Opinion No. 3068 (Sup. Crt., January 24, 2005), the

Gallagher Court said in response to the State's Motion for Fees per I.C. §§ 12-117,
I2-1I7, 12-121
12-I21 and
I.A.R,
LA.R, that "when the law is well-settled and the Appellants have made no substantial showing that
the district court misapplied the law, attorney fees are appropriate." !d.
Id. (Citing Bowles v. Pro

Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148
I48 (1999)). See also McCuskey v. Canyon
I28 Idaho 213, 9I2
912 P.2d 100
IOO (1996). Here, the law was well settled, and was well
County, 128
explained. And, the Plaintiff failed to make any showing that would suggest otherwise.
In sum, said Defendants request an award of attorney's fees under Rule 54(e), and under
I2-117, 12-121
I2-I2I and 6-9I8A,
6-918A, on the basis that said Defendants prevailed at every
Idaho Code §§ 12-117,
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stage of this action, the law is well settled, and the Plaintiff failed to properly pursue his claims.
That is, the Plaintiff pursued his claims against these Defendants without foundation.
Finally, it should be noted that there is a strong policy reason for awarding fees. If a loser
resnonsible
in an election desires to forfeit his or ril!ht
rilIht to a recount and sues. he or she should be held resDonsible
--- ---

- - -

- -- ---

-- - - -- - -

- -

-- -

-

-

f....l'

j

....

for the fees incurred ifhe or she loses in court. Otherwise, what is to prevent anyone who loses from
out of pocket fees and
suing? Worse yet, why would anyone run for election ifhe or she must pay
payout
costs to defend the seat he or she won? The chilling effect had by this frivolous adventure by the
Plaintiff and his supporters, as well as those calling the shots, can only be offset by an award of fees
and costs incurred by the prevailing parties. Here, the City prevailed as it said it would during
numerous meetings last December, 2009.
In sum, reasonable attorney fees for the Defendants from December 1, 2009, when the initial
Complaint was filed, through the issuance of the Memorandum Decision and Order of October 5,
2010, total a reasonable rate of just under $30,000.00 This is broken down as follows:

MLH
JM

KH

100.00
55.00
55.00

$34,010.00
$638.00
$27.50

Total Fees:

$34,675.50

This total is consistent with the requirements of Rule 54(e)(3).
)(3 ). Indeed, counsel for said Defendants
has been representing the same since 1997, and has an established relationship; and the rates charged
to said municipal clients hardly have changed over this time.
Additionally, this amount certainly is reasonable when compared to fees sought by other
parties in this case. Indeed, rates charged to a municipality often are less than what would be
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charged to private clients for a variety of reasons, including the fact that fees are being paid by the
citizenry of said municipality. In fact, the fees and costs incurred by these Defendants is significantly
less than the bond required to cover the potential costs of the remaining private Defendant.
Further, the fees charged are reasonable in light of the voluminous records and numerous
motions that were filed; and as such, the fees sought are not inconsistent with prevailing charges for
similar work on such a complex and novel issue. Indeed, this matter was certainly complex and
novel, and there hardly any cases in the State ofldaho addressing issues underlying election contests.
Finally, given the work that was required, the political nature of the issues, the treatment in the
media, the expedited nature of the case, etc., the matter certainly was not one of desirability by any
means. In sum, there really can be no doubt that the fees sought comply with the criteria set forth
in Rule 54(e)(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant timely (Judgment was entered on 11-4-10)
11-4-1 0) requests that the Court award costs
as a matter of right in the amount of
of$167.20,
$167.20, discretionary costs in the amount of$735.15, and

----

reasonable attorney fees in the amount of
of$34,675.50.
$34,675.50.
DATED this

R
_jj_ day of
ofNovember,
November, 2010.
HAMAN LAW OFFICE

~.
~·
Michael L. Haman, counsel for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING
~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12.._
Q day of
ofNovember,
November, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF
COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES by the method described below to:
Starr Kelso
Keiso
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 664-6261
Scott Reed
P.O. Box A
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83814
Coeur d'
Fax (208) 765-5117
Peter Erbland
P.O. BoxE
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 664-6338

~s.
~S. First class mail
Fax
Hand Delivery

hs.

First class mail

- - Fax

___ Hand Delivery

~.
~- First class mail

- - - Fax

___ Hand Delivery

Michael L. Haman

AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S
MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES - 12

SC 38417-2011

Page 2390 of 2676

Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
rd
923 N: 33rd
Street
P.O. Box 2155
d' Alene, ID 83816-2155
Coeur d'Alene,
Telephone: (208) 667-6287
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683
ISB # 4784

ST,\TE DF !!);,Jm
! ~~
CCU!~ i Y OF KOOTENAft J~
FIL..ED:

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

~fa;.~
n~DfII41a;.
~ IP
". /
( J lp
~·"
~."

" .

/

(

J

Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Weathers, Council and Mayor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Case No. CV-2009-10010
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE,
D' ALENE, et al,
aI,

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR
D'ALENE'S
D'
ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS
AND FEES

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
)ss
)

first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
Michael L. Haman, having been fIrst
1.

I am an attorney with the fIrm
firm Haman Law OffIce,
Office, attorneys of record for the

d' Alene, its City Clerk, City Council and Mayor in their official capacities,
Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene,
14, 2010, the City as a proper party and its Clerk in
in the above-entitled action, and after May 14,2010,
relation to Plaintiff's claim under I.
I.C.
C. 34-2001(6), and as such I am informed as to the items of costs
expended in the defense of said action.
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF
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2.

I have reviewed the records and files concerning this matter and believe that the

following items of costs (attached as Exhibit "A")are correct, are reasonable, have been necessarily

d'Alene,
Alene, are exceptional and are in compliance
incurred on behalf of the Defendant City of Coeur d'
with Rules 54(d)(1) and 54(d)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure:
(1)

Court filing fee (Answer)

(10)
(1 0)

Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition.
See Exhibit "A," attached.

A.

Ronald Prior

$42.00

B.

Susan Harris

$67.20

TOTAL COSTS INCURRED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:
3.

$58.00

$167.20

Further, the Defendants seeks discretionary costs pursuant to Rule
Ru1e 54(d)(l
d)(1 )(D), for

the postal charges, copy costs and fax charges incurred in the defense of this action. Said items of
costs were necessary and exceptional in light of the complexity and magnitude of the matter, and
were reasonably incurred. Moreover, it would serve the interests of justice that the Plaintiff be

ordered to reimburse the Defendant for said discretionary costs. This is on the basis that the costs
were paid by the City of Coeur d' Alene, i.e., its citizenry, to defeat an action that was brought
without legal foundation. Hence, the Order of
ofDismissal
Dismissal of the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, et al.
4.

I have reviewed the records and files concerning this matter, and the invoices attached

hereto as Exhibit "B 1,"and
," and the last pages to Exhibits "B2," "B3," and "B4;" and, I believe that the
following items of discretionary costs incurred in relation to the defense of the claims levied against
the Defendants in this case are correct, are reasonable, have been necessarily incurred on behalf of
said Defendant, and are in compliance with Ru1e
Rule 54(d)
d)(1
(1 )(D), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure:
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A.

Discretionary Costs Ru1e
Rille 54(d)(l)(D):
54(d)(1)(D):

1.

Faxes
Copy Costs
Postal

2.
3.

TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS:

$471.30
$260.39
$3.46
$735.15

TOTAL COSTS INCURRED (MATTER OF RIGHT AND DISCRETIONARy):
DISCRETIONARY): $902.35
5.

With regard to the fees, the rates charged by myself and the paralegal who assisted

on this case likely are lower than the customary billing rates charged to governmental entities, and
moreover the rates are reasonable and proper for the work performed in this case. Further, the rates
for said legal professional likely are less than the fees charged by other independent/outside counsel
representing governmental entities in the region for this type of litigation. Additionally, the rates
charged are commensurate with said legal professionals' experience.
6.

Based on my experience in handling this type oflitigation, the fees incurred and the

rates assessed by the Defendants' agent are reasonable and were necessarily incurred for the
successful representation of said Defendant. Moreover, the fees incurred and the rates assessed were
necessary and were reasonable given the novelty of the questions involved, the circumstances of the
case and all that was entailed, the undesirability ofthe case, the nature of said counsel's relationship
with the Defendants, and surely consistent with awards in any other similar case. Further, the fees
incurred in defending what was a frivolous venture by the Plaintiff against the City on two fronts.
u1timately dismissed in March, 2010;
Initially, the City defended claims that were illtimately
201 0; in May, 2010, the
City was brought back in as a proper party BUT also the City Clerk was brought back in to the action
to defend claims arising under I.C. 34-2001(6). Despite reasonable efforts taken by the City dating
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ofhis
back to December 2009 to explain to Plaintiff the frivolity of
his claim, he nonetheless pursued the
C. §
matter to trial where no evidence whatsoever was introduced to substantiate any claim under I.
I.C.
34-2001(6).

Second, the City was often faced with numerous motions to amend to allege

malconduct. none of which were sunnorted
sUDDorted bv an semblance of fact or law_ It should also he noted
...

~
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~
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-

-

-
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-~-- - --- --

- -

-. ---- ..-
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-----

_._- - - --

- -

--- --~,
- ~,

that the real and proper party in this case was the County but strangely the Plaintiff dismissed the
County in December, 2009, and then tried to allege wrongdoing by the County via the City. This
failed, miserably.
7.

Reasonable attomeyrates
"B2 - B4"
attorney rates and fees assessed total $34,465.50. See Exhibits "B2-

attached hereto. This is broken down as follows:

100.00
55.00
55.00

MLH
JM
KM
Total Fees:
8.

$34,010.00
$638.00
$27.50
$34,010.00

The fees sought are consistent with Rules 54(ee)(1),
)(1 ), 54(e)(3), 54(e)( 5), and Idaho Code

§§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and 34-2020.
Further your Affiant saith not.

(5
/5

DATED this

/
"
~
day of
ofNovember,
November, 2010.

Michael . aman

.

.

.
~~\\llllllb
. ___1_.2_
1r:::::.
~~"lIIlllb
ofNovember,
Subscnbed
~<Jr!l
~fore me this ---L.2.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING
1I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ll_
ofNovember,
Ll.- day of
November, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES by the method
described below to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Coeur d'
Fax: 208 664-6261

__~_u.s. First class mail
--~-U.S.
- - Fax
_ _ Hand Delivery
--Hand

Scott Reed
P.O. Box A
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83814
Coeur d'
Fax (208) 765-5117

/
/u.S.
U .S. First class mail
- - Fax
_ _ Hand Delivery
--Hand

Peter Erbland
P.O. BoxE
P.O.BoxE
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
Fax: 208 664-6338

/
/U.S.
u . s . First class mail
Fax
-_
_
Hand
--Hand Delivery

.~
.~··..
Michael L. Haman
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_;TON & ASSOC. REPORTll~G
REPORTI1~G
JTON
~RVICE

P.O. Box 880
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
83 816
TAX ID. #82-0374519

Date

Invoice#
Invoice #

1/30/2010

C0102B1

H-am_a_n--------------~1 I

I

1
t1-M
M-:-:la-:-;-L-.
-:-:a-:-;-L-.H-am-an----------------t·1

BRANNON VS CITY OF COEUR
COE!JR D'ALENE

HAMAN LAW OFFICE
1110 W Park Place
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

Terms

Due Date

Reporter

Date Depo Taken

Net 30
Net30

3/1/2010

GEH

1/29/10

Quantity

Description

Rate

32
20

1 Copy of
ofDEPO
DEPO OF SUSAN R. HARRIS
ofDEPO
DEPO OF RONALD E. PRIOR
1 Copy of
Postage/Handling
PostagelHandling
Full Key-Word Index
':opying of Exhibits

2.10
2.10
12.50
15.00
0.35

2
6

Please note Invoice. # on Check or send copy of Invoice when remitting. Thank you.

Phone#
Phone #

Fax#
Fax #

E-mail

208-667-8244

208-635-5217

gheston1@gmail.com

Amount
67.20
42.00
12.50
30.00
2.10
153.80

Total

$153.80

~
~

e
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Haman Law Office
rd
923 N. 3
3rd
Street
Alene, ID 83814
83 814
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
208-667-6287

Case costs on Brannon v City
Case#
Case # CV 09-10010

0
Costs from 12/1/09-9/30/1
12/1109-9/30110

Fax Total
Total-- $471.30
Postal Total- $3.46
Copy Total- $260.39
Filing Fee - $58.00

i

~

SC 38417-2011
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!

1),
5,

Haman Law Office
923 N. 3rd Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

City of Coeur d'Alene - 415
Attn: Mike Gridley
710 E. Mullan Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Date:

2/04/2010

City-- 23962
Regarding: Brannon v City
cv
CV 09-10010
Invoice No: 18813

Services Rendered
Date
12/01/2009

Staff
MLH

Descril2tion
Descri12tion
Receipt and review Plaintiffs complaint
and attend meeting with City Officials
re: Plaintiffs claims (1.5); Research
Idaho statutes re: Election laws (.5)

Hours
2.00

Rate
$100.00

Charges
$200.00

12/02/2009 MLH

Conference with City and County
Officials re: Plaintiffs claims (1.0)

1.00

$100.00

$100.00

12/03/2009 MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
Further action (.1);
(.1 ); Review Idaho code
and case authority re: Plaintiffs claims
and in preparation of Motion to Dismiss
(1.7)

1.80

$100.00

$180.00

12/04/2009 MLH

Further review of Idaho code and case
( 1.1)
authority re: Plaintiffs claims (1.1)

1.10

$100.00

$110.00

12/07/2009 MLH

Continued review of case authority and
statutes in preparation of Motion to
Dismiss (.8); Preparation of Motion to
Dismiss (1.7)

2.50

$100.00

$250.00

12/08/2009 MLH

Continued research and review of case
authority and statutes in preparation of
Motion to Dismiss, and preparation of
Motion to Dismiss (2.6); Telephone
conference with County Attorney John
(.1 ); Emails to and from City
Cafferty (.1);
re: Status (.2)

2.90

$100.00

$290.00

12/09/2009 MLH

Further research and

3.60

$100.00

$360.00
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Haman Law Office
Page No.:
2
authority and statutes in preparation of
Motion to Dismiss, and continued
preparation of Motion to Dismiss, (3.6)
12/10/2009
1211012009

MLH

Additional research and review of case
authority and statutes in preparation of
Motion to Dismiss (2.;);
(2.; ); Further
preparation of Motion to Dismiss (3.0);
Telephone conference with City re:
Amended Complaint (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone
conference with Counsel for Kootenai
County re: Plaintiffs claims and
Amended Complaint (.3); Telephone
conference with Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy re: Plaintiffs claims (.1);
(.1 );
Receipt and review Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint, correspondence and
Request for Admissions (1.0)

6.60

$100.00

$660.00

1211112009
12/11/2009

MLH

Review Defendant Kootenai County's
proposed Motion to Dismiss and
Answer (.6); Further review of Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint, attachments and
request for Admissions (.5);
Conference with City re: Amended
Complaint (1.0); Continued preparation
of City's Motion to Dismiss (2.7);
Additional review of case authority and
legislation re: Plaintiffs claims (1.7)
(1. 7)

6.50

$100.00

$650.00

12/13/2009
1211312009

MLH

Further preparation of City's Motion to
Dismiss, and preparation of Answer to
Plaintiffs amended complaint (1.8);
Further review of County materials,
Plaintiffs pleadings, case law and
legislation in preparation of City's
pleadings (1.9)

3.70

$100.00

$370.00

12/14/2009
1211412009

MLH

Additional preparation of City's Motion
to Dismiss, and preparation of Answer
(4.9); Further review of County
materials, Plaintiffs pleadings, case law
and legislation in preparation of City's
pleadings (1.0), Email. from City re:
Recommendations for Motion to
Dismiss (.2); Telephone conference
with City re: Plaintiffs claims and City's
Motion to Dismiss (.6)

6.70

$100.00

$670.00

12/15/2009
1211512009

JM

0.30

$55.00

$16.50

12/15/2009
1211512009

MLH

Telephone conference with Clerk re:
(.1 );
Filing fee for appearance (.1);
Telephone conference with Judge's
Clerk re: Hearing for Motion to Dismiss
(.1 ); Preparation of Notice of Hearing
(.1);
((.1
.1))
Final preparation of City's Motion to

3.90

$100.00

$390.00
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Haman Law Office
Page No.:
3
Dismiss and Answer (2.8); Further
review case authority and statutes in
preparation of Motion to Dismiss and
Answer (.5); Email to and from City
Attorney re: Motion to Dismiss and
Answer (.2); Preparation of Notice of
Hearing (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone conference
with City Attorney re: City's pleadings
(.3)

12/16/2009 MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
(.1 ); Receipt and
Future handling (.1);
review letter from Plaintiff's Attorney re:
Plaintiff's claims (.2)

0.30

$100.00

$30.00

12/17/2009 MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
Future handling (.1); Receipt and
review letter from Plaintiff's Attorney re:
Plaintiff's claims (.1);
(.1 ); Emails to and
from City re: Conference with Counsel
(.2)

OAO
0.40

$100.00

$40.00

12/21/2009 MLH

Emails to and from City re: Plaintiff's
Discovery Requests (.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

12/23/2009 MLH

Emails to and from City re: Conference
with Plaintiff's Attorney (.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

12/24/2009 MLH

Conference with City and Plaintiff's
Attorney re: Future handling ((1.5);
1.5);
Receipt and review Answer of
Defendant Kennedy (.2); Receipt and
review Defendant Kennedy's responses
to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions
(.2)

1.90

$100.00

$190.00

12/28/2009 MLH

Emails to and from City re: Meeting
with Plaintiff's Attorney (.3); Telephone
conference with City re: Conference
with Plaintiff's Attorney (.1)
( .1)

0.40
OAO

$100.00

$40.00

12/29/2009 MLH

Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Plaintiff's
claims, along with attachments (.3);
Conference with Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy re: Conference with Plaintiff's
Attorney (.2)

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

12/30/2009 MLH

Receipt and review emails from City re:
Plaintiff's claims and City's proposed
response (.2); Telephone conference
with City re: Conference with County
and Plaintiff's Attorney ((.1);
.1 );
Preparation for and attendance at
conference with Plaintiff's Attorney

2.50

$100.00

$250.00
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(2.1 ); Conference with City re:
(2.1);
Anticipated Temporary Restraining
Order (.1)
12/31/2009

MLH

Emails to and from Counsel for
Kootenai County re: Additionai
information sought by Plaintiff's
Attorney (.3); Receipt and review email
from Counsel for Kootenai County with
attachments re: Response to Plaintiff's
questions (.2); Telephone conference
with Counsel for Defendant Kennedy
re: Plaintiff's questions (.1);
(.1 ); Email to
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Plaintiff's questions (.1)

0.70

$100.00

$70.00

49.70

Total Fees

$4,956.50

Price
$0.50
$0.50
$58.00

Charges
$4.00
$8.50
$58.00

Total Expenses

$70.50

Expenses
Start Date
12/15/2009
12/15/2009
12/16/2009

Description
Fax Defendants' Answer to Court
Fax Notice of Hearing to Court
Haman Law Ck# 5305 to Kootenai
County for filing

Total New Charges

Quantity
8.00
17.00
1.00

$5,027.00

Staff

Name

Hours

Rate

Fees

JM
MLH

Jen Myers
Michael L. Haman

0.30
49.40

$55.00
$100.00

$16.50
$4,940.00

Time Keepers: (MLH) Michael L. Haman - Attorney
(JM) Jen Myers, (KJH) Kari J. Henley
Henley-- Paralegals
Rates: Attorney
Attorney-- $1 OO/hour;
00/hour; Paralegal- $55/hour
TaxiD#:26-1731118
TaxID#:26-1731118
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923 N. 3rd Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

City of Coeur d'Alene - 415
Attn: Mike Gridley
710 E. Mullan Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Date:

5/27/2010

Regarding: Brannon v City - 23962
CV 09-10010
cv
Invoice No: 18945

Services Rendered
~D=a=re~
___ ~S~ta~ff~
________D_e_s_cr~ip_ti_o_n______________________
=D~at~e_____
~S~ta~ff~-------~D~e~sc~r~ip~ti~o~n
_____________________ ~H~o~u~rs
Hours

1/04/2010

JM

1/04/2010

MLH

1/05/2010

JM

1/05/2010

MLH

SC 38417-2011

Review file and preparation of City's
responses to Plaintiff's Requests for
Admission (2.0)
Further preparation of responses and
objections to Plaintiff's Request for
Admissions (1.2); Telephone
conference with City re: Plaintiff's
request for Certificate of Election (.1);
( .1 );
Telephone conference with Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy re: Status of
Plaintiff's proposed Temporary
Restraining Order (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone
conference with City re: Plaintiff's
proposed Temporary Restraining Order
( .1 ); Receipt and review letter from City
(.1);
re: Letter from Plaintiff's Attorney to
Kootenai County re: Temporary
Restraining Order (.2); Research case
authority and rules re: Injunction
against seating elected officials (2.0)
Preparation of Affidavit of Michael
Haman in opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (.2)
Attendance at hearing on Plaintiff's
Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (1.7); Emails to and from City in
preparation of City's response to
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (.4); Telephone
conference with City re: City's

2.00

Rate
$55.00

Charges
$110.00

3.70

$100.00

$370.00

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

7.10

$100.00

$710.00

i

~

l
1

Defenoant'S
uetendanrs

Exhibit

g,3
g.3
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responses to Plaintiff's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (.3);
Continued research and review of case
authority and statutes in preparation of
City's response to Plaintiff's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (1.0);
Preparation of response to Plaintiff's
Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Motion to Strike (3.2);
Receipt and review submissions by
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy (.4);
Preparation of proposed Order (.1)

1/06/2010

MLH

Email from Counsel for Kootenai
County re: Request by Plaintiff's
Attorney for additional information ((.1)
.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

1/08/2010

MLH

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

1/11/2010

MLH

0.60

$100.00

$60.00

1/12/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's amended Notice of Hearing
and second amended Notice of
Hearing, and Defendant's Motion to
Shorten Time with proposed Order (.4);
Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Motions (.1)
Final preparation of responses to
Plaintiff's Request for Admissions (.1);
(.1 );
Emails to and from City re: Request for
Admissions (.2); Receipt and review
Plaintiff's objection to Defendant
(.1 );
Kennedy's Motion to Shorten Time (.1);
Receipt and review letter from Plaintiff's
Attorney with attachments (.2)
Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Shorten Time, Memorandum
in response to Plaintiff's objection to
shorten time, proposed Order, Notices
of Hearing on Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike, Motion
to Strike and affidavits of Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy in support of
various motions (.7)

0.70

$100.00

$70.00

1/13/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review Plaintiff's Motion to Shorten
Time ((.1);
.1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review Plaintiff's Motion to Continue
(.1); Receipt and review Plaintiff's
(.1 );
Motion for Scheduling Conference (.1);
Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion to
Shorten Time for hearing on scheduling
(.1 ); Receipt and review
conference (.1);

2.30

$100.00

$230.00
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Plaintiffs affidavit in Support of Motion
to Shorten Time for scheduling
conference (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion
to Reconsider with attachments and
exhibits (.5); Receipt and review
(.1 ); Receipt and
Plaintiffs objection (.1);
review Plaintiffs Motion for Scheduling
(.1 ); Receipt and review
Conference (.1);
Plaintiffs supplemental affidavit in
Support of Motions (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review Plaintiffs second supplemental
affidavit in support of Motions with
exhibits (.3); Receipt and review
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel against City
of Coeur d'Alene
d' Alene (.1);
(.1 ); Review Idaho
(.1 );
Code re: Discovery of ballots (.1);
Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's response to Plaintiffs
Motion to Shorten Time on hearing on
Plaintiffs Motions (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review Plaintiffs proposed Amended
Order on scheduling (.1);
( .1 ); Letter to City
re: Plaintiffs submissions (.1)

1/14/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Order Vacating
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for
Summary Judgment and setting
scheduling conference (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

1/15/2010

MLH

0.80

$100.00

$80.00

1/18/2010

MLH

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

1/25/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy re: Status of case
(.2); Telephone conference with City
re: Status (.2); Receipt and review
case authority from Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy (.4)
Email from Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy re: Deposition of witnesses
(.1 )
(.1)
Receipt and review affidavit of Deputy
Secretary of State Hurst (.2);
Telephone conference with Counsel for
Kootenai County re: Plaintiffs
discovery request (.2); Receipt and
review Plaintiffs Request for
Production of Documents to City (.2);
Letter to City re: Plaintiffs Request for
(.1 ); Receipt
Production of Documents (.1);
and review Plaintiffs notices of
depositions of four witnesses (.4);
Letter to Plaintiffs Attorney re:
depositions (.1);
(.1 ); Emails to and from
City re: Plaintiffs Request for
Production of Documents (.2); Emails
to and from Council for Kootenai

1.60

$100.00

$160.00
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County re: Discovery (.2)

1/26/2010

JM

1/26/2010

MLH

1/27/2010

MLH

1/28/2010

MLH

1/29/2010

JM

1/29/2010

MLH

SC 38417-2011

Letter to Plaintiffs Attorney re:
Deposition of the City (.1);
( .1 ); Email to the
City re: Notices of Depositions and
lettei to Plaintiff's Attomey (.1)
( .1)
Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs
Attorney re: Depositions (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt
and review Motion for expedited trial
with attachments from Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy (.4)
Conference with City re: Future
handling (.3); Receipt and review from
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Submission of second affidavit in
support of Motion for Expedited Trial
(.2); Receipt and review Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Expedited Trial
with affidavit and exhibits (27 pages)
(.5)
Conference with City Clerk (.5);
Preparation· for hearing (.1);
( .1); Attend
hearing (1.0); Telephone conference
with Counsel for Kooenai County re:
Discovery (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone conference
with City Attorney re: Status (.2); Email
to City re: Status (.1);
(.1 ); Email from City
Clerk re: Discovery (.1); Email to City
Clerk re: Discovery (.1)
Telephone conference with Susan
Harris re: Deposition (.1);
( .1 ); Letter to
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Response to
Objection of Deposition (.1);
(.1 );
Preparation of Notice of Service of
Defendants' Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents
((.1
.1))
Telephone conference with Susan
Harris re: Deposition (.2); Telephone
conference with City re: Depositions
( .1); Telephone conference with
(.1);
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Depositions (.2); Preparation of City's
First Set of Written Interrogatories and
Request for Production of Documents
to Plaintiff (1.7); Receipt and review
Defendant Kennedy's Objection to
(.1 ); Receipt and review
Depositions (.1);
Plaintiffs responses to Kennedy's
(.1 ); Letter to Plaintiffs
objection (.1);
(.1 );
Attorney re: Depositions (.1);
Telephone conference with Counsel for
Kootenai County re: Discovery and

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

1.00

$100.00

$100.00

2.20

$100.00

$220.00

0.30

$55.00

$16.50

4.40

$100.00

$440.00
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depositions (.2); Attend depositions of
Harris and Prior (1.2); Telephone
conference with City re: Depositions
(.1 ); Conference with Wes Somerton
(.1);
re: Depositions (.1);
(.1 ); Conference with
Counsel for Kootenai County re:
Depositions (.2); Review Rules of
Procedure re: Deposition (.1)
( .1)

2/01/2010

JM

2/01/2010

MLH

2/02/2010

JM

2/02/2010

MLH

2/03/2010

Letter to Plaintiff's Attorney re: Future
depositions (.2); Email correspondence
to City (.1)
Emails to and from Plaintiff's Attorney
re: Discovery (.2); Telephone
conference with Counsel for Defendant
(.1 ); Telephone
Kennedy re: Discovery (.1);
conference with County Attorney
re:Depositions (.2); Emails to and from
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Depositions (.2)
Letter to Counsel for Kootenai County
re: Depositions of Harris and Prior (.1)
Emails to and from Plaintiff's Attorney
re: Depositions and discovery (.2);
(.1 );
Email from City re: File materials (.1);
Review depositions of Harris and Prior
(.5)

0.30

$55.00

$16.50

0.70

$100.00

$70.00

0.10

$55.00

$5.50

0.80

$100.00

$80.00

MLH

Emails to and from County re:
Discovery (.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

2/04/2010

MLH

0.80

$100.00

$80.00

2/05/2010

MLH

0.60

$100.00

$60.00

2/08/2010

MLH

Emails to and from Plaintiff's Attorney
re: Discovery, depositions and
recounting of ballots (.3); Receipt and
review Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition of
Witnesses (.2); Email to City re:
Deposition (.1);
(.1 ); Emails to and from all
counsel re: Discovery (.2)
Emails to and from County re:
Discovery (.2); Email from Plaintiff's
(.1 ); Telephone
Attorney re: Discovery (.1);
conference with City re: Depositions
(.2); Telephone conference with
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Depositions (.1)
(.1)
Conference with Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy re: Status (.1);
(.1 ); Email from
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Depositions (.1);
( .1 ); Email from Plaintiff's
(.1 ); Review
Attorney re: Depositions (.1);
file materials in preparation of
responses to Plaintiff's Discovery
Requests (1.0); Receipt and review
Plaintiff's 60 page Motion to Compel
(.8)

2.10

$100.00

$210.00

SC 38417-2011
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2/09/2010

MLH

2/10/2010

MLH

2/11/2010

MLH

2/12/2010

KJH

2/12/2010

MLH

2/15/2010

MLH

2/16/2010

JM

2/16/2010

MLH

SC 38417-2011

Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs
Attorney re: Motion to Compel (.1);
(.1 );
Emails to and from Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy re: Depositions
(.2); Continued preparation of
responses to Plaintiffs Discovery
Requests (.8); Telephone conference
with Counsel for Kootenai County re:
Motion to Compel (.2)
Telephone conference with City re:
Depositions (.1)
Telephone conference with Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy re: Status (.1);
(.1 );
Receipt and review Memorandum from
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Depositions (.2); Telephone
conference with Counsel for Kootenai
County re: Discovery (.2); Telephone
conference with City re: Depositions
and discovery (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review
Notices of Vacating Depositions (.2)
Review and preparation of documents
in support City's opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel (.5)
Conference with Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy re: Motion to Compel (.1);
Preparation of affidavit in response to
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (1.3);
Conference with City re: Motion to
(.1 ); Telephone conference
Compel (.1);
with City re: Motion to Compel (.1);
(.1 );
Attendance at hearing on Motion to
Compel (1.5); Review Idaho Code re:
Motion to Compel (.1);
(.1 ); Review City's
file material in preparation for hearing
on Motion to Compel (2.2)
Continued review of file materials in
preparation of responses to Plaintiffs
Discovery Requests (1.2 ); Preparation
of Order (.1);
(.1 ); Review Plaintiffs
proposed Order (.1)

Telephone conference with Plaintiffs
Attorney re: Emailing proposed Order
Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
( .1); Preparation of Responses to
(.1);
Plaintiffs Request for Production of
Documents (3.0); Email to City re:
Subpoena of Kootenai County (.1);
(.1 );
Email to City re: Scheduling Order (.1)
Review of City's files and continued
preparation of responses and
objections to Plaintiffs Discovery
Requests (1.5 ); Emails to and from

1.30

$100.00

$130.00

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

0.80

$100.00

$80.00

0.50

$55.00

$27.50

5.40

$100.00

$540.00

1.40

$100.00

$140.00

3.30

$55.00

$181.50

2.30

$100.00

$230.00
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Plaintiffs Attorney re: Order to Compel
(.2); Receipt and review Plaintiffs
Notice of Records deposition of County
(.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review Order (.1);
(.1 );
Review email from City re: Scheduling
(.1);
(.1 ); Telephone conference with
Counsel for Kootenai County re:
Discovery and procedure (.3)

2/17/2010

MLH

2/18/2010

MLH

2/19/2010

MLH

2/21/2010

MLH

2/22/2010

Continued preparation of responses
and objections to Plaintiffs Discovery
(3.1);
); Emails to and from City
Requests (3.1
re: Discovery (.2)
Emails to and from City re: Discovery
(.2); Further preparation of City's
responses to Plaintiff's Request for
( 1.1)
Production of Documents (1.1)
Email to Counsel for Kootenai County
(.1 ); Telephone conference
re: Hearing (.1);
with Counsel for Kootenai County re:
Hearing ((.1);
.1 ); Receipt and review
Kootenai County's Notice of Hearing,
Motion to Shorten Time, Motion for
Protective Order and Memorandum in
Support of Motion with attachments
(.8); Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Motion to Dismiss with
attachments (.5)
Further preparation of City's responses
to Plaintiff's discovery requests (1.6)

3.30

$100.00

$330.00

1.30

$100.00

$130.00

1.50

$100.00

$150.00

1.60

$100.00

$160.00

MLH

Conference with City re: Discovery
(1.3); Continued preparation of
responses to Plaintiff's Discovery
Requests (1.0)

2.30

$100.00

$230.00

2/23/2010

JM

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

2/23/2010

MLH

4.20

$100.00

$420.00

2/24/2010

JM

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

2/24/2010

MLH

Emails to and from City re: Discovery
(.2)
Final preparation of City's responses
and objections to Plaintiff's Request for
Production of Documents (2.8); Further
review of City file materials in
preparation of responses to Discovery
Requests (1.3); Preparation of email to
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Discovery (.1)
Telephone conference with Judge's
(.1 );
Clerk re: Change in hearing time (.1);
Email to City re: Change in hearing
time (.1)
Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Motion to
Dismiss (.1); Emails to and from
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Discovery (.2);
Telephone conference with City re:
Motion to Dismiss and discovery (.2);

0.60

$100.00

$60.00

SC 38417-2011
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Review rules re: Motion to Strike (.1)
2/25/2010
212512010

MLH

2/26/2010
212612010

MLH

212712010
2/27/2010

MLH

2/28/2010
212812010

MLH

3/01/2010
310112010

JM

310112010
3/01/2010

MLH

310212010
3/02/2010

MLH

310312010
3/03/2010
3/04/2010
310412010

MLH
JM

3/04/2010
310412010

MLH

SC 38417-2011

Telephone conference with City re:
Discovery (.2); Receipt and review
emails and correspondence from City
re: Disciosures
Disclosures (.2); Receipt and
review follow up letters from City to
Plaintiffs Attorney and Plaintiff's
Attorney to City re: Campaign finance
disclosures (.2)
Receipt and review Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Kennedy's Motion to
Dismiss (119 pages) (1.8)

0.60

$100.00

$60.00

1.80

$100.00

$180.00

Further review of Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Kennedy's Motion to
Dismiss (119 pages), and Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to City's
Motion to Dismiss (1.6)
Further review of Plaintiff's submissions
in preparation of City's responses to
Plaintiffs Motion (4.0)
Preparation of pleadings notebook for
upcoming hearings (1.0)
Continued review of Plaintiffs
submissions (2.0); Review Defendant
Kennedy's submissions in response to
Plaintiff's submissions (1.0); Review
Idaho Code and case authority in
preparation of City's Motion to Strike,
Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion to Vacate and City's reply to
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
City's Motion to Dismiss (1.0);
Preparation of City's Motion to Strike,
Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion to Vacate, City's reply and
City's responses to Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss (5.3)
Further review of all pleadings in
preparation for oral argument on City's
Motion to Dismiss (5.0); Participation in
City's Motion to Dismiss (2.5)
Preparation of Order to Dismiss (.1)
( .1)
Telephone conference with Clerk re:
Motion for Fees and Costs (.1);
( .1 );
Preparation of Notice of Hearing (.1)
(. 1)
Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's proposed Order ((.1);
.1 );
Receipt and review letter from Plaintiff's
(.1 ); Receipt and
Attorney re: Orders (.1);
review statement from Kootenai County
re: Costs and Order to Quash (.2);

1.60

$100.00

$160.00

4.00

$100.00

$400.00

1.00

$55.00

$55.00

9.30

$100.00

$930.00

7.50

$100.00

$750.00

0.10
0.20

$100.00
$55.00

$10.00
$11.00

0.60

$100.00

$60.00
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Receipt and review email from County
re: Order (.1);
(.1 ); Email to County re:
Order (.1)
3/05/2010

MLH

Receipt and review letter from Plaintiff's
Attomey ie: Contemplated Motions (.1
(.1);
);
Emails to and from City re: Anticipated
Motions (.2)

0.30

$100.00

$30.00

3/08/2010

MLH

Preparation of City's Motion for Fees
and Costs, Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Motion, and Memorandum in
Support (4.0); Receipt and review
submissions from Plaintiff's Attorney re:
Motion to Disqualify Judge, Motion to
Reconsider all Orders, Motion for
Permissive Appeal (.8); Telephone
conference with City re: Plaintiff's
submissions (.1)

4.90

$100.00

$490.00

3/09/2010

MLH

Continued preparation of City's Motion,
Memorandum and Affidavit for Fees
and Costs (2.2); Continued review of
Plaintiff's submissions re:
Reconsideration and appeal (.5);
Receipt and review letter from Court re:
Correspondence by non-party witness
( .1 ); Receipt and review Notice of Filing
(.1);
Transcript (.1);
( .1 ); Final preparation of
City's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion to
Disqualify Judge Simpson (1.4);
Review Plaintiff's Motion and
Memorandum for Reconsideration of
Court's Order to Dismiss (.3);
Preparation of City's Reply to Plaintiff's
Motion to Reconsider (1.4)

6.00

$100.00

$600.00

3/10/2010

JM

0.10

$55.00

$5.50

3/10/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with Clerk re:
Motions (.1)
Continued review Plaintiff's
submissions, and applicable law and
statutes in further preparation of Reply
to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
(1.3); Further preparation of City's
Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration (1.9); Review
Plaintiff's Motion for Permissive Appeal
and applicable rules and case authority
(1.1);
( 1.1 ); Preparation of City's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion Permissive Appeal (1.4)

5.70

$100.00

$570.00

3/11/2010

MLH

0.90

$100.00

$90.00

SC 38417-2011

Final preparation of City's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Permissive Appeal (.5);
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Receipt and review Affidavit of Dan
English re: Discovery (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review letter from City re: Campaign
finance disclosures (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review Plaintiff's supplemental Motion
re: Hearing on bond (.2)
3/12/2010

MLH

Preparation for Hearing on Plaintiff's
Motions to Disqualify and Reconsider
Bond (.2); Attend Hearing on Plaintiff's
Motions (.6); Receipt and review Order
(.2)

1.00

$100.00

$100.00

3/16/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
Status of litigation (.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

3/22/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion to
Disallow Costs, Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs,
Plaintiff's Memorandum re: Attorney
fees, Plaintiff's supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider Dismissal, and Plaintiff's
supplemental Memorandum re: Bond
(1.4); Receipt and review Plaintiff's
Notice to Court of requested
documents (.2)

1.60

$100.00

$160.00

3/23/2010

JM

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

3/23/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with Clerk re:
Vacating hearing on Motion for Fees
and Costs (.1);
(.1 ); Preparation of Notice to
Vacate Hearing (.1)
Receipt and review Motion in Limine of
Defendant Kennedy, Affidavit of
Secretary of State in Support of Motion
in Limine with attachments, and
Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion in Limine (1.2)

1.20

$100.00

$120.00

3/25/2010

MLH

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

3/26/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion to
Extend Time to Answer Discovery (.2);
Telephone conference with City re:
Status (.3)
Receipt and review Kootenai County's
response to Plaintiff's request for
reduction of bond (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

3/29/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Plaintiff's second
supplemental Motion to Reconsider
Order of Dismissal (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review Defendant Kennedy's
Memorandum re: Bond with
attachments (.4); Receipt and review
Defendant Kennedy's statement re:
Discovery (.1)
(. 1)

0.60

$100.00

$60.00

SC 38417-2011
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3/30/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City
Councilman re: Status of litigation (.2);
Receipt and review supplemental
Memorandum of Defendant Kennedy

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion in
Opposition to Defendant Kennedy's
Motion to Compel (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and
review letter from Counsel for Kootenai
County re: Discovery (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone
conference with County re: Disclosures
(.1)
(.1 )
Conference with County re: Documents
(.2)
Receipt and review Kootenai County's
proposed disclosures of documents
and review for privilege (1.5); Receipt
and review Order on Plaintiff's Motion
for Bond Reduction (9 pages) (.2)
Continued review of Kootenai County's
proposed disclosures with regard to
privilege (.8); Receipt and review
Defendant Kennedy's Amended Notice
(.1 );
of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss (.1);
Telephone conference with Kootenai
County re: Disclosures of confidential
information (.3)

0.30

$100.00

$30.00

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

1.70

$100.00

$170.00

1.20

$100.00

$120.00
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Order (.1)

3/31/2010

MLH

4/01/2010

JM

4/01/2010

MLH

4/02/2010

MLH

4/04/2010

MLH

Email to City re: Protective Order (.1);
(.1 );
Research case authority and rules re:
Protective Order and common interest
privilege (.9); Preparation of Motion for
Protective Order ((1.2)
1.2)

2.20

$100.00

$220.00

4/05/2010

JM

0.10

$55.00

$5.50

4/05/2010

MLH

Email to City re: Document production
by Kootenai County (.1)
Telephone conference with Counsel for
Defendant Kootenai County re:
Disclosures (.2); Telephone
conference with City Attorney re:
Disclosures (.1)

0.30

$100.00

$30.00

4/06/2010

MLH

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

4/07/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
(.1 ); Telephone conference with
Status (.1);
Court re hearing (.1)
Receipt and review Motion to Intervene
and attachments by interveners William
and Elizabeth McCrory (.7);
Conference with City Councilman
Edinger re: Status (.2); Receipt and
review letter from City re: Campaign
finance disclosures (.1)

1.00

$100.00

$100.00
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4/08/2010

MLH

4/09/2010

MLH

4/12/2010

MLH

4/13/2010

Conference with Court re: Future
handling (1.5); Receipt and review
stipulation and proposed order (.2)
Receipt and review Notice of Request
for Transcript by Plaintiff's Attorney (.1)

1.70

$100.00

$170.00

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

Telephone conference with City re:
Status (.2); Email to City re: Status
(.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Notice of Unavailable Dates
(.1);
(.1 ); Telephone conference with
Defendant Kennedy re: Status (.1)

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

MLH

Receipt and review Notice of
Disqualification by Judge (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

4/14/2010

MLH

Preparation of Memorandum in
Opposition to interveners Motion (.8)

0.80

$100.00

$80.00

4/15/2010

MLH

Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs
Attorney re: Campaign finance
disclosures (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

4/16/2010

JM

0.10

$55.00

$5.50

4/16/2010

MLH

Email from Plaintiffs Attorney re:
Disqualification (.1)
Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs
Attorney re: Disqualification (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

4/19/2010

MLH

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

4/30/2010

MLH

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

Total Fees

$12,156.00

88.00

Price
$0.50

Charges
$44.00

12.00

$0.50

$6.00

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

39.00

$0.50

$19.50

Receipt and review letter from Court re:
Disqualification (.1)
Receipt and review Order of
Assignment of District Judge (.1)

125.70

Expenses
Start Date
1/05/2010

1/05/2010

1/11/2010
1/11/2010

SC 38417-2011

Descri~tion

Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed, City of
Cda and Judge Simpson Defendant
City's Memorandum in Opposition of
Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order/Motion to Strike,
Affidavit of Michael Haman
Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed, City of
Cda and Judge Simpson Defendant
City's Memorandum in Opposition of
Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order/Motion to Strike,
Affidavit of Troy Tymesen
Fax to Kootenai County Court Notice of
Service
Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed and City

Quantit~
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of Cda Defendants' Response to
Plaintiff's Request for Admissions
1/26/2010

1/29/2010
1/29/2010

1/29/2010

2/02/2010
2/03/2010
2/12/2010
2/12/2010
2/12/2010
2/12/2010
2/16/2010

2/16/2010

2/16/2010
2/24/2010

2/24/2010

2/26/2010

3/01/2010

3/01/2010

3/01/2010

3/01/2010

SC 38417-2011

Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed and City
of Cda response to Plaintiff's Notice of
Depositions of the City of Cda and the
\iv'eathers
City Cierk Susan iiv'eathers
Fax to Kootenai County Court Notice of
Service
Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed and City
Defendants' City of CDA, Request for
Production of Documents to the Plaintiff
Fax to Starr Kelso and Scott Reed
answer to Plaintiff's Response to
Objection to Deposition
Shipping USPS to 83816
Shipping USPS to 83814
Copies
Fax to Judge Hosack
Fax Affidavit of Michael Haman re:
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Fax to Scott Reed Affidavit of Michael
Haman to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Fax to Kootenai County Court proposed
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel
Fax to Scott Reed proposed Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Fax to Starr Kelso proposed Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
Fax to Scott Reed, Starr Kelso and City
of CDA Defendants' Response to
Plaintiff's Request for
Production/Examination to City of CDA
and Susan K. Weathers, Defendants
Fax to Kootenai County Court Notice of
Service
Fax to Starr Kelso 2009 Campaign
Finance Report and Election Manual for
City Clerks
Fax to Scott Reed Defendants' Motion
to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel
Filed in Support of Motion to Amend
Pre-Trail Order and Vacate Trial
Fax to Kootenai County Court
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Pre-Trial
Order and Vacate Trial
Fax to Kootenai County Court
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of
Plaintiff's Counsel Filed in Support of
Motion to Amend Pre-Trial Order and
Vacate Trial
Fax to Starr Kelso Defendants' Motion

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

48.00

$0.50

$24.00

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

1.00
0.00
30.00
7.00
6.00

$1.73
$1.73
$0.10
$0.50
$0.50

$1.73
$1.73
$3.00
$3.50
$3.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

72.00

$0.50

$36.00

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

7.00

$0.50

$3.50

4.00

$0.50

$2.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

16.00

$0.50

$8.00
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to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel
Filed in Support of Motion to Amend
Pre-Trial Order and Vacate Trial

3/01/2010
3/01/2010
3/03/2010
3/04/2010
3/09/2010
3/09/2010
3/09/2010
3/09/2010

3/10/2010

3/11/2010

3/16/2010
3/23/2010
4/08/2010

Fax to Scott Reed Defendants' Reply to
Plaintiff's Response to Motion to
Dismiss/Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss
Dismiss/Piaintiffs
Fax to Judge Simpson Defendants'
Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion
to Dismiss/Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss
Fax to Judge Simpson proposed Order
to Dismiss
Fax Notice of Hearing to Kootenai
County Court, Starr Kelso, Scott Reed
and Paine Hamblin
Fax to Kootenai County Court
Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene
Motion for Costs and Fees
Fax to Kootenai County Court Affidavit
of Michael Haman
Fax to Kootenai County Court
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Costs and Fees
Fax to Kootenai County Court, Starr
Kelso and Scott Reed, Defendant
Memorandum in Opposition of Plaintiff's
Motion to Disqualify
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration to Kootenai County
Court, Starr Kelso and Scott Reed
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Permission to Appeal to Kootenai
County Court, Starr Kelso and Scott
Reed
Fax Memorandum Decision on
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judge
Simpson to City Attorney's Office
Fax to Kootenai County Court, Starr
Kelso, Scott Reed
Fax to Scott Reed Stipulation to Vacate
Hearing

$0.50

$4.50

10.00

$0.50

$5.00

4.00

$0.50

$2.00

12.00

$0.50

$6.00

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

21.00

$0.50

$10.50

11.00

$0.50

$5.50

15.00

$0.50

$7.50

18.00

$0.50

$9.00

15.00

$0.50

$7.50

9.00

$0.50

$4.50

8.00

$0.50

$4.00

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

Total Expenses

$238.46

$12,394.46

Total New Charges
Staff

Name

Hours

Rate

Fees

JM
KJH
MLH

Jen Myers
Kari J. Henley
Michael L. Haman

8.70
0.50
116.50

$55.00
$55.00
$100.00

$478.50
$27.50
$11,650.00
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Time Keepers: (MLH) Michael L. Haman -.Attorney
(JM) Jen Myers, (KJH) Kari J. Henley - Paralegals
Attorney - $100/hour; Paralegal- $55/hour
Rates: AttorneyTax 10#:
ID#: 26-1731118
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923 N. 3rd Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

City of Coeur d'Alene - 415
Attn: Mike Gridley
710 E. Mullan Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Date:

10/06/201 0
10/06/2010

Regarding: Brannon v City
City-- 23962
cv
CV 09-10010
Invoice No: 18958

Services Rendered
=D=at=e
_______ ~D~e=sc~r~ip~ti=on~____________________
=D=at=e_____
_____ ~S~ta~ff~
~S~ta~ff~-------~D~e=sc~r~ip~ti=on~-------------------5/03/2010 MLH
Telephone conference with Court re:
Hearing (.1)

Hours
0.10

Rate
$100.00

Charges
$10.00

5/06/2010

MLH

Participation in informal conference
with City re: Status and future handling
(1.0); Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Memorandum in Opposition
to McCrory's Motion to Intervene (.3)

1.30

$100.00

$130.00

5/10/2010

MLH

Further review of McCrory's Motion to
Intervene with attachments, and final
preparation of City's opposition (1.2)

1.20

$100.00

$120.00

5/11/2010

MLH

Review submissions by Plaintiff's
Attorney re: Upcoming hearings (.5);
( .1 ); Receipt
Email to City re: Hearings (.1);
and review Defendant Kennedy's
response to Plaintiff's objection to
Kennedy's Motion to Strike (.2);
Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy to Court re:
procedure (.1)

0.90

$100.00

$90.00

5/13/2010

MLH

Receipt and review email from
Plaintiff's Attorney re: Request for
public meeting with attachments (.2);
Telephone conference with City re:
Plaintiff's Attorney request to address
(.1 ); Telephone
City Council (.1);
conference with City re: Fees (.1)

0.40

$100.00

$40.00

a
~
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5/14/2010
5/14/2010

JM
MLH

Prepare file for hearings (.3)
Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs
(.1 ); Review all
Attorney re: Hearings (.1);
file materials in preparation for oral
(4.1 );
argument on Plaintiffs Motions (4.1);
A.1...L
___ ...I
A.L.L---...1

1-\llt!IJU
J-\utmu
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L
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0.30
5.90

$55.00
$100.00

$16.50
$590.00
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(1.6); Conference with City re:
Plaintiffs Motions (.1)

5/17/2010

MLH

Receipt and review proposed Order
(.1)
(.1 )

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

5/18/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
Status (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

5/19/2010

MLH

Receipt and review proposed Amended
Order (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

5/20/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
Future handling (.3)

0.30

$100.00

$30.00

5/21/2010

JM

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

5/21/2010

MLH

Review file materials re: Outstanding
discovery in preparation of letter to
Plaintiffs Attorney (.1) Draft letter to
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Discovery (.1)
Further preparation of letter to Plaintiffs
Attorney re: Discovery and Motion to
Compel (.1);
(.1 ); Emails to and from
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Order (.2); Telephone conference with
City re: Discovery (.1)
( .1)

0.40

$100.00

$40.00

5/24/2010

MLH

Receipt and review proposed amended
Order from Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy (.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

5/24/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
Motion to Reconsider Court's Order on
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss (.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

5/25/2010

MLH

Preparation of City's request for Trial
setting (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone conference with
City re: Plaintiffs submissions (.2);
Telephone conference with Counsel for
( .1 );
Defendant re: Future handling (.1);
Receipt and review numerous
submissions by Plaintiffs Attorney re:
Motions for Permissive Appeal,
Reconsideration, Amendment to Order,
Motion to Intervene and letters to Court
and Counsel (.9); Receipt and review
letter from Plaintiffs Attorney re:
Discovery (.1)
( .1)

1.40

$100.00

$140.00

5/26/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Notice of Hearings

0.10

$100.00

$10.00
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by Plaintiff's Attorney (.1)
5/27/2010

MLH

Preparation of email to City re:
Plaintiff's Motions (.1);
( .1 ); Preparation of
letter to Plaintiff's Attorney re:
Discovery (.1);
Discovery'
(.1 ); Piepaiation of email to
City re: Plaintiff's proposed Amended
Complaint (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone conference
with City re: Future handling and
investigation (A);
(.4); Review file in
preparation of Motion to Compel (.2);
Preparation of Motion to Compel,
Notice and Affidavit (.5)

1AO
1.40

$100.00

$140.00

5/28/2010

JM

0.10

$55.00

$5.50

5/28/2010

MLH

Letter to the Clerk re: Notice of
Hearing, Motion to Compel and Affidavit
of Michael Haman (.1)
Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's request for trial setting (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

6/01/2010

JM

0.20

$55.00

$11.00

6/01/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with Judge's
Clerk re: Hearing date for Motion to
(.1 ); Preparation of Amended
Compel (.1);
Notice of Hearing (.1)
Telephone conference with City re:
Status and response to Scott Reed
demand (.2); Receipt and review
(.1 ); Attend
demand letter from Reed (.1);
City Council meeting re: Future
handling and demand letter (1A)
(1.4)

1.70

$100.00

$170.00

6/02/2010

MLH

Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy with informal
responses to discovery (.2);
Preparation of email to City re: Future
handling (.2)

OAO
0.40

$100.00

$40.00

6/03/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Amended Notice of
Hearing from Defendant Kennedy (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

6/04/2010

MLH

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

6/07/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Plaintiff's response
to City's Motion to Compel (.2)
Telephone conference with Counsel for
Defendant re: Future handling and
(.1 ); Preparation of City's
investigation (.1);
Memorandums in Opposition to
Plaintiff's submissions (2.8); Receipt
and review Defendant Kennedy's
submissions in opposition to Plaintiff's
Motions (.6)

3.50

$100.00

$350.00

6/08/2010

JM

0.70

$55.00

$38.50

6/10/2010

MLH

Preparation of exhibits for hearing on
all Motions (.7)
Receipt and review Plaintiff's replies to
City's submissions (.9)

0.90

$100.00

$90.00
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6/14/2010

MLH

Emails to and from City re: Hearings
(.2); Review all pleadings in preparation
for all motions (1.4);
(1.4); Attendance at
motions (1.8)

3.40

$100.00

$340.00

6/15/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Pretrial Order (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

6/17/2010

MLH

Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Orders and
three proposed orders (.4)

0.40

$100.00

$40.00

6/18/2010

MLH

Review file materials in preparation for
conference with Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy (.1);
(.1 ); Participation in
conference with Counsel for Defendant
Kennedy (1.7); Telephone conference
with investigator Gervais and
Associates re: Future handling (.5);
Email to investigator re: Facts and
future handling (.4)

2.70

$100.00

$270.00

6/21/2010

MLH

Receipt and review executed Orders
(.3)

0.30

$100.00

$30.00

6/23/2010

JM

1.00

$55.00

$55.00

6/23/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Plaintiffs responses
to City's Request for Production of
Documents, and preparation of
discovery notebook for future hearings
and submission of materials to
investigator (.9) Telephone conference
with Plaintiffs Attorney re: Recoreded
conversations by Confidential
Investigations (.1)
Receipt and review Plaintiffs initial
responses to City's Request for
Production of Documents (250 +
pages) (1.8)

1.80

$100.00

$180.00

6/24/2010

MLH

Further review of Plaintiffs responses
to City's discovery requests (.7);
Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Plaintiffs
responses (.3); Email to City re:
Plaintiffs responses (.1)

1.10

$100.00

$110.00

6/26/2010

MLH

Receipt and review additional
supplemental materials from Plaintiffs
Attorney in responses to discovery
(1.0); Telephone conference with
investigator re: Activities and Plaintiffs
responses to City's discovery requests
(.4)

1.40

$100.00

$140.00

7/06/2010

MLH

Follow-up telephone conference with

0.60

$100.00

$60.00
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investigator re: Status and recorded
( .4); Telephone
conversations (A);
conference with City re: Discovery and
investigation (.2)

7/07/2010

MLH

fe:
Follow-up conference with City re:
Status of investigation (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

7/12/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with investigator
re: Status (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review
Plaintiffs responses to Defendant
Kennedy's discovery requests (.2);
Receipt and review Notice of Service
(.1 )
(.1)

0040
0.40

$100.00

$40.00

7/16/2010

JM

0.10

$55.00

$5.50

7/16/2010

MLH

Letter to City re: Confidential
Investigation interviews (.1)
Receipt and review letter from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Plaintiffs
discovery requests with attachments
(.2); Telephone conference with
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Meeting (.1);
(.1 ); Conference with Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Future
handling and Summary Judgment, and
possible contempt issues (1.6);
Telephone conference with investigator
(.1
); Further review of all audio tapes
(.1);
provided by Plaintiffs Attorney in
responses to City's discovery requests
(1.5)

3.50

$100.00

$350.00

7/18/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with investigator
re: Audio tapes (.2); Conference with
investigator re: Scope of work (.8);
Review Plaintiffs responses to
discovery in preparation for
conference with investigator (1.0);
Continued review of audio tape in
preparation for conference with
investigator (.8)

2.80

$100.00

$280.00

7/23/2010

MLH

Receipt and review five confidentiality
agreements from Plaintiffs Attorney
(.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

8/02/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with investigator
re: Status and future activities (.7);
Receipt and review email from
investigator re: Identity of questionable
voters (.2); Telephone conference with
City re: Status of case and Motion for
Summary Judgment (.2)

1.10

$100.00

$110.00
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8/03/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion
for Summary Judgment, and
supporting affidavits (1.3); Receipt and
review Defendant Kennedy's Motion to
Strike (.3); Review Plaintiffs amended
Complaint re: Issues on Summary
Judgment (.1)

1.70

$100.00

$170.00

8/04/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City
Councilman Kennedy re: Status and
Summary Judgment (.1);
(.1 ); Telephone
conference with investigator re: Status
(.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiffs
submissions to Court re: Motion in
Limine and Authority (.2)

0.40

$100.00

$40.00

8/06/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for
Contempt with supporting
correspondence and affidavits (.5)

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

8/10/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Notice of
Appearance of Counsel for nonparty
McCory,
McCary, Motion for Enlargement of
Time, and Affidavit in Support (.4);
Receipt and review Notice of Hearing
and proposed Order (.2)

0.60

$100.00

$60.00

8/11/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Affidavit of Dan
English (.2); Receipt and review
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy's reply
to Counsel for non party McCrory's
Motion for Extention of Time (.3)

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

8/12/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Affidavit of Service
and Notice of Hearing (.2); Telephone
conference with Susan Harris and
Ronald Prior re: Trial testimony (.6)

0.80

$100.00

$80.00

8/13/2010

MLH

Receipt and review nonparty McCrory's
reply to Defendant's Motion for
Contempt (.3)

0.30

$100.00

$30.00

8/16/2010

MLH

Receipt and review supplemental
affidavit of Dan English in Support of
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for
Summary Judgment (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

8/17/2010

MLH

Participation in Defendant Kennedy's
Motion for Contempt (.8); Conference
with City re: Status of case and trial
(.1); Conference with Counsel for

4.60

$100.00

$460.00
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Defendant Kennedy re: Trial (.2);
Receipt and review Affidavit of
Plaintiffs Attorney in opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, with
attachments, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
affidavits, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
attendance of witnesses for trial, reply
to Motion to Strike McCrory affidavit,
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment, Notice of
Hearing, Affidavit of Plaintiffs Attorney
in Support of Motion to Compel, and
renewed Motion to Amend Complaint
(3.3); Emails to and from investigator
re: Status (.2)
8/18/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with investigator
re: Status (.2); Emails to and from
investigator re: Status and trial (.2);
Receipt and review Affidavit of
witnesses Parker and Jenkins
associated with Plaintiffs Attorney (.3);
Telephone conference with City re:
Status (.1); Telephone conference with
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Future handling (.2); Further review of
Plaintiffs submissions in opposition to
Defendant Kennedy's motions (.5);
Receipt and review memorandum and
report from investigator (1.0)

2.50

$100.00

$250.00

8/19/2010

MLH

Receipt and review further
supplemental materials filed by
Plaintiffs Attorney in opposition to
summary judgment and in support of
Plaintiffs motions (.4); Email to
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
Investigation report (.1)

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

8/20/2010

MLH

Emails to and from Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy re: Hearings and
motions (.3); Receipt and review further
submissions from Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy (.2)

0.50

$100.00

$50.00

8/23/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with Defendant
Kennedy re: Status (.2); Emails to and
from City re: Status (.2); Review
Plaintiffs submissions and motions in
preparation of City's responses (.8);
Preparation of City's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs renewed Motion
to Amend (1.2); Preparation of City's
response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
(.6); Research case authority, rules

5.80

$100.00

$580.00
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and statutes re: Power of Court to
compel attendance by nonparty
witnesses (.8); Preparation of City's
response to Plaintiffs Reply to
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for
Summary Judgment (.6); Review
previous orders and pleadings in
preparation of City's replies to Plaintiffs
submissions and affidavits (1.4)

8/24/2010

MLH

Receipt and review email from Counsel
for Defendant Kennedy re: Attorney
General opinion on election law (.1);
(.1 );
Further review and evaluation of file
materials and pleadings in preparation
of responses to all of Plaintiffs
submissions (.9); Research case
authority, rules and statutes in further
preparation of responses to Plaintiffs
submissions (.8); Further preparation
of responses to Plaintiffs submissions,
including preparation of Motions to
Strike Affidavits of Plaintiffs Counsel,
Motions to Strike Affidavits of Plaintiffs
witnesses, objections to Plaintiffs
Motions to Compel, response to
Plaintiffs repy to Defendant Kennedy's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Plaintiffs renewed Motion to Amend
(3.4); Receipt and review Plaintiffs
objection to Defendant Kennedy's
statement of facts with attachments
(.6); Receipt and review additional
submissions from Plaintiffs counsel
including Motion to Shorten Time with
Affidavits (.3); Receipt and review
amended Notice of Hearings from
(.1);
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy (.1
);
Receipt and review nonparty McCrory's
Motion to Dismiss and answer to
charges of contempt (.3); Preparation
.1)
of Notice of Hearing ((.1)

6.60

$100.00

$660.00

I .
I

8/25/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with City re:
Status (.1)

0.10

$100.00

$10.00

8/26/2010

MLH

Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs
Attorney re: Supplemental materials
(.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review supplemental
filings by Defendant Kennedy in
support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (.7)

0.80

$100.00

$80.00

8/27/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Plaintiffs reply to
City's Memorandum in Opposition to

2.50

$100.00

$250.00
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Defendant's Motion to File Second
Amended Complaint (.2); Receipt and
review Affidavit of Hurst (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt
(.1 );
and review Affidavit of Kimbrough (.1);
Receipt and review Affidavit of Spencer
with attachments (.4); Receipt and
review Affdaivit of English (.1); Receipt
and review Affdiavit of Phillips with
attachments (.5); Receipt and review
Affidavit of Smith with attachments (.2);
Preparation of Motion to Strike
Spencer Affidavit (.6); Emails to and
from investigator re: Status and trial
(.2); Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Motion to Strike Untimely
Pleadings (.1)

8/30/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Amended Notice of Hearing
(.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiff's
Notice of Hearing on Motion to Shorten
Time (.1);
(.1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiff's
(.1 ); Receipt
Motion to Shorten Time (.1);
and review Plaintiff's Motion to File 3rd
(.1 ); Receipt and
Amended Complaint (.1);
review Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to File 3rd Amended
Complaint with proposed Complaint and
supporting exhibits and affidavits (1.4)

1.80

$100.00

$180.00

8/31/2010

MLH

Preparation of witness list and exhibit
list (.7); Review file in preparation of
witness and exhibit list (1.8); Review all
pleadings in preparation for hearings
on all motions (3.9); Attend Hearing
(1.6); Receipt and review Defendant
);
Kennedy's witness and exhibit list (.1
(.1);
Preparation of amended exhibit list and
witness list (.2)

8.30

$100.00

$830.00

9/01/2010

MLH

Further review Plaintiff's exhibits in
preparation of Objections and City's
Motion in Limine (3.5); Receipt and
review Defendant Kennedy's response
to nonparty McCrory's Motion to
Dismiss with attachments (.4)

3.90

$100.00

$390.00

9/02/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's proposed Order on 8-31-10
Motions and Plaintiff's Objection (.2)

0.20

$100.00

$20.00

9/05/2010

MLH

Receipt and review Defendant
Kennedy's Pre-trial Brief, findings of
fact and conclusions of law (1.2)
( 1.2)

1.20

$100.00

$120.00
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9/06/2010

MLH

9i07/2010

iviLH

9/08/2010

Review orders and pleadings in
preparation of City's Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of LawlTrial
Law/Trial Brief (1.8);
Further review of Plaintiffs exhibits in
preparation of objections (1.0)
Review Notice of Trial Setting and
Pre-trial deadlines (.1);
(.1 ); Email to
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re:
(.1 ); Review file materials and
Hearing (.1);
discovery responses in further
preparation for trial, Motion in Limine,
trial notebook, and City's Finding of
Fact and Conclusions of LawlTrial
Law/Trial Brief
(2.4)

2.80

$100.00

$280.00

2.60

$100.00

$260.00

MLH

Further review of all file materials,
recordings, pleadings and applicable
statutes in further preparation of City's
Motion in Limine, Findings of Facts and
Conclusions/Trial Brief (1.7);
( 1. 7); Review
ConclusionslTrial
affidavits and depositions in
preparation for examination of
witnesses (1.4)
( 1.4)

3.10

$100.00

$310.00

9/09/2010

MLH

Additional preparation for trial and of
City's Motion in Limine, and Findings
(7.1 ),
Conclusions/Trial Brief (7.1),
and ConclusionslTrial
Telephone conference with City re:
Status and witness participation (.2)

7.30

$100.00

$730.00

9/10/2010

MLH

Final preparation of Motion in Limine
(.3); Conference with Counsel and
Witnesses (4.0); Review file materials
in further preparation for trial and City's
Motion in Limine (2.5); Telephone
conference with City re: Trial (.1)

6.90

$100.00

$690.00

9/11/2010

MLH

Final preparation of City's Findings of
Law/Trial Brief
Fact and Conclusions of LawlTrial
(3.0); Continued review of file materials
in preparation for Trial including
opening statement and examination of
witnesses (5.0)

8.00

$100.00

$800.00

9/12/2010

MLH

Further review of all file materials,
depositions, affidavits, and orders in
preparation for trial including
preparation of opening statement and
preparation of objections to Plaintiffs
exhibits and in preparation for
examination of witnesses (6.6);
Telephone conference with Mayor (.1);
Telephone conference with City
(.1 ); Emails to
Councilman re: Status (.1);
and from City re: Trial (.2)

7.00

$100.00

$700.00
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9/13/2010

MLH

Attend trial (6.5); Review materials and
notes in continued trial preparations
(1.0); Receipt and review Plaintiffs
Motion to Disqualify Judge (.2);
Receipt and review Plaintiffs renewed
Motion to Amend (.1)
( .1)

7.80

$100.00

$780.00

9/14/2010

MLH

Attend trial (7.0); Review materials and
notes in continued trial preparations
(.9)

7.90

$100.00

$790.00

9/15/2010

MLH

Attend trial (7.0); Conference with
Court (.5); Telephone conference with
Press (.2); Telephone conference with
City Attorney re: Testimony (.2);
Further review of rules and case
authority in preparation for City's
Motion in Limine (.8); Review motions
and notes in continued trial
preparations, preparation for Plaintiffs
Motion to Amend, and in preparation of
closing with reference to testimony and
exhibits (1.4)

10.10

$100.00

$1,010.00

9/16/2010

MLH

Attend trial and hearing on City's
Motion in Limine and Plaintiffs Motion
); Further review of file
to Amend (8.1
(8.1);
materials, notes and rules in
preparation for City's Motion in Limine
(.7); Further review of notes and
materials in preparation of closing
argument (1.4); Further review of file
materials, notes, rules, and past orders
in preparation for Plaintiffs Motion to
Amend (.5)

10.70

$100.00

$1,070.00

9/17/2010

MLH

Attend trial (7.0); Further preparation of
City's closing argument (2.0); Review
Defendant Kennedy's Motion in Limine
and notes in preparation for
Defendant's Joint Motion for directed
verdict (.3)

9.30

$100.00

$930.00

9/18/2010

MLH

Attend trial (3.6); Final preparation of
closing (1.6)

5.20

$100.00

$520.00

9/30/2010

MLH

Telephone conference with Counsel for
Defendant Kennedy re: Future handling
(.2); Receipt and review Notices of
Transcript Orders by Plaintiff (.2)

0.40

$100.00

$40.00

Total Fees

$17,563.00

176.80
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Expenses
Descri~tion

Start Date
5/19/2010
5/21/2010
5/21/2010

5/25/2010

5/27/2010
5/28/2010
6/01/2010

6/07/2010

6/07/2010

6/07/2010

6/07/2010

6/07/2010

6/08/2010

6/23/2010
8/23/2010

8/24/2010

8/24/2010

8/24/2010

SC 38417-2011

.

Fax Order on Motion to Scott Reed
Fax to Starr Kelso
Fax to Plaintiff's Attorney re: Plaintiff's
responses to Request for Production of
Documents
Fax to Kootenai County Court, Starr
Kelso, and Scott Reed Defendants'
Request for Trial Setting
Fax to Plaintiff's Attorney re: Discovery
Fax to Plaintiffs Attorney and Scott
Reed Notice of Hearing
Fax Amended Notice of Hearing to
Kootenai County Court, Scott Reed and
Starr Kelson (2 pages x3)
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Permission to Appeal to Scott Reed and
Starr Kelso (14 pages x 2)
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Permission to Appeal to Kootenai
County Court
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to McCrorys' Motion to
Intervene to Kootenai County Court
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration to Kootenai County
Court
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to File
Second Amended Complaint to Scott
Reed and Starr Kelso (3 pages x2)
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to File
Second Amended Complaint to
Kootenai County Court
Copies of Plaintiff's Discovery
Responses from FedEx Kinkos
Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Gibson and Jenkins to
Kootenai County Court
Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Starr Kelso filed in Support
of Motion to Compel Attendance to
Kootenai County Court
Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Starr Kelso to Kootenai
County Court
Fax Defendant's Memorandum file in

Quanti!y
Quanti!Y
1.00
1.00
1.00

Price
$0.50
$0.50
$0.50

Charges
$0.50
$0.50
$0.50

9.00

$0.50

$4.50

1.00
48.00

$0.50
$0.50

$0.50
$24.00

6.00

$0.55

$3.30

28.00

$0.50

$14.00

4.00

$0.50

$2.00

5.00

$0.50

$2.50

5.00

$0.50

$2.50

6.00

$0.50

$3.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

0.00

$257.39

$257.39

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

4.00

$0.50

$2.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50
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Response to Plaintiff's Reply to
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for
Summary Judgment to Kootenai County
Court

8/24/2010

8/24/2010
8/24/2010

8/24/2010

8/30/2010

8/30/2010

8/30/2010
8/31/2010
8/31/2010

8/31/2010
9/10/2010

9/10/2010

9/13/2010

Total New Charges

SC 38417-2011

Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Piaintiffs "Renewed"
Motion to File Second Amended
Complaint to Starr Kelso and Scott
Reed (22 pages 2)
Fax Notice of Hearing to Kootenai
County Court
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's "Renewed"
Motion to File Second Amended
Complaint to Kootenai County Court
Fax Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Witness to Attend Trial to
Kootenai County Court
Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Lawrence Spencer to
Kootenai County Court
Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike
Affidavit of Lawrence Spencer to Scott
Reed and Starr Kelson (4 pages x 2)
Fax Notice of Hearing to Kootenai
Couny Court
Fax to Kootenai County Court
Defendant's Amended Witness List
Fax Defendant's Witness List, exhibit
list and exhibits to Starr Kelso, Scott
Reed and City Attorney's Office (72
pages x 3)
Fax Defendant's Amended Witness List
to Kootenai County Court
Fax to Kootenai County Court
Defendant City of CDA's Motion in
Limine
Fax to Scott Reed and Starr Kelso
Defendant City of CDA's Motion in
Limine
Fax Defendants' Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law to Kootenai County
Court, Scott Reed, Starr Kelso and
Kootenai County (5 pages)

44.00

$0.50

$22.00

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

4.00

$0.50

$2.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

8.00

$0.50

$4.00

2.00

$0.50

$1.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

216.00

$0.50

$108.00

3.00

$0.50

$1.50

5.00

$0.50

$2.50

10.00

$0.50

$5.00

20.00

$0.50

$10.00

Total Expenses

$484.19

$18,047.19
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$12,394.46

Previous Balance

$-12,394.46

Total Payments and Credits

$18,047.19

Balance Due
Staff

Name

Hours

Rate

Fees

JM
MLH

Jen Myers
Michael L. Haman

2.60
174.20

$55.00
$100.00

$143.00
$17,420.00

Time Keepers: (MLH) Michael L. Haman - Attorney
(JM) Jen Myers, (KJH) Kari J. Henley
Henley-- Paralegals
Rates: AttorneyAttorney - $100/hour; Paralegal- $55/hour
TaxiD#:26-1731118
TaxID#:26-1731118
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Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE, P.c.
P.C.
rd
Street
923 North 33rd
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155
Telephone: (208) 667-6287
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683
ISB # 4784

ZD!D Nrv 16 AM
ZDID
AH 9: 41
CLERK Qf<;TniCT
DI<;rniCT COURT

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,
Case No. CV 09-10010
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF HEARING
vs.

D\L

CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE,
ALENE, et aI,
al,
Defendants.
TO:

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF, and his attorney of record, AND TO THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Tuesday, the 7th of
ofDecember,
December, 2010, at 2:00
p.m. of said day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, in the courtroom of said Court, Coeur
d' Alene, Idaho, Kootenai County, the undersigned will call up for hearing before the Honorable
d'Alene,
Judge Hosack, First Judicial District Judge, Defendant City of Coeur d'
d'Alene's
Alene's Motion for Costs and
Fees.
~.
~·

Dated this

-/-S--/-S- day ofofNovember,
November, 2010.

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1I

SC 38417-2011
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~
By
~
____
~
~
________________
By____
__~~----~~-------------Michael L. Haman
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'
Alene
d'Alene

---------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVING

----

I HEREBY
HEREB Y CERTIFY that on this
this~
~ day of
ofNovember,
November, 201
2010,
0, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING by the method described below to:

Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Fax: 208 664-6261

Scott Reed
Attorney at Law
POBoxA
POBox A
Coeur d'Alene,
d' Alene, ID 83816
Fax: 765-5117
Peter Erbland
Paine Hamblen
PO Box E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328
Fax: 664-6338

___
__ U.S. First class mail
__//_u.s.
- -- -- Fax
_____
___ Hand Delivery

V'.
v-· U.S. First class mail
Fax
- -- -___ Hand Delivery
_____

/U.S.
/
' U.S. First class mail
Fax
- -- -___ Hand Delivery
_____

L2 ----------------.
------------------.

Michael L. Haman

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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KELSO LAW OFFICE

2086646261

001/002

STATt UF ION-i0
Il ~.
STATe
ION-iG
~·
COUNTY OF KOOTENAJ f SS

STARR KELSO

.-,,
El"\·..
""I, Ef'

;~
·~

L:nv :>'/.2445
if.2445
P,O. Box 1312
P.O.
8381(1
Cocurd'Aknc, Idaho 83816
Tel: 208-765-3260
208·765·3260
Fax; 20S~664-'6261
208~664-'6261
Attomt::y at
a(

7010
?.OIO ~rw 18
IS PM 3:
3= 45
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

Attorney tor PlainlilT
Plainli!T Brannon

IN THE DiSTRICT COURT FOR THE FII~ST .IUDJCJAL
JUDICIAL T.>lSTR.tCl'
DlSTR.tCr OF
THE STATE or
Or IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTF.:NAI
KOOTF':NAI

JIM URANNON,
BRANNON,

Cas~o~
Casl.~

No. CV-09-lOOlO
No,
CV·09-100l0

Plaintiff.
Pluintiff.
MOTION TO STRIKE PART

OF AMENDED AFFrnAvrr
AFFTnAVrr OF
MICHAEL HAMAN

VS.
vs.

CITY OF
O.F COEt II< D'ALENE. ·JOAHO.
'IDAHO.
a. municipal COrpor:J.llcm.
corpor:J.Licm. et..nl.
()et'i:nd an Ls.
ls.
Det'i:nd

- -.....................
....... .............

. ......

"

COMES
th.,;
COM ES NOW (h..;

.,..~.~--"'.~.~---

Plaintjf]~
Plaillljf]~

by and lhrough
through his l'\Uurney
auurney and pursuant to Rule IJ 2 (1). Idaho
lc..laho

Rules of Civil Procedure p:.art of the 1\.mcwded
Amcwded An1dtlvit
Afndnvit uf Michael HatlHln
Hatmm dated
da!'cd November 15.
2010,
2010.
Mr. llaman's
llaman 's
lh~

law regarding

affidflvif~
affidavit'~

numerou:-:: attempts lo
incorpt,,'atc fll1d
Lo incorpt)t'atc
rmd c'lf'/CI'
«'lf'lct· opinions on issues of

"hc$t
··he$1. interests or
of

justic~",
.iu$tic~",

that the contest was brought without legal
thal

Ihundation. tlmt
I.hal the
COnleS( wus
hm;is or comparison, !.hal
t:hc contest
lhundation.
that the costs arc exceptional with no hm,is
ft·ivolous.
n'ivolous. that the
concerning a city

(~OS[S
(~osts

arc cOllsistent
consistent with awurds i.n ~Uly
~wy simila,.
similar' ca.sc.
ca~c. (hal
that in an election contest

~~kction

county is the real party in interest.
inte.rcst. that no evidence was
that the Coullt)'

introduced that the board of canvasSt:rs
canvas&:rs erred 1n
in "counting
"count.ing votes''
votes" when it was admitted by t.he
the

city

lh~u

(hey
an.y votes. thal the claimed
COsl'i and fc:.~cs arc consistent with any
they didn't count any
clnimcd cosl'i

Rules
Rulc.s of civil

p.l'oc(~dllrc
proc\.~durc

opinions offered
c()n~jd(!ration
con~id<!ration

or st.atutcs.
st.at:utcs. or similar opinions

r~garding i~sucs

~<.:attered
~,-:attered

through il. arc inappropriate

of Jaw and do nOI
no I provide any fhclual
fhctual

ha~i~
nasi~ ..

or

othf,.~rwi!:lC.
oth~,.~rwi:re.

filr

in this maw::r by the Court.

OraJ argum.ent
argument is requesled
requesled..

._
.·
-- - - - - -- -

PLA.TNTIFF"S
PLAINTIFF'S 1'v10Tl.ON
:'v10TI.ON TO STRIKE MICHAEL !·lAMAN'S
"IAMAN'S AMENDED AFFIDAVrT
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It! 002/002

KELSO LAW OFFICE

2086646281

DATE~()is !1:/~;lay
01" November. 2010.
2010,
;1:/~:lay oi"Novembcr.
c.

L ,
L'

!I c ")
(..c.[,.~-·
"')
i..C·j;,.~-·
...................
l .. ;;.r•""' .......
""""'
......
·'''''''''··"
....·l,,::.r'''''·
""", """".
""-,

•................ .
"'-"'''''''''.,.

Slarr Kelso, Attorney fbr PJ(.IintHT

CERTIfICATE
wit.h !.'\(\stagc
CERTTflCATE OF SERVICE: A copy was mailed hy reguhll'
reguhu· U.S. Mail with
f.'\Ostagc prepaid
t.hereon
thereon to Defendant City and WCl.lthcrs'
Wco.lthcrs' attorney f'd'ichacl
M·ichacl l-hlman
Haman and Defendant Kennedy's
i.lllOrneys
auorneys ,S~ott
_s~ott W,
W. Rct.:d and Pclc:r
Pctc:r C. Erbland on the j~~_
J}£ ..... <.tHY
dny ol"Novembct.
ofNovembci'. 20 10.
I0.
/"';.-:;::2 I
/--;.-::::2

,,-~-...~()-,,~.~~"(-'"- ---~----~()_,~-~~-·{_·-···
Slarr
S1arr Kelso

2 PL/\INTIFF"S
PL/\INTlFF"S MOTION ·ro
'ro STRIKE
STR1KE MICIIAEL
MJCJIAEL HAMAN'S AMENDED AFFIDAVI'l'
AFFrDAVl'r
SC 38417-2011
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~001/003

KELSO LAW OFFICE

2086646261

STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
Allomcy
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83816
Tel: 208-765-3260
208-664~6261
Fax: 208·664~6261

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

~4/a,v
~41a,V
.... .
' _/;,It
....

A1tornt!y l<w
f()r Plaintiff Brannon
1\ttornt!y

' //

'J

TN 'rJ
'T'J I.E DISTRICT (~OURT
(.~OURT OF TIlE
TilE FIRST 11.Jl)I.CL'\L
Jl.Jl)I.CJ.'\L DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON.
Pbinr:iff,
Pbinl:iff,

CASE NO. CV-09-I0010
CV-09-10010

OBJECTION AN!)
AND MOTION

'l'() DISALLOW DEFENDANT
'ro

vs.

KENNEDY'S CLAJMED
KENNEDY"S
CLAIMED COSTS
PURSUANT TO IHCP
mC? RULE 54(d) (6)

ClTY OF COEUR IYALENE,
lYALENE, cl.
ct. al..
Defendants.
Defendant.s.
... ..•.

.. ...

...

""""
"' ,~-.--- " ".-"--""."" ".,,. "
""""'''"'''•··~-·---··"'"""'""-""""""""""'

IN PART

......
' .. ".,,,.,,,,,,,,-,,,-........................
- ...--

COMES NOW thc
the Plaintifr,
Plaintiff, Jim Brannon. by and through his allorncy
auorncy and hCl'cily
herehy objects
lo the Cl)sts
Cl)Sts clnimed by l)cfcndanl
Defendant Kennedy in his memorandum tmd
tUld mows
moves lhal'
that' they be
disallowed in part.
part
The has
hasis
is or this objection and motion to disallow in pa.rt.
part. is as follows:
fol lows:
I,
I. C. Costs as of right:

Paragraph 3. $58.00 f()r service
~erviee by Steve Kecd. This cost. on
Oil its face refers to the
contempt. procecdjngstiled
procecdjngsliJed ognin:":t
ogain:o:t William McCrory, a. separate manCI·.
mancr·.

2. '0_
D. Discretionary cosls:
coSlS:
a. "Transcript.,":
"Transcript.,..: There is no showing ns to why the hearing on
wa~

complicated and nceded
needed to

then:.~
thcn:.~

··v,~rify
'·v,~rify

2010

oc
oe transcribed
t.rnnscribcd other than ~I.~~. general claim that

were "multiple
''multiple motions" during
duri.ng tlw
tl.w

were necessary to

F~bmary 12~

cours(~
COllrs(~

of

!1R~ casl..~
!JR~
cas1..~

and

Lran~cripls
Lran~cripts

the Court's rulings."
rulings," Then! i~ no showing why t.h(;~rc
t.ht~rc

was anyt.hjog particularly, or what wa...; particularly. complicf:ltcd
comp!icf:ltcd with regard 10
to
,my
not. ctco.rly
<.my motion J.":quiring
r':quiring the Court" s ruling that was not
cico.rly set fonh by (he
rhc
Court in its ruling from the

l~uch
l~IlCh

or S\!l !(u1h
f(u1h in "u

m~momndum
m~momlldul11

decision or

order. The Cow't's
Cow'!'::; docket d()~!;
do~!; not rcOect
reneet a hearing
hc~u'jng \.V3S
\.vas held
hdd on
Oil June 19. 20 II 0
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nor Lhal
lhal t.here
there was a hcarin1!
henrinl!... held. ,m
\lfl October 27. 20 J 0 There is no rem.on
rcm;on

orfercd by Defendant Kennedy why any ruling ·was
offered
'was "exceplionally"
''exceptionally''
01' needed 10
to be transcribed. A Courts ruliug
fulillg in any
a.ny given
complicated or

proceeding may be complicated or need 1(,
t<' be tmnscl'ilx:d <~nd
not unusual or exceptional in litigation. In this case

ths:r~
Ih~T~

1<.H'
l(.H'

il [0
to occ·ur
occ.ur is

is
IS ilO
no showint?
showinl? ho, or

why. such rulings arc
urc clnjm(.~
claim<.~ 10
to be unusual or exceptional in this case,
case.
h,
h. ·'invcstiglll.ion
·'invcstigal.ion ofVo1ers":
of Voters"': In
J.n lite.rally
litc.rally
th,~rl.':
th(~rl,':

~very (.~ast.'~
~vcry
<.~asr~

whethc:.•r it goes to tdal
whethc:.·r
tr.ial or not,

is
i::; need to contacl
contact potential wil.ncsscs.
wil.nesses. That is roulint:.
routint:. The

nt.U'l'lher~
mU'l'lher~

location, and diflkulty
locat.ion,
diflkllity in contacting
conl<:tc1ing these
thc~ witnesses varie$
varic$ from cnsc

to case. In this case there h:l
h;; no showing of who,
who. wh:u.
wh:.Il. when. or where the
witnesses were contacted. or why an investigator
jnvcstigator was "exceptionally"
necessary 10 contact witnesses, identified by Plaintiff. Dctendant's
DctCndant's own

\,:Ounsd and Jargt! law
\,:ounsc!
Jaw tinn
CCHl1.acl.
CCH11.acl.

~'tn.ff cmlld

htwc routindy pcrnmm;~d
pcrHmm:~d all

witJlt:SS
witllt:SS

There is no showing how thc
the investigation
invc~t.ignti(ln in thi:-> ~~asc was "peculiar
'"peculiar

:md unique"
unique'' as alh~ged. or how it was "e"cept;onaL"
"e"ccptiona.L'' M(~re!y
M.:~rely saying. so. docs
not make il'
i1· so. There is no showing why there was an

excepnonal
exceptional need to hire

an investigator locntcd
located in Spokane and submit h.is bill1.or
biliJ.or travc.:llime
travc.:ltimc to,
to. and

!l'om,
lrom, Coeur d'Alene
d. Alene 1.o
1.0 attend meetings or obtain docllmcnL~,
documcnL~. As ::;uprx,rtcd
::;up(X,rLCd
hv• the Amended
/\mended Cost Memorandum tiled bv• the Cit\l/Wcathcrs.
Citv/Wcathcrs.
liSt!
ust: or
of an
J

invesl.igator ;n
in this case was not an exception(t!
exception(ll la.<>k
lnsk undcrwkell
undcrwkeo in lbis
litigatioll.
litigation. The City's Ruorney's
::~Horney's and paTak~gaJ's
parak~gaJ's it.emized
it.emizcd

1l~es
1{~es

sought as costs

document meetings with an investigator used by Defendants City and

a',

\Vcathers.
\N'calhers. No costs ure
urc l'cqllcst(.'(j
l'C<JUCSt(.-d by lhem.
lhcm. Also. a-; reflect.ed
reflected by the affidavit
aftidavit

of Kathy Lewis,
Lcwi~, a representative of
oflhe
the City
CilY of Coeur d'Alene, neither'
neither· the
''inv~stigator"
"i!'!v~stigator"

hired by Defendant Kennedy. Bill 1\.torlin.
l\.1'orlin. nor !l.is
h.is company,

"Morlinvc:stigalions," arc
a.re licensed as
ns a "dClcctivc~'
''detective~· or a "·d(.~tcctivc
••d<.~tcctivc agl.':ncy" in
··Morlinvc:stigalions,'·
th~

City ufCocur d'AI~~ne as
riS required hy Chupter
Chuptcr 5.48
SAS orth~
ofth~ Cjty'::;
Cjty':s

ordinances as attached to Exhibit A 10 the aflidavitof
tlflidavill.)f K(lthy
K<tthy LI,~wis
L~.~wis liIed
lilcd
.h'~rcwith.
.h'~rcwith,

The City's ()rdilluncc'rcquircs
<lrdinancc,rcquircs that any person or
Of husiness
husincss who

engages in ila privale
priva.te detective business
bllsincss mllsl
musl

ht.~

licensed by !.he
the City of Coeur
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d'
Alene. The City"s
City's ordinance dc/tnes
detect.ive agency
d'Alene.
c.Jcli.ncs a private dC·tcclivl.~
dc.tcctivt.~ or detective
as a person or business engaged in "discovering
''discovering or revealing the idcTllily.
idcrllily.
whereabouts, characler
whel'eabouts,
characlcr or actions of any pcr:50n
pcr:5on or thing"
thing'' i"Chaptcr
rChapter 5.48.0 I0
(OR) I within the city (ChapleT
(Chapler 5.4R,()70
(8)J,
(B)
5.4R.070 (B)].

Thcn~
Then~

is IlO
lhe
no ::;howillg
::;howing where Lhe

·'invcsligatiun··
"illvc~ligali()n" of
ofM.r.
Mr. Morlin took plncc with rc:gard to

hi~

bilkd time. Some

nf the
time spcci
lkally a"cg~s
allcg~s that on March 16
l 6 he was in Coeur
of
t.he billed lime
speci fically
(.rA.Icn,::
March J8 he was in Coeur <I'
d' Aknc~ and on August
d'Alcn,:: March)
Allgust 14 he was in
Coeur d' AJcne. Also the October 5, 201
2010() "bi II"
II .. subrnitt.cd
subrnitt.cU by Bill Morlin
rdcrs to work done in .."July"
July'' but there ,lrc
'1rc no itemizations providt~ in this
r~gard
f~gard

This

()~it:ction
O~it:ction

and no time spent documenl~d.
document~d.

and Motioll
Motion is further
furt.her supported by

th~

Memorandum of

I..tlW
l..t~w

tiled

herewith.
arguIl1~nl
argum~nl

On.11
On.tl
wiTl1cs~cs is
witnesses

is requested, Md
ruld the right. lO l:'X:mllnC
croSl) examine, or
t:.Xaminc ,md
'md crosl;

call~
ca11~

any

rt.:sl;,~rv\.~d.
n.:s~:.~rv~.~d.

DATED th·i:-: i 't
th11 day of
ofNovcmbcr~
November~ 2010
2010..
.-<~7)l,'J..

·t. .~.\~:.'(Jt.:~l.._'-";.._··--·-·············
__ . . . ..........................
•'•' . . . . . . -_
d//,1 (.

__
--"U'-~·
_
__
""_<11_>..;..:~:.~0::!.,~:,,-,-,.:..-··

.

Swrr
SWrr Kd~(),
Kd~o, Atrorncy lt>r
Il)r PlainlitTUr:mnon
PlaintitTBrannon
CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE: A copy was mail~d l(l Mike Hn.nHm.
CERTIFrCATE
HO.tlHHl. Scou
SCOH lh~t~d, and Peter
atr<).mcys f()r
f()r Dc1:Clldarlts
Dc1:CodarJts on lht!
tht! ......
.l.f_d...'llYy of Novcmncr,
November, 20 II0 by rcgutar U.S. Muil.
Erhland. ntr<).mcys
. ,....IK
.../

,_..,.,...·<

·'·

",/'<

.'.

'

,

·-y.(-o..lIA,r
(j..f
_ .
·-:r:.f-et/lA..r
tj..f""'-•.-··
---.-,,"
,.,...I''''''
_--,_........ "
~....·---·.........,.,.,.,......
""'-··---·--········

~

Starr Kdso

·.

. . AI.MED COSTS
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STARR KELSO
Attomey at Lav.'
La",,, #2445
Attorney
P.O.l3ux
P.O.l3ox 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Td: 208·765-3260
208-765-3260
F~lX: 208-664-6261
F~IX:

2010~/0V 18 PM 2:56
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

n~~~-. j/1
........ v•'

Attomey for Plaintiff Rrannon
At1.omey

\

IN
J.N THE DISTRlCT
DISTRJ.CT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DlST.RICT
DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF TDAHO
IDAHO,.. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

.IJM
.11M BRANNON.
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-09-10010
CY-09-10010

MEMORANDUM SIJPPORTTNG

vs.
VS.

CITY OF COElJR
COEtJR D'
n· ALENE. el.
eL al.

OBJECTION AND MOTION
'l'O
"1''0 DlSAI..I.OW
D1SA 1..1.0W DEFENDANT
KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS IN PART

PURSUANT TO IRep
IRCP RULE 54(0)
54( d) (6)

ndendallt.~.
Defendant.~.

COMES NOW Lhc!
lhe;!

PlainlHl~
PlaintHl~

Jim Hnmuon,
Bnuu1on, by

~utd
~uld

through his attorney
altorncy anJ
am.J in support ur
ul'

his ObjecLion and Motion to Disallow Defen.dant
Defendant Kenlledy's
Kennedy's claimed costs, in part. pursuant to
IRep
lRCP Rule 54 {d")(6)
(d")(6) hereby submils
submits this Mcrnonmdutll
Mcrnorandutn nfLaw.
ni'Law.
INTRODTTCTION
INTRODTTCTlON

Defendanl
Defendant

K,enncdy~~
K.enncdy~~

Cost Mcmom.ndum, other
ot.hcr than the claimed $5R.OO court filing fee.
fee,

are not
<.1)
noL "Costs m:; <'l Mauer of Right. and arc not supported pursuant to IReI'
IRCP Rule 54 (d) (.I)
c:nsc law. as being necessary (lIld
<md cxc,:ptiunal, and in the intcre::>t
intcre::;t ofju!'tlcc,
ofju!'ticc.
requirements. or case
, ARGUMENT
·ARGUMENT

The grant {)r
{)i' denial of discretionary costs is committed to the sound

di.~crction

nf the trial

court. l.RCP Rule 54 (I) (D) is a two part tc:-:t that requires u :-:hov.ring
shov.ring lh;;!t
t:hr.1t (1) the
t.he costs wen:

necessary and exceptional. and then that I,hey
nec.essary
t.hcy (2) should be t1Warded
tlwarded in the interest' of justjcc.
justjce.

City (!OI1c:Cu/l
p, 2d I 118
JJ8 (2006),
(2()06).
t!Ot1c:Ca/l \',\'. Seuhert, 142 Idaho 5HO, IJ30 P.

The Court is to cons'ider
cons·ider the nature and scope of the case and determine

whClht~r
whclht~r the cosLS
cosLs

claimed ore eXl:cptional
ext..:cptional for the nature and scope of the ca-.e.
ca<;c. lia.vden
lIa,vde/T l.ake
l.ak.e Fire Protection
District v,v. Alcorn. fi·II
-1 I Jdoho
/61 (2000). This is an dection
dcction conlesl.
contcsl. There is no
/doho 307, 109 P. 3d 161
~_3_Ucgation. nor_~h()\'~ing.
nor_~hm·~ing. t1~m
tl~m

any

o~jcctc~
(}~iectc~

to cost

'1.\'l.lS
\HlS

"exceptional''
"ex.ceplional" in an election contest f()r

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORTo.F
SUPPORT OF PLAIN'rIFF'S
PLAIN'l'JFF·s OB,lECTION
OB.IECTJON AND MOTlON
TO DlSALIJJ\V
DISALlJJ\V DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S Cr..A1MED
CL.A1MED COSTS
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··incumbent Defendant 10
to ··check
Ddtmdant Kennedv. as the ·'incumbent

th~~~.

election o,[tjce
o.mce and/or
anellor W
w interview or investigate" regarding them.

Den~ndtUH
DeH~ndtuH

c.ontested the

~.::k~ction,
t:k~ction,

or anv.
.'-· voters with the
Kennedy at ,1(,)
JW time

aHcgation that it
in any manner, 1.Uld
..Uld there is no showing nor aHcgalion
if was

·<necessary.. l()r
to lind pl!l'Sons
p!!rsons who voted illegally fl.)r
P!ai.nti IT. lel
lcl alone
I()r him w
to lry 10
fl.)!' Plai,nti
·<necessary"
"exccpi.ion<.il."
"exccpiiOili.il."

Dcf~:ndan.t

thi.lt any
nny
Kennedy htts, at all
al! times
time!'> prior to trial.
tri~l1. catcgork.nHy
calcgoric.nHy dcnic:d In''lt

illegal voters cost votes. He supported this daim
th:lim with numcrm.L->
nUmCr01.l"
Det~djc !1eard
l1e~trll which were procured and prepart~d hy
Det~dic

aftidavit~
amdavit~

of Dan English and

Defendant Kennedy's counsel. Defendant

Kennedy maintained rhi$
cotry or t.h~~
rhis p()sltion
pus1tion at all times Wlt'il his stipulation. during tliaL
t1ial. to the entry
Alhdtwtt 01' liregory i"rot'c,
i'•rofc. and the ilh;g<tl
Alhdi.wtt
ilh;gitl

'lut~:. ~If
~,f MI'.
Mr.
'I\Jt~:.

Ain91.vorth nnd Mi:,
Mr..
Aifl91"vorth

\~/hilt'. Thl''l(,
Th&'<:r wr.n~
\~/hll('.

all

voters identified by Ptaintill ' There is no good .Ia.ith
.ta.ith basis for Dl!ltmdant
vOlers
iJdtmdant Kt~nn.cdy to argue that
1

un itwesligation
itWt'sligt.lliofl

t~tilurc
t~lilurc

given his

Dctcnda.nt
Dclcnda.nt
prt~parcd
pr(~p(lrcd

o( vu(ers
or
vufers or a search for illegal vOlers
voters telr 13ramwn was rea:-;onahlc lH' lltX:cssary
ntX:cssary
t(lr

10 challenge anything or any

Kennt~dy's
Kenn~w~dy"s

aspc::•~l
~ISpt:l~l

lH'

of the election. let alone exceptional.

witne.sst!s. English and 13card, by affidavits that were procured and
witnesst!s,

tht:y hHd reviewed
by Kennedy':) counsel claimed thot thtly

lh~o.~
lh\'~

dccr.ion records and
dccdon
llnd that

votes cast
c.::ast other tlmn Ms. Zellars. There has been no c.laim bv Defendant
there were no illegal
.,,'"
~
~

Kennedy that an "!nvc::;tigation''
K.ennedy
"il1vc:)tigalion" of

vol~rs

and po\:(:ntial
pot:.::ntial witnesses is not

roulinC?~)l
rouline?~)l

done in

"bmden" to do so in an election contest that focused nn
election contest Cn$c-s
cn$C's or that. il was his "blll'den"
lh~

acthms
Mthe CliY.
C1t.y.
acthH1s of'the

s~l.!
S~I.!

C'ity t~(McCu/1
,";'eubert, 142
142/Jc.lho
130 !'. 2d 1118 (2006).
C'ily
(~rMcCul/ v. ,..,'el.lberl,
IJt.lizo 580. 1301'.

in addition !i)r
ln
fi."Jr tht~ Court to the require Plaint.itT
Plaint.i.tT to pny
pay any c()~t.s
co~t.s tor work done by
Defendant

Kcnncdy'~
Kennedy'~

illegal under Ihe
the City

hired investigator. whose work
t)f

\~lS
\~ts

wholly, or to a significant dctnx.\

Coeur d'Alene's ordinance Chapter 5.48

(at1uch(~d
(attuch~:;~d

to the aHidavit
anidavit of

ctfcctively aiding the enlurccmcnt
contract
Kathy Lewis) would result in the Court effectively
en(urccmcnt of an illegal cont.ract
between Defendant Kennedy and hi.::> unlicensed investigator.
invcsliglttor. t'vfc;
t'vfc: Shane v. Quillin. 47 Idaho
542. 547, 277 P. 554. 559 (IY29) An illegal contract is one thaI:
that rests (In
on illegal consideration
consisting of ~1ny
~lny

a~~~
a~~1

695. 70)
701 (1997j.
(!997j.

which is contrary
to J.:aw.
contntry 10
klw.

The cmltract belween
between

_____ ____ ___

Quirin~"~-'·
QlIirin~
\.'.

Dcfl~nd:lnt
Dcfl~ndant

Quiring,
5Mi. 944 P. 2d
QUiring, 130
/30 Idaho 560, 56(j.

Kennedy or his

atlom<.~ys
~ltlom(~ys

on his behalf and

Bill Morlin is a contract f<'lr
h1w.
f<.lr an act by Bill Morlin which is contrary to hiw.
,,

,_,

,

------'''----..'''---

I Indeed it is
Is inhen:ntiy
inhen:ntly inconsistent
inconsiste-nt I'IC.·,r
i.·,r I)crcmlurlt
r:>crcmlunt Kennedy's COIIIISl'1
COIIIISl'l to claim thaI
that "in 11u tOI.l(:~:T1cd
t01.l(:~:T1cd cffi)rI"
cffi)rf'" 110
Villers w~·t'c
Pf'olrs ;tHida"iI
Ill'
questionable "'''crs
w~·rc located who voted ti)r
ti::tr Plaintiff. Greg Protrs
anidavil is clear c"idcncl~
cvidcncl~ ,lrlhc
,,flhc fill~nes~ 111"
this ~ti'lleI1lCnt.
~ti'tlerncnt. Defendant Kennedy's
Kenncdy"s counsel
couosel not only C'tlrnrnll.nic:alcd
r:tlrnrnu.nic:arcd with
wilh Sgl.
Sgt. Mqjor Pron
Profl by c:nmrtil
\:nmrtil bl)t
btJt he nlso
nl.so
rc,civl~d (I C(IPY
C\'PY ot'the <lffidtlvi\
<Jffidttvit filled out by !>ron.
!>rot\. directly from Profl. ast<..'
Vl1ted fi.:Jr
in the i:Orll'e!:'lcd
rc(;eivl~d
IIS\<) whl) he V(1led
fj);, ill
(;orll'e!:'lcd
~cc(ion.
be fi m: tti*JI.
tti*ll.
~cct:ion. rc~ardjng
rc~arding Seil[;!,-nmnlhs
Seilr:!,-nmnths befim:

2

Sl.JPPORT OF J"LAINTIFF"S
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.DlSALL()\V DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS

SC 38417-2011

Page 2439 of 2676

11/18/2010 14:52 FAX

2086646261

KELSO LAW OFFICE

ItJ
ltJ 003/003

CONCLUSION

The only co.-:t ,rwardable
awardable w
to Defendanl Kennedy is the tiling (("'C
f(..-e required to lile
lite hi~ answer.

u:;'", day ofNovcmber. 2010.
DATED ~his 11:;'
~r~
. iJI)[t,f~/'
~r~.
[t./~/.................
'-'··~~...............................
,........................
.............. ,-",~~.""
..... .. ........ -... .....
.. ... ······
.... .
Sturr Kcl~().
Kcl~o. Attorney
/\Horney I()r
J'()r Plainli tf
ff Bnmnon
."

, "

"".",-...

___

" " ' - - - , ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " " ,,,.,

,

,

CERTIFICATE
mai.led lo Mike Haman. Scott Reed, and Peter
CERTIFiCATE OF SEi{VICE:
SEKVlCE: A ,opy
'opy was mailed
Erbland. tl~J()rneys
tl~Jorneys !(w
!(}I' Dctcndanrs
Dctclldanls on th~ ./$:. . .day of
ofN·.)vembcr.
N'.)vembe r. 2010 by rCll-ular
rcJl-ular lJ.S. Mail.

::-{i

,,,;

. ____. . ~12_
LW~~·:.. ..____
__. ,_"_".,..__
__
···----.
~U. Lk,(l~~·:
Slarr

..

Kch~1,)
Kch~o

OHJECTlON AN.D MOTION
;\3 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS OBJECTiON
TO DISALLOW DEF.ENDANT' KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS
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<:·•·\i·
'u':.:Il liu,"',·if,
liu.·,.,.;f,
(:"'\i'
I\ ,'\i:v
1'\i :V
\.~Ih.C 'u':':

}~r
~

COUNTY 0::
OF KOOTENAI

Fi~~~
FI~~~

2010 ~mv 18 PM 3: 31

STARR KELSO
L·1W
Allc~rn~:y ;-tl
;-11 L'lw

.ii)
.!4S
il2 . ·14S

P.0. nox I',
I ·; 12
P.O.
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho
ldaho 83816
Tel: 208-76:;-32G(l
208-76:;-32()0
I-'Fax:
ax: 20g-664-626!
Atwrm~y
Atwrl1l~j'

fi·1r Plaintiff Brannon
li'lr
Brannoll

IN TrW
TlW DISTRICT COURT FOR TilE FIRST JllDICJAL OlSTR,l(''!'
n.tSTR.l('T OF
THE S'T';\TE
mAllO, rN ANn
K()()T~N/\l
ll!E
S'T':\TE OF ID/\llO,
/\NO FOR THF COUNTY OF KOOT~N/\l
.11M riRANNON
rlRANNON.,.
.liM

Case No. CV -09-100 I 0

AFFIDAVIT OF K.ATllY LEW[S
LEW!S

Plaintiff.

CT'{ OF COEUR fYM..ENf::,
IDAlIC>
.EM::, IDi\110
a mllnicipli
municipll corpc:r:'Hion,
corpc:r:uion, et.al.
Deftmdanl:;,
Deftmdant:;.

STArr:: OF lDi\
ID/\ l ro

)
:-;:;,

COUNTY 01-' 1-:00TF:Ni\1)
hOOTEN/" )
KI\Tt
K/\TI IY LEWIS. being til'.!>!
til'st duly s\ovorn upon oath. testilies.:lf.
testilies .:~r. follows:

I. lI :1m
:11ll

O\\~r
o\\~r

testify, and make this
the ag:e of 18. c.ompt!\cnl
C.Olllpt!ICl1t to teslify,

kl1l)\Vhlg~
knowhlg~ HI

which I 'vill.
\vill. if called

1(1
,1(1
l(l I,')
(I

.,C),
.)c),

stat,:mcnt
Slat,:mcnt

upon

pt~rsonal

will h~.~;t i i"y;
l"y;

(!D {:rnploy(:c
{:rnploy(:C l,f lh~:
IJf co~.ur
~,.:r;taiL in f.llir.l.
2. IJ iHTl ,In
Ih~: City IJf
Co~·ur d' ;\knt:.
;\kllt:, My job dutit:s
dutil:S I..:lilaiL
r.1l'Ir.1.

lh~:
th~:

llVCrseeing of the licensing of indi vidU~1iS
Jic.en:.;cd lO
overseeing
vidll~1jS and businesses required to 1.!'
1,),.:.:, lic.ensed
to
Wl.lrk
w(.1rk

within the l:ity
t:ity limits of Coeur tt"/\icnc and II have clistody
custody and contn,)1
contrc.1l (Jver
(.lver the.

records identifying pt.:rsons
pt:rsolls who are licensed in (nell/,
Coeul' d'Alene;
.>.
J,

v

AI the reqlle:,t
reque:>t of Starr Kelso. II reviewed Ihe
the

d(lClll1lt~nts
docuntt~nts

1m lilc
lile with the City of Coeur
Cneur

J'Alene
J'Aiene pertaining 10
(0 detective and dele~:tivt:
dete~:rivt: ;'lgCI\l~y
;·lgcm~y li~:.:tl.Sing
Ij~:':ll.sing in lilt..:
tlu..: C:ity ofC(lellr
of<.\,eur

d'Akn;:; :o cktc::nnine whtlht:r
d'Alell;:;:o
whc:tht:r Hill Morlin and o.r
O.r M(JrlinvC$ligilljon~;.
Morlinvc$tiga1ion~;. L.T. .. C. is, or
Or

\Vlil'>,
\VII~'> •

.'\rFln/\
.'\rFID/\ VIT
VI'!' OF 1\./\TIIY
'l\.ATIIY U··:WIS
U··:WJS
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I ic,~nst~d
dcreetive and
lent~ at any
ic(~nst~d as a dCleetive
Jnd or detectivt: agency in
ill the City of C0e.11r
C0C.llr d.
d· A lcnt~

or

201 I) lhrollgh
through the dat(~
dat,~ (.1( this ;)ffid3Vil.
;~ffid:lvil.
time in the. year 2010

4. !:lased
!;lased llron
t!p011 my review of Ihe
the
lit.cn:-;ing
lic.cn:-;ing in the City

lI.. I.. C. were
we-re

li<.~~nsed
1i<.~~llsed

dnl~llnll:.nls per1aining
dnl~llnll:.nl$
penaining tO
to dclc~:livc
dctc~:liVC and dl.:tc.:cljvc
d~.:tc;ctivc ~l1-'!cncy
~ll-!C11CY

of Coeur (j'
Alene, neither Hi II Morl
MorJ in nor MQr!
Mor! i IlvCSljl~<1lioIlS,
d'Alene,
nvcstii~<Hions,
as a derectlve
derecllve I'll' detect
delcellIvt:
\It: agclH~y
agcJH~Y by the City of
nf Coeur d' A
Aicnl'
len.:

during any time in the ye~r 20 II 0 through

5. :\ true and

.;.om~cl
t:·om~ct

th~

date of
Df Ihis
this affidavit.

or th..:
copy or
lh~ City of Coeur (L\Icnc's
(L\lcne's ordinam:e(s)
ordinltm:e(s) regarding the

requiremenl
agcllt:ics be liccl1:,\cd
requirement th;lI
th:ll detec.tivcs
detectives (iJ1(1
<HHI detective agcnt:ics
liccn:.-cd in COt'ur
Cot'Ur d'Ak:nc is

attach,·d hereto
:lttach"d

a~ Exhibit
EXhibit ;\.

Furtl-w.r
FUflJ-w.r t\ffiant
/\ffiant saycrh
sayerh nol.
no!.

o.

!hi~; .- , .day
(hi~;'
dav
of
November.
.or
..
.
. . .. 20 I0.
·-'"' . .
.
"-.
.,','··......
~-~··-:__:::·,,::..
..::..
"""~-~
..--""...................................
... ,.. , ...... ,-.", ......... ,,.:-.:::'
'', ,.." :: ..
'
, ·
'....
"
",,

11/\'
J)i\'

NOTARY P

IDA110

2 AFFIDt\
VIT OF K.:\TIIY 1,EWIS
AFFIDAVIT
l .EWIS
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Chapter 5.48
> f)R.lVATE
:>
f).R.JVATE Dt::TECTJVES
Dt::TECTIVES
> 5.4R.010:
5.4~U)10: DEFI,NITJONS:
DEF!.NITIONS:
::,.
::........ "'1'"&-. .... '\'!.1-'"'-J'JJ.,
....... 1 &t\,; vY'IIU:"t

i \ .......

t _, ... _11oi~o'h'"

~f\\.t

l111JU..""~.:')o

I'H'I.,'•#J

:ft tlat.;
...,
llll~

\.l:l\:..U Ul

(''t&....·.... f..:.Or

ul.. ...

ll

'-··ll..apu:.l ""11011

1..1~'1.,•11o fk.t~
IIUV~

... 11\,..

..,... L!UI-;'r'ti ... L"'•
lll~t.UIIIIi:?•") ..

>
>DETECTIVE
DETECTIVE AGENCY: Means and inc!.udcs any person who as principal
prindpul or
>·employer
>- employer engages in. or who advenises
adveT1ises or holds himself out as being
:.:· engaged in, the private detective business.
:,:'
> PRI
PRl VATE DETECTIVE: Mcan:->
Mean:-> and includes any mll,lII:!}
n<tl.ur:tl pcr!'lUfl
pcr.sun

or l'ithcr

> sex who cng:;li:tCS
cng:;lf:tcs in, or who advcrt,is~s
advcrt.is~s or holds himsdf oul W:l
w:; being

engaged in. the private dctective
detective business as agent or cmplo)'c\;~
employe\:~ of
oC a
>duly
>
duly licensed detective agency.
~..,.
~,,,>

>.
>·
>PRIVATE
Me::u1s and includc$Ule
of. or
>
PRIVATE DETECTIVE BUSINESS: McmlS
includc$U1C business or.

::,.-.", the
Lhc busim.·ss u1:
uL making for
the. representation of being engaged jn Lhe
:>hire
:> hire or reward. investigations with rderencc to any of the
·,-, following rmlticrs:
rm.tt1crs:
':;>

Dctecting. discovering or revealing crime or crimin~ll$,
Detecting.
crimin~tls, or
> securing
~ecll ..ing sel:rct
se~..:ret inlhnnatinn
inlhnnation or evidence relating
reluting thereto;
rcvc.::~1Jing the idc.::ntity, wh~~l'cabouts.
wh~~rcabouts. charnc1cr
charnctcr or
o.r
> B. Discovering or rcvc.::~\Jjng
> actions of ::my persun
pcrsun or Lhing;
thing;
> C. The
Thc hahils,
hahHs, c()nduct~
conduct~ 1l1lWCIllCntS.
rmwcmcnts. whcrcahouts,
whereabouts, associations,
> transactions. r~pUlaLi()n~
r~pulations or character of I.Uly
(Uly person;
> D,
D. The credibility of witnesses or other pcrsons~
persons~
> E. Tht: location or recovery of lost or stolen prop~rty;
·.::-F.
',> F. The causes, (~rigil1
(~rigin or responsibility
re$pon~ihility ()r
l(>r fires, ,lccidenls
accidents Or
or
,> injuric~ to n:ul or pcn;onal
.>
pcn>onal properl)':
property:
>G.
>
G. The affiliation, connection or relation of any person with any
'> union or nonunion organizntions. with any otTicial member or
>
>
tht.~reot: or with
wit.h any person seeking cmrl()ym~nl
cmploym~nl in thl~
th~..~
.> reprc:~cntativ(~
rerrc:~cnlaliv(~ tht.~reol:
strike.~
:,:.-'.·' place of any person who has quit work by reason of strikc,~
>H.
of any statement
representation~
>
H. ·rhc
'fhe tmth
tm1.h or falsity orany
statemenL or repre$entati()n~
> L 'rhc
'fhe busin.es~ or~ccuring
of~ccuring fbr hire or reward evidence to be lIsed
used
> h~fhrc authnrizt~d invf.:~:-::liga1ing
invt~:o::tiga1ing committees. hi)nrds of award
nward or
> arbitration. or in th~ trial of civil or criminal cascs~
cases~
.>
> 1.
J. The busin~;ss
busin~:ss of
offurnishing
furnishing tbr
tor hire or reward. guards or other
:;.
> p~rsons to protect
pro!'ccl: persons 01·
OJ' prc.)perl.y,
prc.)pcrl.y, prevent then. or unl<.swful
::"::.· laking
good;;;, -.varcs
\vare::; and mcrchaJl(lisc,
taking of goods.
mcrchaJlClisc, or the misappropriation or
cOI1<.:ealment of goods. wares and merchandise. money. bonds. stocks,
·'.::--,. cnm:ealmer.t
.>
dlOSCS in <1~li(lr),
Olher v,".luablc
> dtoscs
a~lioo. notes or other
v"•luablc d(Jcumcrlls
documents ()f
()r f)(tf.x~rs;
f.laf.X~rs; (II'
>
>the
the bll::;in~ss
bu::;in~ss oi"perrurming
ofperrurming the service of such g'uard
g·uard or other person
oJ tfi/;:tfiii:- silid
(a)~ (c). (d))
for any oj
s{lid purposes. (pnor cooc §§5-12-1 (a)~(c).
> 5.4S.U:W:
5.4S.O:W: APPLICABILITY
A.P.PLlCAl3lL1TY OF Cl1APTER:
CllAPTER:
.>
,> .1\.
.!\.

u
U

:'·.:.". .
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tmy otlicer ()r
chapter shall apply to any
nr employee or

> any state.c()unty.
state. county. city or town, appointed or ck~clcd by due
>authority
bvv: lo
>
authority of b'vv:
Lo any person whose business is the furnishing of
.>

husine:;s and tillllncial
tinancial standing and
und crt:dil
information u.s to the husinel's
crt:dit
-"1'""'
.....,~.
,~·
-"1'
.........

·-._
'.'- -J.'Il"'
_.1·'1'.. ' ..
l'~""""
1'~

-·
0"

......,.

,,,,,

,.~
·-~ "~"~I

t.· ..

1".11'\I.J
1".I"'IoI.J

\",1
\'i,l

'UI]
I(.UI]

·..-..~ ........
.........',,_
'".~
_

1.'...•••"\,rIJ
I·''"'·"'·'IJ

;1'\l'lll;n-"'' ·n
•u..• ln.
.. ~ .. I"U·.-.
I"U'._. ......
...........
hl.lhitt.•
;""'I";n-"""
In, as
tl'\~"l
•.... n~:sl h/.lhitl'

"'''1''''
'''"I"'' "'5
'''5 ,(..,

or

l':.t'll~
":'t'l/~

''',01''"" .....
lU'"
'"'''UI IU.ol''''"'
,,.

L'V "····~
•• ~ ... ,
" ......
.... " ' •• Ul

financi;;11 r.espon.~ibilitjC$
financi::1l
r.espon.~ibilitics of applicmllS
applicants t~)r
t~>r immrancc,
insurance, indemnity
>- bonds. or commercial credit, or of elajmants
cJajmants under insur:mcc
::> policies. (prior code §5-12-I(b»
§5-12-l(b))
::>policies.
> 5.48.030: LI.CF::NSE: J\PPLICATI0N~
1\PPLICATJON~ ISSUANCE CONJ.)l'fIONS:
CONDl'flONS:
:>
:>
>

>A.
unlawfi1l to opcn.'tlc, maintain, or othen.vi.o;e
>
A. It .~hall bl;': unlawfill
mhen.vi."e hnve
hove n
[-I

> d~lt:ctive agency or
OT be t::mploycd
t::l11ploycd thereby without first being liccm.txl
liccm>txl
;.hi~ eh.lplcr.
ehaplcr.
":. ._--,., pursuant to thi~
liccn~c
Ijccn~c fi:~e~
fi:~es provided tor in section 5.60.020 orihis
ol'ihis title
>shall
> shall be paid yearly. All applicaliuns I()r
f(lr a license shall
sholl be made
> in writing and filed witil
wit11 the city clerk. The city ("'Icrk
~o.·lcrk may seck
> advice from the poli.cc dep(lfl.tncnl
dep(lrt.mcnt rcg<U"ding
rcg<U'ding the qualiflcations
qualifications of
finds the applicant. qualifil.x]
·..>:-- Ih~
th~ applicant. If the
t:hc eity
city clerk flnds
qualifi~.xJ under
.>
til.: city clerk may is~uc the licl.!nse.
> th(~· provision:-:;
pmvi.siom:; of this chapter th.:
>
>If
If the CilY
ci1.y ck:rk Jinds
jinds that
thatlhc
the applicant does not. meet. with such
.> qualiiications. he/she shall deny the applicati(m
applicati<m and
<lnd give notice
>thereof
>
thereof to tht:: applicant.
npplicanl. N(')
N,., license required by this chapter .shall
shall
.>
ten (I
(10)
·> he grunted to any person who, within Len
0) years of the dntc of
> such
slich •-tpplicution
'ipplicutiol1 for a license. has been convicted or a felony
lt:lony nor
> unless the appiicant
citizen of the
t.hc United Slates
Stat.es of good mnml
ilpriic3nt is"
is CI citizen.
moml
.::>
oran
agcll(~y. "')
"I)
·:.-• character. In !h(~ case of
an application for a d,~'e(:tivc
d'~'e':tivc agcnt~y.
>
>detective
detective agency license shall be issued to any applic.arn
applic.arH unlcs$
unlcs:-; he
:>
>or
or she is
i::; a citil,\:n
citi~.:,\.:n of lhe
the Unitt:d States,
SttikS, of good mor.ll
moral character.
>
>and
and .shall
shall hnvc
hnve ar.least
ar.Ie.1st five
tive (5) ycnrs'
yeaN;' prior cx.pcricnce
cx.pcricncc as Hrl
> employee
empll)ycc or a l"cguJurly
rcgulurly const.ituted
constituted poJicc iorc~
tore~ or
:>
ur the equivalent
> experience as all
ml employee of a bona t1de
t"lde detective agency. In order
>experience
.>to
.> to determine ~uitability of prospective applicants for licensing
> with the city of Coeur u'Alene.
d'Alene. t.he Coeur d'Alene city clerk or his/
:>
her desigll~e
>her
design~e shall require each :--.pecificd
specified applicant to provide
> inform~1l1()n
tingcrp,·inl.s necessary to obtain criminal history
inform~llion and tingcrp1·in1.s
> .infonmuion !rom
lrom the Tdaho
Idaho stat.e
stnt.c police and the rt~dern(
ft.~dern( bureau of

>B.
> B. The

> invcstigatjo\~.
md
invcstigatiot~. Pursliantlo
Pursuantlo section 67-300~, Idaho Code ..<.md
> congre~sil)mtl
congre~siomtl ~~nactmenl
~~nactmcnl public law 92-544. the city t)fCocur d'Alene
> $h;·lll
$h;·l11 submit ;l
:1 set of
nf tingerprint~ obt.'l.incd
obt.1.incd From the applicant
applicanl and
> the rcquired
IdaJlO stale pi)
pl)jicc,
required fees to the ldaJlO
lice, bureau of criminal
> identilication.
iden.tilication. l()r
l{)f a criminal l'~c(lrds
r~cords check

or stale
sUtlc llnd
und national

»
> databasc&.
database&. Tht.~
Th~-.~ submission of tingerprinlo;
tingerprinto; and intonm~tion required
> by this sccuon
seCLIon ~~hall he onibrms
on f6rms prcscritx..-d by the ·Idaho state
Coeur d'Alene is authorized ltl
crimim1l
> polil:C. The ~ity of
orCoeur
ttl receive crimilHll
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history infimm)tion
stale police and from Ole
tJ1c l~def"..ll
l~deml
illfcmm)tion from tl1c
U1C lda.ho
ld':lho Slale
> bureau ur investigation for the purpose of evaluating the fitness of
>applicants
> applicants tor licensing. A~ required by slate
state and lcd'-T<lllaw,
Icd"'1<t1law,
disst:m.i.naljou or other u.o;e of the criminal histN)'
> further disst:m,i,naljOrl
,> informarion
.>
into.rrnarion is prohihite,d.
prohihite.d. As required by !'>cction
:-;cction 5.60.020,
>
:>

>criminal
tcndc.rcd at such time as the
:>
criminal hi:-::tory check sh:.1tl
$11:111 be tende.red
> applicCltion
applicHtion is made. No license fbr
tbr a detective
det.ectivc ag~~ncy
ag~o.~ncy shalt be
> issued to tl c(;rpomtion
C(;rporation not aUlhorized
authorized to do busil'les~
busines~ in the state.

>
>Private
Private delective
detective and detective agency licenses shall expire on
;:..
:::.• Decemhct· :; I of
nf each year.
::...
:::->C.
C. Upon nK~eipl of an application for privale
private detective, the city
>
clerk may issue a provi:.;ionalliccnsc
irlhe
>clerk
provisional license to an applicant if
the city
,>
.> dcrk d~lermines
d~termines that !;lIch
!;Uch person is in suhsttlntial
suhst<1ntial compliance with
>the
> the provisions oflhis
orlhis chapter. A pmvisionallicensc shall expire
>one
120) days from lhl;!
th!:! date of issuo.ncc
n.t such
>
one hundred twenty ((120)
i~SU;J,ncc or
01' at
> <:.arlicr
~:.arlicr time.
time, as lhtl
tht: city
cilY clerk
cle.rk may designate. A private uctcctivc
> with a provisiona.l
provisional license musl
must ~ under I.he
the sUp"rvision
supt·rvision of a
>· Iic(~nscd
>.
lic,~nscd privale
private detective agency owner until completion of aJi
aJI
.>
>criminal
criminal history checks
checb and issuance ofn license which is
i:s not
> provi~iunaL (Ol.'d.
(01.'d. 3309 *5,2007:
*5, 2007: Ord. 3034 §4, :wo
:WO I;
I: Ord. 2639 §3,
::.> 1994:
I 994: Ord. 2630 §6, 1994: Ord. 2045 §11.
§ 11. 1987: Ord. 1702
I702 §3, 1982:
·::':;. prior code §5- i 2-2)
> 5.48J)40:
5.48.()40: LlCENSE: FEE:
:.,.
:-,. The lic~"!nsc I'lX~
l'tx~ f()r a dcll:Clivc
dct~:ctivc agency shaH be SCI,
SCI. by r~sOIUli()n
r~solution of
>
>the
the city counc~l us
as set fi.)rth in sl;..'Clion
s~;..-ction 5.60.020
5.60J120 of
n{'this
this title,
ro the treasurer ~U1d
~md the receipt lhc'H.-for
thcH.{or
> which fee shaH he paid 10

be prcs~~ntl:d
prcs~~nt~:d to the clerk with the application. (Ord. 2630 §7,
§7.
:>
> 1994: prior code §5~ 12· 7)
>· S.4N.OSO:
>.
5.48.050: TNSI
TNS\ H~ANCE RJ.::QUJRED:
:>
>!:>hall
!:>hall

·.::',::"..

§4, 1986:
§4.
I 986: Ord. 1767
176 7 §6, 1982: prior'
prior <:ode
(:odc
>
5.48.060:
EMPLOYMENl'
RECORDS:
:>
EMPl..OYMENr

..>
> (Rep. by Ord. i 949

§5~ J 2~6)

>
>Every
Every perS(ll)
pers(ln !iccnscd
licensed under 1·hc
I'hc provisiuns
provisions ofthjs chapter shall
::-> keep a book containing the full nmne,
n3Jne, place of TCl->idence,
rc!->idence, address,
> l:omplete
l:ol11plete and :J.(:cumtc
:,l.(:cumtc description and history or r~cord or each
:> pel'son
person cmrl("ly(:~d
cmploy(:~d regularly or occasionally as a private or special
detective within the city. Each employee shall also be dc~igmJh.;:d
dc~igmJh.::d in
;>..,. detect.ive
> the hook by a
n separate number.
numocr. Upon the request of the city ck."rk
:>
>and/or
l;ll\d/or the chief ()r
of p~)licc
P~'licc or of any pcrson(s) dc:-;ignatcd by them,
>
>the
the hook hcrei(1
hcrei£1 required to be kept, shall he cxhil1itcd
cxhil'litcd lt)r
l()r Lht:
the
ol !.he-city
~'tlliJTt)r lhe
diu~l of
ofpoltCC
any _ _ __
> in~peCtl<)n
in~pectl<)n ot
fhc-city clerk
c1crk~illJTt)r
tfie di1C~1
polIce or of <lny
>·). p..:.~rson(s) designated hy them to inspect the same, and the ,n:tjlur(.~
.n:tilur<.~ or
SC 38417-2011

Page 2445 of 2676

11/18/2010 15:00 FAX

I4J 006/006
141006/006

KELSO LAW OFFICE

2086646261

> rcfusallo
rC(lUCSI shall conslilull:!
refusal to c~)!nply
c~Hnply with th~ rC(lUCSl
constilult:! cause for lhe
Lhc
> rl~V()Catjon
rl~vocation ()fhis/h~r
ofhis/h~r lict:nse.
Iicl:!nse. (Ord. :n09
:H09 §<l, 2007: prior code
> §5-12-3)
";:0
> 5.48.070: IDENTIFICATION CARDS~ !SSUANCE~
ISSUANCE~ CONTENTS; CARRYING
'.,.... RCQ'(IIRI"J)
H!llt'N
.......
RCQ'(IJRI''j)
~~.... "'llt'N
.~
:
r.. ...,,'
~~''''
vv .:·
.:',~
:::-:::0-

Every applkanl
applir.:anl obl,:;J,ining
obi.::J.in.ing ita license under the provisions of this
>
pcr.son in t.he
the employ of $uch
such lice;:rtscc
lice;:nscc
;:- chapter shal i f"umish every per.son
>
>with
wit.h an identification card, which shall be issued
i.ssued and signed by the
> licensee, and contain the nnme.
name. general description. signature
signalure and
>
photograph of the person employed oy such l.iccoscc.
l.iccJ)scc. together with
>photograph
:>
> tht: number hy which he i~ designawd
designated upon lhe books or the licensee,
>- in <lccor.dal1(';c
\'v'jth the provisions of lhis chapter. The chief of
>
<.~ccor.dan<.;c ''~-'ith
::::.·.. police shall
~hal! he notiflcd
notif1cd in writing by the licensee itnmcdia1.dy
itnmcdiatdy upon
">
or any identificat.ion
> the issmUlcc
issuance or revocation or
idcnti licat.ion card.
:>
A.
>A.

> B. 11. i:, unlawful for (Uly
<UlY person to act
aCI a..'
a...;;i a priV:lt~
priv:.~t~ detective for
::-·hire
::.. hire wilhin
within tht.·
th<:.· city.
city, unless such person crrrrics
cfU'ncs an idcntilicat.ion
·'.>_:,. card provichxl in subsection A of
of'this
this section upo.O
upo.o his JX.'TSOn
p''Tson while
> so acting..
::lnd it is lHlbwfl.11
tmbwfl.ll Jhr any per!'on to refuse tn cxhihjt
cxhihit
:>
aCling.. ::\nd
> his identj.licntion
idemj_licntion card upon demand of any rcgulHr
rcgulnr p(lli':~ onict.'f
lltliCt.'f of
>
the city. (priol'
(priOi' (:(ld~ §5 12
4)
>the
J2w4)
> 5.4l:':.mW: EMP.LOYEES NOT TO DJVULGE
[)JVtH. ,GE INFORMATION: EXCEPTIONS:
8

..

w

:~

>
beer\ an employee or
:1
>- ft is unlawful f()r any person who js or has beerl
Or:l.
> dct..:ctive
dct..:c.tive agency Lo
lo divulge lo any pe~on, other than his employer.
">
> except as his employer may dir~'Cl
dir~o.-ct and except as ma.y be r~qujrcd
r~quircd by
:>
> law,
law. any inf()l"malion
inf()l"nl.alion acquired by him during such employment with
> I'CSPCCI
rcspccr to any of IIhe
he work to which he, or any olhcr
olher employee uf
.>such
o~;;~n assigned by such detective a.gency.
agency.
.> such ddccli\-\.'
ddeCli"\.- agency, has ol;;~n
>>or
or with resp(:~ct
resp<:~ct to any of the work, business or amtirs
amtir~ of such
">
> detective agt::ncy.
ag~.::ncy. (prior
(_prior code §:5-12-5)
> 5.4lU)90: .i\'rTORNEYS
A'l'TORNEYS EXEMPTED:
>·The
chaplcr ~haJJ
auorncys while
>.
The prnvi$ions of this chapler
~h"jJ not apply Lo
lo allorncys
:>
> engaged in the practice
pract:ice of law. (Ord. 1.438 §§I,
I. 1976: priM code
>
:>

§5·12-R)
*5·12-8)
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STARR KI,:'LSO
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AUorncy ~Il
~•l 'If .:n,.·
ff:.A45
A((orncy
.:n'"' ff:'A45

P.O. Box: 1312
C()~lII'
d·Ak~rw.
Co~lll' d
· Ak~rw. Jdabo 83R
83 RII()()
T\.~I;
T~..~l: 20~-765-32()()
20~-765-32()0

F,IX.:
F;lX.: .:!()X-(,(l4M6.261
20X-(,(14M6.26l

i\U.or·r11.:y
i\U.OI·I\~y !'or
I'or PlointilT
Plointill Brannon.
IN TUE
Tl.IE DISTRICT COl !RT
)RT FOR THE FII{Sl
FII{ST .II
Jl JDlelAL
J()ICIAL DISTRICT OF
lii.E
lll,!.:: STAfr.:
STAfF OF IDAHO,
JnA~'I(t IN AND FOR
fOR THE COUNTY Or:
or: KOOTI~Ni\1
KOOT!~Ni\1

.11M
JIM BRANNON.
Plainliff:
Plaintil'f:

C:tsc
C:ISC No,
No. CV -09-100 I 0

vs,
V,';,

CITY OF COEUR
COEI.!R 1),;\LENE./DAlIO,
D'ALENE. IDAliO.
:1 111l1nic:ipal
nmnic:ipal cO/'Pc)r~llioil.
COJ'POr~1Lioi1. ~r.al.

OBJECTION
OB.JFCTION TO ANI)
ANI> MOT'lON
TO DISAI.I.OW lN
IN PART DEFENDANT
CITY/WEATHERS CI.AHvTF.D
Cl.l\HvTF.D COSTS
AND ALL (W
()Io' CI.AIMFD .t\'.i."TORNPY
i\fTORNPV

ANI> P!\Ri\Lb:OAL
PA/{i\I.b:(1AL FEES

fklt:l1danls,
f)l~lt:ndanls.

COM I.:S
t:S NOW Ihe
Ihe Plainti n~
rt~ .lim Brannon,
Brannon. by nnd
unci lhrough
through his atlOrm,'y
atwrm.•y and

hct\~by ()bj~cl.~
hCI,,~by
obj~cl.~

to nnd Ill(lVI,;,S
LO disallow in purl I.kl'\.'lldanl
Cily/Wc~1hcl's clainwd ('~liSls
mov~:.s lO
l.kl\.'ndant CiLy/Wc:t1hcrs
l.~lisls ~md all ()fth~~
nfth~~ d~lillll.:d
d~sim~.:d
attnl'n(~y
attnr·n(~y

and pal'a,k.~al
para.k.!;!al

Th",~
Th~,.~

to IRep
IRCP Ruk 54 (d) (6),
(6).

or

only Cl.i:;ts thul
thUl these l>cli~nd;rnls
l>cji~tld;rnts ure
lo as "CnS1S
~IS a Mat\.~~r
Mal\.~~r of Ril:!hC
urc cmitJcd
cmitlcd Lo
"Cnsts ~·sa
Ri!:!hC arc lht:
Lh~::

court filing

Susan
Susall

Ih~s
fe~s p\ll'SUflt1l
pmsuw11

fl:.:l~

und
lind

th~· ~o~ts
~O)I;IS
th~'

llarri~. Th\.~
Ilal'ri~,
Th~..~ o{ht~r
olht~r

for one

t~()py
l~()PY

th~:.~
or thl:.~

r~:.·sp~~TiVl~ d(;.~r()sif'i()ns
dt~pnsif'ions Pi'
rl:.·sp~~.{'iv(.~

claimed cosl.
cos!. an: JWL
/Wl "exceptional.'·
"exceptional.''

Th~y !lI\~
!11\~

Ronald P1·ior
PJ'ior M)d
(H)d

routine \:o::;ts
\,;o~ls involved in

litignlioll.
litigrnion.
Thl~

daim f()r

att.orm~y
att,orm~y

r~.quircmcnts. \.:<ISt~
r~.quircmctlts,
~,.:<.1St~ 1;;1\.v.
I;;I\.V. Id~lho
Jd~rho

tlnd
und paralegal Ji:c!'
/Ceo!' is Ilot
nnt nwun.J:.JI."lk
nwun./"JI,"lk under lR('l'J
TRC'l'J Hulc
l<ulc 54 (d) ((1)
1)

Code

s~.~~:li<lll
sl.~~:li(ln

34-2020,

s~cli,)n
s~cli()n

l:!MJ 17.
17, S('dit.ln
s(,d,j'.ll! !1-121.
11-/21. or secrion
seerioll

6-91 ~ A. Thl:
Th~: d.:ction
d~cLion c,onlcsl
c.ontcsl was not bfllllghl.
bwughl. pur,-:ucd.
pur.-:ucd. or defended frivolously,
frivolously.
11r
,Ir WI1.1WUI
wit.lwut fnlJlld,lIi(lrI
fnundtlli(.lrJ and Le,
LC. sc::ct.ion
sc::c1.ion J4-2020 docs no1 p"()Vid(:
pr·<.wid(:

This

ol~ic~~tion ~md
I)I~ic~~lioi1

U!lrt.:!~1son~hly.
unr~~lson~hly,

I()r
l()r att..,l'/\~y
attnm~y I,<"~cs.
l.<..~cs.

motion to disallow i:s
i::; supponccl by Ihe
the :vkrnlJramlulTl
i'vkrnoramlum in Support fikd

ht~rt:v.ii
til,
h~:.~rt:v,:i 1'h.

Oral mgwru:nt is

r~qu(:stcd,
r~qtwstcd.

__t_~PJAlNJ"tEil'$_ill3.JEC'l'lON
_-'-~PJAlNJ'tEIl'S-D13.JEC'l'lON

TO AND MOTION

l'(~)--1-)fS-A-b-bOW
l'(~)-I-)fS-A-b-bOW

Dl.:n::NDI\NTS
DI,:n::ND/\NTS

CJTY/WE/\THl--'.1\S"
CJTY/WE/\THt-',I,S' CI..AJ.M FOR COSTS, IN PART. AND /\TTORNEY
/\TTORNFY

FFFS(P/\}{AI
,FCrAL FEES 'J'N
TOTAl,
FFFS/Pt\K/\1 .FCrAL
'J'N TOT/\
I.
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DAr~":f)
DA'f~":D
. . ·t~
·'!'~ .f{~by oCNovc.mbel'.
oCNovc.mber. 2010 .

, . __
,.'
' •'
J.utl
J.ut
/ .·' . <..
<...
•
0.
Stall" Kelso. I\lll)rn~~y
t\lll)rn~~Y fot'
for PlaintifT
l

L--··~
L_J"~

...........
, , ,"
_,, - " - - , , ,...
-.......................................
.............
',
...................................... .

CERTIFK'Ail·:
SERVICJ..·:: t\
A copy \ovas
\Vas nwikd
nwiled hy r~g.lIlar
r~g.ular lJ.S.
U.S. !Vl(lil
!VlHil with postagt.: prt!paid
CERTIFK'All': OF SERVICI..'::
thert.~on 1\)
thert.~ol1
hJ DcJt.~ndant.
Dcft.~ndant. City ~md
~lnd Wcall.l(~rS'
Wcall.l(~rs' allomcy Mich"cI
Mich<~cl llamau tmd l,,)d'endaJH
l")ef'endanr KcrHwl.ly'8
KCrHWl.Iy'8
aHorneys SC()tt W.
W, RI.:~t:d
. day ol'Nnvcmhcr. 2010
201 n..
attorneys
R~.:~t:d and Pc.:ll.:r
Pc.:t~o:r C. Erbbnd orllhl.!
onlh!.! . . . ../.~:
../.~:··day

.".

.,,'..-···.'
' ' ':'1t.

j

(

. _. .

"i;)]().(0/(
"{)../\).(0/! c#:'L~-=C#:.L~-=-··-·"·

St(II'r
St(ll'f

Kds()
Kdso

___LJlLAJ.NJ'lf'FS
l____J_lLi\J.NJ'If·FS OBJEC'J'ION
0)3 lEe' nON'·ro
rO-Am.>-MOTION
. . Am)-MOTION TO
T0-1->1~/\-hbOW-DEI":LND/\NTS
-1-)I~/\-hbOW-DEr:LN!)j\ NTS
CITY/WF::'\TI fU~S
IU~S CLAIM FOR COSl'S. IN P;\RT,
P/\RT, t\ND
AND ATTORNEY
ATTORNFY
CITY/WE:,\TI
F'FFSIPAR/\LEG/\1.
r'FES/PAR;\LEGAI. Fl:l~S
r:1:l~S IN TOTAl.
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STARR KI,:LSO
KI.:LSO
AUorney [It
[tt La",
Lav.,.. #2'~45
#2 1~45
Auorney
P.O. Box lJ 12
Co~ur d
CO~llr
d'·Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83 XI o
0
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax;
Fax: 208-664-6261
208-664-626!

CL2J/~STRICT COURT
:~~TR~T
COURT

rHt,~iY~,
EPU,.'4~

~/J

''~/P
~lp

J

Attorney Jor PlaintifTBrannon
DISTRICT COURT OF TI·fE
.IUDlCIAL L>lSTRICr
IN rHE
THE D!STRICT
Tl-fE FIRST .IUDIC1AL
L>lSTRIC'l' OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CASE N().
N()_ CV-09-IOOIO
CV-09-10010

JIM BRANNON.

1
MEMORANDUM SUPI·
SUPI')ORTlNG
0RTtNG
OB.IECTlON AND MOTION
OB.fECTION

Plain tin:
Plaintin:

: TO DISALLOW IN PART DEFENDANTS

vs.
VS.

CITY/WEATHERS CLAIMED
CLAJM.ED COSTS AND FEES
PURSUANT TO IRCP RULE 54{d) (6)

CITY
C1TY OF COEUR D'ALENE. ct. al.
Defendants.

COMES NOW tht:
the!: Plainl.iff,
PJaint.iff, Jim Brannon. by and through his attorney 'lnd in support of

his Obje;:ction
Ob_je;:ction and !vtotion
Motion to Disallow
Djs~lllow Defendant. City/Weathers
Cily/Wcathcrs daim~d costs,
costs. in part.
part, pursuant
1.0
t.o IRep
IRCP Rule .54
54 (d)(6),
(d)(6). and allorne,y
allorne.y and parulegal
paralegal .Ii.~e...
.fi.~es in total,
lotal, hereby submits this
thi.s

McmorJndum of Lnw.
McmorJncium
INTRODUCTION
I)cfend~Ult~
Dcfend~mt~

tht! costs fm
fOl' one

City/Weathers Cost
<~opy
(~ory

M the

M~mumndum,

re~pccrlvc
re~pccllvC

ot.her tha.n
than the cil,imed
ch1imed court filing fcc and

depositions of Ronald Prior and Susan
SUS.1tl Harris, are not

"Cost$ as a Mauer of Righi,:"
Righ1.:· The claimed attorne-y
aLlome.y ,'(;:!!8/
l·e~::s/ paralegal
matter ::IS
::~s discretionary

costs and fccs
fees is

!1('i,
!1(>t

C0$15,
CO$lS,

f~cs

arc not awurd;,1ble
<lwurdi,lble in t.his
this

or under general applicQ,tion
applico.tion statutes. An award

()r

Ihe
rhc

o~i~ct~o~d
()~i~ctl.~d

to

.supported
,supported pursuant
pursuanl to
tn lRCP Rule 54 (d) (1) requirements. case
C,lSC law. Idaho

Cndc section 34-202.0, sect.ion 12·1 J7, section
seclion 12-121. or SCCl'ioJl
sccl'ion 6-918 A.
,I\RGUMEN'r
.1\RGt.JMEN'f

Tht! gram
grant or denial nf discretionary costs is commil1e.d 1.0
t.o the sound discretion of the trial
In election contests attorney fees mc
me not
aJiowt!d by
court (n
court.
nOl aJlowt!d
I.e.
I.C.

s~cl,i()n
s~cl.ion

34-2020. Discretionary "cost,,'"
"cost-.'' under IRep
IRCP

that requires a showing that (J)
( J) the costs were

nccc~sary

lh~
lh.~

Rul~

spccilic
spcciLic wording uf the

~tatutc.
~tatlltc.

54 (1) (I)
(D) rt;quirc a two purt
part test

and exceptionaL and only then t.hat they

MEMORANDUM I,N
OBJECfJON AND M(}fiON
M(YfION
I.N SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OB.IEC'fJON
TO DTSALLO\V DEFENDANTS C1TYfWEATHERS
ClTY!WE/\THERS CLAIMED COSTS AND fEES
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Page 2449 of 2676

11/18/2010 15:28 FAX

(2)

~hould
~h()lIld

141002/004
141 002/004

KELSO LAW OFFICE

2088848281

he awarded in the interest· or
of justice. ('ily
f.'ily t.!(
f.!/" McCallv. Seuhert.
Seubert. 142 Mallo
Idaho 580. '30
I 30 r.
r.

2d 1118 (2006).
Ch1im~d
Chlilll~d

fax. <.:opy,

The Court
claimed

,~;
I~; (f)
(o

~md

postal costs:

cOllsider
consider

~lrc
~trc "cxc.~ptionar'

lh~

nalure
nature and scope (If
of the

Ct'S~
Ct&S~

l.md
whetber the costs
<.md dctcrmint; whether

jb( the nature
nalure ~nd scope of the casco
Ha;Fden Lake Fire J>ro/t:clion
lbr
case. Ha;rden
J>rolt:Ciion

District~~l..fl Idaho 307.
Districl ~I. Alcorn, I..fJ
J07. 109

(2UO~~. Then:
Then.: is no <lJlcgati(}n~
ullcgation~ nor showing, that
P. 3d 161 (2()O~~.

it' was "\!xct!plinnnl"t.hi~ election contest,
it
''l!xct!ptinnni"· in this

(1$
<JS

eJection contest. or
Ihr lhut
opposed to any other election
nr lhr
that

matter ::my lilig.::Jtion,
routinely incurred in any
Hny
litig.::Jtion, to incur these claimed costs. These costs are routine!y
litigalion.
litiga[ion.

Attorney
/\ttomcy Fee,,;::
Fee.-:::

Attorney fer;:.s
"co~:Is" under I.e.
scclion 34-2020. The legislature is aware thul
fer::.s arc not "costs"
l.C. :scclion
thut

"costs" arc not "a Homey fees." When the legislature has intended thnt. the term "costs"
''costs.. cover

allomey tees it has specifically so provided. Attorney

n~es
n~e!{

awardable under I.e.
LC. 34-2020.
arc not awardnblc

Noh/e
f:lectiom Board. 135 Idaho 495, 2()
p, 3d 679 (2000).
(2()OO).
Nohlc v. Ada County
Cmmty f:lections
20 f'.
Attnn1cy fees are not awardable under l.C.
Attnnlcy

awardable in an dection cont.Cl>1.
cont.cl:>i.

th(.~

12~ 117
12~1
I7

or I.e.
I. C. 12-121.
J2-121. For al.lnmey
al.Lnmey fees
rces to be

Court must he left with the
t.he abiding bdicr
bdic!" that the suit Wa"
wa-:;

brought, purslied.
pursued. or defended frivolou
frivoJou.~ly. unrensonaoly.
unreasonably,

01'
Ol'

without. foundation,
foundation. Noble v. Ada

County Elections
Electiuns Buard,
495, 20 P.3d 679 (20()()).
Board, 135 Idaho 495.
{2000). In its

Mem~H'~Hldum
Mem~H·~mdum

Decision, the

Court speci.ncaJJy
speci.Hcally !lnmd
i1nmd lhal
that "'the partics
parties and counsel did thdr best in.
in I.il.i!!'lting
l.it.igating a diffi.cult case."
(Mt~morandum
(M(~l11orandum

Ddendants'
Defendants'

Decision p. 13). The Court in its nlJing
Dedsion
n1Jing or
of Augu!)t
August 31.. 2010,
20 l 0, denying bot11
boll)

Motion~ l<'
J('lr
1r

SummalY
Judgment, held lhal
tfl
Summmy Judgment.
that ··we still have the issues here as w

iJJcg.al votes cnst. that were sutlicicnt
iJJcgal
suflicicnt to change the result and we also
aJso have the allegation here of
counting votes
counling

rcsultin~
resultin~

in an error that could change the result. That was there in December

2009. It's still there." Hr,
Hr. T. p.

6~

1.4-9. ItII is i.rrcconcilable f(,r
t<:)r a case in which Sl)mmary
s:Jmmary judgment

..-.-vas
vas nol
nOl granted two weeks prior l<.)
t() the Slelfl
H)und Lo
lo h~1.ve
h~l.ve been bl'Ought.
st<lfl of trial be held lo
to fbund
bmught.

pur:::ucd. ''r
()r defended frivolously, unreasonably, or withoUl
I'cJlI.ndulion. As the Court noted. nt
without l'cmndution.

or

page 13 of its Novcrnbcr 4, 20 I0 Memorandum Decision. Ihe
the dctcmlination of the merits of the
contc~t

.

could onJv
onlv be made alter six days
davs
,' of trial.
..

Defcndm11s argue Lhattheir
daim for attonlcy
attomcy and
While these Defcnomlls
Lhallheir claim
~lnd paralegal

f.ce~

is supported by lhe
Lhe
1s

c..lm:s not arise under ehhcr statue
stalue
"interests of ju~tk:e·· that' argument is unfilunded.
unfllunded. That
Th(-It issue docs

2 MEMORANDUM IN SUPT'OR'l' OF PLArNT1FF'~
j\JIOTION
PLAfNTIFF'~ ()H.lECTION
()H.IECTION AND l\'l0TION
TO D1SALLO\V
DJSALLO\V DEFENDANTS CITY/\VEATllERS CLAIMED COSTS AND FEES
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aflcr ilit is found thc
the "C()sts"
'"c<.,sts.. were ..
necessary and exccptit>nal.
Additionally. nothing can be
until after
"nccesSttry
exccpti(>nal. Addit.ionally.

more sacf'cd
sacr·cd to our f(mn
that is based upon elections and elected
t<mn of govcmment. lhal
than dcctions. Even ta.king into com,idcral'ion
com>idcral'ion [he
the
thun
clctCI111inatioll,
clctenninatiou,

th{;;~
lht~

lllcl
fllcL lhat
that the Court spccilic<llly
spccilic<JIIy

Court~s
COUrl~S
n()l~s
U(ll~s

rcprcs~ntation.

Memorandum Decision and uJtimatc

in its Memorandum

I)c~ision
Dc~ision

that
thai.

lh~

legality
lcgnlity and validity of the election
electinn could only be dct,;,:rmincd after six day;; of trial underscores

the
!1·1ct thal
that
the! !1'ICt

th~

wm· brought in the ..
interest of jwaice:'
justice:' The Memorandum
election cofll(..>st
com~>st W£I,\'
"interest

Dec.isi.on or
of the Court, although it upheld the dcct.ion,
dccl.lon, underscores area:)
Mea:') of kgitimmc c.onccm

rcgar·ding municipal, n...;;
regar'ding
at;; well as counly
COUll I)' and slate.
slale. elections such a,.; residency, compliance with
stalutory requircm.cnts regarding abscnll.'t!
VA. But tor
statutory
absenll-'t! ballot records. and LJOCA
UOCA VA.
f.or lhe
the five vote

diflercnce in tlw
ca..o;c
these
tlK: election
ciection contested in this ca.,
..c t.hese
unaddress~d and

required

the

rccoJ'd~
I'CC()J'd~

rec()rd~
record~

l.Hl!\:solvcd
I.Hl!\;solvcd indcl1nit.ely,
indcl1nit.cly. The
and

f~)Jl()w
f~lllow

been h:pl as

i~sues

l"~tilure of dcction
I"~tilure

would have continued on

officials t(1
t<.1 maintain stntutorily
statutorily

their own procedures in h(>lding
hl>lding elect.ions
elections is crit.ically
critically important.. I Jad

r~quircd

and the pf()cedurc~
procedures foJlowcd
foJiowcd Lhis
this election

l;·onlCsl
~,;.ontcst

would never

occurred,
occurred.

attorney ices
These Ddend:mts' argument that attorncy
of
nf the lemporary
lcmporary

n~straining
n~$training

~hnuld
~h()uld

h:J.sed upon t.he
t.hc pur:mit
pursuit
be awarded h:lsed

order by Pluintifr
ordcr
Pluintif1' arc likewise unfounded. The Supremc
Supreme Court's

DcJl..>ndants. The law is clear !hat in the absence or
holding on
un this issue is unchallenged by these DcJl.>J1dants.
of
the issuing of an injunction, there is no h!lsis
husis for
ror Ole
tJ1c award of
or lees hecausc:
necallsc: the pru1)'
pru1.y ha:-; not heen
been

·wrongfully
'wrongfully enjoined.
enjojned. Brady v. City of Homcdalc~
Homedale~ 130 Idaho 569. 573, 944 P. 2d 704, 708 (1997),
( 1997).

J.C.
I.e.

s.rx-cifically applicahle only ··in
••in nctions
6-91.8 A by its specific wording making it $JX-cifically

under this ace
acC (Tille () Chapter 9) does not apply. This election contest

i~;

not a •tort
'tort claim."

Additionally. for all the reasons staled
stated above rega.rding
regarding the other gtmcral applicatiun
application statutes
providing 1hr ..attorney
ltlomcy fees lor liivulotl.,-;
liivulou..-; suitg, there

c~!rtainly
c~!rrainly

was nO"bad
no ••bad faith"
faith"' on the part of

put·suing any Oflhis
of this litigation.
Plaintiff in bring tmd plll'suing
CONCLUSJON

nnly costs awanJabk
awan.J::tbk~ to Defendants City/\Vcat.hcr
lee required to file
The only
Cityf\Vcat.hcr arc the J.iling
tiling Icc
cosls of tht'
aHomey or !)arnlegaJ
their Answer and the costs
tht• t",,·o
tw·o respective deposilion
dcposilion transcripts. No attorney
(Jarnlegal

fees arc awardabk.

!..t
lL day of November. 2010.

DATED this .

((";·i
")"i'cvvl.l
eel--··
CJ/Vl.l Cel--··

·'to:'
.. " ''''''''''''
..,'''''U.'_ _ _ _ _ "~_~ _ _ ,_. __ ".,_ ••• ·,,.''''., • ••
, "' ,.,.,.,.n _
__
_
.,to:'_
__
_ .,
,,,.,
''"'""'''VI"•'•U·'---'--"~-~--•••-"""'""'""'"""'•,

.... , ....... n

"'"
"'''

Statr
StaJ'r Kelso. Attorney tor P~ninljlT
P~ainliiT Br.mnon

PLAINTI.FFS OBJECTION AND MOnON
MOTrON
3 MEMO.RANDL!M
MEMOHANDt.!M TN SUPPORT OF PLAINT/.Ff'S
TO DISALr,OW
CI.ArMED COSTS AND FJ.~ES
DISAU,OW DEFENDANTS CITY/WEATIIERS Cl.AfMED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy W~p\ai1cd
w~ptailcd to Mike Haman, Scott. KC(;d.
Kcc:d. Dnd
and Peter
Erhland, at.t.t:.rncys
at.l.l?.rncys f(lr Defendants on
Oil the . ..iX~.day
/1.:~~.day of Novcmhcr.
November. 2010 by rt~gular U.s.
U.S. Mail.
"::":~:,~.=j
..~
..::.·:~:.~.=j
. .~
·'/ L.t

. , / L . I I .( ./

(ij,..,.-- ...
i} (ij,../···

................ -... -.-.~"~~
__
........................
~.~~.. ::c,.. . i..("'~L:_~,
l..("'~t:-~.--

Starr Kelso

,,

______________

.,,--------------

4 MEMORANDUM
MEMORA.NDUM IN SUPPORT
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445

P,O,
P.O. Box 1312

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho
fdaho 83 ~ 16

~,..,

Tel: 208-765-3260

-

Fa.x: 20S-664-626
2()~-664-626 IJ

Att.orney fiJr
f(Jr Plaintiff Brmmon
IN TH1~
.JlJDICIAL DISTR~CT OF THE
THl~ 'OlSTR1CT
'OlSTRJCT C01JRT
COURT OF THE FIRST .ITJDICIAL
STATE OF II>AHO, IN
I.N A.NI>
A.NO FOR TIn:
TIU: COlJNTY Oft KOOTENAI'
KOOTENAI.

JIM

BRANNON~

Case Nf'J.
N.-J. CV-09-10010
NOTICE OF HE,I\RJNG
HE.I\RJNG
PL'\INTIFF'S
ON PL"IINTIFF'S

MOTIONS
DA
TE= D~cembcr 7. 20)
DATE=
20 J0

Plaintiff,

vs.
VII.

TIME:

2:00
2:00P.M.
P.M.

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE. IDAHO. ET.I\L.
ET.AL.

Defendants.
NOTICE rs
fS HEREBY GiVEN,
GIVEN, that a hearing shall he held on Tuesday
llcccmhcr
Ilcccmhcr 7, 20W at 2:00 o'clock p.m.,
p.m" hefore the Honmahlt: Charles W.
w.

H()S~ICk,
Hos~ack,

Senior District Judge in the courthouse in Coeur d'Alene. Idaho upon the f{.'illowing;
f{)lIowing;

PLAINTJJ'IF'S OBJECTION
013JECTJON TO MO'I'ION
1.
PLAINTJlIF'$
MO'nON TO DISALLOW TN PART
DEFENDANT' CITY/WEATHERS CLAIMED COSTS AND ALL OF CLAIMED
ATTORNEY AND PARALEGAL .FEES
,FEES
2.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PART OF AMENDED

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN

3.

PLAINTIFF'S OB.lEC''J10N
OB.IEC''JlON ANI)
AND MOTION TO DISALLOW

DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS

•.
))ATI
l)ATI
".
:,~:.~"'. .Il'".....
):tms

loTild
t"N'ovcm berr........"010
'?010.
/oTll
~
0 t'N'
day o

.·'·':?f)Ct~J
··:?f)u~J ul~
U!j~,,,.-,~.
. . .,~·

__
__
___ ,,,,,,.,,.,,,,,,,,,,,._,,,,
__
_
_ c--.::......:
c--.:;__: _
_ ".
,, ____
.................. _ ....-..,,
...

-~---~~-~----···~~-

Starr Kelso

---

Attorney for PlainlifT
PlaintifT

NOTICE OF HEARING
SC 38417-2011

Page 2453 of 2676

11/18/2010 15:24 FAX

2086646261

KELSO LAW OFFICE

~

002/002

CERTJFlCATE OF SERV1CE
CERTIFlCATE
SERVJCE

II certify thal
that a Iru,,~
lru"~ copy of'
orlhc
the I.loove
ahove and foregoing wa
wa..;... mailt:d on lhc IS'1'I1
lS·nJ day
of November 20 Il ()o to:

Mic.imci L. Haman
Mic.haci
H:;l.Iml.l1
Haman I.aw
l.aw Office
P.O. Bux
Box 2155
Coeur d' 1\lene:,
Alene:, Idaho 83816
Peler C. ErbIand.
Erbland. 188#2456
lSB#2456
Peter
Paine. Hambkn, Coffin, Brooke & MjJlcr, LLP
701 Front Avenue. Suite 10
1011
Post
POSl Office Box
I3ox E
CocuflfAlcnc. ldnho 83816-0328
CocunfAicnc.
Scott W. Reed, iSB#818

Lnw
P.O. Box A
Coeur d' l}I~fH:':,
l}l~fH:':, Iduh()
Idaho
Attorney at

(:=~:~':; , :.'·:~ .·: . . . . . . !?/
I?/ v..

~·8 . 16
~'8"16
,'

j'

.',' ) '

.-,·' S~:;::.
s~:;::. !~~~.: _~~t-£i<~::
-~~t-£J-:.-~::
!I

\,\......... __ ,./
, _..
,---"'

NOTICE OF HEARING
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ST~~TE Of
!
~
sr~~TE
Jf :[Y.4.Hlj
HY.4JiCi
~O~~~J'(
~O~~~J·( Dr
DF KOOTENAI?S~
KOOTENAJtS~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRit:fFOF
DISTRICfi:OF
S'U

;ft l
;it

KOOftit.WN!'d
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Koc31i'itWNrd

2
IQ: 21
222 AM 10:

~,C~i:
~
,c~i: ~1\~R:~~:fur1M~
~~~~R :~~:fur1M~

JIM BRANNON
Plaintiffs/Appellant,
Plaintiffs/Appellant,

)
)
)
)

v.

)
)
)
)

CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE,
ALENE, IDAHO
A municipal corporation, etaL
Defendants/Respondents.
Defendants/Respondents .

CASE NUMBER CV09-l
CV09-1 0010
00 10

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF APPEAL

)

Appeal from:

First Judicial District, Kootenai County.

Honorable:

Charles Hosack

Case Number from Court or Agency:
Order or Judgment appealed from:

CV-09-1 0010
Judgment filed on November 4, 2010

Attorney for Appellant: Starr Kelso
Attorney for Respondent: Michael L. Haman
Appealed by:

Plaintiff

Appealed against:

Defendant

Notice of Appeal Filed: November 15, 2010
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed:
Appellant Fee Paid:

No

Yes

Request for reporter's transcript filed:
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Name of Court Reporter: Valerie Nunemacher
Keri Veare
Allison Stoval
JoAnn Schaller
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene,
d' Alene, Idaho 83816
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261

!
>-ss

-'u I tNA/1

111

c'

2Dta Nr.v
N0V 23 AM
AH 10:
fO: 30
(lLERKjJJI • ,
(/LERKfPt
~

r

,

II.CTCQURT

·CTCOURT

.

DEP/11\.-. OEPII'\.-'

;C!()-'
~u-,
.·

Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST WDICIAL
mDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-09-10010
AFFIDAVIT OF KATHY LEWIS

vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE,
D' ALENE, IDAHO
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
ss.
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI)
KATHY LEWIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, testifies as follows:
1. I am over the age of 18, competent to testify, and make this statement upon personal
knowledge to which I will, if called to do so, will testify;
2. I am an employee of the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene.
Alene. My job duties entail, in part, the
overseeing of the licensing of individuals and businesses required to be licensed to

work within the city limits of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene and I have custody and control over the
Alene;
records identifying persons who are licensed in Coeur d'
d'Alene;
3. At the request of Starr Kelso, I reviewed the documents on file with the City of Coeur
d' Alene pertaining to detective and detective agency licensing in the City of Coeur
d'Alene

d'Alene
L.L.C. is, or was,
d'
Alene to determine whether Bill Morlin and or Morlinvestigations, L.L.c.

1 AFFIDAVIT OF KATHY LEWIS
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i

licensed as a detective and or detective agency in the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene at any

201 0 through the date of this affidavit.
time in the year 2010
4. Based upon my review of the documents pertaining to detective and detective agency
d'Alene,
Alene, neither Bill Morlin nor Morlinvestigations,
licensing in the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene
L.L.C. were licensed as a detective or detective agency by the City of Coeur d'
during any time in the year 2010 through the date of trris
tl-ris affidavit.

5. A true and correct copy of
ofthe
the City of Coeur d'Alene's ordinance(s) regarding the
Alene is
requirement that detectives and detective agencies be licensed in Coeur d'
d'Alene
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
Further Affiant sayeth not.

DA!E.V
D. j",Ib
lliyfb day ofN.~ember,
ofN_~ember, 2010.
DA!E.U

~a;(;/~~
~a;C/~~

Kathy Lewis
,'),~
l/"'l~
SWORN to the undersigned Notary Public on the~ay of
ofNovember,
November,
\\IIIII 111111!/0;
\\\\1/1111//1//0;

,\\\\,
~~~G,%
,\\\\, c
C...
...~~~GI
%~·
...
"'v~
v~ ~

~'$···
~'S.,.

UBLIC FOR I
\
Residing at€oem
at-eoem d'Ale~e-d'Ale~e= --. 0("-1oc-1- ~l <;
My Commission expires: \0 -3o
-30 ~~\( ~
MyCommissionexpires:\0

·~ ~"'NOTAR}:"'~'
~··'NOTAR}>-.~.
.~

22 f .....
.._..., ~\ ~
: :;.: '"'\Pusuc
In\, PUBLlC././0 ~~
-v·~·

- ,,'
,..

-v·~.

.

~

~
~

th~~ijj;·~~d on the_day of
th~~ijj;'~~d

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that a copy of
P"~!.IUftbllruia
November, 2010, to: Michael L. Haman; Scott Reed; and p"~/.IUftbO:ru1a

Starr Kelso

2
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STArl::
V11l
OUA TY '·LII11-t'J
CQUA
10
FILED:~
KOQTENAJ } SS
FiLED:~ OF KOOTENA.J}

e

20 I0NO
NOlII! 26

p~ 10~
(0~ fL
11
n

\)

/:
55
/:55
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OUfiT

.....
..
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'~~
~~

STARR KELSO
Auorney at Law "## 2445
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83816
Telephone: 208~
2{)8~ 765-3260
Frtx:
PrIx: 20R-664"·6261
AtlOnlcy
f()r Plrli
Attomcy f(lr
Plr~i ntj
nti rf
ff Brannon

IN
lN THE DiSTRICT COURT OF THE FIRS'r
FlRS'l' JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAI10,
IDi\110, IN ANO
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KO(JrENAT
KO<JT'ENAT

.11M
JIM BRANNC>N.
Plajntjn~
Plaintiff~

v::;.

CITY or COUER 0' ALENE. lDAl·.IO,
IDAl·.IO,
al.,
aI.,
Defendants.

(;;t.

CV-09-·lOOiO
CASE NO. CV-09··100iO
SUPPLEMENTAl. MEM<)RANDUM
IN Sl
SI JPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL OR IN Tl·.IE ALTt::I~NATJVE
ALTt::l~NATJVE TO
AL'll~R OR AMEND THE JUJ.KiMENT
AL'n~R

__

--_
............. __ ........ ......
............
_-_..........._.---·············--········-······--·
..·········---···········-·,

COMES NOW Plajntill
to IRep
Plaint ill hy and lhrough
through his attorney. and pursuant lo
IRCP Rule

59 (a) (6) and (7) and "IRCP
"IReI' Rule 59 (e) submits this supplemental memorandum in
.·support
supporl of his motion.
UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS ClTIZENS ABSENTEE VOTERS ACT

PlaintiiThas
that the UniftmllCd
Unif(mned and Overseas
Plainli
IT has argued continuously and regularly thatlhc

( UOCAV A) did not apply to the Novcll1lx~i
Novcmlx~i 3, 2()09
2009 City of
Citizens Absentee Voters Act (UOCAV
Coeur d' A
Alcn(;~
len':~ General Election and that the mere Jilin!!.
fhm1 docs not in
-..... of a UOCAVA fbml

and (If
of itsdr
itself cs;tablish a pen.;on
person to be quulified
qualified t()
to vole .in the City's election. The Court"s
Memorandum

D~cision at

utili7..ed
pages 4 through 6 discussed this issue. The Court tltili7..ed

••l.JOCA V
VA
cva.luaLe the i:>:-luc.
i:>:-;uc. (Mem.
··UOCA
A c:riwria''
C:riWrl(l" to cva.luaw

D~.c.
D~·c.

l<.m.nd that there
p. 5) The Court
COllrt {(.H.I.nel

was no obligation to verify residence lor City voting digibility. The Court recognized
Dlal the municipaltcsidcncyrcquin.mcnt-i!;-ditTen:nt
municipalrcsidclTcyTCqUinmcnt-i!;-di rfen:nl than tor feaerul or slalc-cicct.t4.io
~._~~_
Utal
slatc-clcct.J4.io....n;:,..$
n""'s~.-~~
Noncthcle:s$, it held that. since it cou]d
Hnd "110
'"no applicable case law" limiting UOCA V
VA
Noncthcle:S$,
cou1d nnd
A
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
NEW
SC 38417-2011
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TRIAL OR TO Al:rL~R
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(except lbr
Ibr the .specific
specific voter n.:,'quirclllt:I1L"I
st~ltulcs r~garding
r~gardjng I"nunicipal
n.:,-quirctnt:nL"' of Idaho statulcs
rnunicipal elections
and
nnd residt::ncy requirements) that UOCAVA applied to a person·~
per50n'~ right to vote i.n tt
federal election. :-:itatc
:-:;tate election, ;.md
,md city election,
dcctio.n, equally.
lJOCA VA and
The (\mrfs holding regarding lJOCAVA

it~
il~

ort..iOCA VA a<;
interpretation ort.iOCAVA

supplanting the requirement to investigate
inve:o;tigalt! accul'acy
aCCUJ11cy of residency. under Le.
LC. SO-445,
50-445,

when a
tll)OCA
j',)nn is submit.ted,
lJOCA v A ahsentcc ballol.
ballot.l·(mn
submitted, specifically
specilically r<.::garding Paquin,
Friend, Gagnon and Farkes was ,Ul
'Ul error of law.

In 200 I tht~ applicability of UOCA V
VA
A to elections. including locnl e,lections,
eJections, was
lOot).
uddrcsscd hy the Second Circuit in Rom(!u
Rom<!U v. CO/Wfl,
Colwn. 265 F 3d fIX
/IX (2"d
(2" 11 C'if'.
(.'ir. 1001).
As the l\omeu
N.omeu Court held,

1. UOCA v
V1\"
1\",....extend~
extcnd~ l'cdcral
I'ederal v()ting
Vt)ting rights to u.s.
U.S. citizens lhrrncrly
Ihrrncrly
a Stale who

r~-sidc
r~'Sidc

outside lhe United

Stat~.~s. 5;e(~
5ie'~
Stall.~s.

citi~cns

or

41U.S.C. . .·ectioFl
·ection /97Hl~
lo
41lJ.S.C.
197Hl~ I 1o

197·W~6. "
197.YF-6."

2. UOCA V1\
A .....
StatC$ to accept and process ... any othenv1sc
othcn\l1SC valid voter
"" ... requires State$

npplication from an abs\!nt..
.oversea~ voter .. :'
:•
registration I.lpplication
abs\!J1t.. .()vcrsel.t~
3. lobe
To be an "overseas voter" the person must reside
resiue outside of the United States
SUttcs
and h(: (otherwise:) quali.ticd
qutlliticd to vOle
vole in the last plac~ in which the pcr.sOI1
pcr.son was
domiciled before leaving the United States.

4. Congress "acted in accordance with t.he
t.hc requirement.';
requirements of the Equal Protection
Claus<:: in requiring States and t.enitorir;:s
t.o extend
eXlend voting rights inji.·deral
t.enitorir::s to
inji:.·deral

dec:tions to
t.o foJ'mer
fOJ'l'l1cr residcnrcitizcns residing outside the United SUlte~
State~ .. but not
f()mlcr re:::ident citil:tms
territor)' of the l.initcd
to f()mlCr
citii!:l.ms rc::;iding in eith~r a State
Slate or a territory'
St.at<;.~s."
St.ak~s." (cmphasisl.lddcd)
(emphasis added)

5. Romeu was a former rc~idcnt of
ofNew
State. "New
''New
New York Slate.

Yorl~

com;til.utionally
vott:rs re.\·ide
re.,·ide in New
com;til.t1lionally require that New York vott:fS
course to

th\~

m"y
nl(lY

Y(lrk~
y(lrk~ su~jcct

of
or

UOCA VA :.md the Supremacy Cbusc."
provisions of the UOeA
Cbu~c."

(crnpha.sis added)
(crnphasis

's decision to move
State l~rre,o;itknce
c~j"resitknce will i.nc.::vitnbly
6. "A cili::en
cili::en',o;
m(Jve crway.from
llW(Jy.lrom her Siale
j,nc.::vitnbly
involve certain loses.
to::;c~. She will lose the right to participate in that Slate's
Slnte's local
cJcction~ ... " (emphasis added)
elections

MOTION Page
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1\ person who changes his or her rcsidcllc~
1.() <Ul()tlK~r
rcsidcnc~ from
frl..)m one St<lt.c
St<lt.c 1.0
<mutlK~r Slal~
Stat~ or to a
Ji:d~n:tl

territory, not
nOllO
to a.a. !()reign
I()rcign country, loses
I()sc~ his or h~r right to vote in federal elections

from the for'mer
for·mer residence Slnte.
State. This is particularly true in the case of Gagnon bccnlJse
been use

uncontcf.ted tcstim.ooy
tcstim.ony at trinl . hy her mOlhcr·in-l:lw.
molhcr·in-l:lw. csl:ablishcd
the uncontcf.tec.
cSI:ablishcd that she had never
lived in Coeur d' /\]cne.
/\lene. 1-lcr
l-lcr UOCA VA absentee ballot
balloL requesL
request is void on its face.
A pers()f'l
SLale to a t()Tcign
perSM'! who changes his or
M her residence from a Stale
fbrcign country is
eligible under UOCAVA to vote in alec/eral
afecJeral eleclion
dec/ion from lhc.l(lrmcr
Lhc.t(lrmcr residence State.
not. gr.mted any rights by UOCAVA to vote in her 1brmcr
lbrmer
This person, however. is .not.
residence State's general or
0,. local elections.

Th.i~

i:-) particularly lnlc
lntc to Paquin. Fricnd~
Friend~ and

F::srkcs.
cnter it'>
lrial
F::srkc:.:. T'hc COll.n's
Cou.rt. 's refusal to enter
it-> Order rcquiJing
rcqui1ing these persons to appear at the erial
v c.n the election ollicials
t:csti.fy. gl
givc.n
complete lui lure to
and testify.
ol1icials complet.e
t.o

rc~,uired
rC~'\1ired

und,~rtak.e
lInd'~rtJk.e

any !:li:atutorily
!:ItatulOrily

invcst.i;!(ltion
invcst.\!.!iltion into
int.o "Tcsidcncv"
"rcsidcncv"
as required bv I.e.
I.C. section 50·445 was additional
.,

~,
...
~1...

.,

tl
II

or

crri:'lr. The show'ing
show·ing of the Tesidem~y
residcm~y of these voters. as dcJinl.'!d
dcJin~o'!d at I.e.
l.C. s~~cl.ion 50~402. as
crrl)r.

being in a t{)rdgn country establishes atl prima facie case (lfthe
ofthe invalidity
inva.lidity oflhc
of the vote and
required that the Defendants come f()rth
/()rth with, and Introduce.
eSlablishing that
Introduce, evidence eslablishing
the City, through its conlnlctor, had complied with ill'
ubligation to verify rcsjdcney
it~ obligation
rcsidcney of

these UOCA VA abscnt~~c ballot applicants .. No such evidc.ctcc
evidc.clCC was introduced,
introduce-d, and
~U1d lhe
the
t.estimony cst.ahlishcd that
I.h~lt no attempt was made to make any investigation.
testimony

or

While tht.~sc
tht.~SC ::>pecilic
$pecilic UOCAV 1\
/\ voters were the focus 0(' the evidence. lx."Cuusc
lx.--causc of
their ohvious
Ihr the purposes of a tn\.J.nicipal
municipal decthH':..
obvious lack of "residency"
''residency" lhr
clccti<m. there wcC(~,
wen~, as

lesLilied
o1lid(1ls~
uther such persons who voted by UOCA VA
VA
lestilicd to hy elections onida
Is~ numen)us
numenJus other
absentee ballot applications and whose n:sidcncy .lbr
.Ibr rmrposes ofthe City·~
Cjty'~ General
Flection was rH)t
n!)t

invcgtigat~d or
invcstigat~d

vcrilied.
veri lied.

CONCLUSION
The Court should
Supremacy

Clm1s~ to
Clmls~

rccogni~t:

only

t~dcml
t~dcn\l

the strict application or
of UOCA V
VA
A lmder
tmder lh,~
Lh<.~
elections and nnt to Shlt.C
stat.c or municipal. dect.ions.
dcct.ions. The

Court, given these 4 additionally illegal ballots, and lht:
Court.
Lht: many other lIOCA.
lJOCA. VA ahsentee
absentee

ballot applicam:s,
applical.H:S, ft.lr
f(.lr which there was no residency investigalion,
investigation. should ()rdcr
(>rdcr a new trial
or amend nr alter its Judgment and granl
grant Plaintiff's request f(,lT
f(lr a new elel~tion.
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Xavier ROMEU, Plaintitf-Appeiiant,
Rossello, Intervenor-Plaintiff~Appeliant,
lntervenor-Piaintiff'~Appellant, in his official capacity as
Pedro Rossell6,
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,

v.
William S. COHEN, Secretary of Defense of
WilliamS.
ofthe
the United States of America,
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America,
George Pataki, Governor of the State of New York & Carol Lee
Sunderland, Commissioner of the Westchester County Board of
Sunderiand,
Defendants-Appellees.
Elections, Defendants·Appellees.
Docket Nos. 00-6303, 00-6287.
0()..6287.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Argued October 30. 2000,
2000.
Decided September 6, 2001.
•< 119 '120 Xavier Romeu, Isla Verde.
Verde, CA, Puerto Rico, plaintiff-appeJlant,
plaintiff-appellant, prose.
pro se.

i 20

Angel E. Rotger Sabat, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Gustavo A.
Gelpi, Solicitoi General. Rosa N. Russe Garcia. Deputy Solicitor General. and Irene S.
Soroeta-Kodesh. Assistant Solicitor General, for intelWnor-plaintiif.appellant
inte!Wnor--plaintiff'-appellant GO\emor
Go\emor Pedro
Rossell6.
Rossello.
{by Daniel
DanielS.
Mary Jo White. United Slates Attorney for the Southern District of New York (by
S. Alter
and Gideon A. Schor,
Schor. Assistant United States Attorneys).
Attorneys), for defendan1s·appeUees
defendan1s-appeUees Secretary
S. Cohen and President William ,lefk..'fSon Clinton.
of Defense William
WilliamS.

Alan D. Scheinkman,
Scheink.man, Westchester County Attorney {by Stacey Dolgin Kmetz, Chief Deputy
County Attorney, and Deborah A. Porder, Senior Assistant County Attorney!,
Attorney), lOr
\Or defendantappellee Carol Lee Sunderland, Commissioner of the Westchester County Soard
So.ard of Elections.
Assistant Attorney
Eliot Spitzer. Attorney General of the State of New York (by Joel Graber. ASSistant
General), for d~'}fendant·appellee
d~'}fendant-appellee George Pataki, Go\(~rnor
Go\<~rnor of the State of N~:w York.
Gregorio Igartua
lgartua de Ia
la Rosa, amicus curiae in support of plaintiff-appellant.

Before WALKER. Chief Judge, OAKES. and LEVAL. Circuit Judges.
LEVAL, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from the Judgment
judgment of the United States District Court for thE'!
thF! Southern District
of New Yoik-(ShtFa
Yofk-(Shlra A:-Seheindtifl;-J:-);-dismissing
A;:-Seheindtifl;-J:-);-dismissing his-complaint COr
for failure to state_.._.a_..c
la....,imcu......_ _ _ _ __
state=~a.....
c......
....
lailllim.l.L....
Plaintiff, a U.S.
U,S. citizen residing in Puerto Rico who was fonnerly a resident of New York:,
asserts the tight to 'v1Jtc
'v1Jte for New York's presidential electors in the election 11eld
l'leld Nowmber 7.
2000. One theory of his complaint is that the Uniformed and Owrseas
0\.erseas Citizens Absentee
ttle New York Election Law ("NYEL") violate the U.S,
U.S. Constitution
Voting Act ("UOCAVA") and the
SCby38417-2011
2463
form0rly Page
extending the right to l.()te
\()te in a presidential
preSidential election to U.S. citiZetlS
CitiZe1l$ formf:}rly
domiciled
in of 2676
New York and now residing outside the United States, but not to U.S.
U .5. citiz~ns formerly
- -- -•_1-

- _ _ I __ L.._I .....
---1--L..-1
..... -_

r_

.-.......
,. ..... "l"' ....
.-.o-..,.,..,."),..-.rr.~.
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- CourL..
domiciled in New York and now residing in a U.S. territory. See 42 U.S.C.
U.S. C. §§ i973ff-1 & 1973ff6; N.Y.
Plaintiff contends also that these statutes
N,Y, Elec. Law§
law § 11-200(1) (McKinney 1998). Plaintilfcontends
ha~.e infringed his constitutional rights to \Klte
hal.e
\(lte and trawl. and his rights under the Pri\lileges and
Immunities and Due Process Clauses. Finding no such 'lliolations.
~olat'ons. we affirm the judgment of the
district court.

Background
Plaintiff.appellant xavier' Romeu,
Plaintiff-appellant
Romeu. a natural bom
born United States citizen,
citizen. Jj~
Ji~ in Westchester
County in New York State from 1994 through May 16. 1999. Romeu registered to wte and did
\Ote in New York in the 1996 presidential elections, casting a
3 ballot in Westchester County. On
mo-ved to and became a resident of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
May 17, 1999, Romeu mo'ved
On July 9, 1999, Romeu registered to wte
\Ote in Puerto Rico. U.S. territories, including Puerto
Rico. do not participate in presidential elections,
Rico,
elections. Subsequently,
Subsequently. Romeu requested an absentee
ballot from the State of New York to ~te in the 2000 presidential election.

l
i?1

Owrsf'...as
State absentef; ballot laws are go~rned, in part, by the Federal Uniformed and OWr5f'...as
\Oting rights to U.S. citizens
Citizens Absentee Voting Act ("UOCAVA").
("UOCAVA"), which extends federal \Ofing
formerty
formerly citiums of a State who reside outside the United Stales.
States. See 42 U.S,C.
U.S. C. § 1973ff·1
1973ff-1 to
2 1 formerly resident in a State who mows outside
1973ff-6. The Act presen.es for a citizen • 121
the United Stat0s the right to ~te in federal elections held in the citizen's pre\Aous
pre\J1olJs State of
pro\Ades that each "State" (8
(a term defined under the
residence. In relevant part, the UOCAVA pro\rides
Act to include U.S. territories) shall permit absentee "owrseas" wters "to use absentee
special, primary, and runoff
registration procedures and to wte by absentee ballot in general, speCial,
elections for Federal office" and requires States to "accept and process ... any otherwise valid
'-()ter
registratit)n application from an absent,
absent ,.. o\erse;)s
owrseas '-()ter,
\.()ter registratit,n
\.()ter, if the application is received by
the appropriat~~ State election official not less than 30 days before the election." 42 U .S.C.
§
.S.C.§
1973ff-1. The Act defines "owrseas ~ter," in relelA':lnt
rele~A':tnt part,
part. as "a person who resides outside
the United St&es and is qualified to wte in the las1 place in which the person was domiciled
before IOO'lo1ng
lea'll1ng the United States" or "a person who resides outside the United States and (but
for such residence) would be qualified to wte
\Ote in the last place in which the ~rson was
iea\Ang the United States." 4Z U.S.C. § 1973ff-6(5)(8)
1973ff-6(5)(B) & (C}.
domiciled befor~ iea\ring
(C). Under the
the plaintiff.
plaintiff, rEffiides in a U.S. territory does not qualify as
statute's definition, a person who, like lhe
'IIO~er'' because such a person does not reside "outside the Uni1.ed States." The
an "o~rseas \A)~er"
UOCAVA further defines the term "State" to mean "a Slate
State of the United States, the District of
th1;1 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American
Columbia, thl;1
Samoa." so that a U.S. citizen li\ling in a U.S. territory such as Puerto Rico who mo~s outside
the United Statas retains wllate\er
\Ote in elections for federal omce that the citizen
wllatewr right to wte
exerCised had he or she continued to reside in that U.S. territory. 42 U.S.C,
U.S. C. §
could haw exercised
1973ff~(6).

Carrying out 'lI1€;'
t11e mandate of the UOCAVA, the New York Election Law ("NYE:~L") provides that a
U.S. domicile was
U.S. citizen "now residing outside the United States" whose most recent U,S.
New York is Emtitled to l,(lte
\(lte as a "special federal loOter," so long as "such citizen
c!tizen does not
\Ote and is not liUting
\iQting in any other
maintain a place of abode or domicile, is not registered to 1o0te
N. Y. Elec. Law
Law§
§ 11-200(1)
election district. state, territory or possession ofthe United States.''
States," N.Y.
(McKinney 1998).l!J
Romeu received a standard form New York State absentee ballot application on September 27.
1999.
1999, from the Westchester County Board of Elections. Pursuant to the NYEL and the
UOCAVA, Section 8 of the absentee ballot application form required Romeu to swear or affirm
that-he-was "not ... -wtif'lg..in
tllat-Re-was"not
-wting-in any other US
U S State, territory or possession or sUbdi\lision
subdi\lision thereof
in the coming eiection(s)." Seclion
Section 6 of the absentee ballot application form required that
citizen~• living outside
Romeu swear or affirm that he was in one of sewral categories of U.S. citizE.'n~'
the United States. none of which included a U.S. Citizen
citizen residing in a U.S. territory. As a U.S.
·1n
citizen residing in a U.S. territory, Romeu ·'122
122 was unable to swear or affirm either that he was
'In
SC not
38417-2011
ink'!
a wter in
k'! U.S. territory, or that he was a U.S. citizen residing outside tho Page
United 2464
States.of 2676
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Romeu brought this suit on March 24,
24. 2000. seeking an order compelling th~) Westchester
Cv'"'uly
~::le\..li~l't ~MM to i~9UC
i~!luc him 0
o b..'lilot
b.."lllot ::md il
.aa d9clarat"",
d9clarato"J jurlomt=-nt
thr~t thp,
thR UOCAVA ~nQ
Cv'-lllly I:lIe\..li~l·t
jurlompnt thR1
the NYEL violate his constitutional rights. In particular, Romeu claimed violations of his
trowi. his rights under the Pri'llileges
Pri\lileges and Immunities Clause
constitutional rights to wte and to tmwl.
of Article N. his Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment Due
DUel Proce.ss rights. and his rights to equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth and Filth Amendments. Pedro Rossoll6, the th<.
th<....,,..·nGO\emor
Rico, interwned in support of Romeu's claims.
Go"~emor of Puerto Rico.

On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. the district court dismissed Romeo's
Romeu's claim.
\lie-,·o~ that Rcmeu. as a citizen of the United States resrding in Puerto
Aithough expmssing the ,,;e-,'"
Rico and denied the right to \()te for the President of the United States, "is sullering a grave
ofRomeu's
injustice." Judge Scheindlin found no ~olation of
Romeu's constitutional rights primarily
because the deprivation of which he complains is created by the Constitution.
Romeu filed ao expedited appeal in this court. Because of the importance of speedy resolution
of Romeu's appeal before the Nowmber 2000 presidential election, we summarily affirmed the
order of the district court on October 31, 2000. noting that we would issue an opinion in due
course setting out our reasoning. We now issue that •Jpinion.
'Jpinion.

Discussion

ij ~2~2:'.\3

In the Jones Act of 1917. also known as the Organic Act of 1917, Congress extended U.S.
citizenship to persons then li\Ang
Ji'.Ang in Puerto Rico,
Rico. and to persons bom in Puerto Rico thereafter.
See Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). Far
For voting rights, howe~r,
hawe~r, the status of a U.S. citizen
U.S. territory of Puerto Rico is not identical to that of a U.S,
U.S. citizen living in a State.
li\Ang In the U.S,
t11e Constitution empowers Congress "to dispose of and mak.e all needful Rules
Article N of tl1e
and Regulations respecting the Territory ...
.. ' belonging to the United States." U.S. Const. art. 4.
§ 3. In the Insular Cases. decided in 1901.0 and in a series of subsequent decisions, the
Supreme Court has held that because territories such as Puerto Rico belong to the United
Unit eel
States but are not "incorporated into the United States as a body politic," C-orr v. United
49 L.Ed. 1f8 (19~; see also
Stet~§.~ll:§.;. 138, 143~..N~4
a/so §,g/?JI(,;
§.f!/?Jtr,: ~E,eopte
St?!.t~§.~ll:,§,,;,
1431wN~4 S.Ct. 898.
898 . 49
~E.eople of
forto Rico, 258JJ.S.
258J.I.S. 298,,)04-05.
298,,)04-05, 42 S.Ct. 343.
66 LEd. 627,~1922),
627.~1922), Congress's regulation of
forto
343.66
the territories under Article N is not "subject to all the restrictions which are·
are. impos~ upon
[Congress] when passing laws for the United States." Dorr; 195
1~5 U.S. at 142:
142; see also Jose A.
Amencan Empire 45-51 (1979); Juan R. Tom.tella. The Supreme
Cabranes. Citiumship
CitiZF.:1I1Ship and the Amenc(JfI
Rico; The Doctrine of Separate anc}
af/(} lJneqLla/40·74
Court and Puerto Rico:
lJnequal40·74 (1985}. Congress's power
in the territories is not unlimited:
unlimited; territorial regulations must comport with those basic principles
fem, "the basis. of all free govemment."
"so fundamental [in] nature" that they fom,
gowmment." :QElMles
:f2E.IMies v.
BidtMJI/, 1~?}d:,,$,
1~?J-!.,. $, 244,~"~91.
244.~"~91, 21 S.q.
S.Ct. 770, 4§J;;;.Ed.
4§_~Ed. 1088 (1~Q.~.~~.
(1~9.~-~~· J,,
conc,~~ng). But
BidtMJl/,
J" conc,~~n9)·
such principles
principles'· 123
)23 of fundamental justice do not incorporate all the mand(:ltes
mand(:lleS of the Bill of
_$plzac,"_?,~8 U.S. at .~g4'()5,
.~g4.05, ~~§..Ct. 34~; !29!!·
gR£!. 195 U.;;S. at 149,;
14~\ ?4 S.Ct.
S.C1. ..?08;
Rights. See .$pllac,".?~8
Territory_pf Ht)l•w!:lii
}!&:mkiC11i, 1.90
217-J8, 23 S.CL]87,
S.C!,;_J87, 4~vk
1016l1903).
Territorypf
Hi:)VIi<!:lii v.
v. ..!!&:mkiclli,
1,90 U.S. 19L?11.
19L?11 217-.18,
4{J~; Ed. 1016_(1903).
r

Rico, like all U.S. citizens li\4ng in U.S. territories, possess more
Citizens li\Ang in Puerto Rico.
limited 'o()ting
li~n9 in a State. Puerto Rico does not elect wting
wUng
\(Iting rights than U.S. citizens li-..ng
representatilo(ls
representati~Kls to the U.S. Congress. It is represented in the House of Representatiws by a
Resident Commissioner who is "entitled to recei~ official recognition ... by all of the
departments of the Gowmment or the United States," but who is not granted full wting rights.
See 48 U.S.C.
U.S,C. § 891: see also Juan R. Torruella, Hac;a
Hacia Donde vas Puerto Rico?.
Rico? 107 Yale LJ.
L.J.
1503. 1519--20
151g..20 & n. 105 (1998) (re\iiewing Jose Trias Monge, Puerto Rico: Thf) Trials of the
Oldest Colony
tl,e World (1997».
(1997)). In addition, citizens residing in Puerto Rica
eolony in tile
Rico do not l,()te
wte for
the--President
the-President and Vice-Rresident of the United States. Indeed, the Constitution does not
~~~~------------~~~----------directly confer on any citizens the right to l,()te
\(Ite in a presidential election. Article II, section 1
pro~des insll!:'!;!ld
inslt!:'!;!ld that ''[e)ach
"[e)ach state shall appoint. in such manner as the legislature thereof may
direct. a numb
•.}f of electors."
electors," whose function is to s~:lect
S~)lect the President. 11,e
numb•.}r
l11e Constitution thus
"vOte in presidential elections on electors designated by thF.J
tilF.) States. not on
confers the rigllt to 'vOte
SCindi\.4dual
38417-2011
Page388
2465 of 2676
citizens. See Rush
Au.c:h v Goff;,
GOff], 531 U.S,
U.S. 96.
96, 121 S.Ct. 525. 529. 148 L.Ed.2d
(2000). ACCOl'fJingly.
AcCOI'fJingly. no u.s.
U.S. Citizen.
citizen. whether"residing
whether" residing in'a'State
in'a'state or'territory 01:
Ol: ~iSE;Where',
~iS'(;i'Where·, has
t
t
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an expressly declared constitutional right to vote for electors in presidential elec~ions. See
U.~w· 1,25.
1, 25, 13 S.Ct. 3, 3€J.Ed.
3§.J.Ed. 8.€.9 (1892) ("The clause under
McPherson v;V; .9lackf]_T:
.918CkfJ.( 146 U,~w'
conSideration does not read that the people or the citizens shall appoint. but that 'each state
consideration
shalL
').
shall.. ...
.."').
Despite the fact that the Constitution confers the power to appoint electors on
01) States rather
indhlidua! citizens. most U.S. citizens ha\e a limited. constitutionally enforceable light
than on indhAdlla[
right
to \Ote
wte in presidt"!ntial elections as those elections are currently configured. The States haw
uniformly exercised their Article II\I authority by delegating the power to appoint presidential (and
vice-piesidentiai}
residing in I,he
l.he State to be exercised in democratic
vice-piesidentiai) slectors to U.S. citizens
citiz@nsresiding
elections. In so delegating tho power to appoint electors. States are barred under the
thal power in any way that ""';olates
"...;olates other specific pro"';sions
pro...;sions of the
Constitution from delegating that
U.S ..~?,;}.
29. ~~~S.Ct. 5, 21J-.Ed.2.!L?4 (196~1;
Constitution." J!yillit:)ms
JfYilli,':lms vv... Bhodes,193
~hodes,~93 u.s
~?.;}. 29,
(196~,1; see also
Anderson v.
v._,t;;.'-?'ie1)rF}?,ze,
,r;;?'iel>re?.,ze, 460 U.§,;.
U.§.;. 780, 7.94-95
7.94-950,
n, 18
18.__1Q3
...193 S.CtJ564, 75 ~.,:.E,_d.~_9
~.,:.E,.d.~9 547 (1983).

~ :1 ~

U.S. citizens who are residents of Puerto Rico and the other U.S. territories ha~ not recei~
similar rights to \Qte for presidential electors because the process set out in A,ticle
A:ticle II for the
appointment of electors is limited to "States" and does not include tem10ries.
terri1ories. U.S. territories
(including Puerto Rico) are not States, and therefore those Courts of Appeals that haw decided
the issue ha~~ all held that the absence of presidential and vice-presidential '!lOting
'!!Oting rights for
U.S. citizens living in U.S. territories does not ~olate the Constitution. See lfL~~~tua
IfL~~lt(la Dl:?~~a
De~~a Rostl
Rosc:1
~fJpd StAt~.E/... ., 32 F.3d
~f!.ed
F. 3d~-'
~., 9·10 (1~t
(l~t Cir.1994H~uri?..ml
Cir.1994L(~uri?..ml ("lgartua
("/gartua f'): ~.~L9.mcy
~-~(qrrwy Gengral of
!!!f Territory of Gi.L~United
Gi.l~Ur)ited States, 738 F.;.2d
F.;,2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir.1984) ("Since Guam ...
'" is
not a state, it Gan
GClrl haw no electors, and plaintiffs cannot exercise indi\ridual
indi'lriduall,(ltl;)s
\('lti;)S in a
prcoidontiol oloction. "):
fll<:fll.a!")!ttt.<t
f!l<:nl.a!")!ttt.<r ()P.J.fl
{)P,1.fl Ra:m
Rmm v. ~jt~d
~il~d States. 229 F.
F.:'$(~
:)(~ aq,~,ll~' '124
r.2QQ.Q2J2.':7t curi.~ (" Igartu8
(1st
(1:::t Ci
Cir.2qQ.Q2J2.':7r
lgartua Ir)
lr) (reaffirming the holding of Igartua
lgartua I).
/).

i"'i""'"

r

INf:J face here is a slightly different one -- not whether Puerto Ricans haw a
The question INIi:J
constitutional right to \n)te for the President, but rather whether Equal Protection is violated by
the UOCAVA, !n.
in. that it provides presidential wting
\Oting rights to former residents of States residing
outside the United States but not to former residents of States residing in .Puerto Rico. like
Like the
First Circuit, we answer this question in the negati~. See !9Jutufl/,
!flJutuel, 32 F.3d at 10·11.

Plaintiff contends that because of the distinctions it draws among wrious categories of U.S.
U. S.
under the Equal Protection Clause.
citizens, the UOCAVA is subject to strict scrutiny underthe
Defendants argll~ in response that application of strict scrutiny is inappropriat0,
lnappropriat0, and that the
application of s1rict scrutiny is precluded by the Supreme Court's decision In H,;Jrris
H,".Jfris X~ Rosart,Q;.
Rosart_g._
446 U.S .•
..§§~L_?51.5"2,
§§~L_?51·5.2, 100 S.QL1929,
s.qL1929, ~~~.Ed.2d 5~?
5~?. (19801,{per
(19801.(per curiam)
curiam). (holding that under
Article IV. section 3, Congress "may treat Puerto Rico differently from States. so long as there
is a rational basis for it.s
iI,S actions"); see also Calffary,g_
CaUfary,,9. v. Gautier Torres .•1.35 t.J.§;
t.J§,; 1, 3 n. 4,,.,.98
41",..98
S.Ct.
S.q~ 906,
906. 55 L.Eq.2d 65 (1978) (per curiam) ($U9ge~;ting
(sugge~;ting that ''Congress
"Congress has the power to treat
Puerto Rico diiffJrently
dilffJrently and that ewry federal program does not ha\oe to be extended to it"). Bllt
But
see Loe~z Lopez :!.:-...~rol1.
:.£__~ron. 84:1
844 F.2d 898,913
898, 913 (1st Gtr.1988)J...1grruello,
G!£.1988)J...1grruella, ,~.~··.. concur~in9
concur~ing in part and
dissent~l}9 in pa~.
dissent~r:!g
Giwn the deference owed to Congress in making "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
r-1 § 3, we conclude that 1he
lhe UOCAVA's
the Territor{' of the United States, U.S. Const. art. rol
distinction between former residents of Stales now living outside the United States and fonner
reSidents of States now living in the U.S. territories is not subject to strict scrutiny. As then·
residents
Judge Ginsburg obseMd in 9!:.!iban v. Vetf!p.ms
Vetf!{f.Jf1S Adn~nisl,.atlon.
Adn"!J.nistratlon. ~?~8
9?~8 F.2.dJ_:l54,
F.2dJj54, 116Q
(D.C.Cir. !~2nl.
!~2D.:. "[t]o
''[t]o require the gO\emment
go\emment ... to meet the most exacting standard ofre\liew ...
(D.C.eir.
would be inconsistent with Congress's '(l]arge
'[Ilarge powers' (under Article IV] to 'make all needful
Rules-and-RegulationSJeSpecting
the Territo!)' ... bejonging
beJonging to the United States."' Id.
Rules-and-RegulationSJeS~/d. (Citations
(cjtations
go~.erning the limits of Congress's
omitted). We need not decide, howewr, the precise standard gOl.erning
authority to confer wting
\Otin9 rights in federal elections on former residents of StB'les
Stffies now living
out$ide
out$
ide the United States while not conferring such lights on former residents of States now
li\ling in a U.S. i"erritory.
j"erritory. F'or we conclude that regardless whether this distinction is
appropriately
;;malyzed
;;tnalyzed
under rational basis relAew
reiAew or intennediate scrutiny. or
01' under
some
SC 38417-2011
Page
2466 of 2676
alternati~ analytic framework independent of the three ..tier standard that has been (~stablis hed

4/14

11/26/2010 13:41 FAX
11/26/2010

2086646261

KELSO LAW OFFICE

~010/020

v. Cohen, 265 f. 3d 118118 - Court...
in Equal Protectitio cases. see Guutlf!!'
Torres~.,_~35 U'~~.,D.~
U.~~-.D-~ 98 .§.Ct 900
GClutlf!!' Torrest.."~35
gOO ("Puerto Rico
,,.,meu
.•
IJmeu

has a relationship with the United States 'that has no parallel in our history.··
history,·' (quoting
F.xarnining, ?_q;.,~:-(J:lores.ge
r;,_q;.,~~:,_•:::lores.fle Oterq
__4J6 u.s.
S~?.J 596.96
596,96 §.:.9t. ?.264.1.~
?..264.1_~ L.E~1sL65
L.E~1SL65 (1976))).
FXa(1linitlfl
O(ero~_4J6
U,S. 5~?J
Congress may distinguish between those U.S. citizens formerly residing in
in;,~
;,~ State who liw
outside the U.S
U.S,... and those who li..e in the U.S. territories.
between U.S. citizens moving from a State to a foreign
The distinction drawn by the UOCAVA betwoon
country and U.S. citizens mo'lo1ng
mO'lo1ng from a State to a U.S. territory is supported by strong
considerations. and the statute is well tailored to seM
ser.e these considerations.
conSiderations. For one thing,
wno move outside the United States. many of whom are United States military service
citizens -wtlo
"125
personnel, might be completely excluded from participating in the election of gO\lernmental
go~.~ernmental ··12s
officials in the United States but for the UOCAVA. In contrast. citizens of a State who mow to
\IOta in local elections for officials
offiCials of Puerto Rico's gOlemment
Puerto Rico may wte
go~emment (as
{as well as for
the federal post of Resident Commissioner). In this regard. it is significant to note that in
excluding citizens who mow from a State to Puerto Rico from the statute's benefits. the
treIDS tMm in the same manner as it treats citizens of a State who iea'oe
iaCM:) that State
UOCAVA trerus
reSidence in another State. Had Romeu left New York to become a resident of
to establish residence
Florida, he would similarly not haw been permitted to exercise the right create(i by the
UOCAVA to \Ote in the federal elections conducted in New York. And if a citiz,~~n of Puerto Rico
took up residence outside the United States. the UOCAVA would entitle that citizen to
partiCipate in Puerto Rico's elections for the federal
continue. despih;J her foreign residence, to participate
\()ting rights in the prior place of
office of Resident Commissioner. Congress thus extended '-<>ting
residence to those U.S. citizens who by reason of their mo~ outside the United States would
otherwise hal.e
ha~.e lacked any U.S. \Oting rights, without similarly extending such rights to U.S.
Stet.f)s. possess wting
citizens who. having mo\ed to another political subdi"';sion
subdio,.ision of the United Stet.es.
rights in their new place of residence.
residence, See McDonald v. Board o[
or"Election
Election Q!zmm'rs.
Q5zmm'rs. 394 U.S.
?02. 807, 80~,~w,§.~~'Ct.
80~,~w.§.~_s.ct. 1~.04. 22 L.E.~,:,?d
L.E.~.:.?d 739 t!.9,§~1
{.!_9.§~1 (upholding absentee \!Oting statutes that
were "designed to make wting more available to some groups who cannot I;-),asily
~:-:.asily get to the
groups. on the ground that legislatures
\Oting more available to all such groups,
polls." without making wting
may "take refom1
rerom1 'one step at a time"'
o~...9ktahoma. Inc.,
time·' (quoting Williamson
Willjam.~of) v. Lef!
Le,! Optical o~".9kfahomD.
348 U:S.
U;S. 483,489.
483, 489. 75 S.Ct.
s,Ct. 461.: 99 L.Ed. 561'<1955»>;
561._(1955!)); see also §y'~h
§y~h v. Ei9f{:}.
EigrE}. 531 U.§:
U.§; 98,
121 S.Ct. 52~..;, 550.
~insburg, J., dissent!!!92
550; 148 L.Ed.2d
l.Ed.2d 388 (2000) ~insburg!
dissent!!!9l (531 U.S. at_,
at _ , 121
.§.:...CL at 53@) (citing and quoting McDonald and W;lIiamsorl);
.§,;...CL
Williamsor1); Ketzenbqs;,h v. f.l&roan,
f./&[Oan, 384 Y"'~
Y.·.~
641.657,
(app!ying to I.Oting
641.
657, 86 ~,~,p.
~.~.P· 1717. '6 L.Ed.2d 828 (19GB}
(1966} (applying
l.()ting rights reform legislation the
in\Qiid under the Constitution because it might halle
ha...e gone farther than
rule that "a statute is not in\Qlid
it did" (internal
omitted)).
(intemal quotation marks omitted».

.!·! ~!;';
~!;·;

,6

plaintiff'contends
contends it should haw done
done~
~ namely,
namely.
Moreowr. ifthe UOCAVA had done what plaintiff
vote in federal elections to U.S. citizens formerly citizens of a State now residing
extended the "ote
in Puerto Rico while not extending it to U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico who ha~ newr
resided in a StateState - the UOCAVA would haw created a distinction of questionable faimess
among Puerto Rican U.S. citizens. some of whom would be able to wte for President and
others not. depending whether they had previously resided in a State. 'The arguable unfairness
unfaimess
and potential dillisi..eness of this distinction might be exacerbated by the fact that access to
the wte might effecti~ly tum on wealth. Puerto Rican wters who could establish a residence
would retain the right to '-<>te
\()te for the President after their return to Puerto
for a time in a State WOUld
Rico. while pll(~rto
Pm~rto Rican wters who could not arrange to reside for a time in a State would be
permanently excluded.
In sum, the considerations underlying the UOCAVA's distinction are not insubstantial. As a
result. we hold that Congress acted in accordance with the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause in requiring States and territories to extend wting
wling rights in rederal elections
fonnet resident citizens-residing-outside
fonneues....
ic1e,......n1..___ _ _ _ __
to rooTlet
citizens-resfdiflg-outside the United-States, but not to fonneues,"'ide....uo1L-_
citizens residing in either a State or a territory of the United States.

•+ ·126
TI1e district court proper1y
',26 Nor do we. find merit in plaintiffs other constitutional theories. TIle
properiy
the constitutional right to \Ote is not violated by the statutes in question. New York
held that lhe
SCmay
38417-2011
\Oters re~;ide in New York, subj~!lct ofPage
constitutionally require that New York \Olers
course2467
to theof 2676
provisions
R::~.::f.!.~,,..,~~O U.
u. ~.§~,!
provis ions of tM lJOCA v
V A and the Supremacy Clause. See Can"inrJ.!.g,tJ..)(,
CaI7111rJ.!.9.t1..Y:, R::~::!.!.~!".,~~O

·'1 ;26

--
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"omeu v. Cohen, 265 F. 3d 118 - Court...
91, ~§,_S. Ct. n~.:..-.1..3
E(?,g 675 (196~J
n~.:..J,.3 L. E(?9
(196~2 ("Texas has unquestioned power to impose
reasonable resi.dence restrictions [on)
C•f the ballot."). Romeu therefore has no
[on} the availability elf
claim to a constItutional
constitutional right to "'te in New York. And while the UOCAVA failed to extend to
\Qte. As explained
him the right h'
h) 1..0te
I..Ote in New York. it did not deprive him of an existing right to ;.Qte.
abo~.e, Romeu cannot \Ote
abele,
\01e for the President in Puerto Rico because the existing laws do not
confer such a \iOting right on U.S. citizens domiciled in Puerto Rico.

Nor is the right ~o travel
trovel ~olated
~elated by the UOCAVA and the NYEl.
NYEL. The Supreme Court has
recently asserted that the right to tra\el is made up of "at least three djfferent
different components. It
protects (i] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to lea\e another State. [2] the right to
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the
t.he
be treated as a welcome viSitor
st.'Cond State, ;.ii,nd [3] for those trawlers who elect to become pennanent residents. the right to
tl'eated like oHler
ott1ercitizens
_§.@enz v. 8.~,
8_~, 526 U.§;. 489.
489, 59.Q.
SQ.Q. 119 S ...9. 1518,
be treated
citizens of that State." .$.@enz
1518,.
L.Ed.,?gJ?.89
143 L.Ed
..fgJ?.89 M~.ID.
M~.ID- E\en assuming for purposes of this opinion that Saenz's references to
States
tl'le right to enter
Stales were int~Med
int~f1ded to encompass also territories and that the reference to toe
and lea~ a St<;lte includes also the right to change one's residence from one ~X)litical
to another, we find no violation of any of the components of the
subdi\lision of the United States 10
Yorlc; has not impaired Rom~u·s
tra~l
right to tra\ellisted in Saenz.
Sael1z. As to the first. New Yor1c;
Rom~u's right to tra~1
to Puerto Rico. tl is tl'ue that the UOCAVA and the Naw
NQW York statute ha\e placed a cost on his
residerlt of Puerto Rico. On abandoning his residence in New York, he
becoming a permanent residerl!
would hS\e
ha\e retained the right to \Ote in the presidentiel
presidentjel election had he mo\ed to any place
U.S, territory. Had hemmed
he mO\ed outside the United States, he could haw continued to
other than a U.S.
wte in New York's presidential election. Had he moved to another State. he could have wted
as a citizen of that State. His mow to a U.S. territory, in contrast, required that he give up
wting for the office or President. Howe\er, neither the NYEl
NYEL nor the UOCAVA caused that loss.
His loss of the right to wte for President is the consequence of his decision to become a
citizen of a tenitory in a constitutional scheme that allocates the right to appoint electors to
Slales
matelially different from that of a New York
Slates but not to territories. His situation is not mate1ially
citizen. prior to the passage of the UOCAVA. who decided to lea~ New York to reside in
France. His doing so would inwlw giving up the right to \Ote in New York because participation
in New York's elections was reserved to citiZens of New York. New York's f.~Hure to offer
after his taking up residence in
Romeu the opportunity to continue to wte in its elections atter
tra\el than did New York's failure under the prePuerto Rico
Ric.o no mom ~olated his righ~ to trs\el
t.o offer continued wting rights to its citizens who mOloed
mo~oed to Fra.nce. A citizen's
UOCAVA law 1.0
decision to move away from her State of residence will inevitably inwlle
inwl~.e cert.ain
certain losses. She will
lose the right to participate in that State's local elections. as well as its fedeta! elections,
elections. the
recei\k-1 that State's police protection at her place of residence,
residence. the right to benefit trom
from
right to recej\k-;
the State's welfare programs. and the ··127
"127 right to the full benefits or the S!at.e's
Stat.e's public
of1he
the citizen's choice do not constitute an
education system. Such consequences of
unconstitutional interference with the right to trawl. Cf. §plJlicr
§puticr To"f?§.,
Torrp§_, 435 ~".$.
~,,.$. at- 4.-5,
4-.S, ~~
S.Ct. 906 (holdirlg
(holdif'lg that a federal cash benefit program for the aged. blind, and disabled did not
S.C!.
li\ling in the fifty states and the
v;olate the right to trawl by applying only to U.S. citizens IMng
District of Columbia, and thus excluding U.S. citizens li~ng
Ii~ng in Puerto Rico).

f.:t..

127

cr.

The second an(i
an<i third components of
or the trawl right are not implicated at all. Neither the
UOCAVA nof
nOf the NYEL in any way impair Romeu's opportunity to be welcomed in Puerto Rico
as a \Asitor or to be treated like other U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico upon his
establishing residence there. Indeed. Romeu complains not that he is being ireated differently
Rico. but rather that he is being treated identically to
from other U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico,
them. By virtue of his former residence in New York, he seeks to be allowed 10
!o wte in the
preSidential
presidential election in a manner denied to other citizens of Puerto Rico. The denial of that
011 his right to tr3\E1.
tra-.EI.
special treatment does not constitute an unconstitutional burden on
Fjnally,
Finally, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. which pro\lides that "[t1he
''[t]he Citizens of
each State shaH be entitled to all PrilJileges
PriiJileges and lmmuniti~s
Immuniti~$ of Citizens in th€-) saveral
several States."
prov;des no a\e{1ue
a..enue of redress. The Court in Saenz explained that the Pri\Aleges
Pri\Aieges and Immunities
Clause of Articre
Article IV establishes "the
''the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
SC 38417-2011
Page 2468 of
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in [a] second State." Saenz, 526 U.S.M--·01·\at _
500.
_
'''''' _
_
-119
_~""'M"'"
-~""'M'\"ft

2676

~,,,,,'''''.''M

~ .............

S.Ct. 15t~.
1St~- Assuming that the clause may apply to Irs\o€l
tra\.131 to territories.l~ the Privileges and

6114

11/28/2010 13:43 FAX
11/26/2010
ll/26/2010

2088848281

KELSO LAW OFFICE

~012/020

,,omeu
1.18- Court
...
"omeu v. Cohen, 265 F. 3d 1.18"
Court._,
Clause does not haw the effect of allowing citizens to carry over to their new
residence the privileges and immunities of their prior State of residence. but rather limits the
capacity of other Stales
States (and perhaps territories) to tl'E!at
tre!at such citizens differently than they
treat their own citizens.
Immllniti.~s
lmmuniti•~s

We conclude tl'iat
ttlat Romeu has failed to plead a constitutional depriwtion resulting from the

failure of the UOCAVA and the NYEL to permit him to continue to 'IIDte
'IIOte in New York's federal
election after his abandonment of his New York residence in fawr of a Puerto Rico residence.
therefOre affirm the judgment of the district court.
We therefbre

***
The writer. speaking for himself alone and not for the court. adds a few observations on the
problem of extE-mding
ext~;-mding presidential wtes to U.S. citizens resjdjng
residing in the territories, These. of
course, do not constitute either a holding or obserwtions of the Court.

1
1?8
?8

The exclusion
exclUSion of
ot U.S. Citizens
citizens residing in the territories from participating in t~:e wte for the
President of the United States is the cause of immense resentment in those territories resentment that has been especially weal in Puerto Rico. See Igartua,
lgartua, II. 229 ~.... .Jd at 85~~Q
85~9Q
(T0r:r.!-l~lIa,
cO!J9unin9~. In addition. this exclusion fi.JeJs
(Tor:r!-l~lla, ,I.,
,1., CO!J9Uning}.
fi.Jels annual attacks on tt)(;) United States
in hearings in the Unjted
United Nations, at which the United States is described as hypocritically
preaching democracy to the world"j
world · ·1 ~!e. while practicing nineteenth-century co!onialism
colonialism at
home. See. e. g... Special Committee on Decoloniz8Uofl
Decolonizalion Hears Petitioners on the Question of
Puerto Rico. United Nations Press Release GAlCOLl2970,
GAICOL/2970, 19 June 1997. These problems of
fairness. resentment. and impaired reputation in the community of nations I:lH::>
arf> serious ones.
IIIt has been widely assumed, because of the peculiar stnJCture of the constitutional dictates
U.S. citizens residing in
jn Puerto Rico cannot be
relating to the eiection
election of the President. that U,S,
gi..en a \Ote in the presidential election without either making Puerto Rico a State, or amending
the Constitution in the manner of the Twenty-Third Amendment, which gaw
ga-ve the District of
presidential electors in the same manner as if rt were a State.
Columbia the power to appoint preSidential
See, e.g., 192!!.~~<!.11,
!92!!.~~<!.l1r 229 F.~.g
F.~.1 at 83-84,: fgartIJ8
fgartua 1,-~?J:.3d
/<-~?.J=.3d a.!..1Q
a_!J.Q (stating that "[o]nly a ...
constitutional amendment or a grant of statehood to Puerto Rico. therefore. can pro~de [U.S,
[U.S.
citizens residing in Puerto Rico) the right to ~te in the presidential election '.lvhich
\ivhich they seek"):
Attorney Gencrel of Guam. 738 F.2d ~
~(stating
(stating 1
that
hat a "consti1utional
"constitutional amendment would
be required to permjt
permit (U.S. citizens li..nng
ti..nng in Guam] to wte in a presidential election"): E3E~.
!JE~.
92"len,
£Qf·ten. 121 LS;upp.2d
L9upp.2d 251.285
264. 285 (S.,;D,N,Y.2000)
(S..;D.N,Y.2000) (,,(O]nly
("(O]nly statehood ora constitutional
Rico.''): H,R.
H, R. No. 1698 p
(1960),
960), 86th
amendment can pro..nde relief to the people of Puerto Rico."):
Cong., 2d Sess"
Sess .. reprinted in 1-1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459, 1460-61.
This assumption may be only partially correct. It is of course true that. absent either statehood
or a constitutional
constitutionsl amendment, Puerto Rican \titers
\Oters cannot have either a constitutionally
guaranteed \(')te
\{')te for the President, or a wte that !Unctions
functions identically with the \IOtes of citizens
eJect jon of a Puerto Rico delegation to the Electoral College.
residing in a State - for the electjon
Nonetheless, the subject matter Of
of this case and our focus on the UOCAVA suggest that
statehood or a constitutional amendment may not bEl necessary prerequisites. to permitting
U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico or other territories to \Ole for the office or President.
StE,te shall appoint [its slate of electors] in
It is true Article iL section 1 provides tha1 "[e]ach St£'te
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." Nonetheless, it has long been clear that
o1.9r the appointment of electors. The
State legislatures do not ha~ unfettered authority O\08r
Fourteenth and Fift.eenth Amendments prohibit Slates
States from adopting a process of appointing
electors that violates the Equal Protection
Protectton Clause orabridges the right tcnote "on~aCCottn:t-t
"on~accottnt-tOIofr------fiiOfr------race, color, or prellious condition of seMtude."
senntude." The Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth
Twenty-Sl>!th Amendments
'IIOte "on account of sex" or, for cjtizens
citizens ·t.( 8 years of age or
prohibit abridgments of the right to 'IIDte
older, "on
of these amendments empowers Congress 1.0
''on account of age,"
age." Each or
1.o enforce their
agaiMt
the
States.
See
U.S.
Const.
amends.
14,
15.
19,
&
26.
mandates
SC 38417-2011
Page 2469 of 2676
Pursuant to its authority to regulate the States' powor 10
1o appoint electors, Congress has
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enacted voting tights legislation that suspends the use oflileracy
of literacy tests,

@013/020
lJ.S.C. §§
see 42 U,S.C.

1973b & 1973aa.l11 and strictly limits States' power to deny \()ting
-.<:~ting rights to U,S.
U.S. citizens on the
basis of their inability to read English when those citizens are .· ·129
'129 educated in U.S. schoolS
schools in
1973b(e).llil Congress has
which the predominant language is not English,
English. see 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e).lli1
also required Stcrtes and political subdivisions to provide bilingual \OI:ing rmlt€~fials.
rnatE~rials. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a.
Most important, Congress has required States to provide absentee ballot eligibility to former
citizens of a State who leaw the State and establish residence in another State within thirty
1973aa-1(e).
days of a presidential election. see 42 U.S.C. § 197333-1
(e). and has barred the States from
establishing durational residency requirements for eligibility to ~te in a Presidential election.
U.S. C. §§ 1973aa-1(c). In gregon v. Mif'cry§dl.
112~,..91 S,Ct.
S.Ct. ?3.Q.1...?7
?.§.9.1..,?7 L,Ed,2d
L.Ed.2d
see 42 U.S.C.
Mif'c'1~!.I. 400 U.S. 112:..91
272 (197Qll.
(197Q).l. the. Supreme Court upheld Congress's power to ban State durational residency
requirements Glnd
G~nd to require uniform absentee ballot eligibility, with eight justices concurring in
the result. IhoLlgi,
thOLIQi, split owr the precise source or the authority in question.LEll
question JEll Finally,
Finally. the
States the obligation to accept the \Otes of their former citizens now
UOCAVA has imposed on Stales
residing abroad.
abro<ad. See 42 U.S.C,
1973ff-1. In both the
tha requirement of manda1t~IY
manda1t~lY absentee
U.S.C. § 1973ff·1.
ha>oe recently abandoned their residence, and the UOCAVA.
ballot eligibility for residents who ha-.e
their elections for presidential electors to
t() accept ~ters who
Congress has compelled States in thejr
are not residents of the State.

130
3o

If, notwithstanding the command of Article II, section 1 that electors be appointed in lhe
the manner
the State legislature directs,
directs. Congress may nonetheless impose on the States a
that lhe
requirement that eact)
eacl) accept the -.otes
\Otes of certain U.S. citizens who are not reSidents
residents of the
State but reside outside the United States or in other States,
States. I can see no reason why
Congress might not also with respect to the preSidential
presidential election require the State to accept
prcsidentil!l! 'IIOtes
the prcsidentil)'l!
\IOtes of certain U.S. citizens who are nonresidents of the Stt!*~
Stt:lt(~ residing in the
U.S. territOries.
Of the UOCAVA by requiring
territories. At minimum,
minimum. Congress might do so on the model of
States to accept the \()tes
\tltes of U.S. citizens now residing in the territories who were rormerly
5t.ate would no doubt
residents of the State,
State. Indeed, e\K!n without congressional mandate. a St.ate
ha\e the power to pass statutes Similar
resrct;;:nts now reSiding
residing
similar to the NYEL allowing its former resro;;:nts
in a territory !o
to participate in its federal elections. Furthermore, ifthe Constitution authorizes
the UOCAVA (;}t1d
the ' ·'J;.. ::w
(;,)nd the other Congressional limitations outlined abo~ on the'
::W power of the
States to determine who may l.()te
\()te in its presidential elections. I see no reason
reaSOn in the
Constitution why Congress might not impose a furthe:r requirement: Congress might permit
aWIY
every ~ting citizen residing in a territory to \IOte for the office of President by requiring ewry
State that chc)o~:;es
chr.)o~:;es its electors by popular ~te (which all States do) to include in that State's
territories.!.?.l
popular ~te the Stale's pro rata share of the votes c.:'lst by U.S. citizens in th~~ territories.!.?l
To be sure, Congress may
rnay legislate extended -.oting
\Oting rights only in ways thet
that are consistent with
its enumerated constitutional powers. But if the UOCAVA is constitutional, .and
zanct if Congress is
within its powers in requiring a State to accept the ~tes of nonresidents in oreJer
orcJer to cure the
problems of disqualifying former residents of a State who mow outside the United States or
who mow their residence to another State without time to qualify to 1.0te
\Ote in that State's
elections. I Ccin
c<:m see no reason why Congress would r:)xceed i1s powers in requiring States to
~te$ of citizens of the territories to cure the
accept a proportionate share of the presidential 1.0tes
presidential disenfranchisement of a substantial segment of the citizenry of the United
States.1m
N, Section 3 of the Constitution gi"lles
gi"~~es Congress the power
States.lm Indeed,
lndeect, giwn that Article N.
Territor(ies]." Con9ress's source of
to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territor(iesJ."
constitutional authority to extend the presidential 'l()te to citizens residing in the territories is
clearer than its power to enact the UOCAVA or the uurational
tturational residency rules discussed in
Orogon.fm
Orogon.1m
•"13'i
·1 3 ·i

Conclusion

SC The
38417-2011
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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.~omeu v. Cohen, 265 F. 3d 118JOHN M. WAU<ER. ,Jr
,/r.. Cllief
Chief Judge, concurring:

I fully concur in Judge Leval's opinion for the court,
court. but I write separately to take issue with his
thrn "statehood
''statehood or a constitutional amendment may not be necessary prerequisites
suggestion thm
to permitting U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico or [the) other territoriesW
territoriesill to vote for the office
of President." Anr.e at 128 (Leval.
(level. J .. writing separately). See also
a/so Amber L. Cottle. Comment,
Comment.
Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and the Right to Vote in Pmsidential
Elections.
adwnce~. the following
l), Chi. Legal. F. 315, pt. II.B. (1995). Judge Leval ad\ence~.
Elections, 19~J5 U.
proposal: "Congress might permit every \Uting citizen residing in a territory to lfi)te
\fi)te for the office
e~Ery state that chooses its electors by popular ~te (which all States
of President by requiring elEry
do) to include in t.hat
that State's popular wte
\Alte the State's pro rata share of the ~tes cast by U.S.
citizens in the tE!rritories"
tE!rritories'' ("the
(''the Pro Rata Proposal"), Id.
ld. at 129-30 (Leval, J"
J., \f;triting
\I'i/riting separately).
Respectfully. Il cannot agree with my colleague: I find no authority in the Constitution for the
provision.
Congress (ewn with the states' consent) to enact such a provision,
Go~.ernment of enumerated powers," Unit<Kl States v.
"'The Constitution creates a Federal Gol.ernment
Lopez, 514 U.§
U.§:,_?49,
. . _?-49, ~g,
~g,.,.,115
..,,115 '1 ~~2 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (199m;
(199§1: SOt.l
sOt.; ~-;rego(y
~-;regory v.
45~Lc;.ct. 2395,115
2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). and it is on these
Ashcroft, so·1
50'1 u.s.
U.S. 452. 45J..JlLc;.Ct.
enumerated p~)Wer$
p~1wers that every congressional enactment having the force of law must rest. I can
identilY
identifY only (01,),
fot.Jr constitutionally enumerated powers that could arguably be candidates to
Cl~use. § 5 of t11e
tl18 Fourteenth
support enactment of the Pro Rata Proposal: the Commerce CI~u$e,
Amendment. § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Spending Clause.~ Howewr. as I shall
explain, none of these pro\ftsions can support the Pro Rata Proposal.

132
1.32

deficient as a
As recent jurisprudence has made clear, the Commerce Clause is wholly defiCient
potential source of authority for Congress to mandate that the states accept the ~Ies
potent.ial
~tes of U.S.
citizens residing in the territories. First of all, a reasonable nexus to interstatf::! commerce is
lacking.
U.S. 598,609,
598, 609, 120 S.Ct. 1740:...11.?...bEd.2d
laCking. See United States v._/'f!Q!!LS'2f1
v.-'Y!Q!!!..s'2!1 529 U.S,
1740:...11,?...bEd.2d 658
(2000) (holding ~hat. at a minimum, regulated acti~ty must "substantially affect" interstate
U.S. 549,558-59,115
commerce); Uni/'tJd
UnittJd States v. LopetL_~14
LopetL-~14 u.s.
549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct 1624, 131 L.Ed.2(t§~6
L.Ed.2ct§~6
(1995) (same). Si~cond,
s--~cond, ewn assuming an interstate commerce nexus Ctluld be adwnced. the
Commerce Clause does not afford Congress the authority to "issue
''issue directj~s
directi~s requiring the
States to address particular problems, [or
(or to] command the States' officers, or those of their
subdi\Rsions. to administer or enforce a fedeml
federnl regulatory program." E!i.!2tz
E.!i.!!.tz vv". UnittJd
political subdiv1sions.
UnitfJ('l
States, 521 u.s.:
U.S,;...§.98:ll~"
..§.98:Jl~., 117 S,Ct.
S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997)
(1997). ''[S]uch commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual so\ereignty,
sO\ereignty, ··,. (d,,'
fd.: see a/so
(Vow Ygrk
v, Upitt')(i
('low
York v.
Upito(i Statos.
States. 505 U.S. 144, 162/
162, 112 S.Ct. ~~~.
2~~. 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992)
(1992} ("While
Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate
concern to th€! States. the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require the States to go\.ern
gO\.ern according to Congress' intentions."); ;(1.
;d. at 166. 112 S.Ct.
240~ ("We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to
acts, H), I see no distinction be~»en the Pro Rata
compel the States to require or prohibit lhosa
those acts."),
Proposal's'
Proposal's • .\·! :l:):":;, mandate that state officials tabulate a share of tile
the \rUtes of the territories in
federal elections and other constitutionally infirm federal mandates command(tlering
slates.
command(t~ering the states.

ij :\3
:l3

The Pro Rata Proposal would fare no better as an enclCtment
encactment under either
either§
§ 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress's authority under § 5. and
presumably under
under§
§ 2 as welt,@]
welt.@l is limited to (1) prohjbiting
prohibiting conduct that itseJf\4olatcs
itself\'lolatcs the
amendments' substantive guarantees and (2) remedying or deterring violations of these
guarantees by "prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct" than is othefWise
Trusl~§~gLJhe Univ. of AI'1'
A/'1. 'iI.
v. Garreti',
Garret(', 531 U.S, 356.
35$. 1.::2::1=S~-~C~1:w--;.2:.;;;§:;:;.§::_!.
1:::2::1-:S~.~C~~t;w-;;.g"",::§~.§=-!._ _ _ _ __
unconstitutional, §3d. of Truslf'!!?§~gL!l!~
L.Ecf2r) 866 (200'1).
(200·1). subject
subJect to the requirement
requ1rement th,lt there be a "congruence and
963, 148 L.Ecf2rj
proportionality bfJtween
OfJtween the [~olation] to be prewnted or remedied and the means adopted to
q,LBoeP.2_1(,;..,F/ores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157. 13~_bJ:d.2d 624
CitY. q,LBoeP,!f._l(.;flores,
that end." City.
(1997); see Cot/e:~q~l
C(lfl(:~fl~l SM,
£duc. EXP.E.£1.£.E!
EXP.E.£1.£g",,§,c:t.,J~,~.?L!:J~
SM. Bank
BCJnk v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondaty £due.
....§.c:t."~·~.?ZJ,J~
666,673.
666,
673.
119
S.Ct.
S,
Ct.
.2219,
144
L.Ed.2d
605
{1~~99.}
{1~~991
("(T]heterm
("(T]he
term
.
'enforce'
enforce'
[in§
[in
§
51
is to be2471
taken of 2676
SC 38417-2011
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~olation$,H).
~elations.").

Itlt could be argtled
argt1ed that because a large segment of the population or
of the territories is Latino,
Latino.
r<:}Siding in the
ex.clusion of U.S. citizens r<;}Siding
black. or of Pacific Islander or Asian extraction, the exclusion
territories from the ~te for electors to the electoral college therefore has a disproportionately
discriminatory eflect. Cf. Jamin B. Raskin. Is This Amen'ea?
Amen'ca? The Distn'ct of Columbia and the
34. Harv. C.R.
...C.L. L.Rev. 39, 65-70 (1999). Of course,
course. this does not make the
Rigl7t to Vote, 34·
C,R....c.L.
enfranchisement of U.S. citizens residing in the territories a proper subject of congressional
under§
§ :55 or§
or § 2 because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fifteenth
action under
pros(:iibes "discriminatory effects,"
effects." Only intentional discrimination is barred by
,;mendment pms(!iibes
these amendments.~ See MObile
pAobile v. Bolden,
Bolden. 446 U.S.2_?~3-64,
U.S.2?~3-64, 100
1005.;..9.
S.:..9· 1490.64
1490. 64 b!=-d.2d
~Ed.2d
(1980).; .Wc!§.!Jington
U:7.d 2d ~@.? (19761:
(1976}:
47 (1980),;
,wc!§.!Jington v. Qgyis,
Qf1yis, 426 U.S~"~29,
U.S"~"~29, 239-4~..... -~.Ct.
~.Ct. 2040.~..48
~ U:.d2d
see, e.g., Yfd.~!OVIC/l
Yfd.~!OVtCil v. Quilter.
Q,!Ji/tcr. 507 U.S.146.158,11:~ !?Ct.
:?.Ct. 1149, ·nL1122.l.Ed:~
'13L1122.l.Ed:~
~~: .'!Yasllingron
.'!Jias/1ingron v. S.£!.!Jl.tfe
S.£!.!JJ.tle Sch. Qj§J. No.1.
No. 1. 458 U..:...§.~ 457. 484-§.?
484-§.?. 102 S.Ct. 31§J,
31§.?, 73
L.E.d.2d 896 {1982};
{1982); see also Garrett, 5}1
5_31 U.S. 356, j21 S.Ct. 955, 96?,.!. 148 ~d.2d 866
@Q1)
@Q1). ("Although
(''Although disparate impact may be relewnt e\lidence of racial discrimination, such
e~.en where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to
evidence alon(;: is insufficient eloen
scrutiny,.,
," (internal
(intemal citation omitted)):
omitted»: see generolly Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional
strict scrutiny
DiscriminatIon: The Re~iliIY
Re~iliiY of Supreme COmt
COutt Rhetoric, 86 Goo.
Geo. L.J. 279. 309-'l7
309-'!7 (1997).
(1997}.
Discrimination:
More significantly, the inability of U.S.
U.S, citizens residing in the territories to wte
\IOte for presidential
~olation of either amendment, and therefore cannot be "remedied"
electors is simply not a ~alation
§ t~ or
§ 2.l§l
under either
or§
2.1§1 To the contrary,
contrary. the exclusi'~
exclusi·~ of the terrjtories
terrjlories from the presidentialeither§
selection process is a deliberate product of our Constitution.l§l As our decision today states,
states.
"he Constitution ... confers the right to wle
\IOte in presidential elections 0\1
lhe
on electors
desigm•t~1d by the States. not on individual citizens .... The states haWlI.miformly
haWt1.miformly
desigm'l.t~1d
presidential
exercised their Article II authOrity by delegating the power to appoint preSidential
vice-presidential) electors to U.S. citizen~: residing in the states to be
(and vice-preSidential)
exercised in democratic elections .... U.S. citizens who are residents of Puerto
Rico and the other U.S. territories haw not recei\ed similar rights to lIf)te
llfJte for
presidential electors because the process set out in Article II for the appointment
of electors is limited to "states" and does not include territories. U.S. territories
(including Puerto Rico) are not states, and therefore ... the absence of
presidential and vice·presidential
vice-presidential ~ting rights for U.S. citizens li~ng In U.S.
1erritori(-)s
territori!-)S does not violate the Constitution.
Ante at 123-24 (paragraph breaks omitted).

11 :l5

The Spending Clause of Article I does not pro..nde congressional authority to enact Judge
LZJ While "the power of
Le~l's
Le~I's Pro Rata Proposal either.
either.LZ.l
of' Congress to *1
-1 :!·5
:!.s authorize expenditure
of public moneys for public purposes is not limited br
b)' the direct grants of legis!ati~ power
round
Constitution," the spendjng
spend;ng power is "not unlimited." South Opftgf:'?
DE.ft.Qf:? v. Dole, 183
found In
in the Constitution,
u.~..:..~Q~. 207 ,-_1..07
u.~..:..~Q~,
,__"!..07 S~fl;.}793,
S~fl:.}793, 97 L.E_~.;
L.E_~_;..~d 171 (198j)
(198i1 (internal quotation mmks and citations
omitted).
II

Under the Spending Clause,
Clause. Congress may pro..nde ft.,:>deral
ft..:>deral funds to a state in exchange rer
ror that
state's acceptance of an attached condition. In this way,
way. Congress and the state are
essentially contracting parties,
parties. with the federal funds simply serving
sel'\ling as consideration for 1he
state's adherence to the condil.ion. In so far as the Pro Rata
R.ata Proposal might simply
sImply "require"
''require" a
l.he state's consent, it could not
state to accept a share of the wtes from the territories without I.he
be supported under the Spending Clause.
E\en if the Pro Rata Proposal were conditioned on state consent as the Spending Clause
requires. it could Stili
Still not be sustained under Con9rt:li:;I'::i'~
Conart:l:::r::>'~ :31Jtllluit't9
<)r Congress to
l3lNllui,"9 ~uth..:.t·ity.
~tJth~'·ity. r ()f
gO\A:)rnment must ha..e the <alltllority.
alltl1ority. both
exercise its spending authority ~lidly, the state QO\A:)rnment
Fed~xal Constitution and the state's constitution.
constitution, to agree to the p;;!rticular condition.
under the Fed~)ral
SCSee
38417-2011
Page 2472 of 2676
__ V_._§.:. .§l~
.?~ 207-08. !QZ".§~,gt.
!QZ".§~.9t. 2793 (noting that "other constitutional provisions may
.Qplf!. 483
483._~L.§.:
pro..nde an inclependent bar 10
to the conditional grant of federal funds"). It is pl:ilin
pl:;;lin that the Federal
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US ·Court
• Court...
.,omeu
Const.itution
Constitution does not afford a state gO\ernment
go"~.ernment the authority to "accept a proportionate share
of the presidential '-Otes of citizens of the territories." Ante. at 130 (Leval, J., writing separately):
5.Q§J}.S. ("3t
<3t 181,
2408 (stating that the states cannot consent to
cf. Now York, 5Q§J}'S.
181 \ .1,12 S.Ct. 240?
"depart(ures] from the constitutional plan").

why. one need simply consider thll
th(:! structural effect of tI~)
\1~) Pro Rata
To fully underst~md why,
Proposal: under it, a state would in essence "share" with the territories (albeit on a pro rata
basis) its authority to select electors. Yet,
Yet. Article II, § 1 of the Federal Constitution prolJides
prol.'ides
Nurnb\~f of Senators
the "State
that the"
State ~'>hall appoint" "a Number of Electors, E->qual to the whole Nurnb\~r
Consl. art. II. §
Representq1tives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." U.S. Const.
and Representqltiv8s
1 (emphasis ~ldded),
~1dded). The text is both clear and obligatory: the selection of a state's electors is
sta1e legislature. Thus,
to rest with th0 "State," either through the people directly or through the stale
this power m
..)y not be shared. pooled, or otherwise diluted e"ven
e~n with a state'$ consent
consent,
mr.ly

The Constitution ha\ling assigned the authority to select electors to the states
i(~\6
~~6

~~xclusiwly.
~~xclusiwly,

neither the Congress nor the officials of the states may. consistent with the Supremacy
Sllpremacy
Clause, alter that scheme.@l
scheme.ll?l '1 ~:6 See generally 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law
Law§
§ 6-1, at 1024 (3d ed. 2000) ("[1]here
("(l]here are Union-reinforcing restrictions tMt flow from the
Constitution's structure alone, without any reliance upon grants or
of power to Congress. and that
are clearly as binding on Congress as on the states. Such restrictions include ... the principle
that neither the states nor Congress may reshape the relationships specified in the Constitution
between citiz€:ns
representati\es."); id. § 6·35, at
a\ 1246 (,,[S10ma
("[S]ome
citizE:ns of the nation and their federal representsti\€s.");
federalism-based limits on state action reflect stnJctural considerations so basic to the nature
and cohesion of the Union that Congress should be no more empowered to wah~ those limits
them.").
than the states are authorized to transgress them.
").

My belief1hat judge Laval's proposal would be constitutionally infirm does not undermine the
concern I share with him that the U.S. citizens residjng
residing in the territories are n(lt
n<.lt being afforded a
meaningful ~ice in national gowmance,lQ1
gowmance.lQJ. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff. Puerto Rico
and the Constitution:
Constttution: Conundnlms
Conundntms and Prospects, 11 Const Comment. 15, 43 (1994).
HOwelef,
Howe~er, I see only two remedies afforded by the Constitution: (1) statehood for each of the
territories,
prQ\liding the
territories. Sef: U.S. Const. art. IV. § 3, or (2) a constitutional amendment pro\liding
llill
territories with voting representati~s to Congress and the electoral colJege.
college.U.ill

ill
st.."ltute pr(Jvidc~~
s:
WThe St.."ltute
provide~~ as fOllow
follows:
EV(4ry
"ow residing
rE~~iding outside 1tIr>
Statal'> whose las!
la51 domtcii~)
In the Unrte(l States
Evc4ry citiZen of Ihe
the United States
Stales now
ltlr> Unitl;:d
Unitt:ld Statel'i
domtcii~J 1n
Slates
i~dialely
i~diately prior to his departure from the united
lJnited States was in the ~tale
~tare of New York,
York. shell 00
oo entitled to vote
voter in an primary. $p(;.'CL~1
SP'-'CL~I and gone,.al
general ~ltection5
~~tections for the public
from StiCh
StICh last
laSI domicile. as a special federal voler
offices or party
p<~rty positiOns of
ot president and
ond vice-president of thfl l)nited
lJnited States. l)nijed
lJnijed Stmteg ."analor,
.:-enator,
representative in congress and delegates and alternate delegales
delega1es to a natJor-al
natJOfla1 convention. provided ... that such
r7-;awltain a place or abode or domicile. is not registered to vote and is not voting in any Other
does not n-;aw•tain
other
citizen doe5
stat~";}. territory or
St1ltes ....
election district. stjj)t~";},
Of possession of the United St3tes
N.Y. Bee. Law§
Law § "1"\··200(1)
"1"1··200(1) (McKinney 1998).
v_:.§J2.~11.
8J See Downe$ v.:2.!2.~I1.

bf!l.;~'!.988 (190'1);
(19(1"1); ~r!.!.;!flr()ng
~r!,!.;!flrona v.
S~1:1l~~, 182. u.~;
U.~;
182 US. 244
244tJ.~._S.Ct.
II. C!f.!i!.r!/J
(!!.!i!.,fJ.tJ S~1:11~~,
1J}_S.Ct. 770. 45 bf!l.;~!988
~43, 21 S.C:.
S.CL (~27. iL~~.Ed.
"L~~.Ed. 1086 U§.9~ll;
(.1§.9~1,1; Doo!l:w
Dooll:w v. Utltl.od
/.ltl/l,od Sf~los,
S!~loS, 182 US. ?Jl2. 21 S ('..\
('..t. 762\,.1f5
762~,.15 L.Ed.
LEd. 1074

(1901); Do U!1~g,"~cJ3idlM3l/,
Li_!1~!:!."~)3id!M311, 182 u.§~
U.§~ . 1.J...21
1.,__21 S.Ct.
S.O. 71l"i§J-.Ed.
71l,,i§J-.Ed. 1041 (19011-

?12.

EJJ
Co"gress has extended the Privileges and Irrmmities
lrrmmities Clcluse
E3J At the very leasl it is clear that Co"9ress
Ocluse to PUerto Rico by
statute. See
See-!(~
-l(~ U.SC.
U.S C. § 73'1
73'/ ("The right~. privilegeS.
privilegeS, and inm.mities of Citizens
citizens of the ~ite("j
~iWJ Slates
States Shan
shan be
respected in PtJ'ilr(Q
PI.J•ilr(o Rico 10
to the s<)n'E
s<Jn"E extent as though Plrorto PJco
PJcO Weft;)
wel'e a State
St.ate of the Union and subjectlo
~ubjectto the
pmagr(:)ph 1 of
Of section 2 ot (~rti(:14=!
(~rti<:ll=! r.J of the Constitution of the united Sta1as.").
Statas.").
provisions of pmagrl:lph
l~J Soc
l~.l
Sao &!,IIlL~:~1~0.!.f}!2,
&JitllL~;~1~0.!.f}!L.'(..,,!5.1'--f?Plt(JfICh
I(....J5£'....f?_fJll_Mtch :~~
::$.~ y.9.,;}01.
Y.-$..;_301. 333-34, 8§JL9LIi03.
8§JL9L!i03, 15 L. 8:I.2d
8:1.2d .I~~.0..~
.I~~-(!~ (upholdirlg
t;u5pension or
t;uspension
ot litf.lracy
lit.!:lracy tests in Voting Rights Act or
01 1965); §.g,e,IOrl
§.g,e,ton COflflfr..,:!.u.iJmtod
CormiY..,:!.".iJmtod SJi~16·$";~~:LY.S.
Sl<~t6·s,_;~~!LY.·S. 2"'8;.,5-.
2""8""5-',8"'9"'","~"."'Ct·.
8"'9~
..,~"."'0".- - - - - illQ..1)J~,.,~ .:?(.!
illQ..1)J~;..~
4(j 309 ((1969)
1969) (saroo);
(salOO); Oregon v. ~jJ£hell,
~iJ..f.hett, 400 U.S.
u.s. 112, '11,EL~1
·11,8.,.~1 S.Ct. 2GCtXL1-.Ed.2d
2GCtX.l.1-·Ed.2d 272 (19'ZQ),
(19~Q2
(opinion of Ju~lice
Ju~tice Black <Jnnouncing
<lMOuncing JUdgrrent
Judgrrent of Court uphOlding expanded pl'ohibi\ion
pt'Ohibition of iiteracy tests in 1970
amendments 10
ro tM VOling
VQ~ing Rights Act).

SCL?J38417-2011
Set)
Sec:1 KagQ~.~IJ/l.l71]
KagQ~.~IJ/i.t71J v. Morq,m.
Morq<m.
"Anl?~rican-flag t\chclOls"
t\ChClOis"

Page
3.§:1.:,,\LlL~1, 658. ~"~,~.!.:.}J17.
3.§j";,,,Y.:lL~',
~-~.~.!.:,}_717, 16l
16 l f:i:12~:L?,?~_LI966)
Fd2d,,?.,?~-L1966) (\Ipholdinq
(11pholdin_q
the
provision ot the Voting I~ghts
l~ghts Act).
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r{orneu
t{orneu v. Cohen, 265 F.
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!.Ql
[.Ql Only .Justice H1r1M
H1riM dissented from the Court's decision to uphold the duralional residerlcy provISions
provssions of the
fJQ1\',).9).
1970 am:mdrTl:mts
am:mdm::mt::. (0
\o the
\he Voting Rights Act. Sea Milcll0l1.
MIIC/le/1, 400 U.S. at 213-16.
213-16, ~:LS.CI.
~;LS.Cl. 26IHt~~~~'1n.
26tt(t~?_~~'1n. J,
J. disS
disSfJQl\1,)_9)..
,h)sticll
,h)Sticn Black Iocat\w
locat\"l\.1 Congress's authority to bar dt.wational
dl.l1'<ltional res~:ler\c.:y
res~:lenc.:y requirorrents
ff,lQuirorrents cUld 10
to cr0ato
cr@ato uniform
absentee ballot 9IJarantees
9uarantees in Congress's inherent ''broad
"broad autllorlty
aut!lor1ty to (;rcatc
t;rcatc .and
<and n-aintlilin
n-aint~;~in a national governrrent."
govQrnrrent."
Stw id. at 134, g·t S.Cl.
S.Gl. 2l~O (opinion of Justice Black). Justice
Juslice ll:luglas
())uglas rooted UWl
uw, authority ~~;!CtiOn
~~:!Ction Five of th<:~
Fourla~!nth
Founa~:nth Arrendr':1t;:!l)t
Arrendrrer)t and Congress'g power to enforce w hal JustICe
JustJCe Douglas styled "\he
"the r~;Jl1t
r~;Jilt to vOle
vote for
(c;Jpu1ion of Ju~,tice
Ju~.tice Oouglas).
Oougtas). Justk::(\
Justic(\ BI'E;)rman.
Bf'E;)rman. W
with
ith whom
national officers." S~:o id. ot 147-60. 91 S.£h1QQ (c:lplllion
Justice V¥hite
V'I,hite ancl
anel ,lvstice Marshall
Mars halt joinr..-d.
joinr..-d, found Congress's authority in Congrcss's
Congress's Section FNf;!
fNe pow ~~r to
enforce the tight
td. at 236<19,
S Ct:...260 (opinion of Justice Brennan).
fight to unhindered interstate travel. See Id.
236<19. 91 SCt,260
Stew art with w horn Ctlief
Cttief Justice Burger and Justice Blackrl1lln
Blackrmn joined, found it unnecessary to rP.sort
rt=)sort to
Justice Stewart
Seclion
tM Fourteenth Arnendrreni arid
and instead located Q.)ng;e;ss's
Qjngi€iSS'S power in its gGnt~r<)1
gcnt~r"<11 authori!,!
authority under
$eclion Five of 1M
ti3vel. Sf,oe
the Necessary am:l
am:! Proper Clause of Article N to "protect and f<1cil~ala"
fncil~a1a" tho right to intf'!rsl2te
int!'!rst2te t;avel.
Sl>oe id. .1lt
.11t
285-87, g, ~,.9.;2?~Q
285-87.
~..9.;2?~9 (opinion of Justice Stewart)

II'u'

l?l
l?J For oxan'f,)le:
oxan'f.)le: Ill!
llll S.
s. citizen$
citizenS ir,
ir1 the l.errilorieS
t.erritorieS cast 1.3 mnion
mniOn presidenlialvotes,
presidential votes, 54 percent for candidate X, and
46 percent 1'f·ot·
01' candidate Y,
Y. a
9 State the size 01
of 1\k=:w
I\I(:)W Vork
York (w
(which
hich has roughly 18 milton residCnts
residents as COJ'Tl)ured
cOJ'Tl)ured to
resident" Irl
6.(j'~. of the total populatiOn of I.he
S1t)l1'E)!S), saO
273 million residentr,
"' t~) fifty States contlined (or 6.6'~.
t.he fifty S1<'!t·es),
sao United
States Census Bt1roar.1,
Abstroct of trte
StettQs: 2000. at 23} would be all(lC<lted
altoc;;~ted 65.800 vot~s
Btln).;JI,I, Str:Jfisticaf
Str:Jfistic(lf Abstrocl
me United Sfl)tQs:
from the territor~~. 46,332 for X and 39,468 for V,
Y, addIng
addtng a net
nellotal
total of 68611 yotes
votes in Ilavor
avor of X. This is but one of
<l<~ nuni>er
nurrt>er of different ways in which tne vOles
votes of citizens dom(:iled
dom(:i\ed in the terntO(~$
terntor~s mighl
might be allocated an"YJng tM
Stataa.
SlatfJs. (Another '(II
w i;'Y
i:'Y would be to allocate t£:rritor~1
tE:rritor~l yotes
votes according to ..
<l Stale's
State's proportion ,)f
>1f the total electoral
votes ratht;lr !han
!.han al;r.~ording
acr.~ording to a Stt'lte's proportion of me total population.)
yotesratht;lr

Bll Unlike the UOCAVA, of course. which 3pplle$
Btl
3J>PIIes to elections for oil
011 federal offk::es,
offices. S()t~
set~ 4:~ u.
U. S.C. § 1973H-1. any
such stiltute w ot)ld
ot.Jid necessarily be limited to the presidential elet;tion.
ele•:tion.
lliJ I offer IhrEM:l
thrEM:l i"1'dt'lpOnses
rt~sponses to Ule
U1e view
views5 exprl'..'Ssad
expri'.."Ssad by Judge Walker. First, JudgfJ
JUdgfJ WEllkcr
WEJikcr suggests Ulat
U1at the
<1J\OCation of territol";,'ll
Siales Ms no basis in tht:! Cl,nstitutiOrl.
I do not CI<1,m
<1llocation
territot'1i.'ll votes 10
to the States
Cl•nstitutiol\. \MIile
\Miile 1
Cl<11m 111m
lll<lt the
constitutiOnal I:"lut"l'\ority
aut1·1ority is clear, 1
I rrake two
tw 0 points: (a) if the l.JO('AVA i:lnO
<:lnO ttle
the durations1
durational r(!~;id~mcy
ro~;id'imcy requitwrlf)nl
requirwrrant
e.c1ch obligating St.ltes
St<'ltes to accopt
accept votes or
ctattrtes
hallt' suppo1i
suppori in the ('.onstitution('..onstitutiOn - E!"lCh
of nonrf.Jsidt'!nts
nonrfoJsid('!nts - I can see no
statlltes havt•
reason why 1M
con~,tiMk)nal baslt'; (b)
ttte ~il<ltlll('J
~il<•tlrte I envision providing 10r
1or proportiOMle
proportiOMte allocation h<l~\
hs~• ,JOy
fJnY loss con~·tiM!Onal
Congross's auth()rity
authQrity rnay w
well
ell res~ie
re$~ie in Artk::1c
Article N.
N, § 3,
3. which grves
gives Congress the power 10
to n'l<;lkc
n'l<1kc ··on
"on needful
Rules and Regul::Jtions
ReguiFJtions respecting the lertitor[ies]." While Judge Walkf.!r argues against lhe Gll(;stence
GJl(;stence of such
auttwity, stabng th"i
thr"i Congress's power under Article N, § 3 is "not w ithoutrlmill:ttu:ms,"
ithoutrrrnit<ltu:ms," he offers no very
autlwity,
why
hy thost~
Ihos(~ linitotions stop st\Ort:
st)ort of such a statute,
slatute, passed for the purpost~
purp(l"t~ of
01 curing the
persuasive reAson w
disertFranchiserront
diSeI'IFranch;serront of the citizens of the Territories.
Second, Judge Wa~(E)r
Wa~(E!r asserts lhal'
lhat· because (in his view) a $tFltute
.stF~tute providing for proportionall:)
proportior'latt:) allocation is not
authorized by th~:1
authorizod
th~'l Constitution. it tollow
followss that U.S.
u.s. crtizens residing in the Territories cannot constitutionally be
f-or the presldenl
constitutional arrendtl-ent
TWf)nl.y- Third
authorized to vot~) r-or
president w ithoot eijher ,)
''constitutional
arrendo-ent akin 10
1o the TwfmtyAi'Y'endn~nt, or tho Territory bEX:;OtnnQ
Al'Y'endn~nt,
OO<::omnQ 3
a State. This is a non sequitur. I have suggesred two
tw 0 different ways in
'III
hich resident:; of trte Territories could be cof
Yot.~ r
or presidential E.'leetors.
E..'leCtors. The second is that the
which
eof ranchised to vot·~
for
UOCAVA. enfr~nchising fomer
forrrer residenrs of the States residinn in foreign
fore~gn ~~ountries. could ~~I'!fQly
~~l.!foly be
UOCAVA,
constitutionally c~x18nded
rQ$ide in the Territories. Judge Walker's
c~x1ended 10
to apply to forrrer resident.,<;
resident..<; of lhe
the States w t10 ro$ide
only answer to thi5 is to suggest that the IJOCAVA is also unconstitutional. But the durational resiclency statutes
(w
('III hi(;h
hir;h have the s;~me potenli<JI
polenti<)1 infirlTity
intiriTity io
to that they also requiro the States to acc~)pt too volCS
voles of nonresidents)
were
w
(ilre expreSSly
expressly upheld by the Supren~ Court in Oregon
Oregan v. M;/(~/)fJIfI"iQ.Q...lJ.S.
Mil<~l1fJif1 _1,Q.Q._l).S. 112.J.!.,;:L.yt.
112.J.!.,;:L.Yt. 260, 27 LEd.?,~,
LEd.?,.~. 272
(1~70J Judge Walker seeks to distinguish Mitchell and the durational residency r"k=~s
ruk=~s as invOIv~"19
involv~"l9 a congressional
r(!rT(ldy
f€!1T(ldy for viOlatlon~;
violatiOn~; of Ihe
the right to travel by the
tha Slates.
States. The Sli.~tulfil upheld in Milcholl.
MUchf)lI. how
hOW <Ner.
€Ner. does
doos more Ulan
I1'f!.!rely
ll'f!.lrely prohibit dU!"i,llional
dun;ltiooat residency requirermnts
fequirermnts oo
tl5 violations of the right 10 U'(lV01.
u·av01. ft a~so pmvides
ptovides that St(.~tes
Stt:~tes
must Dccept
residents, notw
noLW rthstancling that a
<l Stale
nOt vic)lcl\e the right to Iravo1
occept the \loh~s
voh~s ot certain forrmr residents.
State docs not
travol
by requitinQ vot~J:-s
vot~Jrs t.o be bona fide residents of the Stale.
Siale. Sao Dunn v. 8/omslr.Jin.
8/(Jmslr.Jin. 405 U.S.
U. S. 3:,0,
3:)0, 34&.49,
34&-49, 92 S Ct.
Cl.
995.31
L.8:J,?S.214 (1972).
,
_.
~
995. 31 L.R:I.?.s.2I4
(1972!.
· -_m.
m•
~
Tl111(1, Judge W<J!kr~r
thaI. even if the UOCA VA is unconstitutIOnal,
simlar provk;\on
/fight be author~~ed
Thtrd.
Wa!kr~r SU9gP..5ts
SU9QP..Sts that,
unconstitutiOnal, a smtar
provk;10n rright
relating S(llli!iy
SOIIi!ly to I:he
!:he votes of rrermers of the 3rrrecJ
arrrecJ sarvices
services by virtue of those clauses rrl
trl Article I,§
I, § 8 Ulal
mal
(lutMri7,:C
Congn':155 to tnlkE"l
autMri7,:C Congn:ms
tn~kE"l rutes
rules with r-espect to the arrred torcel,.
torcel>. Perl,.,ps
Per11ap:; so. In any t;lllcnt.
t;lvcnt. Article rv, § 3.
3,
which giv0s
giV0S Con~J(ess
Con~Jress the power to make "a~ noodful Rules and Regulations respecting
(especting lhe
lheli':1f(il.orfieS]."
h:nril.or{ies]," would
provide no tess (:\)nslitutional auU)ority
auU1ority to ensct tl'le
tI'le statutes I envision.

ill In Mdrtton
Melltton l.crtM Comrronwl3<Jnh~o~erto-Rrco-;-tl'le1crritor~ls-of
United-States-with-pC!rrronentpopulatjollS~-_ _ __
Comrronwe<Jnh~o~erto-Rico-;-tl'le1cffltor~lS-of the United-States-with-pcrrronentpopulatloru:-----include the Territory of Guam. 1M
lllfl Territory of Ule
U1e U.S. Virgin Islands. t~1e
t~~e C'..orrm:mwealttl of thEI Northern Mariana
Is
lslandr:s,
landf:S , and the I'Nr'itory
f'Nritory of Arrerican Sarros.
Sarroa. Through legislation. Congr!ilss
Congrlilss has conferred U.S. citizenship on
those born in F\n?r11.l
§ 1402, Guam. see ict.
iet. § 1407, the U.S. Virgin I$lan(j:~,
soe id § 1406, and
R.n?.r-tl.l Rico, see 8 U.S.C.
U.S. C.§
!$land:~. sae
tho Northern Maril,lI1a
l'rori;,llla Islands, se~!
tJ.S.C. § 1801 (approving the "Covenant to Es~blist1 <l<I CommnweF:Jtth
$e~! 48 U.S.C.
CommnweF:Jlth of me
1\11arian8
J\.t1arian8 Islands."
Islands,"§
§ 301 of which
w hich provid~)s
provid~JS for U.S. cHiZenship). ThostP
Thos<P born in Am;)ciC<ln
Am;)ric<Jn
Samo:J,
Sarno;),
on tileof
SC Northern
38417-2011
Page
2474
bui rather "Art);.!riean
"Art)i.!riCan nationals." aU.S.c.
U.S. C. § 1101(01)(21),
1101(a)(21), (22) S(;;o
Sr;;o (]Cnl.lfcJ!Iy
gcnwcJ/ly .JonBthan
,JonBthan
(l\hor
olhor hand, are not Citizens but
rM NIJphews
o( Uncle
tlJ() AppfiCtlli()/1
C. Dri~r. tM
NtJphews or
()ncle Sam:
SiJm: 'flliil
T/1£:1 History, Evohttioo,
Evohttioo. and tim
AppfiC<lti<>n of Birtt1riglll
Birtt1riglrt Ci{izons/Jip
Citizonsl1ip in
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the Uniled
Goo. Imnlgr.
700 (1995) (criticizing
Unitecl STele!>.\}
Sletes. 9 Gco.
lmnigr. U,
U. 667,
667,700
(cnticizing tho
the fact that the Fourteenth l,n'l:lndn'Cnt's
l,n'l:lndn-ent's
CitiZenship
tlietl provides that ",alII
"(alii persons bom ...
tt1c Unitf:d Stntoo
citi:?.ens of the united
'" in tr10
Stn100 ...
.. , ore citi;?ens
citIZenship guarnn1ee, w tliGtl
States." has not 00011
ooen extended to the territories),
territories).
States,"
L~ In his separa!i'f.
separatvr. vi1"w
vil>;w 5,
s. JudgE! Leval suggf:.'Sts
suggt.'SlS that the Territorial
Territor~al Clause 01
o1 Article N,
N. § ~\.
~~- GL 2, W
which
l~
hiGh provides
h.';lS the pow8r
aU needfut
th"t
thilJt C.ongress
C'.ongress ht;Js
powt!r 10
to "rreke au
needful Rules and RoSJulalion...'>
RosJulalion...'> respecting the Territorlics],"
Territortics],'' could also
serve as a source ot
of constitutional authority for Congress to require me
tN! states 10
to accept a pro rata share of the
or the terntories.
votes of
territories.

tnl+;l 111m
thm the Territorial Clause (lffords
<lffords Congress subSlantialleew
substantialleew ay to govem
govern the t~!rritories,
t~1rritories, .§imms
While It11 is tHI+;!
,§jmms v.
Simms,
lirritatiOns, ;:.(.)1'},
0.(1.,.. Dof/'
Simms. 175 U,S,
lJ.S. 11i~;
112._~; 20 S,Ct
S.Ct 58, 44 L.~; 115 (1899), that,
that. pow ens rIot
r101 without !irritatiOns.
;:.(.)e, e.g
Dorr v
UnifE)(i
Stl:ll(~s ..13!,~",.~L?
liOf:l aiso Unif()g_~J,qips
UnifElCI Stl:llc~s.Ji!.~
....~l;,§). 138. 2<1 s,g.:."§Q§~_'19
S.g..:._§Q§~_/19 L.Ed,
L.Ed. 12JU~?'~U;
12JU~?:~f.i; :>of:l
Unifop_~J,qips v. VeC~!!!!lE::.y!gl!ict.~
Vec~!!!!lE::.Y£.g'!£ct.~
U,S,
26B-6~.;J1-0 S.Ct.
S.C!., 105{\
1056! 10~..hJd.2d 222 (1990
nghts are guaranteed
U.S. 250,
250. 26B-69,,JJ_O
(199Q) ("Only fur\d(-lrTfmtal
fur\darTfmtal constitulional
constitutional nghls
to inh<lbitants ot thOr50
RI.~'/!Hi()n5hips &~(weon
thOrSe territories,");
territories."); :~ve generally Jon M Van DIke,
D1ke. Tho Evo/vin~J
Evolvin~J L~J[J/
L~JDI R'.~'I!Hionships
&~cweon
(11G Unilod SlalfJ~:
,1I')(l/rs Affiliated US,-Flf1fl's/ands,
"'{he provision by 1ts
Its
1110
State~= <m<ii(S
u.S.-FifJflls/ands, 14 U. Haw,
Haw. L.Rov. 445,
445. 453-71 (1992). 1he
i3ft::-Jrd Congress t.he authority to ~se requimrren1s
requimrrents on the St.3tOf:,
st.:ltor:. in CongrB$~"'S
CongrBs~•·s regula
regulation
the
terms does not i3fti)rd
lion of Ihe
terr~ories. Set;l
Set;~ a/,\;o U,S.
u.S. Const almnd.
a~mnd. X (non-delegated powers are res\,!rvoo
res\<rved to the state~~): U.S. Coost art,
art N,
terr~ories,
§ 3 (territory
tale cannot be changed w
without
s tate's legis
'!?...'...'!::.
(terrrtory of .,•• s
state
ithout the consent of the concerned state's
teg1s !8ture);
!<Jture); Tox '!?
While, i Wall,
roo, 725,.,2.~~~-&J
72S,.2.~~~.&J 227 ((11!}.§PJ
!}'§Pl (holding UfleonSlitutional
attOlTpted SI!!ceS51On
Wall. 700.
uMonstitutional Tex:;Js's
Tex::Js's attorrpted
seceS5JOn from the
Union: 'Tllhe
pr8~(i)r\lalJOn of U,e
Ole maintenance ai'
gOllernrmnts, are liS nM::h
flM::h within the design
"[Tjhe pre~<i>rvaiJOn
tr'e States, and Ule
ol' their
the~r governrmnts,
\he lAlnstitution
C'Alnstitution as Ih(l
th(l preserv3tion
preservation of the Union and the rll:)intenancc
r~t:1intenancc of !he
the Ncltional
Ncltionat gavernn-ent.
governn-ent The
aM care of the
Constitution, in <.Jl
<.J11l of its provisions,
provisions. looks to an indestructible union, corrposoo of irtCleslfIJ\~{iblo
irteleslrtJI~fiblo $ttl/OS,"
SttJtos."
(Elrlllhasis addoo}),
(erll'hasis
addod}).

Q) Althou!}h
Althou!)h the SlIpremil
Sllprema ('..ourt
C'..ourt has
haS not yet articulated Ihe
the stan(tard
stanctard tor accessing the scope of Congress's
An-endrrent, the tact that bolh
both § 5 Qnd
and§
tl1eir term:; provide (".ongres!l
C"..ongres!l
§ 2 by t/)eir
authority under § :,~:.~ (~f the Fifteenth Arl-endrrent,
with only the "pow t:;:r to enfOl'ce"1/'le
enforce" the substantive provisions of Ithe
he Amendrrents strongly ~;llggests
~;l1ggests that the
limitaticms on Congress's ~lulhority under
under§
§ 2 3re similar 10
to Ihose
those under § 5,
5. See Bd
ad of 7'm.<::trw.o;;
7'm$tr~.<:, of the Un"v.
Un,.v. of -1!~
';'.;Jit:trmtl,
':'.:Jat:trrr.tl, 531 U.S :l56,
:156, 12t§.;.Q.
12t,;?,;._Q. 955, 957 ~i'.,!!,
~,..•!!· 148 L.Ed.2d
l.Ed.2d 066
£166 8.99.U
G_QQ.U (dISCussing
(diSCussing the Voting Rig~lts
Rig~1ts Act of
1965, which w ,J~;
<J~; f<nacled
f<nacted by Con9r~~';$
Congr~~.;s under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendrrer1!,
Amendrrer1t, fJS a model Qf
of "congru€lnt and
p,'oportionar' legislitltlon).
&11 seo
soo £UY
fUyor
US, ·1'1~:
100
L.Ed,2~
pr·oportionar
legisli!ltton). But
of Rome v (Jni!!!!l.:,~:£!.~,
tlni!!!!J.:.~.'£!.~. 4Ati uS.
~: 176,.77,
176·· 77 1
oo S'S:L~"?-48,
s.s:L~"?-48. 64 L.
Ed. 2~
2.!QJ1?.§.Q). (sug(,jesHng
;! authority need only IX: "ralionany"
2.!QJ.l?.§.Q).
(sug(,Jesting Ii;lgislative
li;lgislativc enactl'oonlS
enactrrents under OJngress's §
§::!
''ralionaUy" related to
"attacking the per~:rtuation
pf:)r~)!\Jation of (;.larlicr!
discnmiMtion"),
(;.larticr, purposef~11
purposef~JI racial discnmiMtion").
[~j To
l~J

be sure.
at discrirrinatory effects w ~h its § 2 autMrity as a mt;lc;ns
deterring or
sure, Cl)ngress
Congress may strike .,t
m(;'<1('1$ of ooterring
remedYing h~IOfiC
pr.lt1erns or
the denial of the vote. See,
~) g"
f:! Rome. 44~
rcmedytng
h~tonc pat1erns
or intentional state discrimination in lhe
See.~)
g., City
City!:(
U.S. ::Jt
:Elt 177,
oocause etectorCll
eteClor211 changes by
177. 100 S Ct,
Ct. 1548 ("Congress could rationally have conclUded tM!,
th<-lt. because
j'w:;sdictiont:> w 1l1';';'d-;;monslfBbJe
j'w:;$dictiont:>
nt.;·;·;;-;;monstrable history of intentional racial discriJl'1ination
discriJ1'1ination in voting creatE!
create! lflf}
[fiE=} risk
riSlk of 'purposeful
discrin'inatiOn, ~~was
W 85 proper to prohibit ch3nges Ulat havo a discrimnatory
discrimMtory il1llflCt.").
irtllact."). This is Of
of no moment here,
here.
discrinmatiOn,
however, becour.~) the denial of me lIote
vote to the territonos, regardless ot the disparate
diSparate efff~'<:ts
efff~><:ts it rrey h(lvl,'},
havl.'}, is nol
not
an inton(iona/
states, and therefore r'l\-'ly
Congress under'
intontional dE!lW~1
dEHW~I of tho vote by the states.
r'l\-'lY not be deterred or rerredied by C'.ongress
under·

§2
~This
where
cton!E!d lh€!
lo vote
~
This differs fr<lr~l
fr()f~l the situation w
here a U.S. citizen is actuaUy residing in the state,
stata, but is ctoniE!d
Ih!;l right 10
Fouftr,.'E)Illh Arrendrrent'~, ~xJ!)al
due to a duration:;J!
duration:;:~! residency tequirermnt. In this Ialter
latter instanca,
instanca. the Fou!lr,.'Elfllh
~xwal protection
guarantee is o1'lended
e,lifferent.1y in their
o1'1ended if the period is significant because statE! residenlS
resideniS are being treated c.lifferently
access to the b;:lllot box without a COfll)elling
cOfIl)elling state interest for lhe
the disparC/te
dispar<lle Ireatrront.
lreatrront. Set.';'
Sr:tt.'i' Ql!!'!.!2.'!.)?'IJms(uifl,
Ql!!'!.f2.'!.)?1tJmsfuirr
405 US,
(elTll;>Cy thLS
thIS constitutional
us. 330, 3~,s::F,
3~.s::F, 92 S,ct,
S.ct. 995,)1 L.Ed,2d
L.Ed.2d 274 ((19i2).
1972}. lhcrerofe,
lhcrerore. Congress rroy rerTll:>dy
violation through It"
See Oregon
":' ~i!£!'P1!,
US, 112
112,.~.L~'CI.
2600.ZJ:,j:;fl.2d 2'1"2
ttr, authority
author-ity ~mder § 5. Soo
Oregon":·
~i!.r?.!'P!!· 400 US.
.•~"~.Ct. 2600,ZJ:.:Jf-:l.2d

Qgi,O)..
u£!I,O)..

l?J Significantly,
Significantly. Bt
8t thr:!'
tl1r;. tirm
tirro the Constitution w
was
as draftc'd,
draftcoO, the Continental Con9re$~;
Congres~; in New

Ymk
ark was in control of

Tt.~ITitories. Soe
Sue ge/lOf[Jlly
geMmlly Denis P. Duffey,
l)uffey, Note, Tho
Tha Nortflwesl
Ordimmco c.1s
the Northwest.
Noflhwt;)SI, T01"fitories.
NortflweSl Ordin.-mcfI
tiS l:l
/:1 Constilulional
Cl)nsti/(J/ional
Docum~;~n/, 95 Cilium,
Cnlum. L.Rev.
(1995). Yct,
Yet. the Fmrrers did not provide tl'li:l
DOCCiml;in(,
L. Rev , 929, 929, 934-40 (1995),
tI'1i:l territory with
ll'1e new federal governrrer.t.
governrrerrt. This, I believe,
believe. SuggeslS
suggests that the exclul-lion
exclUlolion ot territorial
territoriollonds
lands
representation to U'le
generaUy from
fr()ll'l thEl !:'lif:ctoral
81€:ctoral college was not sirrp!y a historicalt>versight.
historical4)versight, but rather a conscious pro<lt.ICt
PJ'(l(JI,IC1 of
or the

constitutional dr;.sigr.,
dr;.sigr..

ill
lZl For the sam,!
sam:! f~)BSOnS
r~)Bsons ml;l!
tMt I believe Judge Levars proposalw
proposal would
ould exceed Congress's ~lIthOfity
~uthority under the
('..orrm:lrce
enforcef'l'ent clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth ArrendJmnts.
Arrel'ldrmnts, UOCA VA's
C'..onm:Jrce C!aus~.'t
C!aus~:t <lnd the enforcerrent
VA 's
directive to the &Jo.tf;)S
&JO.t!)S to extend the franchi$O
franchi$0 in federal elections to non-resident U.S,
U.S. citiz(m5
cf!iz1ms liVing
liv1ng overseas,
:;;c:e
$ce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1, 1973ff-6(5)(C),
1973ff-6(5)(C). appears constitutionally infirm. \M111e
\M11Ie Cortgre~ds
Congre~ds EluthoriiY·~lI=nd::i:e;:-:;r~thoO::-::-,
authoriiy-:-;u~nd;J.e::;;rCOjtho~·~~~~~~
Spending ClalJ~l";
Clau~•!'; Irilght
rr;~ght support UOCAVA's requirenent
reQuirenent that thE! st.at.es accept the votes
VOles of nO:Nesideni
no:Nesidenl U.S.
citizens living abrocld,
abrO;3d, it aoes
does not appear
app0-ar to me thal
that at present. state
slate adherence to 1his
\his reqLllrement
rec;LIIrement is conditioned
on Ihe
Or federal monies,
()()
lhe accoptance
acceptance or
monies.

SCIt 38417-2011
is possible,
possrble, however,
how ever. that those provisions of UOCA VA gov£:rning mJrtary voting!
voting, soe 42 U,S,C,
U.S. Page
C. § 1973ff-1(
24751) of
& 2676
(2). mJy well b0 Clcz "rw,c;essary
(2),
"rWl(;eSsary and propi':'r"
propf:.r" e)cercisf}
e.lCercise of Congress''''
Congress'5 <llJih()fity
<'llJIh()(ity to provide rOr
or an army and navy,
navy.

se~
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v_ Cohen, 265 F. 3d 118r<.omeu v.
118 - Court...
u. 6. IAnst.
§ 5. d·;.
lB. Ly -/,,,,u,';"9
~!>/~Hl/IMI oro not dinonfr;)ncht(:"rJCt
virtU(i) of thjilir
~Anst. i:ll
ar r. I, §e.
d·L 12" 14, 113.
'l'"'uo•;,,9 tI',~,I,',"lil'&~
u·.~.t.•...lil.&~ ~!>~~Hl~IMI
dinonfr;lnCht(:"rJCt ~y virtu(i)
th'ilir
".iCtive
servicc aw
'aW {~y
1973ff,·6(1)(A}.
''<.iCtiVe duty" service
t~y from their "place of residence,"
residence.'' soe
see 42 U.SC.
U.S C. § 1973ff·-6(1)(A}.
@jlfl
@j I(l !.fE:.~.':!.!!f!...fJ!U
!,fl};,~,Q.!!f!...Q!U7g
h.'oS<~ v, I!!!!!pd
f.!!!!!..od StiiI6
Stiilf:>'S.
3?E.~ 8,10
8, 10 n. 1 ('19~~! curiam).
curiam),th€)
the p~
p~">intifh;,
.. intifhi, whO WerfJ
werfJ U.S.
7!J. "'(l$,~
'S. 3?.1.:;.~
RIco, I)rgweCllhat
VOle in the presioontial
s,'!(:uroo by Article 25
citizens residing in F1.Jt)rto Rico.
argweClthat their right to vote
presi<Jenti.al eiQction
e!Qction is S''!<:uroo
2.5 of
lntern<~tion<rl (:(lvf.mant
C<\vf.mant on Civil and Ftl6tical
Ftl6ticat Rights.
Rights, 6 l.t.M. 368 (1967).
( 1967). which the Unite(1 81,*;)5
St<JtE;)s has
haS ratified.
the Intern<'ltiorlt'11
Article 25 provides in pertinent part
Every citizen
citizon sh,l!l!·tave
sh<\!ll·tave the right and the opportunity .... w ithoulunroosonoble r~trictionll
r~trictionl] ... to vote ... at genuine
periodic electiOn:>,
electiOn:>. which llhall
shall be universal and equal suH(a~
suHra~.·......

Aesenlly. Articll;l 2.5 is not $(~ii-executing,
Congo Rec. S47&l
sc~ii-executing, se(t Cong.
S478-l (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992,),
1992.}.
'1.

~Ild
~nd thereforo cannot

b0
be

pr-iv<Jtt~ly ~)nforced.
pr-iv<l\l~ly
~mforcoo. S("f.1
S(•'t.! Ig<J1ty2.
lg<Jit!_.!Q Do La Rosa
Rosa..• 3/.
~?:...~
~m
C'1t 10 n.

Assuming fot'
for the sake ol
01 diSCufision
discu!'sion that the voting status
slatus of tht~ terrllories
terrrtories docs violate Ar-lide
Ar-tide 25, the qlJestion
qiJestion
arises whether, ifl order to corrply with ollr
arrses
our treaty obligations under Article 25. CoI)gress
Cor1gress could ~Ien~mt
~len~mt the A'o
Raw Proposal undtll'
L1ndt1!' 1t)e
1t'le Treaty Oause
aause of Article H, § 2. It believe the answer is plainly "no." While ltIe
l.tle scope of
C'.ongress's authority under the Tre~ty Clause is separate and independent of Its
C'.ongress·s
rts other enulli0fated
enunie-rated powers.
powers, see,
see.

.!.z.

e.g., Missouri V.
v. 1-io/J;;md.
433-,14, 40 S.Ct. 382., 64~~~641 (1920) {t_lolmec
I-iolh,md. 2?,.? U.S. 416.
416, 1133-1.4,
{t,lolmec.,.. .!.l. it (lik~
(Iik~ Congress's
(~<;u1not be used 10
to alter the structural relatinnshrps
er,shrined in the ConSl!\\IHon.
Consttl\iUOn. sorrethiTlg
sorrething lhe
spending power) (~<"'not
f€llatinnshlps erlshrined
\he
Pro Rata Pl·opo(;cll
P!'opo(',cll w
auld plainly do. See U.S.
would
u.S. Coost art VI (providing thal
that the Constitution i$ Hl~~
1!1~~ "Suprem·)
"Suprem·.:J Law of
rl'le !..and");
f3.cid ~'.
~·. Covert. 3fi.1I1.S.
3fi.11J.S. 1
77 S 9· 1222,
1222. 1 l.Ecl2(J 1!:!iH:lPJ15)
l!!!iH1PJJ6) (pltJrflli'1:".~2iniO('1):
(pltJrality.,.~(Jinion): 'flwl,/Ij
lqwlrm 9£'
.9£
!he
Land"); !3.eid
1, 16-1?,
16·17",77
b!.B.~?..,Ud at
b!.B.~?"'Ud
m 10 n.
f'l. 1,
t

o

r&

~Notably.
~
Notably.

the DC.
0 C. Circuit has held IMt
tMt the House of Representatives'
Representativos' rT~y
rn~y perrm thO temrori<ll
temtori<~l delegates to the
limited voting
voling authority. Seo
Sec £oAicllol
£ollictro/ v. Ao(lersol1,
Aot1erson, 14..E.¥l623,
14_E_;¥l623, 632 {.Q.g.Cir.19tJ4).
tQ.9.Cir.19tJ4). But sao gOIlet;)/Iy
gollet'i)l/y Jamn
Thera "1
<·1 ConstillJliqf101
ConstiiiJiiqnol Right to Votl)
Voto and Be Ropr6'SE!nled?:
Ropr6'Sented?: Tllo
Tile Caso oftM
oftho Dislricl
Disrrict of Coll.lmbJ:J,
Columh~:J,
B. Raskin. I.e;
'.e; Thoro
48 Am U.L.Rev. 589,592
(arguing lhat
fully protects the right to vole Md be represented
589. 597. (1999) (argurng
that the "Constitution Fully
in natioMI goverr~r'l'ltl(\r.
goverr~r'l'ltlr'll. for every COrTmmity
corrm.mity of A!"I'erican
A!"l'erican cit.~ens
cit.~ ens taxed. drafted,
drafted. and goVerr'l8t:J
governet:J by our
institutions").
HOuSf~
HOllS(,~

(lQ1 This view
l!Q1

<)fsO €!)(prE)sscd
€!)(pressed by the First Circurt
lg<~rlua Do 1:;9 Rosa, 32 F
.3d i;!.!J"9:
1;!1 ·~9:
was ,)1$0
CirCUit in Igi~(lua
F.3d

jurisdictirm. not a SlatE!,
srate, w I"ch
11rch participates in the presidential election is 1he District of Coluni:)ia.
Colun"t>ia. which
lhe only jurisdictjr)n,
enty-third arrendrrcnt to the ClnslitutiQn
ConslitutiQn ... Only <~ simiL-,)r
simiL-':lr constitutional
obtained that right through the IW entyHthird
am,mdrrent
am:mdrrent or ;:J
;:1 grant of statehood to F\!erto
F\Jerto 1«0.
l«o. therefore, Ctln
eM provide appellants the rigl,t
rig!1t to vote in I.h()
f.h()
whiCh
presidsntial election w
hieh they seek.
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U.S. Code

TIl"LE
Tll"LE

·~2

::.
::• CHAPTER

~o
~0

::- SU601APTER f·G:;.
f-G :;. §
9 19]~~ff-·l
191'~~ff-·1

§ 1973ff-l.
1973ff-1. State responsibilities
(a)
(D) In

generiiil~
genera~

s1·1all··"·
Each State 51"lall'""'
(1) permit absent uniformed services voters and ovcrscils
oVCrsCilS voters to use absentee registratio
ballot iiI
i;'\ 9(-~neral,
91.-~neral, special, primary, and runoff elections for Federal office;
lftCC(:~pt and process, with respect to any election for Federal office. any
anv otherwise vi.llid
(2) ;;ICC(~pt
vi,llid v·
v'
ballot ~;Ipplication
~;1pplication from an absent uniform(~d
uniform1~d services voter or overst>as voter, if the applicatiol
applicatior
election official not I(~$s
l<~ss ttMn 30 days before I:he
l:he elettion;
elec:.tion;
clcctior:

(3) permit absent uniformed services vote~; and overseas voters to use Feder<ll
Feder()l write-in abs
1973ff<:! of this title) in general elections for Federal office;
(4) use
uSE: the official post card form (prescribc:d under ~~ection 1973ff of this title) for simllltc:m.
simultc:m•
ballot application;

absent~~c

(S) if th~~ State requires an oath or affirmation to accompany any d()curnent
{S)
d\lCutnent under this subcl
by the Presidential designee under section l9"73ff
J9"l3ff (b)(7) of this title;
(6)
(G) in addition to any other method of registering to vote or applyinq for an absentee ballot
(A) for absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters to request by mail
rnail and ~
()pplications and absentee ballot applications with respect to general, special, primary, ;j
oKcordance with subsection (c);
o1Ccordance
(C)i

(8)
(S.) for States to send by mail ;!lnd electronically (in

~ccordanc.e
~ccol'danc.e

witl1 the preferred me·
witl)
me"

(C»

ab~>eflt
ab~;ent uniformed services voter or overseas voter under subp;:'lri.'lgraph
subp;;~rl.'lgraph (C)) voter regis

applications requested under subpara!;vaph (A) in accordanCE;
accordancE: with subsection

(~'!);

and

(C) by which the absent uniformed services voter or overseas voter can designate wh•
whl
registration application or abs~ntee ballot ~PDlical;ion
~pplication hl~
Ill~ transmitted by mail or electror
(7) in addition tO_iillY._Q!:hcr
tO~fl¥-Q!:hcr mqt-hod
bl;.'lI1k ab$cnte<:. ballots in the State.
mqthod of transmitting bl;;mk
State, estal
and ele.ctronically blank Clbsentcr. ballots to absent uniformed service~~;
scrviCt;~~; voters and overseas vc
pmmlry I ,;lnd
pmmlry,
;;lnd runoff elections for Federal office in accordance with subs~ction
SlJbs~ction (f);

(8) I;r,,)ri:,rnit
tr<Jri:>rnit a validlv
validly requested absentee ballot to an absent uniforrned
uniforrncd services voter or ov
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456
LLP
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, llP
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Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at law
P. 0.
O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-5117
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-09-10010

JIM BRANNON,

Vs.

)
)
)

SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT
OPPOSITION
OF
KENNEDY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

)

Plaintiff Brannon's Motion for New Trial and supporting Memorandum consists
entirely of a rehash of old arguments made repeatedly before and during trial. The pattern
followed by plaintiff counsel seems once again an effort to either evade or, on appeal,
495, 20 P.3d 679, (2001). The
overturn Noble v. Ada County Elections Board, 135 Idaho 495,20
facts in Noble have many similar ties.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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Procedurally, plaintiff repeats one identical argument. Here plaintiff alleges error
in the failure of defendants to offer evidence or present witnesses after the close of
plaintiffs case. Here, as in Noble, all of the witnesses who would affirm the validity of
the election process were called by plaintiff, testified and were cross examined by
counsel for defendant. On occasion, identified exhibits for defendant were introduced
into evidence during plaintiffs case in chief.
Noble rested his case"
case "... and the interested parties chose not to present any
evidence at the hearing." 135 Idaho at 498. The solid holding of a unanimous Idaho
Supreme Court was that Noble did not meet his burden of proof. That is what this
Court has decided. Part of the efforts of defendant was to show that plaintiff did not
carry that burden.
Plaintiffs motion does not rely on paragraphs 1,2,3,4
1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of I.R.Civ.P., Rule 59
(a). The rehash alleges (6) insufficiency of evidence and (7) error in law.
This Court reluctantly gave the widest imaginable scope to plaintiffs presentation
in examination of witnesses, exploring of dead ends (number of computers in the
county's election office) and argument unsupported by evidence. Plaintiff fails to
identify a single instance in which during trial there was an error of law that was adverse
to plaintiffs case.
This Court's twenty page Memorandum Decision fully covers, analyzes and
disposes of all the contentions raised by plaintiffs motion and memorandum.
This Court had the opportunity to hear and view the witnesses. Most of the
reported cases in Idaho are upon motions for a new trial following a jury verdict.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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In a jury verdict case, the trial court must ask these two questions described in

Schwan's Sales Enterprises v. Idaho Transportation Department, 142 Idaho 826, 136
P.3d 297 (2006):

". . .motion for new trial calls the trial judge to weigh the evidence and
determine (1) whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear
weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would produce a
different result.
142 Idaho at 833.

The challenge to the loser in moving for a new trial made after an adverse
judgment in a case tried before the court, is clearly more difficult. The trial judge has
already weighed the evidence and made its decision based upon its determination.

5%
After being burdened with multiple briefs upon the law, this Court endured 5
% full days
of trial granting great latitude to plaintiff.
Although it is a case involving motion for new trial after jury verdict, the Idaho
Supreme Court in Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642,
642,200
200 P.3d 1191 (2009), laid out
the criteria to be used in determining whether to grant a new trial.

When a motion for a new trial is based on the ground of insufficient
evidence to justify the verdict, the trial court must weigh the evidence
presented at trial and grant the motion only where the verdict is not in
accord with its assessment of the clear weight of the evidence. Lanham,
130 Idaho at 498, 943 P.2d at 9234; Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo
Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 45, 896 P.2d 949, 953 (1995). In ruling on the
motion, the trial court must independently assess the credibility of the
498, 943 P.2d at 924; Quick, 111 Idaho at
witnesses. Lanham, 130 Idaho at 498,943
766, 727 P.2d at 1194.
146 Idaho at 647-648.
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The Memorandum Decision of this Court decided, based upon credible
evidence, against every single one of plaintiff's itemization in his memorandum and
motion:
1.

Faiiure to investigate residences and failure to keep a record are not proof
of illegal votes. p. 6.

2.

The physical absentee ballots were accurately counted by Judge Marano.

p. 8.
p.8.
3.

The statistical data of the absentee ballot recount does not produce any
information as to for whom the ballots could be counted. p. 9.

4.

There was no evidence that the stack of 2050 returned envelopes did not
include all 2041 valid names in the November 6, 2009 data base report.
p.12.
p. 12.

5.

There was no fault regarding Section 34-1411; the election process is
complex and the county ran the election well. p. 13.

6.

Alleged election irregularities do not provide the Court with discretion to
set aside an election under Idaho case law. p. 17.

The motion for new trial must be denied.
th

Dated this 29 day of November, 2010.

.....

~-

~

t~J-1

-------=--~~~--~--~~--

Scott W. Reed, One of the
Attorneys for Defendant Kennedy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certi~ that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax or first class
mail, this 29 day of November, 2010 to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
0. Box 1312
P. O.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208)
{208) 664-6261
Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office
P. O.
0. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, Id
ld
FAX (208) 67
68
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Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
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JS8#818
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P. O.
0. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, 10
ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-5117

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-09-10010

JIM BRANNON,
)

Plaintiff,

)

)

~.
~-

)

SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

OF
RESPONSE
DEFENDANT
KENNEDY
TO
PLAINTIFF'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO
ALTER TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
DATED NOVEMBER 26,2010

)

Counsel for plaintiff on Friday filed a Supplemental Memorandum citing Romeu v.
nd

Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2
(2nd Cir. 2001) in support of plaintiffs argument that the Uniformed

and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOVACA), 42 U.S.C. §§1973 ff-1 and 1973
ff-6, does not allow the absentee votes of Paquin, Friend, Gagnon and Farkes to be
counted.

RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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The reported Court of Appeals opinion as provided to this Court and counsel does
not support plaintiffs argument and is clearly distinguishable.
Xavier Romeu brought suit alleging a constitutional right to vote for president in New
York.

He had been a resident of V'v'estchester County in New York State from 1994

through 1999 and had voted for president in the 1996 presidential election. On May 17,

1999, Romeu moved to and became a resident of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. p.
2/14.(1) These are distinguishing facts upon which the opinion is based:

On July 9, 1999, Romeu registered to vote in Puerto Rico. U.S. territories,
including Puerto Rico, do not participate in presidential elections.
Subsequently, Romeu requested an absentee ballot from the State of New
York to vote in the 2000 presidential election. (Emphasis supplied). p. 2/14
New York State had an election law relating to voters registered within the state
who are absent from the state but intend to maintain a voting residence within the state.
The Court of Appeals observed that U. S. citizen residing outside of the United States
may rely upon UOCAVA to vote:
. . .so long as "such citizen does not maintain a place of abode or
domicile, is not registered to vote and is not voting in any other election
district, state, territory or possession of the United States." N.Y. Elec. Law
§11-200(1) (McKinney 1996).
p.
p.2/14
2/14

1 The faxed opinion does not have page citations to 265 F.3d. Reference here is to page numbers at the
bottom of the 14 page opinion.
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The fact that Romeu became a permanent resident of Puerto Rico and
registered to vote in Puerto Rico barred him under the New York statute and under
UOVACA from voting absentee for president in New York:

In this regard, it is significant to note that in excluding citizens who move
from a State to Puerto Rico from the statute's benefits, the UOCAVA treats
them in the same manner as it treats citizens of a State who leave that
State to establish residence in another State. Had Romeu left New York to
become a resident of Florida, he would similarly not have been permitted to
exercise the right created by a the UOCAVA to vote in the federal elections
conducted in New York. And if a citizen of Puerto Rico took up residence
outside the United States, the UOCAVA would entitle that citizen to
continue, despite her foreign residence, to participate in Puerto Rico's
elections for the federal office of Resident Commissioner. Congress thus
extended voting rights in the prior place of residence to those U.S. citizens
who by reason of their move outside the United States would otherwise
U .S. voting rights, without similarly extending such rights
have lacked any U.S.
to U.S. citizens who, having moved to another political subdivision of the
United States, possess voting rights in their new place of residence.
(Citations)

p.5/14
The opinion concludes as follows:

In sum, the considerations underlying the UOCAVA's distinction are not
insubstantial. As a result, we hold that Congress acted in accordance with
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause in requiring States and
territories to extend voting rights in federal elections to former resident
citizens residing outside of the United States, but not to former resident
citizens residing in either a State or a territory of the United States.

p.
5/14.
p.5/14.
Paquin, Friend and Farkes
Farkas are residents of Canada and Gagnon is in the
military. These are the relevant portions of the Idaho statutes:
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Idaho Code §50-416. . .

If a person is absent from this state but intends to maintain his residence
for voting purposes here, he shall not register to vote in any other city
during his absence.
idaho Code §34-405 ...

If a person is absent from this state but intends to maintain his residence
for voting purposes here, he shall not register to vote in any other state
during his absence.
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of the Monica Paquin application which is
identical to the other three. Printed paragraph 4 as sworn to by the applicant states:

4.

I am not registering, requesting a ballot, or voting in any other
jurisdiction in the U.S., except the jurisdiction cited in this voting
form.

Romeu could not have signed such an oath being a full-time resident of Puerto
Rico and having registered to vote there. The opinion lends no support to plaintiffs
claim of illegality.
The applications of all four, while giving a Coeur d'Alene address, state that each
currently lives in either Canada or is in California and is qualified as military service
related.
As of 8:00 o'clock p.m. on November 3,2007,
3, 2007, the Kootenai County Election
Office had complied with every federal, state and municipal law relating to absentee
votes from persons who had a residence in Coeur d'Alene and who were living out-ofstate/out-of-country but with an intention to return. A copy of the December 18, 2009
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letter from Chief Deputy Timothy A. Hurst to Dan English confirming the acceptance of
absentee ballots from the Canadian voters is attached as Exhibit B.
Respectfully submitted, this~y of

Nove~

r
r }}

C:::>&JS
V ....
-=~ '~v..-1·;
t

,;

Scott W. Ree'd, One of the
Attorneys for Defendant Kennedy
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax or first class
mail, this 30th day of November, 2010 to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
0. Box 1312
P. O.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 664-6261
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EXHIBIT B

.,-• KOOTENAI

~002/003

OF IDAHO

OFFICE OF THE SE.C~r:TARY
SE.C~I::TARY OF STATE
. BEN VSURSA .

December 18,2009
18, 2009

Dan English
Kootenai County Clerk
POBoX, 9000
Coeutd'Alene, Idaho 83fil6
83£116

Dear Dan:
I run in receipt of your letter dated December 16, 2009. regarding the eligibility of a
certain oveTSca~
oversea~ citizen and military personnel to vote in the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene election .

.•

It appears from th.e
th.c information that was cntered
entered int.o the statewide voter registration
sysc.ern that TammyFarkes,
TammyF'arkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory Proft and Alan Friend regl~tered
re,gl~tered to vote in
system
accordan.ce
accordan.cc with state law.

A person
pernon Jiving outside the Slate
sc.ate tempo('arily
tempoJ:"arily doe~ nollose
not lose his or her right to vote ~imply
~jmply
by being absent
nbsent from the state. Article VI,
VI. Section 5 of (be
tbe Idaho Constitution says:
'"For purposes of voting, no per.son shall be deemed to have gained ·or
'01' lost a.
residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the setvice of
this stare. or of the United Stales~
States~ nor while engaged in the. na"jgation
nalljgation c,f
lhis
Clf the
waters of this state or of the United States.
States, nor while",
while"' student of any ifilRti.tution
ir.,sti.tution
., of lcariring.
Icariring. not while .kept at any alms house
bouse or other asylum at t.he public
expense,"
expense."

Idaho Cod" Section 34-107(3) also says:

CIA quaUficd elector who has. left his home ~nd gone into another state or territory
"A
O( county of thi!!.
or
thiR state for a temporary puq,05e
pufpo:ie only shall not be considered
conside:red to
hi~ residence."
have. lost his
Jd~o Codo
Section~4-1
Code Section
~4-1 07(4)
07(4) also says:
.P.O
P.O,.•. BOll
Boll 83720. IJol!la,
lJol!la, ldnho
Idnho 113720-0080
113720..0080
Telapltone: (206) 334·2300,
334·2300. FAX: (206) 334,,2282
334"2282
Loc.3ted
.Iefferson Street. Suite 203
Loeo\\ted al
at 700 West .lefferson
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12/18/2009

Ud ~.01
~.Ol "~HI~
"~H/~

10:30

lll: :i:.l. f"tl...t
1":;':.1.
F/Lt

208

3;

1~2

.282

KOOTENAI (
'fY
Tn
rn Secretary
Secretar::v of S\.
5\. ..• e

PAGE
.~
K001'ENAT
-~ KOOt'ENAT

02/03

~003/003
~oo3/003

"A qualified elector shall not be considered to have gained a res.idence in any
county or city of this state into which.be comes for tempoJ:'ary
tempol:'ary purposes only.
only,
hls home but with the intention
without dte intention of making it hIs
intenlion of leaving it
when he has accomplished the purpose t.'iat
t..'iat brought him there."

If a pC(8on
pcl"Son ha~ gained residency in tbe
the State and is registered to vote, that regi~tralion is
valid os tong ~ the pers~n continues to vote and ha'\
ha" the ;.nlenlion
i.nlention of returning
relurning to Idaho Lo
to make

it the perllons
persons borne as long ac;
a.c; the person does not establish another permanent home outside the
.· State (I.C. 34·107(5)).
Sincerely,

TIMOTIIT
TIMOTI-IY A HURST
Chief Deputy
Secretary of State
Stale .
TAH/bek
TAHlbek
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
664-8115
Phone (208) 664-81
15
FAX (208) 664-6338
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P. 0.
O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-5117
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-09-10010

JIM BRANNON,
)
)

Plaintiff,
~.
~-

)

SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk;
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the
incumbent candidate for the City of
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN

)
ss.
)

Marlin, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
Bill Morlin,

I have personal knowledge of all the facts set forth hereafter.

I formed a

Washington State local limited company. I have a license with the State of Washington
Marlin Investigations, LLC. A copy is attached.
as Morlin

AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN
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I reside in Spokane County. I do much of my work out of my home.
I was retained by attorney Scott W. Reed to make inquiry concerning names of
questioned voters identified by the attorney for plaintiff Jim Brannon.
I did go to the election office of Kootenai County on occasion, but almost all my work
was by phone or computer from my home in Spokane County, Washington.
I have looked at the copy of the Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance Chapter 5.48
attached to the affidavit of Kathy Lewis.
In the definition in Section 58.48.010 Private Detective Business, is a list A through
J, of the activities which constitute the actions that make a person a Private Detective in
Coeur d'Alene. My computer investigation and telephone calls were not in the category
of any of those listed actions.
I was simply attempting to determine if any of the persons named by Brannon were

non-residents of Coeur d'Alene and therefor POSSi~
possi~

Bill Morlin
Marlin

c(5'~
cI5'~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this (day
c day of November, 2010.

~-0(~
&~J(~

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Coeur d'Alene
My Commission Expires: 7/13/15

AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
certi!M_ t~t a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax or first class
I certiA{
'f'o day
dav- of November.. 2010 to:
mail.. this ---r--'/'o

Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P. O.
0. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
FAX (208) 664-6261
Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office
P. O.
0. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

FAX{!?
FAX;;;r~'~
t~

AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN
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M(J~LItNE,n~i\n6NS
MO~LitNE'tl~/\TlONS ~~.. L,LC

SPOKANE WA 99208

Domestic limited Liability COlllpany
Company
Renewed by Authority of Secretary of Siat.
Stat•

REGISTERED TRADE NAMES:
HDRLINVESTIGATIDNS LLC

...... -.,..,.......... ,,'",...- , - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --1
··-···-········-······----···-···----------------~--~--~
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Chapter 5.48
>
>PRIVATE
PRIVATE DETECTIVES
> 5.48.010: DEFINITIONS:
>
> The words and phrases used in this
thJs Chapter shall 'have the meat-nngs:
meat-lings:

>
>DETECTIVE
>
DETECTIVE AGENCY: Means and includes any person who as principal or
> employer engages in, or who advertises or holds himself out as being
> engaged in, the private detective business.
>
>
PRIVATE DETECTIVE: Means and includes any natural person of either
>PRIVATE
> sex who engages in, or who advertises or holds himself out as being
> engaged in, the private detective business as agent or employee of a
>
duly licensed detective agency.
>duly
>
>PRIVATE
>
PRIVATE DETECTNE BUSINESS: Means and includes the business of, or
> the representation of being engaged in the business of, making for
> hire or reward, investigations with reference to any of the
> following matters:
> A. Detecting, discovering or revealing crime or criminals, or
> securing secret information or evidence relating thereto;
>B.
>
B. Discovering or revealing the identity, whereabouts, character or
> actions of any person or thing;
> C. The habits, conduct, movements, whereabouts, associations,
> transactions, reputations or character of any person;
> D. The credibility of witnesses or other persons;
> E. The location or recovery of lost or stolen property;
> F. The causes, origin or responsibility for fires, accidents or
> injuries to real or personal property;
<;. The affiliation, connection or relation of any person with any
> 9.
>
union or nonunion organizations, with any official member or
>union
> representative thereof, or with any person seeking employment in the
> place of any person who has quit work by reason of strike;
> H. The truth or falsity of any statement or representation;
> I. The business of securing for hire or reward evidence to be used
> before authorized investigating committees, boards of award or
> arbitration, or in the trial of civil or criminal cases;
>-J. The business of
offumisbing
furnishing for hire or reward, guards or other
> persons to protect persons or property, prevent theft or unlawful
> taking of goods, wares and merchandise, or the misappropriation or
> concealment of goods, wares and merchandise, money, bonds, stocks,
> choses in action, notes or other valuable documents or papers; or
> the business of performing
perfonning the service of such guard or other person
>
>for
for any of the said purposes. (prior code §§5-12-1(a),
§§5-12-l(a), (c), (d))
> 5.48.020: APPLICABll..ITY OF CHAPTER:
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Nov. 30. 2010 4:58PM

Palrr,

I George, PLLC

No.5791
No. 5791

P. 1

Michael L. Haman
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
923 N. 3rd
3n1 Street
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, 10
ID 83816·2155
83816-2155
Telephone: (208) 667·6287
667-6287
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683
ISB #4784
Attorneys for Defendant City ofCoeut·
ofCoeUl' d'Alene, Clerk
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,

Case No. CV·2009=10010
CV-2009=10010
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.

CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE,
ALENE, et al,

DEFENDANTS CITY/CLERK'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL AND/OR AMEND OR
ALTER JUDGMENT

Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene and its Clerk, in her official capacity, by
and through their counsel of record, and hereby submit their Memorandum in Opposition of
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and/or Amend the Judgment for the reason that the Court's October
5,2010,
5, 2010, Memorandum Decision and the subsequent November 4,2010,
4, 2010, Judgment are suppo11ed
supp011ed by

sufficient evidence, nol'
nor was there an error of law supporting the Court's findings. As such, for the
!}le Plaintiffs' Motion under Rules 59(a)(6) and (7),
reasons set forth below, the Court should deny !he
and 59(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
A.

Motion for New Trial per IRCP 59(a).

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW
TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER·
AMEND/ALTER • 1
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Regardless of whether the Motion is brought under Rules 59(a)(6) or (7), the standard
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occUlTed at trial; that the ends of justice would be served by vacating the decision; and, that a

"rr

I'll

.11
.111'11
.11.111'11

App. 1992). For purposes of this response, the emphasis is on the word, "would;.,
"would;u That is, the
Plaintiff must show that the verdict was so contrary to the evidence or that there was an error in law
such that a different result would occur, as opposed to could occur.
Befot·e addressing whethel'
whethet· a different result would occur, the Defendants take issue with the
Befol'e
contention that the burden ofproof somehow shifted to the Defendants, and that Defendants failed
to satisfy the same. The basis of his contention is a mistaken reliance on the Secretary of State's
database that was generated 3 days after the election which did not, in itselfshift the burden of proof.
This is especially U'ue
uue in light ofthe testimony of Tim Hut·st
HUt'st stating that the subject database was not
an accurate accounting. More importantly, the Plaintiff'S
Plaintiff's contention does notestab)ish
not establish thatthere was
insufficient evidence to SUppOl't
support the findings of the Court,
Court.
However, even if the Plaintiff is somehow conect and the burden shifted~ the Defendants
established through the testimony of County officials and Judge Marano the accuracy and validity
of the election results. This testimony was not refuted. Rather, the Plaintiff
Plamtiff simply tried to create
confusion through mistaken math during closing argument. Nonetheless, for whatever reason the

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW
TRIAL OR ALTERNATNE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER ~ 2
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I George, PLLC

No. 5793

P. 3/6

Plaintiff chooses to ignore and hide from the testimony and evidence presented by the County
officials and Judge Marano.
ofLaw
It should also be noted that contraly to the Plaintiff's assertion in the Memorandum of
Law
in Support of his Motion, the Record does not establish that 12 illegal votes were received and

counted, and thus this did not shift the burden. Also~
Alsol the Court did not consider the November 6
6'h1h
ever changing database to the exclusion of all other testimony, including the testimony of Judge
Marano and the County officials. One can go on and on with the blatant misstatements contajned
in the Plaintifrs submissions, but the point is clear. The Plaintiff engaged in an attempt to

overthrow a valid election based on the supposition of a few supporters relying on an unreliable,
daily changing database. The Court recognized that this fact was not enough to change the results.
In other words, the Court's findings are supported by the evidence as opposed to the suppositions
offered by the Plaintiff.
Second, there was not error in law, as argued by the Plaintiff in the supplemental
nd
memorandum. Initially, the case cited, Romeu v. Cohen~ 265 F.3d 118 (2
(2nd
Cir. 2001), is not

applicable, whatsoever. That case regarded one's right to vote in a federal election as opposed to
state and local elections; and, it regarded whether UOCAVA applied to a fOlmer
f01mer resident of New
York now a citizen of Puerto Rico. These are different issues than what face the Court in the instant
matter. As such, Romeu is inapplicable. In fact, the 200 Circuit never said that UOCAVA cannot
apply to state and local elections. To the contrary, most states have laws allowing citizens covered
by UOCAVA to register and vote absentee in state and local elections.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW
TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER
AMEND/ALTER.• 3
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With that, there was substantial evidence regarding the quaJifications
qualifications for one to vote in a
local election that supports the Court's findings. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 50·402.
50-402. This CoUlt
COUlt
considered the applicable statutes, reviewed UOCAV
VA,
A, considered the testimony of the County
officials, and considered the testimony of Tim Hurst in deciding voter qualifications. There was no
error in the Court's detennmations;
detenninations; and, there has been no showing that the Court was in error for
considering UOCAVA.
Setting the aforementioned aside, the crux of the Defendants' Reply is whether the results
on a re·trial would change. In other words, taking everything the Plaintiff contends as being true,
would the results ofthe election change? The answer is simple, no. The 1-eason
l'Cason is just as'simple
as-simple and
clear, to most. That is, there is no evidence regarding how certain individuals, including Paquin,
Friend, Farkes and Gagnon, voted; and, moreover, even if one adopted the Plaintiff's perverse logic
in counting there is no evidence that would show or even tend to show that the results ofthe election
would be such that the Plaintiff actually prevailed over Kennedy. Moreover, there is no evidence
regarding selection made by the alleged "12 illegal voters.''
voters." In sum, there has not been a showing
that the results would change. Absent such a showing, the Plaintiff's Motion must be denied.

B.

Motion to Alter or
Or Amend per Rule 59(e).
59(e).

As the Court knows, a Rule 59(e) Motion raised after final judgment is to "correct en·ors
en'OIS both

of fact or law that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective
cOlTective
action short of an appeal. Such proceedings must ofnecessity, therefore, be directed to the status of
the case as it existed when the cout1
cou11 rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based."
based.'' Lowe

v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259,263,
259, 263,646
646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1982). Implicitjn
Implicit in this language is that

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TOPLAINT1FF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW
AMEND/ALTER • 4
TRIAL OR ALTERNATNE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER.
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the error must be substantial as opposed to clerical enors.
en-OlS. See Silsby v.\I. Kepner, 140 Idaho 410, 411,
95 PJd
P.3d 28, 29 (2004).

For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffhas made an insufficient showing that there was
a substantial error made during the proceedings that would compel an amendment to the Judgment.
Simply put. the Plaintiff bas failed to show that Judge Marano and County officials erred when
offering evidence regard to the hand recount, the void ballots, the meaning behind the void ballots,
the duplicate ballots,
ballots. and the meaning behind duplicate ballots, and the total count. Rather, the

Plaintiff simply confuses the issue by using faulty math, just as he did during closing argument.
FUlther. the Plaintiff
FUlther,
Plaintiffhas
has not made a showing that some error occurred in the Court's assessment of

legal versus illegal voters. In sum, there is no showing at all that the Comt
COUlt erred in fmding
rmding that
Kennedy lawfully prevailed.
Jn sum, the Court should denythe
In
deny the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative

Motion to Amend/Alter Judgment on the basis that the Plaintiff has failed to present evidence
showing either a factual or legal error that would change the outcome of the Court's findings.
DATEDthis
DATED this

)0 dayofNovember,
day of November, 2010.
HAMAN LAW OFFICE

By: Michael L. Haman. of the Firm
Counsel for Defendants City/Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING
November, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi&.3d
thi&-.:?0 day of
ofNovember,
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS FORNEWTRIALORALTERNATIVEMOTIONTO
FOR NEW TRlALORALTERNATIVEMOTION TO AMEND/ALTER by the method
described below to:
Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600
Coeur d'Alene,
d' Alene, Idaho 83816
664-6261
Fax: 208 664·6261

__
u.s. First class mail
U.S.
\/""Fax

Scott Reed
P.O,BoxA
P.O.BoxA
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax (208) 165·5117
765-5117

U.S. First class mail
-....,..--U.S.

Peter Erbland
Paine Hamblen
P.O.BoxE
P.O.
BoxE
Coeur d'
Alene, Idaho 83814
d'Alene,
Fax (208) 6646338

_ _ Hand Delivery

-7----::;07 Fax
Fax

_ _ Hand Delivery

__ U.S.
u.s. First class mail

-.-(~-Fax

.,/Fax

_ _ Hand Delivery

______

...__
____
~--------.,.

. ,.

'
'

Michael 1.
L. Haman
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
d' Alene, Idaho 83816
Coeur d'Alene,
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261

2010 OCC
DCC -6 PM 3: 15
IS

Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Defendants.

Case No. CV-09-10010
CV-09-1001O
NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT
OF TESTIMONY OF EUGENE A. MARANO

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney, and gives notice
that a transcribed copy of the testimony of Eugene A. Marano at the trial in this matter has been
filed with the Court.
The particular relevance of this filing is with regards to:
1. The Court's finding that "the sum for ballots cast is 2,051." Memorandum Decision p.
8;
2. The Court's finding "Judge Marano's ballot count of2,051 for physically existing
absentee ballots to be accurate" Memorandum Decision p. 8;
3. The Court's finding that "The sum for ballots cast is 2,051." Memorandum Decision p.
8;
4. The Court's holding that "the County did in fact count 2,051 valid absentee ballots sent
in by 2051 valid absentee voters." Memorandum Decision p. 14.

1 NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF EUGENE A. MARANO
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confirmed, in his affidavit signed in open court and in his testimony as
Judge Marano confIrmed,
reflected by the transcription:
"I arrived at a total of2027 absentee ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene
general election." T. p. 40.

Starr K so, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was served by hand delivery Defendants City and
Weathers attorney Michael Haman and Defendant Kennedy's attorneys Scott Reed and Peter

Erblanda6L:cember,2010.
Erblandi5L_6L:r:=ber,

2010.

Starr Kelso

2

NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF EUGENE A. MARANO
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1

9/15/10 - 9:29 a.m.

2

--000---ooo--

3

MR. KELSO:

Yes.

Call Eugene Marano.

4

THE COURT:

All right.

If you would come up

5

to the witness stand and stop there and be sworn by the

6

clerk and be seated, please.
(Witness sworn.)

7

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY

8

MR. KELSO:

9

10

Q.

Good morning.

11

A.

This view is much better.

13

Q.

Would you state your name, please.

14

A.

Eugene Marano.

15

Q.

And you currently reside at?

16

A.

Kootenai County.

17

Q.

And your position?

18

A.

I'm a senior magistrate judge.

12

19
20

I'm more used to

it.

Retired or
That means I

work when I feel like it or somebody tells me to.
Q.

NOW,
Now, pursuant to the order of the court in

21

this matter, did you participate, undertake any

22

activities with regards to any matter?

23

A.

Well, at the request of the prosecuting

24

attorney and yourself, Mr. Kelso, I agreed at great

25

great discomfort to myself to count a bunch of ballots.
4
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1

The discomfort being that my math is not great.

2

did that on the 22nd of June at the election office.

3

Q.

4

Hosack?

And was that pursuant to the order of Judge

Yes.

5

6

accordingly.

7

Q.

8

9

And I

Yes.

All right.

I was a volunteer.

Okay.

Paid

So what did you do on the

22nd of June, if you could explain to the court?
A.

I

went to the elections office.

Was seated

10

behind a desk.

11

Trained on myself at the desk and proceeded to count the

12

ballots that were handed to me -- ballots and envelopes

13

that were handed to me with the help of your son Matt

14

who basically helped me.

15

good job is my wife was his third grade teacher.

16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q.

There was a video, which I reviewed.

That's right.

And the reason he did such a

Now, when you were seated at

the table what was provided to you first?
A.

Let's see, the envelopes.

Absentee return

envelopes.
Q.

And what were those represented to be?

The

absentee envelopes.
A.

From the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general

election.
Q.

Were they represented by anyone to be all of

the absentee return envelopes for the 2009 city
5
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1

election?

2

A.

As far as I remember they were, yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Yes.

5

n

"'"
",.

Kootenai county
County

6

A.

I assume so.

7

Q.

Yeah, okay.

8

A.

She acted like she was in charge.

9

Q.

And you proceeded to count those absentee

10
11

Would that have been Carrie Phillips?

return envelopes that she provided you, correct?
A.

I did.

Came out of a couple of blue tubs and

12

she put them all in front of me and Matt and I separated

13

them and proceeded to count.

14

15

Q.

And what was the total number of absentee

envelopes that you counted on that day?

16

A.

2086.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

You counted 2086 absentee return

envelopes?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Now, of those four

21
22
23
24

25

question.
A.

I believe there was some

Four of them were of question?
Yeah, whether they were city or county

election.

Q.

From those 2086 envelopes, it could not be

determined or told to you whether they were city
6
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1

election or county election?
Yeah, again, I wasn't there to draw

2

A.

3

conclusions.

4

Q.

Right.

5

A.

Just to do the counting.

6

Right.
k~d
&~d

she said what

she said and whatever.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

They were -- she couldn't -- they -- the

9
10

She said they were ...

ubiquitous "they" -- could not determine whether they
were city or county elections.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

I just counted them.

13

Q.

So did your records reflect then 2082

14

confirmed city?

15

A.

No, I don't think I did it that way.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

My notes are in the file.

18

the file.

19

Q.

Sure.

20

A.

And I can't remember.
MR. KELSO:

21
22

court case.

23

memory, your Honor?

files.

I forgot to bring that.

It's sealed, I believe, in the

Could he look at his notes to refresh his

THE COURT:

24
25

I sealed them in

Well, there's about 12 to 14

Which file did you put it in?
7
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1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

4

THE COURT:

The one that your clerk gave me.
You never have been much help.
I know.
All right.

Let's take a -- it's

5

In a sealed
locked up in the -- so
SO it's 1n

6

have seen it.

(Off the record.}
record.)
{Off

8

THE WITNESS:

10

I

+-h-:T"\l.r
f-l-t-:T"\l.r

'-.1..1...1...1.~

T

..1..

I'll go look for it.

7

9

-=

As Judge Perocell {phonetic}
(phonetic)

once said, "I'm going to take the stapler away from all
the clerks."

11

Actually to answer your question, Mr. Kelso,

12

at the top of my notes it says, "Absentee clerk

13

ballots" -- "first batch," excuse me, "envelopes.

14

extra blue.

15

envelopes are City of Coeur d'Alene or County."

107

And then "Four unable to determine if these

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

And when I go to a total to get to the 2086, I

18
19

don't distinguish those four out.
Q.

Okay.

Okay.

So without distinguishing out

20

those, the county election official provided you with

21

absentee ballot envelopes to count that were in the City

22

of Coeur d'Alene election of 2009 and you came up with

23

2086 and four of them you really couldn't -- nobody

24

seemed to know, correct?

25

A.

Well, I didn't know.

Let's put it that way.
8
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1

Q.

Right.

2

A.

I just counted them.

3

Q.

You were provided and counted 2086 absentee

4

return envelopes?

5

.M.
.M..•

7\

Correct.

6

Q.

NOw,
Now, you also counted something else?

7

A.

Yes, I counted the absentee ballots.

8

Q.

The actual ballots themselves; is that

9

correct?

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

The same time -- as soon as I finished the

13

14
15
16
17

And when did you do that?

envelopes.
Q.

Okay.

And how many absentee actual touch,

wrinkled, ballots did you count?
A.

2027 and that does not include 17 duplicate

ballots.

18

Q.

19

ballot?

20

A.

And what is your understanding of a duplicate

Quite frankly she told me what it was and I

21

quickly forgot.

22

to count only and not draw any conclusions.

23

you could have hired a trained monkey to do what I did.

24

25

Q.

Okay.

Again, I was meticulous in being there
Basically,

So on that day, as I understand it, you

arrived at a total of 2027 absentee ballots that were
9
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1

counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general

2

election; is that correct?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Now, it's my understanding that you were

5

aga1n to count some other ballots that
called back once agaln

6

had been located later?

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

When did that count occur?

9

A.

That occurred on the 2nd of July.

10

Q.

Okay.

11
12

And were those, those ballots presented

to you in any sort of form or envelope?

A.

Let me try and recollect here.

Okay.

A

13

ballot box labeled Coeur d'Alene write-in ballots

14

11/3/09 were given to me and that was by Deedie Beard.

15

Q.

Okay.

And on the cover of the envelope, did

16

it indicate -- let me show you what's been marked as

17

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 77 and see if that was what was

18

on the information you provided.

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And what does that information --

21

A.

Just read it.

22

Valid seven.

23

monkey could have done better.

24

invalid seven.

25

Q.

11/3/09 write-in absentee.

Invalid -- valid is zero -- I told you the
The valid is zero and

So in that group that you counted.

There were

10
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1

zero valid and seven invalid?

2

A.

Again, I didn't --

3

Q.

Right.

4

A.

I

5

Q.

Okay.

That's a -- that Exhibit 77 is, is that

a correct copy of what your -A.

8

As far as I recollect.
MR. KELSO:

9

Move to admit 77.

10

MR. ERBLAND:

11

MR. HAMAN:

No objection.

12

THE COURT:

Exhibit 77 is admitted.

13

(Exhibit 77 admitted.)

14

MR. KELSO:

15

A.

And I

remember now that we counted some on the

Q.

Okay.

A.

I

And what did you do on the 14th of

and I

was handed ballots by Carrie Phillips again,

counted --

22

Q.

That was July?

23

A.

14th.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Any other counting or anything

July?

20

21

Q.

14th of July.

18
19

No objection.

you did?

16

17

just

counted seven.

6

7

didn't say what was valid or invalid, I

And July 14th you counted some more

ballots?
11
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

- - what were they represented to
And what were --

4

A.

To tell you the truth I can't remember.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

I didn't put it in my notes.

3

be?

I just counted

7

the ballots that were given to me by Ms. Phillips and it

8

doesn't show what they were.

9

beginning there were 17 ballots -- hold on just a second
Here it is here.

Although at the very

10

here.

They were duplicate ballots

11

2, so there
labeled 1 through 16, but there was no No.
No.2,

12

were 15 duplicate absentee ballots.

13

Q.

So ...

14

A.

Then I was also handed ballots to count by

15
16
17
18

19
20
21

Sherri Van Palin (phonetic) and there were two of those.
Q.

Okay.

That's what I was -- and those were

indicated as being what?

A.

That I don't remember.

I'm going to -- you

want me to guess so I'll guess.
Q.

Well, we had 17 duplicates and we had 15 and

we had two, so there were

22

A.

23

Q.

Seventeen duplicates.
seventeen duplicates.

And on 7/14 you were

24

handed what, you don't know -- you were handed some

25

documents to count?
12
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1

2

A.

Correct.

They were ballots 1 through --

numbered 1 through 16.

3

Q.

Sixteen ballots?

4

A.

Numbered 1 through 16 of which there were only

5

15 because there was no No.
No.2.
2.

They were

6

1 through 16, but it went 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, et cetera.

nurr~ered

7

Q.

But you don't know what they represented?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

occasions?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

6/22.

13

So on -- you were there on three

And on that occasion you counted 2086

absentee ballot return envelopes?

14

A.

Correct.

15

Q.

So then on that same day you counted 2027

16

ballots?

17

A.

Correct.

18

Q.

Then you were called back because the county

19

apparently discovered some other documents a week or so

20

later?

21
22
23

A.

Apparently so.

Anyway, I was called I think

by Mr. McHugh to come back and count seven more ballots.
Q.

And of those, the documentation provided to

24

you reflected that zero of those ballots were valid and

25

seven were invalid?
13
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

That's what -- I drew no conclusion from that.

4

Q.

Right.

5

A.

Exactly_
Exactly.

6

Q.

Okay.

That's what was represented to you?

MR. ERBLAND:

7

I'll object to that.

He was

8

handed an envelope and it made the statement and it's on

9

the envelope, the meaning of it is subject to further

10

proof and the representation is solely in the exhibit.

11

I don't believe the witness testified that anybody said

12

anything to him about that.

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

MR. KELSO:

16

MR. ERBLAND:

The exhibit?
Say again.
This exhibit I just put in.
If that's what he was referring

17

to, I don't have an objection.

18

THE COURT:

Is that what we're referring to?

19

MR. KELSO:

77, is the --

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

No. 77.

Well, that would be the

best evidence, I guess.
MR. KELSO:

22

Q.

And that reflects what?

23

A.

Valid zero and invalid seven.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

And then you were summoned once again

to -- another couple weeks later to count something,
14
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1

ballots, but you don't know what they represented?

2

A.

I can't say for sure.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

I have no remembrance.
And your charge by this

5

6

go and count the absentee ballot return envelopes?

A.

7

I'd have to look at a copy of the order to

8

tell you that.

9

in front of me.
Q.

10
11

Okay.

I took it as to count whatever was put

If we could -- I don't have that order

handy, your Honor, but it would be about end of June -MR. ERBLAND:

12
13

We'd stipulate he was ordered to

count.

14

MR. KELSO:

15

MR. ERBLAND:

16

was it not, to

Well -Well-The order is the order.

It's in

the file.

17

MR. HAMAN:

Yeah.

18

MR. KELSO:

That's what we'd like to see so

19

the judge can remember exactly what he was ordered to

20

do.
THE COURT:

21

Well, I am not going to keep going

22

and getting the clerk file and pulling out documents for

23

you, so the objection will be sustained.

24

any relevance of this at all.

25

MR. KELSO:

I don't see

Well, it's very relevant, your
15
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1

Honor, because if you'll remember it's been testified

2

that if there were 2084 absentee envelope ballots there

3

has to be 2084 absentee ballots.
THE COURT:

4

There's no real reason to argue

5

with the ruling of the court, Mr. Kelso.

6

is what he counted.

His testimony

7

MR. KELSO:

Okay.

8

THE COURT:

What my order said is irrelevant.

9

MR.

KELSO:

THE COURT:

10
11

your problem.

12

MR.

13

THE COURT:

14

If you think it's relevant, that's

Okay.
It's what he did and what he can

testify to as to what he did that's important.

15
16

KELSO:

Okay.

MR. KELSO:

Okay.

established, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR.

19

THE COURT:

ERBLAND:

20

And I think that's been

I'm done with this witness.

I think it has.
May I approach the witness?
Yes.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY

21

MR. ERBLAND:

22

Q.

Judge Marano can I see your notes, please.

23

A.

Yes.

24

MR. ERBLAND:

25

MR. KELSO:

What's good for the goose.
I won't even object to you using
16
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1

them and slowing it down, Counsel.
MR. ERBLAND:

2

Q.

Judge Marano, I'm going to

3

ask you some questions about your notes and by the way,

4

did you -- were you asked to sign an affidavit in this

5

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And did you?

8

A.

I haven't yet.

9

Q.

Are you willing to?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Have you seen the affidavit?

12

A.

I have it here.

13

Q.

Is it accurate?

14

A.

The part about that at the very end where it

15

says after July 2nd I didn't count any others, okay, is

16

probably not entirely correct.

17

Q.

All right.

18

A.

The other parts.

19

Q.

Could you use that to refresh your memory if

20

necessary?

21

A.

In fact,

22

Q.

Have you?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

But the other parts of it --

I have been.

Let's take a look -- I have a copy of

it also and just so that we're clear, there was an order
17

SC 38417-2011

Page 2521 of 2676

1

issued by this court and you respond to that order,

2

correct?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

And then on June 22nd, I'm looking at

5

paragraph 2 of your affidavit.

6

A.

Okay.

7

Q.

You met at the Kootenai County Elections

8

Office at 1803 North Third Street.

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

Representatives of Kootenai County and Jim

11

Brannon gathered in a conference room, correct?

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q.

You were seated at a table.

14

Matt Kelso was

there and -- to observe the counting, correct?

15

A.

Yeah, he just sort of helped out.

16

Q.

All right.

And Carrie Phillips with the

17

Kootenai County Elections Office opened tubs, placed

18

what she represented were absentee ballot return

19

envelopes, correct?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

And you began to count those and you counted

22

them, correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

You counted 2086 absentee ballot return

25

envelopes?
18
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

Four of which were undetermined, correct?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Now, I understand you were there to count,

5

right?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

You were not there to determine which were

8

city and which were county, correct?
just counted what they gave me.

9

A.

I

10

Q.

All right.

As you sit here today then, you do

11

not know whether any of the additional 2082 are solely

12

for the county election, do you?

13

A.

I don't have a clue.

14

Q.

All right.

15

A.

I will confess to looking at some of them and

16

wondering how people actually vote when they put the

17

name in twice, but who am I to ...

18

Q.

Okay.

Then I understand that after counting

19

and tabulating the absentee return envelopes that were

20

given to you, not knowing which the split is between

21

city, county, if there is one, you then began counting

22

the absentee ballots themselves, right?

23

A.

Correct.

24

Q.

Carrie Phillips unsealed the ballot box

25

counted by machine 3A, correct?
19
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

And in machine -- from machine 3A, how many

3
4

ballots did you count?
A.

977.
And then you were asked to

5

1s
18 that right?

6

A.

I was asked to what?

7

Q.

Excuse me.

8

A.

Correct

9

Q.

And then did Carrie Phillips unseal a ballot

10

Is 977 what you counted?

box from machine 3B and have you count those ballots?

11

A.

Correct.

12

Q.

And that was -- you were advised that these

13

were duplicate ballots, correct?

14

A.

Some of them were duplicate ballots.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

Fifteen duplicates marked 1 through 16, No.
No.22

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25

missing.
Q.

So you verified there were 15 duplicate

ballots then?
A.
ballots.
Q.

That was represented to me they were duplicate
Whether they were or not was not my charge.
By the way, do you know what a duplicate

ballot is?

A.

County clerk explained it to me and Deedie

Beard explained it to me.
20
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1

Q.

And they can explain that to the court.

2

A.

I'll take their word for it, but I'll leave it

3

up to Judge Hosack to take what he does.
Q.

4

5

Sure.

And then how many other ballots did you

couilt
COUIlt from that

6

A.

Let's see, 640 not counting the 15 duplicates.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

Not counting the 15 duplicates so you

had 640 there.

9

A.

Hold on just a second.

10

Q.

All right.

Yes.

Now, did Carrie Phillips then

11

unseal the ballot box of absentee ballots counted by

12

machine No.
NO.4?
4?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

And she placed those absentee ballots on the

15

table at which you were seated?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Mr. Kelso's son was there, he observed all

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Okay.

18

21
22
23

24
25

this?

Were you advised that any of those were

duplicate ballots?

A.

She advised that there were two duplicate

ballots.
Q.

Okay.

And then how many other ballots were

there?
21
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1

A.

410 not including the two duplicates.

2

Q.

Okay.

3
4

Now, I understand that you were asked

to add these things up.

A.

That's correct.
A..""ld you
A.."'1.d

5

did.

6

A.

I

7

Q.

And if you look --

8

A.

Without a calculator by the way.

9

Q.

And if you look at page 8 of 8 of your notes.

10

A.

Page 8 of 8, yes.

11

Q.

Does that show your addition of these three

12

columns?

13

A.

Yes, 2027.

14

Q.

2027?

15

A.

Correct.

16

Q.

You don't know what a duplicate ballot is, but

17

I want you to assume, for a hypothetical --

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

-- that a duplicate ballot is one that comes

20

in and for some reason, I don't know whether it's got a

21

hanging chad or they didn't -- it's ripped or torn,

22

another ballot has to be prepared to get it to run

23

through a machine, and so it's just like a legal

24

description you recall back when you practiced law, one

25

person reads the legal description, the other one reads
22
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1

the -- traces it, correct?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

All right.

So if you add the 17 duplicate

4

ballots, what is the number that you come up with?

5

I think you did it on your

6

A.

2044.

7

Q.

2044.

All right.

And

Now, you dated and signed

8

your written accounting and then you were contacted

9

if I look at page 8 of your draft affidavit of

10

paragraph 8.

On July 1, you were contacted by plaintiff

11

Jim Brannon's attorney Starr Kelso and Barry McHugh; is

12

that correct?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

And it was agreed that you would meet with the

15

representatives of Mr. Brannon at the Kootenai County

16

and the Kootenai County representatives on July 2,

17

correct

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

-- to count the discovered ballots?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

I wasn't invited, but then again there's lots

22

of parties I haven't been invited to.
MR. KELSO:

23

I'll object to that representation

24

your Honor, I can produce the email from Mr. Reed

25

indicating that he's not interested in attending.

It's

23
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1

my understanding that both Mr. Reed and he

2

MR. ERELAND:
ERBLAND:

3

THE COURT:

It's not relevant.
Hold it.

Hold it.

Hold it.

4

Let's maintain a degree of professionalism.

5

doesn't get us anywhere, particularly in a court trial.
MR. ERBLAND:

6

7

That just

I withdraw the comment.

It's

not relevant.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. ERBLAND:

Let's ...
Q.

On July 2, did you go to the

10

elections office meeting with Dan English and Deedie

11

Beard?

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q.

And on July 2 was Starr Kelso, Matt Kelso,

14

William McCrory there?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And plaintiff, Jim Brannon?

17

A.

I think he was there, but I'm not sure.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

And when you arrived, were you seated

at the same table as you were on June 22, 2010?

20

A.

Sure looked liked it.

21

Q.

And a ballot labeled "Coeur d'Alene write-in

22

ballots 11/3/09" was placed in front of you?

23

A.

Correct.

24

Q.

And is that the one where you have the cover

25

of the envelope that had the words "11/3/09 write-in
24
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1

Absentee Valid 0, Invalid 7,
7,1111 written on it?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Did you open the envelope and then

count those ballots?
7\

5

.M..
.M. •

6

Q.

And there were seven of them?

7

A.

Seven was the number.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

Now what I want you to assume as a

hypothetical because I know you don't know, when they

10

talk about invalid it is

11

actually write in a vote and that write-in itself is

12

invalid, but it is a ballot that has other races in it

13

and while the write-in is invalid, the ballot itself is

14

still run through the machine because there are other

15

races, okay, will you assume that?
MR. KELSO:

16

somebody can go in and

You know, your Honor, I'll object

17

to that.

18

purpose pursuant to the court order to count what was

19

presented to him, not to render opinions on

20

hypotheticals.
MR. ERBLAND:

21
22

This witness is called strictly for the

I'm not asking him to, I'm

asking him to assume that.
THE COURT:

23

Well, he has testified what he was

24

here to do was to count, but I'll trust this witness

25

will be able to focus on what he's here to testify
25
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1

about.

MR. ERBLAND:

2

3
4

So I'll let him go ahead and ask the question.
Q.

Thank you.

Assume that

that's the case, all right?
A.

Okay.
Now, would you add 2044 and seven, please?

5
6

A.

2051.

7

Q.

2051.

8

May I approach the witness?

9

THE COURT:

10

Yes .
Yes.

MR. ERBLAND:

I want to look at your notes

11

again, Judge Marano, because while I have a copy of your

12

notes up to the

13

have the 14th.

14

minute.

15

A.

Sure.

16

Q.

I recall you testifying that when the 15

well, prior to the 14th.

I don't

So I'd like to look at that for a

17

duplicate ballots, that's the one with the -- I gave you

18

the example of the legal description.

19

counted that they were out of -- there was one out of

20

sequence, correct?

When those were

21

A.

Correct.

22

Q.

Do you remember which one was out of sequence?

23

A.

Two.

24

Q.

On your notes?

25

A.

There was no No.
No.2.
2.
26
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1

Q.

On your notes of July 14, 2010, the first

2

ballots that you were handed by Carrie Phillips there's

3

a sequence number on your notes, correct?

4

A.

And how many -- how many

5

6

Yes.
-~

how many

numbers do you have down there on that first line?

7

A.

Fifteen.

8

Q.

Fifteen.

9

nuw~ered

And is there one -- is there a 16 on

that line?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And so is there one number out of sequence?

12

A.

Two is missing.

13

Q.

Two is missing.

Okay.

So do you know -- and

14

if you don't, fine.

Do you know whether or not at that

15

very time you were handed the 15 duplicates?

16

A.

At this time?

17

Q.

Yes.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Same day.

21

Q.

Go ahead.

22

A.

Same day.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

And then on --

Same day you were handed ballots to

count by Sherri Van Patten?
A.

That's Palin (phonetic)
27
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1

Q.

Palin, okay.

2

A.

I think.

3

Sherri.

4

Q.

Well, if Palin was there I will support that.

5

.M..
.M.
•

7\

Okay.

6

Q.

How many duplicate ballots were handed to you

8

A.

Two.

9

Q.

And how many duplicate ballots did Carrie

7

Whatever her name was, her name was

then?

10

Phillips hand you from machine -- from box 4, machine 4

11

earlier?
A.

12

MR. ERBLAND:

13

14

Machine 4 had 410 not counting two duplicates.

I have.

THE COURT:

16

MR. ERBLAND:

Any cross by the city?
Excuse me, my counsel's got a --

sure.

18
19

That's all the questions

Thank you.

15

17

Okay.

Your Honor, may we have the judge's notes
marked as an exhibit?

20

MR. HAMAN:

No objection.

21

THE COURT:

You certainly may have them

22

marked.

Are you going to offer them?

23

MR. ERBLAND:

Yes.

24

THE COURT:

Any objection?

25

MR. KELSO:

No objection.
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THE COURT:

1

So it will be marked as

2

Defendants' -- I don't know if we have a list from

3

defendant Kennedy, so I guess make it Exhibit

4

MR. HAMAN:

5

THE

6

COL~T:

You can make it part of the City.
Make it Defendants' Exhibit J

then, I guess.

7

MR. HAMAN:

8

MR. ERBLAND:

9

THE COURT:

10

Judge Marano's notes.

11

admitted.

That's fine.
Thank you, Mr. Haman.
Okay.

Defendants' Exhibit J are

All right.

And those are

12

(Exhibit J identified and admitted.)

13

MR. ERBLAND:

14

Thank you.

I have no further

questions.

15

THE COURT:

Any by the City?

16

MR. HAMAN:

No questions.

17

THE COURT:

All right then.

18

MR. KELSO:

Thank you.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY

19
20

MR. KELSO:

21

Q.

22

Redirect.

Judge Marano, you indicated you had a copy of

a proposed affidavit for you?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

That you were referring to during your

25

testimony today?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And, in fact, you said that it was accurate up

3

until when it ended, but there was this other meeting

4

that took place on whatever day it was, the 14th, it

5

wasn't documented.

6

A.

The 14th?

7

Q.

July 14th.

8

A.

The -- actually the affidavit says that no

9

further absentee ballot return envelopes, so that would

10

be correct.

11

Q.

Oh, okay.

12

A.

Yeah, I didn't count any more absentee

13
14
15

ballots, so that is correct.
Q.

That is correct, yes.

But then there was another meeting that you

testified to?

16

A.

Two more.

17

Q.

Two more.

Okay.

Can I see that?

No objection.

18

MR. ERBLAND:

19

MR. HAMAN:

No objection.

20

THE COURT:

- So it's marked as --

21

MR. KELSO:

Ninety-seven.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

And Plaintiff's

23

Exhibit 97 is offered and being no objection I guess

24

that's an unsigned affidavit.

25

talking about?

Is that what you're
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1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

MR. KELSO:

4

Q.

7

is that

8

A.

10

that?

It's unsigned, but your testimony here today

If it helps, I'll just sign it now.

Q.

THE COURT:

14

MR. KELSO:

I've already been sworn in.
Let the record reflect that you

signed Exhibit 97.
THE WITNESS:

16

I didn't have a notary available

at the time.
MR. KELSO:

18

19

Well, then we're going to have

swear you in ...
THE WITNESS:

17

How about

I've got a pen right here.

13

15

Let's warm that up and I'll ask

Can I borrow a pen from someone?

11

12

So 97's admitted.

the judge a question.

6

9

All right.

(Exhibit 97 identified and admitted.)

3

5

An unsigned affidavit.

Any objection to his signature on

Exhibit No. 97?

20

MR. ERBLAND:

No objection.

21

MR. HAMAN:

No objection.

22

MR. KELSO:

Q.

So
SO that's just the same as if

23

the notary had been there and you sworn to her as

24

opposed to being under oath today, correct?

25

A.

Correct.
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Q.

1

All right.
Matt, you got that up there ready to go?

2

3

straighten it a little bit.

4

down to number -- let's see, No.
No.2,
2, please.
All right.

5

Good.

That's good.

Just
Go

Perhaps that clarifies what the

6

Judge's order was.

It indicates in paragraph 2 that you

7

met with representatives of Kootenai County, Starr Kelso

8

attorney for plaintiff Brannon at 9:00 o'clock --

9

9:00a.m.
9:00 a.m. on June 22nd, 2(a).

10

A.

2(a) the number of

11

Q.

Okay.

12

(a)

okay.

No, I can't see -- okay.

"To count:

II

"

13

A.

14

Q.

Yes.
II

"

the number of absentee ballots counted in

15

the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general election,"

16

correct?

17

A.

Correct.

18

Q.

That's what you were there to do, correct?

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

And "(b) The number of absentee ballot return

21

envelopes received regarding the 2009 City of Coeur

22

d'Alene general election," correct?

23

A.

Correct.

24

Q.

That's what you were there to count?

25

two things?

Those
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

little bit there.

4

uphill.

S
5

That;s good.

Let's go down to 4.

Can you tweak it a

Just that way so I don't have to read

The words are slanted.

Okay.

That's fine.

Now, is it true, your Honor, it says, "Once I

6

7

was seated at the table, Carrie Phillips, Kootenai

8

County Elections Office supervisor," who Mr. English has

9

testified is now the supervisor in place of Deedie

10

Beard, "opened two blue tubs and placed what she

11

represented to me were the absentee ballot return

12

envelopes received regarding the 2009 City of Coeur

13

d'Alene general election," correct?

14

A.

That's what she said.

15

Q.

That's what she said.

16

That's what she

represented to you, correct?

17

A.

That's what she said.

18

Q.

"I then proceeded to count the return absentee

19

return envelopes," blah-blah-blah, and then down below

20

it says,

21

counting, and I arrived at a total of 2086 absentee

22

ballot return envelopes handed to me regarding the 2009

23

City of Coeur d'Alene general election," correct?

"I add the totals from the written, the

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

"Of that total of 2086, I was informed by
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1

Carrie Phillips that in the case of four of the said

2

absentee ballot return envelopes counted, it was not

3

able to be determined whether they were regarding the

4

2009 City of Coeur d'Alene or whether they pertained to

5

some other election," correct?
A.

6

Correct.

7

Can I have the exhibit?

8

THE COURT:

9

THE WITNESS:

10

MR. KELSO:

11

Okay.

Your notes?
Yeah.
Q.

Correct.

Okay.

Okay.

Let's go to 5.

"After completion of the counting and

12

tabulation of the absentee return envelopes, as above

13

stated, I commenced counting the actual absentee ballots

14

received.

15

in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general election.

16

process was as follows."
A.

17

18

me.

19

they

Actual absentee ballots received and counted

That's true.

The

Is that true?
That's what was represented to

I make -- I draw no conclusion as to whether
as to what Ms. Phillips said.

20

Q.

That's what was represented to you?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

That those were the actual absentee ballots

23

received and counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene

24

election?

25

A.

That's what she said.
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1

Q.

Okay.

So Carrie Phillips unsealed the ballot

2

box containing absentee ballots counted by machine 3A,

3

placed the absentee ballots --

4

(Reporter interruption.)

5

THE COuKT:
CODKT:

Iill just mention this.
I'll

lim
I'm only

6

one person and I'm trying to understand what's going on

7

and there's an awful lot of repetition here, at least as

8

far as I'm getting.

9

the same stuff and it's being presented as if it's

And I keep listening and it's just

10

extremely important and very, very new.

And it's

11

confusing to me because I keep hearing the same thing

12

over and over again and it's -- it's wearing on me.

13

I mean, I'm not being irritated, I just want

14

Counsel to know that their audience is kind of getting

15

worn out by sitting on the edge of my chair and hearing

16

this testimony come in as if it's new and startling.

17

And I'm straining, straining, and it's the same thing

18

I've heard three or four times before, and I'm -- I'm

19

just getting a little tired.

20

Counsel, that you try the case the way you want, but ...

21

MR. KELSO:

I just mention that to

Thank you.

The only thing I'm

22

responding to is the cross where Mr. Erbland presented

23

some other figures.

24

judge did in counting.

25

THE COURT:

I'm just verifying exactly what the

Well, why don't we move to the
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1

other figures because that's -- I'm listening for it.

2

It should be, all right, it's not 977 it's 2014.

3

There's something
MR. KELSO:

4

Q.

Okay.

Let's take 5.

These

5

were the envelopes that you counted that were

6

represented to you to be the actual absentee ballots

7

received and counted in the 2009 election, correct?

8

A.

The actual ballots, you said "envelopes."

9

Q.

Actual ballots.

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

So, okay, so let's go down to where --

12

A.

Again, when I say that was represented to me,

13

that's my best remembrance of it.

14

Q.

15

bit further.

16

Right.

Let's go down to the -- B, go a little

Okay.

Next page.

It indicates, "I was informed that duplicate

17

absentee ballots are ballots that for one reason or

18

another would not run through the counting machine and

19

thus a duplicate was made from the original and then run

20

through the counting machine."

21
22
23

Is that what was represented to you by Carrie
Phillips?
A.

It probably better described as would not run

24

through, they kicked them out or something like that, I

25

think is what she said.

The machine kicks them out for
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1

whatever reason.
Okay.

Q.

2

Again, I draw no conclusion from that.
And down at C we're just -- briefly,

3

you mention two more duplicate ballots, those were

4

ballots that were kicked out, wouldn't run through the

5

machine.

6

A.

Whatever, yeah.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

from.

Seventeen, if we have

9

A.

10

Q.

11
12

And that's where this 17 number comes

Fifteen and two.
17 duplicate ballots that were kicked out

and couldn't be run through the machine, correct?

A.

Correct.

And, again, Deedie or Carrie can

13

explain -- Ms. Beard or Ms. Phillips can explain that to

14

you much better.

15

Q.

I'm only asking you what you were told.

You

16

were there to count ballots and absentee ballot return

17

envelopes.

18

Now, let's go to 6.

19

After my completion of counting of the counted

20

absentee ballots, I was advised by Carrie Phillips that

21

those absentee ballots constituted all of the absentee

22

ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene

23

general election, correct?

24

A.

That's the best of my remembrance.

25

Q.

And you arrive at a total by adding up your
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1

figures of the absentee ballots counted in the 2009 City

2

of Coeur d'Alene general election as 2027?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

And that number does not include the 17

5

duplicate ballots, correct?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Because they were kicked out and wouldn't run

8

through the machine, correct?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

So
SO on the day that you went over there you

11

went

let's see -- and you thought you were done?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

So
SO let's see, so that was the 22nd of June, so

14

on July 1st you get a phone call and you're informed by

15

Mr. McHugh and myself that the county elections,

16

Kootenai County Elections Office had discovered that

17

there were actually more absentee ballots that should be

18

counted, correct?

19

A.

That's

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

Not a telephone call.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

it was in an e-mail by the way.

So you agreed to go back over there and

see what was there, correct?

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

Okay.

We'll go to 9.
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1
2

And you counted those ballots that had the
information on the cover?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And there were seven?

s5

A.

6

Q.

7
8

9
10

So -- and then no further absentee ballots

were counted?
A.

No further absentee ballot envelopes were

counted.
Q.

Envelopes, excuse me.

Correct.

So as the

11

court designated counter, tell me to the best of your

12

knowledge and information how many absentee ballots that

13

were counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene election

14

did you come up with?

15

A.

I missed the question.

16

Q.

Okay.

Let's go to paragraph

MR. ERBLAND:

17

I'm going to object.

This is

18

cumulative and it is simply a repeat of the direct

19

examination.

20

THE COURT:

21

in this case so far.

22

thinks this is new information, so ...
MR. ERBLAND:

23

24

the notes.

25

There's been an awful lot of that
But Mr. Kelso, I guess still

It's in the affidavit.

It's in

It's in the testimony.
THE COURT:

I'm painfully aware of all that.
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1

MR. KELSO:

Well, okay.

2

MR. ERELAND:
ERBLAND:

3

make these swashbuckling points?

4

been driven home again and again.

5

when one will do?

Can't we wait until argument to
This is -- the point's
Why use six nails

6

THE COURT:

I don't know.

7

MR. KELSO:

Paragraph 7 -- or 6, excuse me.

8
9

I don't know.

Paragraph six.
Q.

Paragraph 6.

"I arrived at a total of 2027

10

absentee ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur

11

d'Alene general election," correct?

12
13

A.

Are you asking me again if that was -- if I

was correct the last time?

14

Q.

Yep.

15

A.

Yes.
MR. KELSO:

16

17

Okay.

That's all I've got, your

Honor.

18

{End of Eugene Marano's examination.)
examination.}

19
20
21
22

23
24
25
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d"Aiene, et ai,
al,

September 15,2010.
15, 2010.

Page 41
1

STATE OF IDAHO
SS:

2

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

3

4

I, Valerie Nunemacher, a notary public and

5

duly certified court reporter in and for the State of

6

Idaho, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:
That the foregoing proceedings was taken on

7
8

the date and at the time and place herein stated;
That the foregoing is a true and correct

9

10

transcription, to the best of my ability, of my

11

shorthand notes taken down at said time and place in the

12

above-entitled litigation;

13

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any of

14

the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have no

15

interest in the outcome of said litigation.

16
17

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand this 5th day of December 2010.

18
19

"

20

UtL
UfL lt<AL
ltUL iil'uJlU\\l)lel~u
luJlU\V)Iel~u

21

VALERIE NUNEMACHER, CSR, CCR, RPR

;

22

23
24

25
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Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
d' Alene, Idaho 83816
Coeur d'Alene,
83 816
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261

20!aD~r:
ZO!GO~t:

-6 PH 3: 15

DISfR~t:T
CLERK DIS
fR~ ~T

it/&-tJ
it!&-tJ
.
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Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'
D'ALENE,
ALENE, IDAHO
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Defendants.

Case No. CV-09-10010
NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT
OF TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY HURST

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney, and gives notice
that a transcribed copy of the testimony of Timothy Hurst at the trial in this matter has been filed
with the Court.
The particular relevance of this filing is with regards to the Court's holdings:
There is "no evidence that nine (9) of the envelopes in the stack of 2,050 bear names
of people other than qualified voters who actually voted." (Memorandum Decision p.
14).
Chief Deputy Timothy Hurst's testimony is filed in its entirety for the Court's review and,
preliminarily at this time, reference is made to the following:
1. The November 6,2009
6, 2009 Absentee Ballot Report, Exhibit 5, is the only evidence as to
the total number of absentee ballots that were legally received. p. 18
2. No absentee ballot voters would have been added to Exhibit 5, but some absentee
ballot voters could have been removed from it. p. 20,
20,21
21

1 NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY HURST
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3. Absentee ballot return envelopes would only tell a person how many were received
because if a return envelope does not have a date and time of receipt stamp on it there
22, 23, 38, 39
is no proof that it was received on or before the close of the polls. p. 22,23,38,39
4. If daily reports had been kept (as testified to by Deedie Beard but which were not
offered or introduced into evidence) those daily report totals would add up to the
figures on Exhibit 5. p. 40, 41
5. The Secretary of State's Office researched its database to determine whether any
persons who voted, either in person or by absentee, had been removed (see number 2
above) from the Secretary of State's database from which Exhibit 5 was compiled. The
Secretary of State's Office did determine the number of people who voted in the 2009
election, either in person or by absentee, who were removed from the Secretary of
State's database as reflected by Exhibit 5. The total number of persons removed from
ofthese
these persons who were
the database was four (4). If it is presumed that all four (4) of
removed from the database voted by absentee ballot and if it is presumed that all four
(4) absentee ballots were validly received on or before the close of the election, it
would add four (4) more absentee ballots to the totals reflected on Exhibit 5. This
would change the number of validly received absentee ballots to 2045 which reflects
that there is a six ((6)
6) vote difference between the 2051 absentee ballots that the
machine co

ted and the total validly received absentee ballot number of2045.

·s 6th
6th day of December, 2010.
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was served by hand delivery Defendants City and
Weathers attorney Michael Haman and Defendant Kennedy's attorneys Scott Reed and Peter
o~6th day ~f. December, 2010.
Erbland 0~6th

Dl--[~~
Starr Kelso
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

3

--000---ooo--

4

5

JIM BRA...NNON,
BRA...NNON i

6

Plaintiff,
Case No. CV 09-10010

7

vs.

8

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et
al.,
al. ,

9

Defendants.
10
11

TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY HURST

12
13
14

AT:

Kootenai County Courthouse
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho

ON:

September 15,
IS, 2010

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE CHARLES W. HOSACK

15

16
17

18
19
20

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
STARR KELSO
LAW OFFICE OF STARR KELSO
Post Office Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

21
For the Defendant Mike Kennedy:
PETER C. ERBLAND
PAINE HAMBLEN, LLP
Post Office Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

22
23
24

25

III
///
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SCOTT W. REED
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT W. REED
Post Office Box A
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

1

2
3

4

5

For the Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene:
MICHAEL L. HAMAN
HAMAN LAW OFFICE
Post Office Box 2155.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23

24
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1

9/15/10 - 1:50 p.m.

2

--000---ooo--

3

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY

4

MR. KELSO:

5

Q.

State your name for the record, please.

6

A.

Timothy A. Hurst.

7

I'm the chief deputy for

the Secretary of State's office.

8

Q.

For the State of Idaho, correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And you were the chief deputy, Secretary of

11

State's office in year 2009, correct?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And your professional responsibilities include

14

carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the

15

Office of the Secretary of State related to federal,

16

state and local election, correct?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And in that capacity as a chief deputy to the

19

Secretary of State with regards to elections, state and

20

county elections and -- federal,

21

elections in the State of Idaho, your -- basically what

22

are your duties as far as interacting with election

23

officials around the state?

24

25

A.

state and local

Our responsibility is to make sure that

election laws are interpreted and elections are
4
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1

conducted consistently.

2

Q.

consistent
Consistent with laws?

3

A.

And we've done training on that.

4

Q.

Okay.

Yes.

Now, are you familiar then with the
NOw,
COlL~ty

5

Idaho Code Section 34-1011 with regards to

6

clerk's record of application for absent elector

7

ballots?

8

A.

Yes, I am.

9

Q.

Can we have that one on the screen?
I'm going to ask you some more questions while

10
11

we're going.

And also are you familiar with Idaho Code

12

Section 50-451 with regards to record of applications

13

for absentee ballots?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

As they were in effect in 2009?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Generally, what -- generally are those two

i ~
,

'

18

statutes, 30-1011 and 50-451, basically the same?

19

A.

Yes, they are.

20

Q.

And there we have 11
lIon
on there.

21

Now, the -- indicates the county clerk shall

22

keep a record in his office concerning these -- all

23

these things we've gone through.

24

with that?

25

A.

Now, you're familiar

Yes.
5
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1

Q.

Okay.

There's been a lot of testimony over

2

the past couple days about the Secretary of State's

3

database, and can you explain basically what that is?

4

A.

The database is a voter registration system

5

for the State of Idaho and it's -- it's a dynamic

6

database.

7

one -- one county in the state, if they're registered in

8

another county then it notifies the other county that

9

they've registered in the new one.

Whenever somebody registers in one state or

So the data can be

10

cleaned, so it's only current registrants in the state.

11

Plus it helps to eliminate duplicates -- duplicate

12

registrations.

13

Q.

And as part of your duties with the Secretary

14

of State's office, chief deputy, with regards to

15

elections, is to issue directives, instructions, and

16

information to various election officials across the

17

state, correct?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

At any time in -- let's just stay with, at any

20

time in 2009 did you and/or anyone in the Secretary of

21

State's office to your knowledge issue any directive or

22

instruction to any State of Idaho county clerk that

23

compliance with Idaho Code Section 34-1011 is not

24

required?

25

A.

No.
6
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1

2

Q.

Does the Secretary of State's database

effectuate the

re~irement

of 34-1011?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

With regards to Idaho Code 50-451, which is

5

under the municipal code, did you or anyone to your

6

knowledge as Idaho Secretary of State's office issue

7

directive, instruction to any city or county clerk that

8

compliance with 50-451 was not required?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Is the Secretary of State's database with

11

regards to elections and voters, does it effectuate the

12

purpose of 50-451?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

NOw,
Now, with regards to 50-451, which really in a

15

sense -- it's up on the screen -- and it's basically the

16

same as the requirements as far as record keeping as

17

50-451, correct?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Okay.

So we'll just use it, it's there.

20

Record of application for absentee ballots.

21

election specific?

Is that

22

A.

Yes, it is.

23

Q.

So for each election, a record of the

24

applications for absentee ballots and all the other

25

information is required under law to be kept?
7
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And if a record is kept for a specific

3

election, it would start at a certain date, I suppose,

4

maybe the date that absentee ballots are mailed out,

5

Septe~ber

6

8:00 o'clock p.m. on election night, correct?

7

A.

15th, or something like that.

~~d

then at

No, because they still keep track of the

8

number of the ballots that are received after the

9

8:00 o'clock on election night.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

They have to be kept in -- and marked as being

12
13

voided or indicated that they weren't counted.
Q.

Okay.

So the record would be open, but if

14

there was a record under 50-451 or the other one,

15

34-1011, that record would reflect all absentee ballots

16

that were applied for, the date the application was

17

made, the date when it was returned, and if it wasn't

18

returned it would be so noted, correct?

19

A.

It should, yes.

20

Q.

It should.

And by looking at that, then a

21

person would be able to go in and say, Okay, from first

22

day of absentee ballots to 8:00 o'clock on election day,

23

November 3rd, 2009, these are the absentee ballots that

24

were validly received, correct?

25

A.

If that was kept, yes.
8
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1

Q.

If it was kept according to statute?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

Now, I'll represent to you that the

4

testimony in this matter has been to date that no such

5

record other -- no such 50-451 record has been kept,

6

okay?

7

A.

Okay.

8

Q.

I'll represent to you that the testimony to

9
10

date is that reliance and use -- total reliance and use
is with the Secretary of State's database, okay?

MR. HAMAN:

11
12

THE COURT:
but overrule it.

I'll -- I'll note the objection

You can go ahead.

MR. KELSO:

15
16

That

misstates the testimony in this case, your Honor.

13
14

Object to the question.

Q.

SO what is -- what are the
So

purposes of these records, 50-451 and 34-1011?

17

A.

The main purpose of them is to make sure that

18

people don't vote twice.

There's a record that someone

19

has

20

not allowed to vote at the polls.

if they have received an absentee ballot, they're

21

Q.

Any other purposes?

22

A.

It's also used to

excuse me.

It's also

23

used to validate the number of -- or absentee ballots

24

that are tabulated match the number of ballots that were

25

received.
9
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1

Q.

So this record was required to be kept by

2

state law as used to validate the number of absentee

3

ballots received compared to the number of absentee

4

ballots counted?

5

.......
-'""'-·
7\

Yes.

6

Q.

Without such a record that reflects the end at

7

8:00 o'clock p.m. on election night -- well, let's

8

strike that.

9

Can I see Exhibit 5, please.

10

This is what's been admitted into Exhibit 5,

11

Mr. Hurst.

It's been identified as the Kootenai -- the

12

absentee ballot report Kootenai and for the election

13

date of November 3, 2009, City of Coeur d'Alene, City

14

Precincts.

15

reflects is the record that was developed, printed out

16

from the Secretary of State's database on that date,

17

November 6th, 2009.

And this document, Exhibit 5, the testimony

Okay?

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

Based upon this record, which has been

20

authenticated and identified and we've established that

21

ballots equal votes.

22

applications were received, 2047 application ballots

23

were issued, 2047 absentee ballots were returned, and

24

five were voided.

25

It shows that 2047 absentee ballot

So based upon that information, is there any
10
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1

way that you're aware of that without this record

2

50-451, City of Coeur d'Alene election officials,

3

Kootenai County election officials could verify that any

4

number of absentee ballots in excess of that 2047 were

5

validly received?

6

A.

7

there's not.

8

Q.

9

Unless they have a different report, no,

If you can show the witness Plaintiff's

Exhibit 85, please.

10

Showing you what's been admitted as

11

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 85, and this is a document that

12

was generated at 11/4/09 at 9:58 a.m. and it reflects

13

the number of ballots that were run through the ballot

14

counting machine, okay, that reflects 2051.

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

Does this document in and of itself,

17

Exhibit No. 85, establish that all 2051 of those ballots

18

that were counted were legally and validly received by

19

8:00 a.m. on November 3rd, 2009?

20
21
22

A.

In and of itself, no.

That tells how many

ballots were counted.
Q.

If Exhibit 5, which is the report run on

23

November 6th, 2009, reflects that a grand total of 2047

24

absentee ballots were issued and there were no other

25

reports such as Exhibit 5 prepared until after the
11
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1

canvas, based upon Exhibit 5 what would be -- just based

2

on 5 without even getting into minutia, but based on 5,

3

what would be the total number of absentee ballots that

4

were legally and validly received for the November 3rd,

5

2009, City of Coeur d'Alene election?
MR. ERBLAND:

6

7

question.

8

database.

He's already testified that this is a dynamic

THE COURT:

9

Object to the form of the

Well, I'll let the witness presume

10

he'll know what he's talking about, so I'll let him

11

answer the question.
THE WITNESS:

12

If all of the -- if all of the

13

information was entered when the ballot was received, it

14

would indicate there was 2047.

15

MR. KELSO:

16

17

A.

Q.

Received?

If that's what was -- if they were all

entered.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

The system is only as good as the people who

20
21

are entering the data.
Q.

Right.

Would you agree that the only other

22

document that would be of more significance or value in

23

establishing how many legal, valid absentee ballots were

24

received by 8:00p.m.
8:00 p.m. on election night would be

25

documented under 50-451?
12
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

May I see Exhibit 8, please.

I'm showing you

3

what's been marked and admitted-admitted -- there's also an 8A

4

and 8B.
Why don't you just take a moment and take a

5

6

look at that document.

I don't know if you've seen it

7

before or not, but just take a moment and read through

8

it.

9

A.

Okay.

10

Q.

Now, with regards to Exhibit 8A, that's just a

11

photocopy of the last page of 175 of Exhibit 5, correct?

12

A.

Apparently -- yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

And I'll represent to you that as

14

reflected by this exhibit, which is an affidavit of the

15

chief election official for the City of Coeur d'Alene,

16

that this 8B is the last page of an absentee ballot

17

report Kootenai printed on 11/16/2009.

Okay.

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

And it reflects that a total requested of

20

2049, total issued 2049, total returned 2049, correct?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And now that total it reflects seven voided,

23

correct?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

So if we look at those two, is there any way
13
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1

or is there a way -- not I suppose any way -- on the

2

Secretary of State's database the number of 2047 in 8A

3

would fluctuate to 8B's 2049?

4

A.

It would because on the 16th the way the

5

report runs -- and I don't have the search criteria on

6

these two reports.

7

Q.

It's right here.

8

A.

We have what Mr. English says it was.

9

Q.

Well, that's what we have to believe.

10

A.

If, in fact, that's what it is.

It's

11

everything having to do with the November 3rd election

12

that was received.

13

6th, it would be all the absentee ballots returned as of

14

the 6th instead of as of the 3rd.

15

additional ballots that were received after the election

16

that were not counted.

And that would be the date is on the

So it would include

The same thing with the 16th.

17

That would

18

indicate additional ballots were also received after the

19

election, and then it should say somewhere on the report

20

whether or not they were counted.

21

Q.

Well

22

A.

Whether they were voided or not.

23

Q.

Okay.

And we've already gone through the

24

testimony and established that on the 11/16, 8A, it

25

reflects that five were voided out of the 2047.

We've

14
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1

gone through and identified those five void ballots.

2

A.

Okay.

3

Q.

And then we also identified at page 66 a

4

person by the name of Harris Patricia L., same voter ID

5

number that reflects two votes for her, one of which

6

should have been voided, okay.

7

Okay.

That's been established.

8

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

So if we look at this which is the November --

10

November 6th report, it would reflect

11

information I just told you, based upon your knowledge,

12

what would be the total number of absentee ballots

13

received for the November 3rd, 2006 -- November 3rd,

14

2009, City of Coeur d'Alene general election that were

15

valid?

based upon that

A.

That were valid.

18

Q.

Well, minus the voided?

19

A.

Minus the voided ones, yes.

20

Q.

And minus the double vote, correct?

21

A.

Well, one of those.

22

Q.

One of those, so ...

23

A.

It wasn't necessarily a double vote.

16
17

It would be the ones on the

2047.

24

issued two ballots.

25

ballot.

It was

May not have been a consolidated

15
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1

Q.

So without getting into the minutia of Harris

2

Patricia L. or either of them were voided.

3

five votes, ballots were voided and that's the

4

November 6th.

5

database, how many absentee ballots were legally

6

received that weren't voided on or before 8:00 p.m. on

7

November 3rd, 2009?

8
9

A.

This shows

So based upon the Secretary of State's

Again, I'd have to go back to say if all of

the information was entered into the machine as they

10

were received, it would have been that the 2057 minus

11

the five.

12

Q.

2047?

13

A.

2047 minus the five, yes.

14

Q.

And you say now if all the information

15

received was being entered, we know that the report done

16

on 11/16, which is B, reflects that the total number of

17

absentee ballots requested, issued and returned

18

increased by two, correct?

19

A.

That's what it shows, yes.

20

Q.

But it also shows the same number, 2041, as

21

being validly issued and received, correct?

22

A.

That's what it shows, yes.

23

Q.

Now, looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, which

24

is the November 4th,

25

you before.

'09,

canvas that I've mentioned to

Based upon these documentations here,
16
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,

'

i.

1

Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 8A and B, does the number 2051

2

accurately reflect the total number of absentee ballots

3

legally received and returned on or before

4

November 3rd, 2009?
A.

5

6

It doesn't show

8~00
8~OO

p.m. on

doesn't match the nuwber

that was entered as having been received.
Q.

7

So just the fact that there's a computer

8

printout showing that 2051 ballots, absentee ballots

9

were counted, that doesn't mean that they were legally

10

received on or before

11

correct?

8~00

p.m. on November 3rd, 2009,

12

A.

That's right.

13

Q.

So if we look at the Secretary of State's

That alone doesn't show that.

14

database, which is the only database that we apparently

15

have available to us, it shows how many absentee ballots

16

were legally received and returned on or before

17

8~00
8~oo

p.m. on November 3rd, 2009.

18

A.

It shows 2042 -- 2047, sorry.

19

Q.

And then you deduct from that five, for what?

20

A.

Five were voided.

21

Q.

So the total of legally received nonvoided

22

absentee ballots that were received on or before

23

8~00

24

that document, correct?

25

p.m. on November 3rd, 2009, was 2042 according to

A.

According to the document, yes.
17
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Q.

1

And since we know that there is no document

2

kept and prepared as required by state law under 34-1011

3

or under 50-451 and the November 6th report, which is

4

the 5th -- or excuse me, the 6th of November, is in

5

existence, what is the only evidence available as to the

6

total number of absentee ballots that were legally

7

received on or before 8:00 p.m. on November 3rd, 2009?

8

A.

The only evidence that I have seen is this.

9

Q.

Is which exhibit?

10

A.

Exhibit 5.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

That's the -- okay.

14

Exhibit 5?

And that reflects 2042,

correct?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And how many -- what's the difference in

17

number between 2051 and 2042?

18

A.

Give me a calculator.

20

Q.

Oh, come on.

21

A.

Nine.

22

Q.

Should the election officials for the City of

19

I can't figure that

out.
You want a pen?

23

Coeur d'Alene maintain the record required under 50-451

24

and 34-1011?

25

A.

We don't have -- Secretary of State's office
18
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1

doesn't have jurisdiction over Title 50 of the code.

2

opinion is since it says it in the code, they should

3

maintain it.

4

Q.

My

And Mr. English testified that he felt the

5

Secretary of State's office did have jurisdiction over

6

municipal elections, but that aside, and let's pretend

7

we're going under Title 34-1011, should a record

8

required under 34-1011 be kept as required by statute?

9

A.

Yes, it should.

10

Q.

Is it improper for a record as required under

11

34-1011 to not be kept?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Is it improper for a record required under

14
15

50-451 to not be kept?
A.

MR. KELSO:

16

17

Yes.
If I could have just a moment,

your Honor, I think I'm finished with this witness.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

19

MR. KELSO:

Q.

Do you have an opinion as the

20

chief deputy for the Secretary of State's office

21

regarding elections as to whether or not it would be a

22

failure of an official's duty, the clerk, to keep those

23

two records, 50-451 and 34-1011?

24
25

A.

Apparently not doing his duty if he doesn't

keep them.
19
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1
2

MR. KELSO:

That's all the questions I have,

your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ERELAND:
ERBLAND:

Any cross-examination?
Yes, sir.

CROSS-EXM4INATION BY

5
6

ERBLAND:
MR. ERELAND:

7

Q.

Good morning, Mr. Hurst.

8

A.

Hello.

9

Q.

You testified that the -- first of all, I

10

think we've heard it a number of times and I'll just

11

verify it, the Secretary of State's database is dynamic

12

and it changes, correct?

13

A.

Yes, it is.

14

Q.

So even Exhibit No.
No.55 that shows 2047, isn't

15

necessarily accurate because there could have been data

16

entries inputted by another county removing voters from

17

that list, correct?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

So even to say that it's 2047 or 2042 isn't

20

necessarily accurate, is it?

21

A.

That's true.

22

Q.

All right.

And that is because of the dynamic

23

nature of the list and because of data entry that could

24

remove or add voters at the time that that list was

25

created?
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A.

1

It wouldn't add any, but it might remove them.

2

MR. KELSO:

3

THE WITNESS:

4

It wouldn't add any, but it

might remove them.
MR. ERBLAND:

5

6

I'm sorry, what was that?

Q.

Okay.

And so that could

explain the reduction in the numbers, correct?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Exhibit No. 85, do you have that in front of

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

That shows how many -- how many ballots,

9

12

you?

absentee ballots were counted for this election.

13

A.

It shows there were 2051.

14

Q.

2051?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And you said -- you haven't seen all the

17

evidence in this case, correct?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

The Secretary of State handles recounts for

20

certain elections, correct?

21

A.

Yes, well, the attorney general does --

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

-- with our assistance.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

If you wanted to know -- if you wanted

to look at the original evidence, the real evidence of
21
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1

what was run, wouldn't you look at the ballots?
A.

2

3

That's the purpose of the recount is to count

the ballots, yes.

4

Q.

So even a report pursuant to Idaho Code

5

Section 34-1011, isn't itself necessarily accurate, is

6

it?

7

A.

State that again.

8

Q.

Sure.

9
10

Reports, a report pursuant to Idaho

Code Section 34-1011 is dependent upon the accuracy of
the person who's creating the entry, correct?

11

A.

Yes, that's correct.

12

Q.

All right.

So when there is a recount or

13

there's an inquiry as to what really happened, isn't the

14

best thing to do -- and I know you haven't seen this

15

evidence -- but isn't the best evidence of that is the

16

ballots themselves?

17

A.

As far as the count, it's the ballots itself.

18

Q.

Yes.

So if you wanted to know whether or not

19

in fact there were 2051 absentee ballots, you could -- a

20

person could actually count those ballots, correct?

21

A.

Yes, that would

22

Q.

All right.

that's right.

And if you wanted to know how many

23

ballots were actually returned, received, you could look

24

at the envelopes, correct?

25

A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

And count them?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And that would be the best evidence, wouldn't

A.

That would tell you how many were received.

4
5

it?

6

It would not necessarily tell you -- I mean, there's a

7

number of things you need to look at.

8

Q.

Okay.

What else would you look at?

9

A.

Well, if it was -- if you look at the

10

envelope -- you need to look at the poll book also to

11

compare that to see if it was in fact counted

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

-- if it was valid or not valid.

To look at

14

the date on the envelope and then an envelope should

15

specify when it was received

16

Q.

Right.

17

A.

-- and counted.

18

Q.

Right.

And then are there also sometimes --

19

in your experience, are there daily reports that clerks

20

make when they get absentee ballots in, saying

21

through that step, looking at the signature, verifying

22

that there's a registration, comparing the signature on

23

the registration with the return envelope?

24

A.

25

report.

Yes.

going

In fact, that's what generates this

23
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Those should be maintained and they would

3

have

4

everything that happened.

5

that would have a daily transaction of

Q.

Okay.

So you could take those daily reports

6

and compile those and then you would know how many came

7

in, right?

8

9
10
11

A.

Yes, yes.

If they were -- again, if they were

all entered correctly.
Q.

Sure.

And it's dependent upon the entry,

correct?

12

A.

Yes, it is.

13

Q.

Any report is.

The Secretary's database, the

14

54-1011, the daily reports, it's all dependent upon the

15

accuracy of the clerk doing the job; is that correct?

16

A.

That's right.

17

Q.

But when it's all said and done, if we want to

18

know how many ballots were actually run through the

19

machine we count them, don't we?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And it's -- I think I may have asked this

22

question, but I'll just ask anyway.

But was your office

23

asked to get involved at all in examining any of this

24

original evidence existing of the ballots or the return

25

envelopes?
24
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Or the applications?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Or the registrations?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

ask you about.

8
9

Just a couple of other points I want to

There have been a number of affidavits that
have been submitted.

I understand that you've -- see if

10

this refreshes your memory that you -- it's your

11

affidavit to the effect that while municipal elections

12

are governed by Idaho Code Title 50, Chapter 4, these

13

elections are also governed by applicable provisions in

14

Title 34?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

All right.

Mr. Hurst, on a different topic, I

17

understand that you've also given opinions on whether or

18

not certain questioned voters were lawfully registered

19

to vote in accordance with state law?

20

A.

Yes.

21

MR. ERBLAND:

22

THE COURT:

23

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

24

MR. ERBLAND:

Q.

25

May I approach the witness?
Certainly.

Have you had a chance to

look at the document I've just handed you?
25
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And could you identify it, please, sir.

3

A.

It's a letter that I wrote to Dan English,

4

Kootenai County Clerk, regarding the eligibility or

5

the -- for four people to be registered to vote in

6

Idaho.

7

MR. ERBLAND:

8

MR. KELSO:

9

MR. ERBLAND:

10
11

MR. KELSO:
90 -- 94.

13

affidavit.

MR. KELSO:

15

MR. ERBLAND:
you hand me 94?

MR. KELSO:

18

MR. ERBLAND:

Might be

No, it's a letter.

That's an

It's attached to the affidavit.
Ah, let me check that.

Could

Go ahead.
Then we'll just go ahead and

have this marked as next consecutive exhibit.

20

(Exhibit K identified.)
MR. ERBLAND:

21

22

I was just checking.

It's not ...

17

19

What number is it?

Was it attached?

14

16

I think it's already in.

No, not it?
MR. ERBLAND:

12

Have that marked, please.

Q.

Mr. Hurst, now what is

marked as Exhibit A -- and I'll move for its admission.

23

MR. KELSO:

24

MR. ERBLAND:

25

MR. KELSO:

Exhibit K.
K, excuse me.
No objection.
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THE COURT:

1

2

Okay.

Defendant's K is admitted,

but why don't we identify it for purposes of the record.

3

(Exhibit K admitted.)
MR. ERBLAND:

4

Okay.

5

Q.

Go ahead.

6

A.

It's a letter from me, Timothy Hurst, to Dan

7

English, Kootenai County Clerk, regarding the

8

qualifications of Tammy Farkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory

9

Profft, and Alan Friend to be registered to vote in

10

Idaho -- qualified to register.

11

Q.

And was that your opinion?

12

A.

Yes, it is.

13

Q.

And does the letter state the basis for your

14

opinion?

15

A.

Yes, it does.

16

Q.

And what is the basis of your opinion?

17

A.

The -- when someone is outside of the United

18

States or outside of Kootenai County and they're away

19

for temporary purposes with the intent of making

20

Kootenai County their home, that they're still allowed

21

to vote absentee ballots, is roughly it.

22
23

Q.

And you cited the Constitution and the

applicable statute, correct?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And the judge can read that and actually
27
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1

that's part of the judge's job here, so -however, you
--however,

2

are the -- you are representing the Secretary of State,

3

correct?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And it is your -- part of your duties to offer

6

opinions on this kind of matter, correct?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

You do it on a regular basis?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And based upon your review of the

11

registration, it's your opinion that Tammy Farkes,

12

Monica Pacquin,
pacquin, Gregory Profft and Alan Friend were

13

registered to vote in accordance with state law?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And they were entitled to vote by absentee

16

ballots in this election?
A.

17

18

And that was based on the information I

had.
MR. ERBLAND:

19

20

Yes.

questions I have.

I understand.

That's all the

Thank you, sir.

21

THE COURT:

Anything by the city?

22

MR. HAMAN:

No questions.

23

THE COURT:

Any redirect?

24

MR. KELSO:

Thank you.

25

Thank you.

Can we have that last

Exhibit K.
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY

1

2

MR. KELSO:

3

Q.

Now, you qualified your statement to

4

Mr. Erbland based upon the information you had

5

available.

6
7
8
9
10
11

A.

What information was provided to you?
Actually had a copy of voter registration

records, as I recall.
Q.

So
SO you had a copy of the voter registration

card for each one of those persons, correct?
A.

As I recall, I had a copy of that from

Kootenai County, yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

15
16

Can we see 50?

While we're waiting.

Looking at your letter,

you're looking at -- excuse me, Mr. Reed, I'm talking.

17
18

That was it?

Your letter, Exhibit K, states -- refers to
Idaho Code 34-1075, correct --

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

-- as the basis of your opinion; is that

21

correct?

22

A.

Based on the residency, yes.

23

Q.

Based upon the residency.

And I don't think I

24

have 34-307 on the slide, we'll talk about this one in

25

just a minute, but will you take a look at that for a
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1

second.

I'm sure you're familiar with it.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And the code section that you cite, 34-1075,

4

specifically provides for residency in the state or

5

county, correct?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

It doesn't apply to municipalities -- it

8
9

doesn't mention municipalities, does it?
A.

Because there's only one voter registration

10

system and one method to vote, to register, and that's

11

only with the county.

12
13

Q.

But it doesn't mention that, does it,

municipal?

14

A.

No, it doesn't mention that.

15

Q.

Are you familiar with the requirements of the

16

Idaho Code Section 50-402 as to who is a qualified

17

elector for a municipal election?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Now, when you say you're familiar with it, as

20

you sit here without looking at it, and I'll do that,

21

but can you tell us what the residency requirements are

22

for a person to be qualified to vote in a municipal

23

election as opposed to a county or state election?

24
25

A.

You have to be 18 years of age.

The same as

in a county election, 18 years of age.
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1

Q.

No, as a city.
No;

2

A.

Eighteen years of age.

3

United States.

4

to the election.

A citizen of the

Resident of the city for 30 days prior

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Or annexed in.

7

Q.

So the difference between state and county is

8

that you only have to be a resident of the state or the

9

county and all those requirements, correct?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

To be a resident lawfully entitled to vote in

12

a municipal election you just testified you have to be a

13

resident of the city for 30 days prior to the election,

14

correct?

15

A.

That's right.

16

Q.

So just because a person is a resident for

17

county voting purposes or state purposes or national

18

purposes, if they're not a resident of the City of Coeur

19

d'Alene, they don't qualify under that statute, do they?

20

A.

Under the statute, no.

21

Q.

I'm thinking maybe 92B, it's the voter

22

registration form.

Yeah, that's it.

Great.

Showing you what's been admitted into evidence

23

24

as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 95.

It's been testified here

25

previously that this is the voter registration card that
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1

is used by Kootenai County and was used in 2009 and it's

2

one approved by Secretary of State's office.

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

So would you agree with all those things?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Okay.

Now, under penalty of perjury, when a

7

person comes to register, does that document ask them

8

whether they are a resident of the city in which they're

9

seeking, in this case, a resident of the City of Coeur

10

d'Alene?

11

A.

No, it doesn't.

12

Q.

It only says a resident of the State of Idaho

13

or the county for 30 days, correct?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And I believe we just established that in

16

order to be a lawfully registered voter entitled to vote

17

lawfully, the person has to be a resident of the City of

18

Coeur d'Alene for at least 30 days prior to the

19

election, correct?

20

A.

According to that statute.

21

Q.

Well, that's the law we have, isn't it?
MR. ERBLAND:

22

Your Honor, I think we can save

23

some time.

We agree that the person has to be a

24

resident of the City of Coeur d'Alene for voting

25

purposes 30 days before the election.

We don't disagree
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1

with that.
MR. KELSO:

2
3

Q.

Well, great.

Then let's move on.

Were you provided any information that

4

established to you -- do I have your letter?

5

steal it?

6

A.

I gave it back.

7

Q.

Let me see that Exhibit K, again.

8

I knew I had it somewhere.

Did I

Here it is.

Too many papers.

9

Now, this Defense Exhibit K, and you indicated

10

that you were provided with the voter registration cards

11

for those voters, correct?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

And those voter registration cards that

14

you were provided, would have been the same as or

15

similar to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 95, correct?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And they would have said that under penalty of

18

law they're certifying that they're a resident of Idaho

19

and the county for 30 days, correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And it doesn't say they're a resident of Coeur

22

d'Alene, correct?

23

A.

That's right.

24

Q.

So were you provided any information when you

25

wrote that letter that showed you or you reviewed that
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1

reflected that each and every one of those persons

2

identified, Tammy Farkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory Profft

3

and Alan Friend, were residents of the City of Coeur

4

d'Alene prior to November 3rd, 2009?

5

A.

According to the addresses that were on the

6

card, as I recall, the address said that they were.

7

a Coeur d'Alene address.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

With a different mailing address.

10
11
12

I'm

speaking from memory, so I don't
don•t know for sure.

Q.

And we can -- we can talk about some of that,

but let's take -- let's take just one of those.

13

MR. ERBLAND:

14

MR. KELSO:

15

Had

How about Monica Pacquin?
I think we'll start with Gregory

Profft.

16

MR. ERBLAND:

17

MR. KELSO:

Okay.

Q.

Gregory Profft is a person --

18

and Defendant Kennedy has offered his affidavit, is a

19

soldier overseas.

20

At no time did he ever live in the City of Coeur

21

d'Alene.

22

under any law a resident of the City of Coeur d'Alene?

23

A.

How could Mr. Profft be a

Okay.

considered

He should not have been.
MR. ERBLAND:

24

25

None.

He lived in Post Falls, Idaho.

We'll stipulate to that.

Of who

he voted for.
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MR. KELSO:

1

2

You want to stipulate to Pacquin

and Friend?
THE COURT:

3

Actually, the Court's not going to

4

accept stipulations by counsel.

5

even get along where they act professionally in open

6

court, so the Court is not going to do stipulations

7

unless the Court adopts the stipulation precisely.

8

Because people are saying, "I'm stipulating to that,"

9

and making a snide remark and then it's accepted.

10

the Court is accepting no stipulations by counsel

11

without the Court affirmatively accepting it on the

12

record because I'm not going to buy into anything

13

counsel are saying back and forth between each other

14

because of the nature of the way this proceeding is

15

being handled by counsel.

16

Counsel really can't

So

So stipulations are meaningless unless you get

17

the Court to expressly buy into it, unless all counsel

18

begin to change their behavior, which I don't foresee.
MR. KELSO:

19

20

definition.

21

four.

22

residency.

23

is "Residence."

24
25

Let's roll down to a residence

Keep going.

I want to go down to three,

Just down to where it defines how you determine
It's right under "C.

Qualified Elector."

D

Now, I'll represent to you that we've had
testimony already with regards to this Idaho Code
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1

section and you can see that residence for voting

2

purposes "shall be the principal or primary home or

3

place of abode of a person," correct?

4

that?

5

Yes.

A.

You agree with

No.22 also says they don't lose their
No.

6

residence if they're out of the city for temporary

7

purposes.

8

9

Q.

Right.

Let me go further.

"Principal or

primary home or place of abode is that home or place in

10

which his habitation is fixed."

11

that means a house or apartment or something of that

12

nature.

They're planning on Teturning.
Would you agree with that?

13
14

And in the testimony

A.

It depends on the situation.

There are other

15

situations you go through for residency.

16

clear-cut.

17

someone's out of the country in military service, he's

18

not considered lost of residency.

In fact, if you look at the Constitution, if

19

Q.

Let's take out military.

20

A.

Okay.

21

Q.

Just citizen.
THE COURT:

22
23

It's not

Well, soldiers are a citizen, so

you're going to have to take soldiers out.

24

MR. KELSO:

I limited it to just

25

THE COURT:

What good is this going to do me?
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1

Are we going to have such a person testify in open

2

court, and if so how are we going to know the specifics

3

asking this witness, who's very knowledgeable and whose

4

opinion I certainly respect, academic questions about

5

somebody who has different situations isn't getting me

6

anywhere because nobody's testified to anything

7

specifically that gives us any evidence that anybody can

8

talk about.

9

And so it's no disrespect for this -- to this

10

witness, but he's being asked to give opinions on

11

something that just flat doesn't matter.

12

to something -- until we get some evidence that we can

13

work with maybe we shouldn't be asking these questions.
MR. KELSO:

14
15

Q.

So let's go on

Okay.

What is the best evidence that you have seen

16

by either myself, Mr. Erbland or anything else, the best

17

evidence of the number of valid absentee ballots that

18

were received by City of Coeur d'Alene on or before

19

November 3rd, 2009?

20
21

MR. ERBLAND:

Objection.

Asked and answered.

Cumulative.
THE COURT:

22

Well, also best evidence is a

23

decision made by the Court and so it's hard for me to

24

imagine how this has any relevance to anything.

25

Assuming you're just using it in a lay person version
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1

I'll overrule the objection and let the witness answer

2

the question if he can.
THE WITNESS:

3

4

Based upon the evidence I've

seen today in court, it's the absentee ballot report.
ivIR.
iviR. KELSO:

5

Q.

Of what date?

6

A.

The 6th.

7

Q.

November 6th, 2009.

You mentioned when an

8

absentee ballot comes back it should be stamped with

9

some information, date and time?

10
11
12
13

A.

When it was received in the mail it should be

stamped with date and time.
Q.

When an absentee ballot is received in the

mail it should

14

A.

The envelope is.

15

Q.

The envelope containing it should be stamped

16

date and time received, correct?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

If you have -- if you don't have an absentee

19

ballot envelope with -- and they usually contain the

20

person's name and a signature on the back, correct?

21
22
23

A.

Yes.

The -- if it doesn't have a signature

it's not counted.
Q.

Right.

But what I'm saying is that, okay,

24

it's got the person's name and then a signature on it,

25

usually on the back of the envelope, correct?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Okay.

If that return envelope is -- does not

3

have a date and time of receipt stamp on it, what proof

4

is there of when it was received?

5

A.

There isn't any proof on that.

6

Q.

There is no proof.

The only possible proof

7

that maybe I'm aware of is that somebody can look at the

8

Secretary of State's database and see what it says,

9

correct?
MR. ERBLAND:

10

I hesitate to object, but I

11

think he's asking for speculation of this witness

12

because a clerk could make an independent daily report

13

or log.

14

needs to decide.

It's not -- it's not relevant to what the Court

THE COURT:

15

16

not relevant.

17

question.

Well, I'll certainly agree it's

But I'll go ahead and let him ask the

18

THE WITNESS:

You'll have to ask it again.

19

MR. KELSO:

20

(Whereupon, the record was read as follows:

21

"Question:

22

I'm aware of is that somebody can look at the

23

Secretary of State's database and see what it

24

correct?"" )
says, correct?

25

THE WITNESS:

Go ahead and read it back, please.

The only possible proof that maybe

I'm not sure it's the only
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1

possible thing I've seen to date.

2

MR. KELSO:

Q.

Okay.

And we know that stuff

3

can be entered into and taken out of that database

4

pretty much anytime, correct, by county officials or

5

city officials?
MR. HAMAN:

6

7

There's no evidence

city officials had any way to access it.

8

THE COURT:

9

THE WITNESS:

10

Objection.

I'll overrule the objection.
I'd qualify what do you mean by

taking away?

11

MR. KELSO:
A.

12

Q.

Let's just say added to.

To be added to or if it's moved to -- if they

13

register at a different location, then the information

14

as far as their absentee voting history is then taken

15

away.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

But the system also does not allow you to

18

enter new absentee voter information after the date of

19

the election as far as issuing any ballots.

20

Q.

As far as issuing new ballots?

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

Okay.

That's fine.

Okay.

l

i .

I think you

23

testified that if daily reports are kept, those daily

24

reports should because of the input process, add up to

25

the figure on Exhibit 5; is that correct?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Now, you also testified that if people -- you

3

can turn that off now, Matt, I'm sorry.

4

If people change their residence, just take an

5

example, somebody who was a resident of the City of

6

Coeur d'Alene votes in the City of Coeur d'Alene

7

election, whether absentee or whether in person.

8

that person moves and establishes a residence someplace

9

else, like in Ada County, then that person's information

If

10

would be deleted from Kootenai County and would show up

11

in the other county, correct?

12

13
14

A.

If he registered to vote in Ada County then

the information moves to Ada County.
Q.

Okay.

Did you or anyone in the Secretary of

15

State's office conduct any search or inquiry as to

16

whether or not anybody who voted was reflected as having

17

voted in the 2009 election, whether it was in person at

18

the poll or absentee in person or by the mail, had moved

19

and established a voting presence at another location?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And how many people -- did you determine how

22
23

many people had done that?
A.

We did determine the number of people who

24

moved outside of and registered outside of Kootenai

25

County.
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1

2
3

4

Q.

Outside of Kootenai County, not necessarily

Coeur d'Alene, but Kootenai County as a whole?
The people -- we looked at the number of

A.

people who voted in the city election.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Who had voter history for that city election

7

that moved

that registered outside of Kootenai

8

County.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

There were four.

11

Q.

Four.

And what was that number?

So we know that since this

since

12

this is an absentee ballot report, were you able to

13

determine whether they had voted absentee or at the

14

polling precinct?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Okay.

Perhaps you -- I don't know where my

17

markers went -- I'll represent to you that if we presume

18

that all four of those people that are documented as

19

having moved out of the City of Coeur d'Alene voted by

20

absentee, okay, ask you to presume that, in the

21

election.

22

testimony of what Exhibit 5 reflects that the actual

23

valid number of absentee ballots based upon Exhibit 5

24

was 2041.

25

absentee that moved, just for the sake of argument, and

And ask you to presume that based upon the

If we presume that all those people were
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1

we add four to 2041, that's 2045, correct?

2

A.

Under your assumptions, yes.

3

Q.

So even if we assume all that's as high as we

4

want, there's still a six vote difference between the

5

2051 counted and the information reflected on Exhibit 5,

6

yes?

7

A.

Under your assumption, yes.

8

Q.

If we have a returned absentee ballot

9

envelope, okay, and let's presume that the returned

10

absentee ballot envelope has a ballot in it, okay.

11

there's isn't a date and time of receipt stamp on there,

12

on that ballot, can that information be added into the

13

Secretary of State's database after November 3, 2009,

14

8:00p.m.?
8:00 p.m.?

15

A.

16

asking?

17

Q.

If

As having been received?

Is that what you're

As having been received.

Let's just say it

18

was received on the 4th, okay.

19

show that that was entered in on the 4th or would it

20

just indicate received -- I'm talking about anyone that

21

you can look at the date and time and verify?

22
23
24
25

A.

Would it automatically

And if a copy of the envelope isn't in the

database, it's whatever the clerk enters.
Q.

Okay.

So the -- since the

in our example,

an envelope that doesn't have a date or time stamp on
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1

it, the clerk can enter any date or time into the state

2

database; is that correct?
A.

3

4

They

enter the date, not the time.
Q.

5

6

No, the database doesn't hold the time.

Okay.

So they just put the date in.

So I

guess what -A.

7

Actually, when they scan it -- for example, if

8

they're using the bar code and scan it in, it

9

automatically puts it in.

10

Q.

Okay.

So take an absentee ballot that doesn't

11

have a bar code and doesn't have a date or time stamp on

12

it.

13

received on or after November 4th, 2009, a person with

14

access to the City of Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County

15

terminals and the Secretary of State's database, could

16

enter in that ballot as having been received sometime

17

before November 3rd, correct?

18

19
20

That -- and it was received after the 3rd, it was

A.

I

don't believe so, but I don't know the

answer to that.
Q.

Okay.

I

think it limits.

I

don't know.

Susan Smith's disk reflecting the

21

9/24 run -- or 11/24.

22

person's putting information into the Secretary of

23

State's database, they would add information, correct,

24

they wouldn't remove information?

25

A.

I

just want to clarify if a

Yes.
44

SC 38417-2011

Page 2591 of 2676

Okay.

Q.

1

Let's scroll down all the way to the

2

bottom and over to the side and showing the dates of

3

receipts.

4

Is that all the way at the bottom there?
You can see, Mr. Hurst, based upon this, this

5

report prints out -- and we can scroll back up if you

6

want, but it prints out by date received.

7

A.

That's an Excel spreadsheet that didn't come

8

out of the database.

9

Excel spreadsheet.

10

It was exported and put into an
The database itself didn't generate

that.

11

Q.

Oh, okay.

12

A.

They may have used an extract file from a

13

database to generate it.

14

Q.

The only reason I'm -- the testimony was that

15

this information came off the Secretary of State's

16

database on November 24th.

A.

17
18

An extract of the file that was then put into

that format, yes.

19

Q.

So the format they used reflected a running
I

20

chronology, timeframe of votes, we go clear up to the

21

very first date and come down.

22

point out, and apparently it doesn't mean anything, is

23

the 11/4s and 5s counting 7 are at the bottom.

24

just

25

Alls I was trying to
AIls

I

that doesn't mean anything?
A.

Apparently it was sorted by the date it was
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l
I

~

1
2

received and those were received after the election.
Q.

Okay.

And date received is the date in the

3

case of the absentee ballots that doesn't have a date

4

or -- a date at all on the return envelope, is whatever

5

date the person inputs into the database, correct?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

So as I'm understanding your testimony, the --

8

a ballot, an absentee ballot conceivably could be

9

received on 11/4 and that absentee ballot return

10

envelope not have any sort of stamp on it indicated that

11

it was received at all, but let's say it was received on

12

the 4th.

13

of these database computers could take that ballot and

14

indicate that it had been received on or before

15

November 3rd?

16

17
18

A.

Your testimony is that a person operating one

I don't -- I don't believe it could do that.

I don't know for sure on that.
Q.

Okay.

Okay.

Now, we talked -- we didn't.

19

Mr. Erbland talked about a recount, correct, mentioned

20

about a recount?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Okay.

I want to talk about a recount.

Isn't

23

it true that under the Idaho state law in existence in

24

2009 that a recount merely consists of taking the ballot

25

stack and -- from the election on the 3rd, that stack of
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1

ballots and then running them through the computer again

2

to count and see if the number's correct?

3

A.

Basically it does, yes.

4

Q.

Yeah.

That recount, assuming that a recount

5

had been done and the machine operated properly, the

6

only thing that that recount would have done was reflect

7

whether or not the number of counted absentee ballots

8

that were put through the machine on election night was

9

2051, correct?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

It wouldn't have changed any of this

12

information in Exhibit 5, which shows which absentee

13

ballots were legally received on or before November 3rd,

14

would it?

15
16
17
18

A.

No.

That's for the election contest statute

under Chapter 20.
Q.

That's what -- that's what election contests

are for, right?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

That's what these are for.

21

looking here.

Oh, I'm just

Exhibit 47, please.

22

Showing you what's been marked and admitted

23

into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No.
No.77 and take a

24

moment and read through it and we will talk about it in

25

just a second.
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1

A.

Okay.

2

Q.

Mr. McHugh, the prosecuting attorney for

3

Kootenai County, testified with regards to that.

4

he got an inquiry on November 16th saying there's a

5

difference between the

6

Exhibit 5, 2047, reflecting 2042 valid votes.

7

see that?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay.

EY~ibit

Said

85, 2051, and the
Do you

So there was a little discussion.

10

Ultimately, Mr. McHugh wrote back to Mr. Spencer and

11

said, Well, in this case, if you're concerned about it

12

you ought to file an election contest, right?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And that's just exactly the same advice that

15
16

you would have given, correct?
A.

MR. ERELAND:
ERBLAND:

17
18

Yes.

basis of relevance.

19

I -- I have to object on the

I think that's why we're here.

THE COURT:

Court and counsel is -- I've lost

20

control of this trial.

And counsel are not taking any

21

attention to the Court's comments as to how we need to

22

proceed, and so at the close of evidence today we will

23

meet with counsel and we will start talking about time

24

limits.

25

control of this trial and I can't apparently influence

It's very artificial, but I've got to regain
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1

the attorneys by comments.

2

So we are going to go with time limits and

3

counsel better be prepared to address that issue because

4

it's clear that, at least right at this point, the

5

Court's having to conclude that nothing else is going to

6

work.
MR. KELSO:

7

8

that defendants have filed documents claiming that
THE COURT:

9

10

You will have plenty of time to

respond about it.

11
12

Your Honor, I would respond to

MR. KELSO:

-- it's a frivolous election

THE COURT:

When I'm imposing time limits, I'm

contest.

13

14

certain you will be objecting strenuously, but there's

15

just no other way to get this case going at this point

16

as far as I can tell.

17

At any rate, the objection will be overruled

18

and we're going to deal with this by the only tool the

19

Court knows it has, so go ahead.

20

MR. KELSO:

That's all I have.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

22

Well, I believe that

was redirect and so I think you may step down.

23

THE WITNESS:

24

(End of Timothy Hurst's examination.)

Thank you.

25
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COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

3
4

I, Valerie Nunemacher, a notary public and

5

duly certified court reporter in and for the State of

6

Idaho, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:
That the foregoing proceedings was taken on

7

8

the date and at the time and place herein stated;
That the foregoing is a true and correct

9

10

transcription, to the best of my ability, of my

11

shorthand notes taken down at said time and place in the

12

above-entitled litigation;

13

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any of

14

the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have no

15

interest in the outcome of said litigation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my

16
17

hand this 5th day of December 2010.

18
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
Alene, Idaho 83816
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
D'ALENE,
ALENE, IDAHO
CITY OF COEUR D'
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Defendants.

Case No. CV-09-1001O
CV-09-10010
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
REGARDING UOCAVA

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney, and hereby submits
MatthewS.
S.
for the Court's review and consideration a portion of a paper being prepared by Matthew
Kelso in fulfillment of one requirement of his Whitworth University constitutional law class. It
addresses relevant case law on UOCAVA.
The particular relevance of this filing is with regards to the Court's comment at it could
:fmd no applicable case law, held that it held UOCAV
VA
A was meant to be applied equally to a
citizen's right to vote absentee, and that therefore this Court would not differentiate the right to
vote absentee based upon whether an election was federal, state or municipal.

DA1Ert'~ecember, 2010.

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was served by hand delivery to Defendants City and
Weathers attorney Michael Haman and Defendant Kennedy's attorneys Scott Reed and Peter
th
Erbland on e 66th
day of December, 2010.

lcLG-Starr Kelso
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UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 10
lOA
A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT
Congress extended federal voting rights to American citizens living abroad-persons
formerly citizens of a state who reside outside of the U.S.-through the passage of the
Uniformed and Overseas Absentee Voting Act in 1986 (hereafter referred to as ''the Act" or
"UOCAVA"). The Act replaced the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, which extended the
right to vote to armed service members and their families, and the Overseas Citizens Voting
Rights Act of 1975, which further extended federal voting rights to private citizens living outside
of the United States. UOCAVA mandates that states allow for a citizen formerly a resident state,
who moves outside the U.S., the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections held in the
citizen's previous state of residence. 1I Citizens protected by the Act include
(1) members of the uniformed services on active duty who, because of their membership
in the service, are absent from their place of residence, and are otherwise qualified to
vote; (2) the spouses and dependents of these uniformed services voters who are absent
with them; and (3) qualified voters who are absent from the United States, whether they

are civilians or in the uniformed servicei (emphasis added).
The Act broadly defmes "overseas voters" to include any person ''who resides outside the United
States and (but for such residence) would be qualified to vote in the last place in which the
person was domiciled before leaving the United States.,,3
States."3
Apart from the power to prevent unconstitutional discriminatory conduct, the
Constitution leaves Congress little room to interfere in the States' conduct of their elections.

1
1
2
2

Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F.Supp.2d 264 (S.D.N. Y. 2000)
UOCAVA statute

3
3

Ibid
lbid

1
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UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 10 A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Congress may regulate the times, places and manner of congressional elections and set both the
time of choosing presidential electors and the day for counting the Electoral but otherwise the
electoral process is a state matter. The Constitution specifically grants States the power to set
qualifications for voting, and the Supreme Cou..rt has long approved residency requirements:
In the U.S. District Court case Igartua De La Rosa v. United States the Court emphasized
that the Constitution does not by its terms grant citizens the right to vote, but instead leaves the
matter entirely to the States.4 The Rosa Court addressed UOCAVA, and said that the Act does
not establish the sole criteria for absentee voting, but rather grants states the ability to allow
additional classes of people to vote by absentee ballot. Furthermore, the Court said that "the Act
recognizes that states may impose additional requirements on absentee voters as long as these are
not inconsistent with federal law ... the issue of whether they are qualified voters would be one to
be determined by the states where they previously resided.,,5
resided. " 5 Rosa also differentiates between
what kinds of elections are provided for by UOCAV
VA,
A, and says that the Act "grants U.S.
Citizens living abroad the right to vote in federal elections-whether for president or other
federal offices-as though they were present in their last place of residence in the United
States ... the Act simply ensures that overseas citizens can continue voting in federal
elections ... ",,66
In the U.S. Supreme Court case Holt Civic Club v. City o/Tuscaloosa,
ofTuscaloosa, the Court said the
following:
"No decision of this Court has extended the "one man, one vote" principle to individuals
residing beyond the geographic confmes of the governmental entity concerned, be it State
4

4/gartua
/gartua De La Rosa v. United States, 824 F.Supp.607 (D. Puerto Rico 1994)
5
5
6
6

ibid
ibid

2
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UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 10
lOA
A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

UOCAVA standards and the state's residency requirements are valid legislation. The Court in
Elections emphasized the State's powers by saying, "the right to
Harper v. Virginia Board of
a/Elections
suffrage is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory and which do
not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has
imposed."ll
The Supreme Court has a long precedent of acknowledging the State's powers in
conducting and regulating State and local elections. In Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court said the
following:
"In decision after decision, this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally

protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the
jurisdiction. This "equal right to vote,"
vote, " is not absolute; the States have the power to
impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways"
12
added).12
(emphasis added).

"We have in the past noted approvingly that the States have the power to require that
voters be bona fide residents ofthe relevant political subdivision (Evans v. Cornman, 398
US.
us. 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380
US.,
us., at 91; Pope v. Williams, 193 Us.
US. 621). An appropriately defined and uniformely
applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic
conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional
scrutiny." 13
13

11
11
12
12
13
13

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.ss.
U.sS. 663 (1966)
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.s.
U.S. 330 (1972)

ibid

4
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UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 1u
IV A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNICIPAL
MUNit1PAL ELECTIONS

UOCAVA does not mandate residency restrictions for municipal elections adopted by a State be
compliant with a federal perspective. It is a State issue. UOCAVA affords citizens abroad the
right to vote in federal elections from their previous state of residence. In this case, Idaho's duly
111ate legislation for bona fide
deterrrri11ate
adopted statutes for conducting municipal elections is t..he dete!1P

residency requirements. Legal UOCAVA voters are granted to vote in federal elections from
Idaho, but they are not extended the same right in municipal elections, under UOCAV
VA.
A.

5
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(c) A period of 30 days appears to be ample to
complete whatever administrative tasks are needed to
prevent fraud and insure the purity of the ballot box. Pp.
345-349.

Page 330
405 U.S.
u.s. 330 (1972)

(d) Since there are adequate means of ascertaining
bonafide residence on an individualized basis, the State
may not conclusively presume nonresidence from failure
to satisfy the waiting period requirements of durational
residence laws. Pp. 349-354.

92 S.Ct. 995,31
995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274
Dunn
v.

(e) Tennessee has not established a sufficient
relationship between its interest in an informed electorate
and the fixed durational residence requirements. Pp.
354-360.

Blumstein
No. 70-13
United States Supreme Court

337 F.Supp. 323, affirmed.

March 21,1972
21, 1972
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Argued November 16, 1971
APPEAL FROM
DISTRICT COURT

THE

UNITED

STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Syllabus
Tennessee closes its registration books 30 days
before an election, but requires residence in the State for
one year and in the county for three months as
prerequisites for registration to vote. Appellee challenged
the constitutionality of the durational residence
requirements, and a three-judge District Court held
(92 S.Ct. 997J
997] them unconstitutional on the grounds that
tfiey impermissibly interfered with the right to vote and
created a "suspect" classification penalizing some
Tennessee residents because of recent interstate
movement. Tennessee asserts that the requirements are
needed to insure the purity of the ballot box and to have
knowledgeable voters.
Held: The durational residence requirements are
of the Fourteenth
violative of the Equal Protection Clause ofthe
.Amendment, as they are not necessary to further a
compelling state interest. Pp. 335-360.

(a) Since the requirements deny some citizens the
right to vote, "the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest." Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S.
621,627 (emphasis added). Pp. 336-337.
(b) Absent a compelling state interest, Tennessee
may not burden the right to travel by penalizing those
bonafide residents who have recently traveled from one
jurisdiction to another. Pp. 338-342.

SC 38417-2011

MARSHALL, 1.,
J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and
J., filed an opinion
WHITE, J1.,joined.
JJ.,joined. BLACKMUN, 1.,
concurring in the result, post, p. 360. BURGER, C.J.;
filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 363. POWELL and
REHNQUIST, J1.,
JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
MARSHALL, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion
ofthe
of
the Court.
Various Tennessee public officials (hereinafter
Tennessee) appeal from a decision by a three-judge
federal court holding that Tennessee's durational
residence requirements for voting violate the Equal
Protection Clause ofthe
of the United States Constitution. The
issue arises in a class action for declaratory and
injunctive relief
reliefbrought
brought by appellee James Blumstein.
Blumstein moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to
begin employment as an assistant professor of law at
Vanderbilt University in Nashville. With an eye toward
voting in the upcoming August and November elections,
he attempted to register to vote on July I, 1970.
I970. The
county registrar refused to register him, on the ground
that Tennessee law authorizes the registration of only
those persons who, at the time of the next election, will
of the State for a year and residents
have been residents ofthe
of the county for three months.
After exhausting state administrative remedies,
Blumstein brought this action challenging these residence
requirements
Page 332
on federal constitutional grounds. [I] A three-judge court,
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convened pursuant to 28
192 S.Ct. 9981 U.S.c.
U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284, concluded that
Tennessee's durational residence
Page 333

requirements were unconstitutional (I) because they
\Vith the right to vote and (2)
impermissibly interfered '\lith
because they created a "suspect" classification penalizing
some Tennessee residents because of recent interstate
movement.[2]
[2] 337 F.Supp. 323 (MD Tenn.l970).
Tenn. 1970). We
movement.
noted probable jurisdiction, 40 I U.S. 934 (1971).
(1971 ). For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the decision below.[3]
Page 334

The subject of this lawsuit is the durational
residence requirement. Appellee does not challenge
Tennessee's power to restrict the vote to bona fide
Tennessee residents. Nor has Tennessee ever disputed
that appellee was a bona fide resident of the State and
county when he attempted to register.[4]
register. [4] But Tennessee
insists that, in addition to being a resident, a would-be
voter must have been a resident for a year in the State and
tfiree months in the county. It is this additional durational
residence requirement that appellee challenges.
Durational residence laws penalize those persons
who have traveled from one place to another to establish
a new residence during the qualifYing period. Such laws
divide residents into two classes, old residents and new
residents, and discriminate against the latter to the extent
{'age
J'age 335
of totally denying them the opportunity to vote.[5] The
constitutional question presented is whether the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits
a State to discriminate in this way among its citizens.

To decide whether a law violates the Equal
Protection Clause, we look, in essence, to three things:
the character of the classification in question; the
individual interests affected by the classification; and the
governmental interests asserted in support of the
Cf Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30
classification. Cj
(1968). In considering laws challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause, this Court has evolved more than one
test, depending upon the interest affected or the
classification involved.[6] First, then, we must determine
what standard of review is appropriate. In the present
case, whether we look to the benefit withheld by the
classification (the opportunity to vote) or the basis for the
classification (recent interstate travel), we conclude that
the State must show a substantial and compelling reason
for imposing durational residence requirements.
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Page 336
A

Durational residence requirements completely bar
from voting all residents not meeting the fixed durational
standards. By denying some citizens the right to vote,
of"'
'" a fundamental political right,
such laws deprive them of
...
.. . preservative of all rights."!
rights. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964). There is no need to repeat now the
labors
III

192 S.Ct. 1000]
10001 undertaken in earlier cases to analyze this
right to vote and to explain in detail the judicial role in
reviewing state statutes that selectively distribute the
franchise. In decision after decision, this Court has made
clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other
citizens in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman,
398 U.S. 419,421-422,426(1970);
419,421-422, 426(1970); Kramer v. Union
Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-628 (1969);
Cipriano v. City of
o/Houma,
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969);
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667
Harper v. Virginia Board 0/
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,93-94
89, 93-94 (1965);
Reynolds v. Sims, supra. This "equal right to vote," Evans
v. Cornman, supra, at 426, is not absolute; the States
have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to
regulate access to the franchise in other ways. See, e.g.,
Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 91; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 144 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.), 241 (separate
opinion ofBRENNAN,
of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.),
294 (opinion of STEWART, J., concurring and
dissenting, with whom
BURGER, C.J.,
and
BLACKMUN, J.,joined). But, as a general matter,
before that right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of
the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests
served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny.
Evans v. Cornman, supra, at 422; see Bullock v.
Carter, ante, p. 134, at 143.
Page 337

Tennessee urges that this case is controlled by
Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). Drueding was a
decision upholding Maryland's durational residence
requirements. The District Court tested those
requirements by the equal protection standard applied to
ordinary state regulations: whether the exclusions are
reasonably related to a permissible state interest. 234
F.Supp. 721, 724-725 (Md.
(Md.l964).
1964). We summarily
affirmed per curiam without the benefit of argument. But
if it was not clear then, it is certainly clear now that a
more exacting test is required for any statute that
"place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right to vote."
Bullock v. Carter, supra, at 143. This development in the
law culminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District
supra. There, we canvassed in detail the reasons for stric~
review ofstatutes
of statutes distributing the franchise, 395 U.S. at
626-630, noting, inter alia, that such statutes "constitute
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the foundation of our representative society." We
.concluded
_concluded that, if a challenged statute grants the right to
vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others,
"the Court must determine whether the exclusions are
necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id.
Id. at
of Houma, supra,
627 (emphasis added); Cipriano v. City 0/
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204,
at 704; City of
o/Phoenix
205, 209 (!970).
(1970). Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections. supra, at 670. This is the test we apply here. [7]
Page 338

B

This exacting test is appropriate for another reason,
never considered in Drueding: Tennessee's durational
residence laws classifY bonafide residents on the basis of
r.:cent travel, penalizing those persons, and only those
persons, who have gone from one jurisdiction to another
during the qualifYing period. Thus, the durational
residence requirement directly impinges on the exercise
of a second fundamental personal right, the right to
travel.
"[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States
has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758
(1966).
(!966). See Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849)
( 1849)
(Taney, C.J.); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44
(1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
I 16, 126 (1958); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618,629-631,634
618,629-631, 634 (1969); Oregonv. Mitchell,
400 U.S. at 237 (separate opinion of BRENNAN,
WHITE, and MARSHALL, J1.),285-286
JJ.), 285-286 (STEWART,
J., concurring and dissenting, with whom BURGER, C.J.,
and BLACKMUN, J.,joined). And it is clear that the
freedom to travel includes the "freedom to enter and
abide in any State in the Union," id. at 285. Obviously,
durational residence laws single out the class of bonafide
state and county residents who have recently exercised
this constitutionally protected right, and penalize such
tt11Veiers directly. We considered such a durational
tt1lVelers
residence requirement in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,
where the pertinent statutes imposed a one-year waiting
period for interstate migrants as a condition to receiving
welfare benefits. Although, in Shapiro, we specifically
did not decide whether durational residence requirements
could be used to determine voting eligibility,

JUSTICE STEWART. Preceded by a long line of cases
recognizing the constitutional right to travel, and
repeatedly reaffirmed in the face of attempts to disregard
it, see Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), and
Wyman v. Lopez, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972), Shapli'o
Shap1i·o and the
compelling state interest test it articulates control this
case.
Tennessee attempts to distinguish Shapiro by urging
that "the vice of the welfare statute in Shapiro ..
. ... was its
objective to deter interstate travel." Brief for Appellants
13. In Tennessee's view, the compelling state interest test
is appropriate only where there is "some evidence to
indicate a deterrence of or infringement on the right to
travel. ... " Ibid. Thus, Tennessee seeks to avoid the clear
command of Shapiro by arguing that durational residence
requirements for voting neither seek to nor actually do
deter such travel. In essence, Tennessee argues that the
right to travel is not abridged here in any constitutionally
relevant sense.

This
fundamental
view
represents
a
misunderstanding of the law. [8] It is irrelevant whether
disenfranchisement or

(92 S.Ct. 1002( denial of welfare is the more potent
deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding
that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have
other "right to travel"
Page 340

cases in this Court always relied on the presence of actual
deterrence.[9]
deterrence. [9] In Shapiro, we explicitly stated that the
compelling state interest test would be triggered by "any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise ofthat
right [to travel] .... " Id. at 634 (emphasis added); see id.
at 638 n. 21.[10]
2 I.[ I 0] While noting the frank legislative
purpose to deter migration by the poor, and speculating
that "[a]n indigent who desires to migrate . . . will
doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk" the loss
of benefits, id. at 629, the majority found no need to
dispute the "evidence that few welfare recipients have in
fact, been deterred [from moving] by residence
requirements." Id. at 650 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see
also id. at 671-672 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, none
of the litigants had themselves been deterred. Only last
Term, it was specifically noted that, because a durational
Page 341

Page
Page339
339

residence requirement for voting

"Id.
.fd.

at 638 n. 2 I, we concluded that, since the right to
travel was a constitutionally protected right,
any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.
ld.
Id. at 634. This compelling state interest test was
also adopted in the separate concurrence of MR.
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operates to penalize those persons, and only those
persons, who have exercised their constitutional right of
interstate migration ... , [it] may withstand constitutional
scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden
imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and
substantial governmental interest.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 238 (separate
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opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.)
(emphasis added).
Of course, it is true that the two individual interest
affected
by
Tennessee's
durational
residence
requirements are affected in different ways. Travel is
permitted, but only at a price; voting is prohibited. The
right to travel is merely penalized, while the right to vote

is absolutely denied. But these differences are irrelevant
for present purposes. Shapiro implicitly realized what this
Court has made explicit elsewhere:

It has long been established that a State may not impose a
-penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by
·penalty
the Constitution. . .. "Constitutional rights would be of
little value if they could be ... indirectly denied." ...

Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540
(1965).[1 I] See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967), and cases cited therein; Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 51 I, 515 (1967). The right to travel is an
"unconditional personal right," a right whose exercise
may not be conditioned. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
at 643 (STEWART, J., concurring) (emphasis added);
Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 292 (STEWART, 1.,
J.,
concurring and dissenting,
Page 342

with whom BURGER, C.J.,
c.J., and BLACKMUN, J.,
joined). Durational residence laws impermissibly
condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing
their prohibitions on only those persons who have
recently exercised that right.[12]
right. [I 2] In the present case, such
laws force a person who wishes to travel and change
residences to choose between travel and the basic right to
vote. Cj
Cf United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-583
(1968). Absent a compelling state interest, a State may
not burden the right to travel in this way.[l3]
way.[13]

cC
In sum, durational residence laws must be measured
by a strict equal protection test
test: they are unconstitutional
unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are
"necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 634 (first
emphasis added); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U.S. at 627. Thus phrased, the constitutional question
may sound like a mathematical formula. But legal "tests"
do not have the precision of mathematical
Page 343

formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree:
that a heavy burden of justification is on the State, and
that the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its
asserted purposes.
It is not sufficient for the State to show that
durational residence requirements further a very
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substantial state interest. In pursuing that important
interest, the State cannot choose means that unnecessarily
burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity.
Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn
with "precision," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963);
(I 963); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,265
258, 265 (1967),
and must be "tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives.
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 63
631.
1. And if there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a
lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a
State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it
acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).

II
We tum, then, to the question of whether the State
has shown that durational residence requirements are
needed to further a sufficiently substantial state interest.
We emphasize again the difference between bona fide
residence requirements and durational residence
requirements.
192
(92 S.Ct. 1004) We have in the past noted approvingly
that the States have the power to require that voters be
bonafide residents of
ofthe
the relevant political subdivision.
E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. at 422; Kramer v.
Union Free School District, supra, at 625; Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. at 91; Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621
(1904).[14] An appropriately defined and uniformly
applied requirement
Page 344
of bonafide residence may be necessary to preserve the
basic conception of a political community, and therefore
could withstand close constitutional scrutiny.[l5]
scrutiny.[15] But
durational residence requirements, representing a separate
voting qualification imposed on bonafide residents, must
Cf Shapiro
be separately tested by the stringent standard. Cj
v. Thompson, supra, at 636.

It is worth noting at the outset that Congress has, in
a somewhat different context, addressed the question
whether durational residence laws further compelling
state interests. In§
In § 202 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
residence
Congress
outlawed
state
durational
requirements for presidential and vice-presidential
elections, and prohibited the States from closing
registration more than 30 days before such elections. 42
U.S.C.
1973aa-l. In doing so, it made a specific finding
U.S.c. § 1973aa-1.
that durational residence requirements and more
restrictive registration practices do "not bear a reasonable
relationship to any compelling State interest in the
conduct of presidential elections." 42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-l(a)(6). We upheld this portion of the Voting
Mitchel!, supra. In our present
Rights Act in Oregon v. Mitchell,
case, of course, we deal with congressional, state, and
local elections, in which the State's interests are arguably
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somewhat different; and, in addition, our function is not
·merely
'merely to determine whether there was a reasonable basis
for Congress' findings. However, the congressional
finding which forms the basis for the Federal Act is a
useful background for the discussion that follows.
Page 345
Tennessee tenders "two basic purposes" senred
ser;ed by
its durational residence requirements:

(I) INSURE PURITY OF BALLOT BOX ---Protection
Protection
against fraud through colonization and inability to
identifY persons offering to vote, and
(2) KNOWLEDGEABLE VOTER -Afford some surety
--Afford
that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the
community, and that, as such, he has a common interest
in all matters pertaining to its government and is,
therefore, more likely to exercise his right more
intelligently.

Brief for Appellants 15, citing 18 AmJur.,
Am.Jur.,
Elections, § 56, p. 217. We consider each in tum.
A

Preservation of the "purity of the ballot box" is a
formidable-sounding state interest. The impurities feared,
variously called "dual voting" and "colonization," all
involve voting by nonresidents, either singly or in groups.
The main concern is that nonresidents will temporarily
invade the State or county, falsely swear that they are
residents to become eligible to vote, and, by voting, allow
a candidate to win by fraud. Surely the prevention of such
fraud is a legitimate and compelling government goal.
But it is impossible to view durational residence
requirements as necessary to ach
ieve that state interest.
achieve
Preventing fraud, the asserted evil that justifies state
lawmaking, means keeping nonresidents from voting.
But, by definition, a durational residence law
(92 S.Ct. 1005( bars newly arrived residents from the
franchise along with nonresidents. The State argues that
such sweeping laws are necessary to prevent fraud
because they are needed to identifY bonafide residents.
This contention is particularly
Page 346

unconvmcmg
m light of Tennessee's total statutory
unconvIncIng In
'scheme for regulating the franchise.
·scheme
Durational residence laws may once have been
necessary to prevent a fraudulent evasion of state voter
standards, but today in Tennessee, as in most other
States,[ 16] this purpose is served by a system of voter
registration. Tenn.Code Ann. § 30 I et seq. (1955 and
Tenn.198, 122
Supp. 1970); see State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn.l98,
S.W. 465 (1909). Given this system, the record is totally
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devoid of any evidence that durational residence
requirements are, in fact, necessary to identifY bonafide
residents. The qualifications of the would-be voter in
Tennessee are determined when he registers to vote,
which he may do until 30 days before the election.
-- including
Tenn.Code Ann. § 304. His qualifications --including
bona fide residence -- are established then by oath.
Tenn.
Code Ann. § 309. There is no indication in the
Tenn.Code
record that Tennessee routinely goes behind the would-be
voter's oath to determine his qualifications. Since false
swearing is no obstacle to one intent on fraud, the
existence of burdensome voting qualifications like
durational residence requirements cannot prevent corrupt
nonresidents from fraudulently registering and voting. As
long as the State relies on the oath-swearing system to
establish
qualifications,
a durational
residence
requirement adds nothing to a simple residence
requirement in the effort to stop fraud. The nonresident
intent on committing election fraud will as quickly and
effectively swear that he has been a resident for the
requisite period of time as he would swear that he was
simply a resident. Indeed, the durational residence
requirement becomes an effective voting obstacle
Page 347

only to residents who tell the truth and have no fraudulent
purposes.
Moreover, to the extent that the State makes an
enforcement effort after the oath is sworn, it is not clear
what role the durational residence requirement could play
in protecting against fraud. The State closes the
registration books 30 days before an election to give
officials an opportunity to prepare for the election. Before
the books close, anyone may register who claims that he
will meet the durational residence requirement at the time
of the next election. Although Tennessee argues that this
3~-day period between registration and election does not
30-day
give the State enough time to verifY this claim of bona
fide residence, we do not see the relevance of that
position to this case. As long as the State permits
registration up to 30 days before an election, a lengthy
durational residence requirement does not increase the
amount of time the State has in which to carry out an
investigation into the sworn claim by the would-be voter
that he is in fact, a resident.
Even if durational residence requirements imposed,
in practice, a pre-election waiting period that gave voting
officials three months or a year in which to confirm the
bona fides of residence, Tennessee would not have
demonstrated that these waiting periods were necessary.
At the outset, the State is faced with the fact that it must
defend two separate waiting periods of different lengths.
It is impossible to see how both could be "necessary" to
fulfill the pertinent state objective. If the State itself has
determined that a three-month period is enough time in
which to confirm bona fide residence in the State and
county, obviously a one-year period cannot also be
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justified as "necessary" to achieve the same purpose.[l7]
purpose.[I7]
Page 348

Beyond
(92 S.Ct. 1006) that, the job of detecting nonresidents
192
from among persons who have registered is a relative1
relative] y
simple om:. ii hardly justifies prohibiting all newcomers
from voting for even three months. To prevent dual
voting, state voting officials simply have to cross-check
lists of new registrants with their former jurisdictions. See
Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in
Presidential Elections, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 359, 364 and n.
.34,
374 (1970); cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 637.
.34,374
Objective information tendered as relevant to the
question of bonafide residence under Tennessee law -places of dwelling, occupation, car registration, driver's
license, property owned, etc.[18]
etc.[l8] -- is easy to
double-check,
especially
in
light of modem
communications. Tennessee itself concedes that "[i]t
might we!!
well be that these purposes can be achieved under
requirements of shorter duration than that imposed by the
" Brief for Appellants 10. Fixing a
State of Tennessee .... "Brief
constitutionally acceptable period is surely a matter of
degree. It is sufficient to note here that 30 days appears to
be an ample period of time for the State to complete
whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent
fraud -- and a year, or three months, too much. This was
the judgment of Congress in the context of presidential
~lections.[l9] And, on the basis of the statutory
~iections.[19]
Page 349

scheme before us, it is almost surely the judgment of the
Tennessee lawmakers as well. As the court below
concluded, the cut-off point for registration 30 days
before an election
,r-<:flects
_n:flects the judgment of the Tennessee Legislature that
thirty days is an adequate period in which Tennessee's
election officials can effect whatever measures may be
necessary, in each particular case confronting them, to
insure purity of the ballot and prevent dual registration
and dual voting.

337 F.Supp. at 330.
It has been argued that durational residence
requirements are permissible because a person who has
satisfied the waiting period requirements is conclusively
presumed to be a bona fide resident. In other words,
durational residence requirements are justified because
they create an administratively useful conclusive
presumption that recent arrivals are not residents, and are

(92 S.Ct. 10071
1007( therefore properly
Page 350

barred from the franchise.[20] This presumption, so the
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argument runs, also prevents fraud, for few candidates
will be able to induce migration for the purpose of voting
if fraudulent voters are required to remain in the false
locale for three months or a year in order to vote on
day.[21]
election day
.(21]
In Carrington v. Rash. 380 U.S. 89, this Court
considered and rejected a similar kind of argument in
support of a similar kind of conclusive presumption.
There, the State argued that it was difficult to tell whether
persons moving to Texas while in the military service
were, in fact, bonafide residents. Thus, the State said, the
administrative convenience of avoiding difficult factual
determinations justified a blanket exclusion of all
servicemen stationed in Texas. The presumption created
'" incapable of being overcome by
there was conclusive -- "'incapable
proof of the most positive character.'"
character.''' Id at 96, citing
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312,324
312, 324 (1932). The
Page 351

Court rejected this "conclusive presumption" approach as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. While many
servicemen in Texas were not bona fide residents, and
therefore properly ineligible to vote, many servicemen
clearly were bona fide residents. Since "more precise
tests" were available "to winnow successfully from the
ranks ... those whose residence in the State is bona fide,"
conclusive presumptions were impermissible in light of
the individual interests affected. Id at 95. "States may not
casually deprive a class of individuals ofthe vote because
of some remote administrative benefit to the State." !d.
Id at
96.

Carrington sufficiently disposes of this defense of
durational residence requirements. The State's legitimate
purpose is to determine whether certain persons in the
community are bona fide residents. A durational
residence requirement creates a classification that may, in
a crude way, exclude nonresidents from that group. But it
also excludes many residents. Given the State's legitimate
purpose and the individual interests that are affected, the
classification is ali too imprecise. See supra at 343. In
general, it is not very difficult for Tennessee to determine
on an individualized basis whether one recently arrived in
the community is in fact, a resident, although of course
there will always be difficult cases. Tennessee has
defined a test for bona fide residence, and appears
prepared to apply it on an individualized basis in various
legal contexts. [22] That test
Page 352

could easily be
if it
(92 S.Ct. 1008) applied to new arrivals. Furthermore, ifit
is unlikely that would-be fraudulent voters would remain
in a false locale for the lengthy period imposed by
durational residence requirements, it is just as unlikely
that they would collect such objective indicia of bona fide
residence as a dwelling, car registration, or driver's
driver'S
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license. In spite of these things, the question of bonafide
residence is settled for new arrivals by conclusive
_presumption, not by individualized inquiry. Cf
.presumption,
Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96. Thus, it has always
been undisputed that appellee Blumstein is himself a
ofTennessee
bonafide resident of
Tennessee within the ordinary state
definition of residence. But since Tennessee's
presumption from failure to meet the durational residence
requirements is conclusive, a showing of actual bonafide
residence is irrelevant, even though such a showing
would fully serve the State's purposes embodied in the
presumption and would achieve those purposes with far
less drastic impact on constitutionally protected
interests.[23] The Equal Protection Clause places a limit
on government by classification, and that limit has been
exceeded here. Cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 636;
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. at 542-543; Carrington
v,_Rash, supra, at 95-96; Skinnerv. Oklahoma,
Oklahoma,316
v:...Rash,
316 U.S.
535 (1942).
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Our conclusion that the waiting period is not the
least restrictive means necessary for preventing fraud is
bolstered by the recognition that Tennessee has at its
disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more than
adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be
.fuared.[24] At least six separate sections of the Tennessee
Code define offenses to deal with voter fraud. For
example, Tenn.Code
Tenn. Code Ann. § 324 makes it a crime
for any person to register or to have his name registered
as a qualified voter ... when he is not entitled to be so
registered ... or to procure or induce any other person to
register or be registered ..
. . when such person is not
legally qualified to be registered as such .... [25]
In addition to the various

192 S.Ct. 10091 criminal penalties, Tennessee permits the
bona fides of a voter to be challenged on election day.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 1309 et seq. (1955 and Supp. 1970).
Where a State has available such remedial action
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to supplement its voter registration system, it can hardly
argue that broadly imposed political disabilities such as
durational residence requirements are needed to deal with
the evils of fraud. Now that the Federal Voting Rights
Act abolishes those residence requirements as a
in
presidential
and
precondition
for
voting
U.S.C. § 1973aa-l, it is
vice-presidential elections, 42 U.S.c.
.·clear
clear that the States will have to resort to other devices
available to prevent nonresidents from voting. Especially
since every State must live with this new federal statute,
it is impossible to believe that durational residence
requirements are necessary to meet the State's goal of
stopping fraud. [26]
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B

The argument that durational residence requirements
further the goal of having "knowledgeable voters"
appears to involve three separate claims. The first is that
such requirements "afford some surety that the voter has,
in fact, become a member ofthe community." But here
the State appears to confuse a bona fide residence
requirement with a durational residence requirement. As
already noted, a State does have an interest in limiting the
franchise to bona fide members of the community. But
justifY or explain the exclusion from the
this does not justif'y
franchise of persons not because their bonafide residence
is questioned, but because they are recent, rather than
long-time, residents.

The second branch of the "knowledgeable voters"
justification is that durational residence requirements
assure that the voter "has a common interest in all matters
" By this,
pertaining to [the community's] government. ... "By
presumably, the State means that it may require a period
of residence sufficiently lengthy to impress upon
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its voters the local viewpoint. This is precisely the sort of
argument this Court has repeatedly rejected. In
Carrington v. Rash, for example, the State argued that
military men newly moved into Texas might not have
local interests sufficiently in mind, and therefore could be
excluded from voting in state elections. This Court
replied:
But if they are, in fact, residents, ... they, as all other
qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity
for political representation. . .. "Fencing out" from the
franchise a sector of the population because of the way
they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.
380 U.S. at 94. See 42 U.S.C.
U.S.c. § 1973aa-l(a)(4).
Similarly, here, Tennessee's hopes for voters with a
"common interest in all matters pertaining to [the
community's] government" is impermissible.[27] To
paraphrase what we said elsewhere, "All too often, lack
of a ['['common
common interest'] might mean no more than a
different interest." Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. at 423.
"[D]ifferences of opinion" may not be the basis for
excluding any group or person from the franchise.
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U,S.
U.S. at 705-706.
[T]he fact that newly arrived [Tennesseeans] may have a
more national outlook than long-time residents, or even
may retain a viewpoint characteristic of the region from
which they have come, is a constitutionally impermissible
reason for depriving them of their chance to influence the
Page 356

electoral vote of their new home State.
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Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1969) (dissenting
opinion).[28]
Finally, the State urges that a long-time resident is
"more likely to exercise his right [to vote] more
intelligently." To the extent that this is different from the
previous argument, the State is apparently asserting an
interest in limiting the franchise to voters who are
knowiedgeabie about the issues. In this case, Tennessee
argues that people who have been in the State less than a
year and the county less than three months are likely to
be unaware of the issues involved in the congressional,
state, and local elections, and therefore can be barred
from the franchise. We note that the criterion of
"intelligent" voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of
abuse. But without deciding as a general matter the extent
..to which a State can bar less knowledgeable or intelligent
citizens from the franchise, cf Evans v. Cornman, 398
U.S. at 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. at 632; Cipriano v. City
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of Houma, 395 U.S. at 705,[29] we conclude that
durational residence requirements cannot be justified on
this basis.
In Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, we
held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited New
York State from limiting the vote in school district
elections to parents of school children and to property
owners. The State claimed that, since nonparents would
be "less informed" about school affairs than parents, id at
631, the State could properly exclude the class of
nonparents in order to limit the franchise to the more
"interested" group of residents. We rejected that position,
concluding that a "close scrutiny of [the classification]
demonstrates that [it does] not accomplish this purpose
with sufficient precision. . .. " !d
Id at 632. That scrutiny
revealed that the classification excluding nonparents from
the franchise kept many persons from voting who were

in

S.Ct. 10111 as substantially interested.
interested.as
as those
allowed to vote; given this, the classification was
insufficiently "tailored" to achieve the articulated state
goal. IbidSee
JbidSee also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at
706.

Similarly, the durational residence requirements in
this case founder because of their crudeness as a device
for
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achieving the articulated state goal of assuring the
knowledgeable exercise of the franchise. The
classifications
created
by
durational
residence
requirements obviously permit any long-time resident to
vote regardless of his knowledge of the issues -- and
obviously many long-time residents do not have any. On
the other hand, the classifications bar from the franchise
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many other, admittedly new, residents who have become
at least minimally, and often fully, informed about the
issues. Indeed, recent migrants who take the time to
register and vote shortly after moving are likely to be
those citizens, such as appellee, who make it a point to be
informed and knowledgeable about the issues. Given
modern communications, and given the clear indication
that campaign spending and voter education occur largely
during the month before an election,[30] the State cannot
seriously maintain that it is "necessary" to reside for a
year in the State and three months in the county in order
to be knowledgeable about congressional, state, or even
purely local elections. There is simply nothing in the
record to support the conclusive presumption that
residents who have lived in the State for less than a year
and their county for less than three months are
uninformed about elections. Cf Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. at 631. These durational residence requirements
crudely exclude large numbers of fully qualified people.
Especially since Tennessee creates a waiting period by
closing registration books 30 days before an election,
there can be no basis for arguing that any durational
residence requirement is also needed to assure
knowledgeability. It is pertinent to note that Tennessee
has never made an attempt to further its alleged interest in
an informed electorate in a universally applicable way.
Knowledge
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or competence has never been a criterion for participation
in Tennessee's electoral process for long-time residents.
Indeed, the State specifically provides for voting by
persons.[31]
[3 I] These provisions
various types of absentee persons.
permit many long-time residents who leave the county or
State to participate in a constituency in which they have
only the slightest political interest, and from whose
political debates they are likely to be cut off That the
State specifically permits such voting is not consistent
with its claimed compelling interest in intelligent,
informed use of the ballot. If the State seeks to assure
intelligent

(92 S.Ct. 10121 use of the ballot, it may not try to serve
(91
this interest only with respect to new arrivals. Cf Shapiro
v. Thompson, supra, at 637-638.
It may well be true that new residents as a group
know less about state and local issues than older
residents; and it is surely true that durational residence
requirements will exclude some people from voting who
are totally uninformed
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about election matters. But as devices to limit the
franchise to knowledgeable residents, the conclusive
presumptions of durational residence requirements are
much too crude. They exclude too many people who
should not, and need not, be excluded. They represent a
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requirement of knowledge unfairly imposed on only
some citizens. We are aware that classifications are
always imprecise. By requiring classifications to be
tailored to their purpose, we do not secretly require the
impossible. Here, there is simply too attenuated a
relationship between the state interest in an informed
electorate and the fixed requirement that voters must have
'been residents in the State for a year and the county for
·been
three months. Given the exacting standard of precision
we require of statutes affecting constitutional rights, we
cannot say that durational residence requirements are
necessary to further a compelling state interest.
III
lll

Concluding that Tennessee has not offered an
adequate justification for its durational residence laws,
we affirm the judgment of the court below.

Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
BLACKMUN, J., concurring
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the
result.
Professor Blumstein obviously could hardly wait to
register to vote in his new home State of Tennessee. He
._11rrived
1Irrived in Nashville on June 12, 1970. He moved into his
apartment on June 19. He presented himself to the
registrar on July 1.
I. He instituted his lawsuit on July 17.
Thus, his litigation was begun 35 days after his arrival on
Tennessee soil, and less than 30 days after he moved into
his apartment. But a primary was coming up on August 6.
Usually, such zeal to exercise
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the franchise is commendable. The professor, however,
encountered -- and, I assume, knowingly so -- the barrier
of the Tennessee durational residence requirement and,
because he did, he instituted his test suit.
I have little quarrel with much of
ofthe
the content of
ofthe
the
C-ourt's long opinion. I concur in the result, with these
few added comments, because I do not wish to be
described on a later day as having taken a position
broader than I think necessary for the disposition of this
case.
I.
1. In Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (194), Mr.
Justice Peckham, in speaking for a unanimous Court that
included the first Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
Holmes, said:

The simple matter to be herein determined is whether,
with reference to the exercise of the privilege of voting in
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Maryland, the legislature of
ofthat
that State had the legal right
to provide that a person coming into the State to reside
should make the declaration of intent a year before he
should have the right to be registered as a voter of the
State.

****
... The right of a State to legislate upon the subject of
the elective franchise as to it may seem good, subject to
the conditions already stated, being, as we believe,
unassailable, we think it plain that the statute in question
violates no right protected by the Federal Constitution.
The reasons which may have impelled the state
legislature to enact the statute in question were matters
entirely for its consideration, and this court has no
concern with them.
193 U.S. at 632,
632,633-634.
633-634. I cannot so blithely explain
Pope v. Williams away, as does the Court, ante at 337 n.
7,

(92 S.Ct. 1Ol3]
1013] by asserting that, if that
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opinion is "[cJarefully
"[c]arefully read," one sees that the case was
concerned simply with a requirement that the new arrival
declare his intention. The requirement was that he make
the declaration a year before he registered to vote; time,
as well as intent, was involved. For me, therefore, the
Court today really overrules the holding in Pope vv..
Williams, and does not restrict itself, as footnote 7 says,
to rejecting what it says are mere dicta.
2. The compelling state interest test, as applied to a
State's denial of the vote, seems to have come into full
flower with Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. 621,627 (1969). The only supporting authority cited
is in the "See" context to Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96 ((1965).
1965). But as I read Carrington, the standard
there employed was that the voting requirements be
reasonable. Indeed, in that opinion, MR. JUSTICE
STEWART observed, at 91, that the State has
"unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence
restrictions on the availability of the ballot." A like
approach was taken in McDonald v. Board of Election
Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969), where the
Court referred to the necessity of "some rational
relationship to a legitimate state end" and to a statute's
being set aside "only if based on reasons totally unrelated
to the pursuit of that goal." I mention this only to
emphasize that Kramer appears to have elevated the
standard. And this was only three years ago. Whether
Carrington and McDonald are now frowned upon, at
Cf Bullock v. Carter,
least in part, the Court does not say. Cj
ante, p. 134.
3. Clearly, for me, the State does have a profound
interest in the purity of the ballot box and in an informed
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[I] Involved here are provisions of the Tennessee
Constitution, as well as portions ofthe Tennessee Code.
Article IV,§
IV, § I, ofthe Tennessee Constitution, provides in
pertinent part:

properly prescribes otherwise, see Oregon v. Mitchell
Mitchell,,
400 U.S. 112 (1970), I see no constitutional imperative
that voting requirements be the same in each State, or
even thai
that a State's time requirement rei ate to the 30-day
measure imposed by Congress by 42 U.S.c.
U.S.C. §
1973aa-l(d) for presidential elections. I assume that the
Court, by its decision today, does not depart from either
of these propositions. I cannot be sure of
ofthis,
this, however,
for much of the opinion seems to be couched in absolute
terms.

Right to vote -- Election precincts .... -- Every person of
the age of twenty-one years, being a citizen ofthe United
States, and a resident of this State for twelve months, and
of the county wherein such person may offer to vote for
three months next preceding the day of election, shall be
entitled to vote for electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States, members of the
General Assembly and other civil officers for the county
or district in which such person resides; and there shall be
no other qualification attached to the right of suffrage.

4. The Tennessee plan, based both in statute and in
the State's constitution, is not ideal. I am content that the
one-year and three-month requirements be struck down
"for
..for want of something more closely related to the State's
interest. It is, of course, a matter of line drawing, as the
Court concedes, ante at 348. But if 30 days pas
constitutional muster, what of 35 or 45 or 75? The
resolution of these longer measures, less than those today
struck down, the Court leaves, I suspect, to the future.

The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws
requiring voters to vote in the election precincts in which
they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom of
elections and the purity ofthe ballot box.

electorate, and is entitled to take appropriate steps to
assure those ends. Except where federal intervention

BURGER, J., dissenting
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
The holding of the Court in Pope v. Williams, 193
U.S. 621 (1904), is as valid today as it was at the turn of
the century. It is no more a denial of equal protection for
a State to require newcomers to be exposed to state and
lo.cal
IQcal problems for a reasonable period such as one year
before voting, than it is to require children to wait 18
years before voting. Cj
Cf Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
( 1970). In both cases, some informed and responsible
(1970).
persons are denied the vote, while others less informed
and less responsible are permitted to vote. Some lines
must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the
"compelling state interest" standard is to condemn them
all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied
this seemingly
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insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it
demands nothing less than perfection.

192
(92 S.Ct. 10141 The existence ofa
of a constitutional "right to
travel" does not persuade me to the contrary. lIff the
imposition of a durational residency requirement for
voting abridges the right to travel, surely the imposition
of an age qualification penalizes the young for being
young, a status lI assume the Constitution also protects.

Notes:

Section 2-201, Tenn.Code
Tenn. Code Ann. (Supp. 1970) provides:
Qualifications of voters. -- Every person of the age of
twenty-one (21) years, being a citizen of the United
States and a resident ofthis
of this state for twelve (12) months,
and of the county wherein he may offer his vote for three
(3) months next preceding the day of election, shall be
of the general assembly and
entitled to vote for members ofthe
other civil officers for the county or district in which he
may reside.

Section 2-304, Tenn.Code Ann. (Supp. 1970) provides:
Persons entitled to permanently register -- Required time
for registration to be in effect prior to election. -- All
persons qualified to vote under existing laws at the date
of application for registration, including those who will
arrive at the legal voting age by the date of the next
succeeding primary or general election established by
statute following the date oftheir application to register
of! ega! voting age before the date of
(those who become oflegal
a general election shall be entitled to register and vote in
a legal primary election selecting nominees for such
general election), who will have lived in the state for
twelve(l2) months and in the county for which they
applied for registration for three (3) months by the date of
the next succeeding election shall be entitled to
permanently register as voters under the provisions of this
chapter provided, however, that registration or
re-registration shall not be permitted within thirty (30)
days of any primary or general election provided for by
statute. If a registered voter in any county shall have
changed his residence to another county, or to another
ward, precinct, or district within the same county, or
changed his name by marriage or otherwise, within
ninety (90) days prior to the date of an election, he shall
be entitled to vote in his former ward, precinct or district
of registration.
[2] On July 30, the District Court refused to grant a
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preliminary injunction permlttmg
perm1ttmg Blumstein and
members of the class he represented to vote in the August
6 election; the court noted that to do so would be "so
obviously disruptive as to constitute an example of
judicial improvidence." The District Court also denied a
motion that Blumstein be allowed to cast a sealed
j)rovisional
jJrovisional ballot for the election.
Ai the time the opinion beiow
below was filed,
flied, the next election
was to be held in November, 1970, at which time
Blumstein would have met the three-month part of
Tennessee's durational residency requirements. The
District Court properly rejected the State's position that
the alleged invalidity of the three-month requirement had
been rendered moot, and the State does not pursue any
mootness argument here. Although appellee now can
vote, the problem to voters posed by the Tennessee
,. capable of repetition, yet
residence requirements is ".
review."' Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816
evading review.'"
( 1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
(1969);
498, 515 (1911
498,515
(1911).). In this case, unlike Hall v. Beals, 396
U.S. 45 (1969), the laws in question remain on the books,
a:nd Blumstein has standing to challenge them as a
member ofthe class of people affected by the presently
written statute.

[3] The important question in this case has divided the
lower courts. Durational residence requirements ranging
from three months to one year have been struck down in
Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F.Supp. 380 (Mass.l970);
(Mass. 1970); Affeldt v.
Whitcomb, 319 F.Supp. 69 (NO lnd.l970);
Ind.1970); Lester v.
8oard 0/
of Elections/or
Elections for District of
Columbia, 319 F.Supp.
80ard
o/Columbia,
505 (DC 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F.Supp. 843 (ED
Va.1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F.Supp. 107
I 07 (MD
Ala.l970);
Ala.1970); Kohn
Kahn v. Davis, 320 F.Supp. 246 (Vt. 1070);
I 070);
Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F.Supp. 15 (Minn.
(Minn.1970);
1970);
Andrews v. Cody, 327 F.Supp. 793 (MDNC 1971), as
well as this case. Other district courts have upheld
durational
dura
tiona! residence requirements of a similar variety.
Howe v. Brown, 319 F.Supp. 862 (NO Ohio 1970);
Ferguson v. Williams. 330 F.Supp. 1012 (NO
Miss.l971
Miss.1971);
); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F.Supp. 402
(Ariz.l970);
(Ariz.
1970); Fitzpatrick v. Board 0/
of Election
Commissioners (NO 111.1970);
lll.l970); Piliavin v. Hoel,
Hoe/, 320
F.Supp. 66 (WD Wis.
Wis.l970);
1970); Epps v. Loan (No. 9137,
Wash.l970); Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F.Supp.
WD Wash.1970);
153 (ED La.1971). In Sirak v. Brown (Civ. No. 70-164,
SO Ohio 1970), the District Judge refused to convene a
three-judge court and summarily dismissed the
complaint.
[4] Noting the lack of dispute on this point, the court
below specifically found that Blumstein had no intention
of leaving Nashville, and was a bona fide resident of
Tennessee. 337 F.Supp. 323,324.
]:5]
j:5] While it would be difficult to determine precisely how
many would-be voters throughout the country cannot
vote because of durational residence requirements, but
see Cocanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for
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Voting, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. 477, 478 and n. 8 (1970), it is
worth noting that, during the period 1947-1970 an
average ofapproximately
of approximately 3.3% of the total national
population moved interstate each year. (An additional
3.2% of the population moved from one county to
another intrastate each year.) U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Population Characteristic, Series P-20, No. 210, Jan. 15,
1971, Table 1,
I, pp. 7-8.
[6] Compare Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. 621 (1969), andSkinnerv. Oklahoma,316
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), with Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
of Elections, 383 U.S.
(1964), Harper v. Virginia Board 0/
663 (1966), and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971 ), with Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), and
(1971),
Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
( 1959).
Allied Stores of
a/Ohio
[7] Appellants also rely on Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S.
621 (1904). Carefully read, that case simply holds that
federal constitutional rights are not violated by a state
provision requiring a person who enters the State to make
a "declaration of
ofhis
his intention to become a citizen before
he can have the right to be registered as a voter and to
vote in the State." ld. at 634. In other words, the case
simply stands for the proposition that a State may require
voters to be bonafide residents. See infra at 343-344. To
the extent that dicta in that opinion are inconsistent with
the test we apply or the result we reach today, those dicta
are rej
ected.
rejected.
[8] We note that, in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended, Congress specifically found that a durational
residence requirement "denies or abridges the inherent
constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free
42 U.S.c.
U.S.C.
316,42
movement across State lines .... " 84 Stat. 316,
§ 1973aa-l(a)(2).
[9] For example, m Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35
(1868), the tax imposed on persons leaving the State by
commercial carrier was only $1, certainly a minimal
deterrent to travel. But in declaring the tax
unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that "if the State can
tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him one
thousand dollars," id. at 46. In Ward v. Maryland, 12
Wall. 418 (1871), the tax on nonresident traders was
more substantial, but the Court focused on its
discriminatory aspects, without anywhere considering the
law's effect, if any, on trade or tradesmen's choice of
residence. Cj
Cf Chalker v. Birmingham N. W. R. Co.,
Co. , 249
U.S. 522,527
522, 527 (1919); but see Williamsv. Fears, 179 U.S.
270 (1900). In Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
M/g. Co., 252
U.S. 60, 79-80 (1920), the Court held that New York
could not deny nonresidents certain small personal
exemptions from the state income tax allowed residents.
The amounts were certainly insufficient to influence any
employee's choice of residence. Compare Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), with Mullaney v. Anderson,

Page 2613 of 2676

342 U.S. 415 (1952).
STEW ART
[10] Separately concurring, MR. JUSTICE STEWART
concluded that, quite apart from any purpose to deter,
a law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional
right of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a
compelling governmental interest.
!d.
Id. at 643-644 (first emphasis added). See also Graham v.
R~chardson, 403 U.S. at 375.

[II] In Harman, the Court held that a Virginia law which
allowed federal voters to quality either by paying a poll
tax or by filing a certificate of residence six months
before the election "handicap[ped] exercise" of the right
to participate in federal elections free of poll taxes,
guaranteed by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. !d.
Id. at 541.
[ 12] Where, for example, an interstate migrant loses his
[12]
"driver's license because the new State has a higher age
requirement, a different constitutional question is
presented. For, in such a case, the new State's age
requirement is not a penalty imposed solely because the
newcomer is a new resident; instead, all residents, old
and new, must be of a prescribed age to drive. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638 n. 21 (1969).
[13] As noted infra at343-344, States may show an
overriding interest in imposing an appropriate bona fide
residence requirement on would-be voters. One who
travels out of a State may no longer be a bona fide
resident, and may not be allowed to vote in the old State.
Similarly, one who travels to a new State may, in some
cases, not establish bona fide residence, and may be
ineligible to vote in the new State. Nothing said today is
meant to cast doubt on the validity of appropriately
defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence
requirements.
See n. 7, supra.
[14] Seen.

I67-168
[15] See Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F.Supp. at 167-168
(Wisdom, 1.,
J., dissenting); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621
(1904); and n. 7, supra.
[16] See, e.g., Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. at 499;
MacLeod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency
Requirements and Civil Rights, 38 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 93,
113 (1969).
[ 17] Obviously, it could not be argued that the
[17]
three-month waiting period is necessary to confirm
residence in the county, and the one-year period
necessary to confirm residence in the State. Quite apart
from the total implausibility of any suggestion that one
task should take four times as long as the other, it is
sufficient to note that, if a person is found to be a bona
fide resident of a county within the State, he is, by
definition, a bonafide resident of the State as well.
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[18] See, e.g., Brown v. Haws,
Hows, 163 Tenn. 178,42 S.W.2d
210 (1930); Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666, 88 S.W.
173 (1905). See generally Tennessee Law Revision
Commission, Title 2 -- Election Laws, Tentative Draft of
October 1971, § 222 and Comment. Seen.
See n. 22, infra.
[19]
[ 19] In the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
Congress abolished durational residence requirements as
a precondition to voting in presidential and
vice-presidential elections, and prohibited the States from
cutting off registration more than 30 days prior to those
elections. These limits on the waiting period a State may
impose prior to an election were made "with full
ofthe
cognizance of
the possibility offraud and administrative
difficulty." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238
(separate opmlon
opm1on of BRENNAN, WHITE, and
JJ.). With that awareness, Congress
MARSHALL, J1.).
concluded that a waiting period requirement beyond 30
days "does not bear a reasonable relationship to any
compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential
elections." 42 U.S.c.
U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a)(6). And, in sustaining
§ 202 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we found
no explanation why the 30-day period between the
closing of new registrations and the date of election
would not provide, in light of modem
modern communications,
adequate time to insure against ... frauds.
Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 239 (separate opinion of
BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, J1.).
JJ.). There is no
reason to think that what Congress thought was
unnecessary to prevent fraud in presidential elections
should not also be unnecessary in the context of other
elections. See infra at 354.
[20] As a technical matter, it makes no sense to say that
one who has been a resident for a fixed duration is
presumed to be a resident. In order to meet the durational
residence requirement, one must, by definition, first
establish that he is a resident. A durational residence
requirement is not simply a waiting period after arrival in
the State; it is a waiting period after residence is
established. Thus, it is conceptually impossible to say
that a durational residence requirement is an
administratively useful device to determine residence.
The State's argument must be that residence would be
presumed from simple presence in the State or county for
the fixed waiting period.
[21] It should e clear that this argument assumes that the
State will reliably determine whether the sworn claims of
duration in the jurisdiction are themselves accurate. We
have already noted that this is unlikely. See supra at 346.
Another recurrent problem for the State's position is the
existence
of
differential
durational
residence
requirements. If the State presumes residence in the
county after three months in the county, there is no
rational explanation for requiring a full 12 months'
presence in the State to presume residence in the State.
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[22] Tennessee's basic test for bona fide residence is (I)
an intention to stay indefinitely in a place (in other words,
"without a present intention of removing therefrom,"
Brown v. HolVs,
Haws, 163 Tenn. at 182, 42 S.W.2d at 211),
211 ),
joined with (2) some objective indication consistent with
that intent, see n. 18, supra. This basic test has been
applied in divorce cases, see, e.g., Sturdavant v.
Sturdavant, 28 Tenn.App. 273, 189 S.W.2d 410 (1944);
Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959 (1924);
Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666,88 S.W. 173 (1905); in
tax cases, see, e.g., Denny v. Sumner County, 134 Tenn.
468, 184 S.W. 14 (1916); in estate cases, see, e.g.,
Caldwell v. Shelton, 32 Tenn.App. 45,221 S.W.2d 815
(1948); Hascallv. Hafford, 107 Tenn. 355, 65 S.W. 423
(1901); and in voting cases, see, e.g., Brown v. Haws,
supra; Tennessee Law Revision Commission, Title 2 -Election Laws, supra, n. 18.
[23] Indeed, in Blumstein's case, the County Election
Commission explicitly rejected his offer to treat the
waiting period requirement as
a waivable guide to commission action, but rebuttable
upon a proper showing of competence to vote
intelligently in the primary and general election.

Complaint at App. 8. Cf Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
at 544-545 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
[24] See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. at 543 (1965)
(filing of residence certificate six months before election
in lieu of poll tax unnecessary to insure that the election
js limited to bona fide residents in light of
of"numerous
"numerous
devices to enforce valid residence requirements"); cf
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (fear of
fraudulent solicitations cannot justifY permit requests
since "[ f]rauds may be denounced as offenses and
punished by law").
[25] Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-1614 (Supp. 1970) makes it a
felony for any person who "is not legally entitled to vote
at the time and place where he votes or attempts to vote.
vote .
to vote or offer to do so," or to aid and abet such
illegality. Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-2207 (1955) makes it a
misdemeanor
for any person knowingly to vote in any political
convention or any election held under the Constitution or
laws of this state, not being legally qualified to vote ... ,

and Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-2208 (1955) makes it a
misdemeanor to aid in such an offense. Tenn.
Tenn.Code
Code Ann.
§ 2-202 (Supp. 1970) makes it an offense to vote outside
the ward or precinct where one resides and is registered.
Finally, Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-2209 (1955) makes it
unlawful to
bring or aid in bringing any fraudulent voters into this
';tate for the purpose of practising a fraud upon or in any
·;tate
primary or final election ....
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See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn.
Tenn.l98,
198, 112 S.W. 465
(1909).
[26] We note that in the period since the decision below,
several elections have been held in Tennessee. We have
been presented with no specific evidence of increased
colonization or other fraud.
[27] ii has been noted elsewhere,
reference to Tennessee law, that

and with specific

[t]he historical purpose of [durational] residency
requirements seems to have been to deny the vote to
undesirables, immigrants and outsiders with different
ideas.

Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. at 484 and nn. 44,45,
44, 45,
and 46. We do not rely on this alleged original purpose of
durational residence requirements in striking them down
today.
[28] Tennessee may be revealing this impermissible
purpose when it observes:
The fact that the voting privilege has been extended to
18-year-old persons ... increases, rather than diminishes,
the need for durational residency requirements .... It is
so generally known, as to be judicially accepted that there
are many political subdivisions in this state, and other
states, wherein there are colleges universities and military
installations with sufficient student body or military
personnel over eighteen years of age as would completely
dominate elections in the district, county or municipality
so located. This would offer the maximum of opportunity
for fraud through colonization, and permit domination by
those not knowledgeable or having a common interest in
matters of goverrunent, as opposed to the interest and the
knowledge of permanent members of the community.
Upon completion of their schooling or service tour, they
move on, leaving the community bound to a course of
political expediency not of its choice, and, in fact, one
over which its more permanent citizens, who will
continue to be affected, had no control.
Brieffor
Brief for Appellants 116.

[29]ln
[29] In the 1970 Voting Rights Act, which added § 201,
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa, Congress provided that "no citizen
shall be denied, because of his failure to comply with any
test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, or
local election .... " The term "test or device" was defined
to include, in part,
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting
or registration for voting (I) demonstrate the ability to
read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2)
demonstrate any educational achievement or his
knowledge of any particular subject. ...
By prohibiting various "test[s]" and "device[s]" that
would clearly assure knowledgeability on the part of
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voters in local elections, Congress declared federal policy
ifthey
they were
that people should be allowed to vote even if
not well informed about the issues. We upheld § 201 in
Oregon v. Mitchell, supra.
[30] H. Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election 106-113
(1971); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F.Supp. at 77;
Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. at 498.
[31] The general provisions for absentee voting apply in
part to
[a]ny registered voter otherwise qualified to vote in any
election to be held in this state or any county,
municipality, or other political subdivision thereof, who
by reason of business, occupation, health, education, or
travel, is required to be absent from the county of his
fixed residence on the day of the election ....
Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-1602 (Supp. 1970). See generally
Tenn.Code
_Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-1601 et seq. (Supp. 1970). An
alternative method of absentee voting for armed forces
Tenn. Code
members and federal personnel is detailed in Tenn.Code
Ann. § 2-1701 et seq. (Supp. 1970). Both those
provisions allow persons who are still technically
"residents" of the State or county to vote even though
they are not physically present, and even though they are
likely to be uninformed about the issues. In addition,
Tennessee has an unusual provision that permits persons
to vote in their prior residence for a period after residence
has been changed. This section provides, in pertinent
part:
If
If a registered voter in any county shall have changed his
residence to another county ... within ninety (90) days
prior to the date of an election, he shall be entitled to vote
itT
iiT his former ward, precinct or district of registration.
Tenn.Code Ann.§
Ann. § 204 (Supp. 1970). See also Tenn.Code
( 1955).
Ann. § 2-204 (1955).
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DOUGLAS, J., lead opinion
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MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of
the Court.

ll.S. 663 (1966)
( 1966)
383 U.S.
86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169

These are suits by Virginia residents to have
I] The
declared unconstitutional Virginia's poll tax.[
tax.[l]
three-judge

Harper
v.

Page 665
Virginia Board of Elections

District Court, feeling bound by our decision in
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, dismissed the
complaint. See 240 F.Supp. 270. The cases came here on
appeal and we noted probable jurisdiction. 380 U.S. 930,
382 U.S. 806.

No. 48
United States Supreme Court
March 24,1966
24, 1966

Argued January 25-26, 1966

APPEAL FROM
DISTRICT COURT

THE

UNITED

STATES

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Syllabus
Appellants, Virginia residents, brought this action to
have Virginia's poll tax declared unconstitutional. The
three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint on the
basis of Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277.
Held: A State's conditioning of the right to vote on
the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Breedlove v.
·suttle, supra. pro tanto overruled. Pp. 665-670.
·Suttle.

(a) Once the franchise is granted to the electorate,
lines which determine who may vote may not be drawn
so as to cause invidious discrimination. Pp. 665-667.
(b) Fee payments or wealth, like race, creed, or
color, are unrelated to the citizen's ability to participate
color.
intelligently in the electoral process. Pp. 666-668.

(c) The interest ofthe State, when it comes to voting
registration, is limited to the fixing of standards related to
the applicant's qualifications as a voter. P. 668.
(d) Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property,
like those ofrace, are traditionally disfavored. P. 668.
(e) Classifications which might impinge on
fundamental rights and liberties -- such as the franchise -must be closely scrutinized. P. 670.

240 F.Supp. 270, reversed.
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While the right to vote in federal elections is
conferred by Art. I,§
I, § 2, of the Constitution (United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-315), the right to vote in
state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned. It is
argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit,
particularly by reason of the First Amendment, and that it
may not constitutionally be conditioned upon the
payment of a tax or fee. Cf Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 113.[2] We do not stop to canvass the
relation
[86 S.Ct. 1081[
t08t[ between voting and political expression.
For it is enough to say that, once the franchise is granted
to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That is to say, the right of
suffrage

is subject to the imposition of state standards which are
not discriminatory and which do not contravene any
restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its
constitutional powers, has imposed.

Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S.
45, 51. We were speaking there of a state literacy test
which we sustained, warning that the result would be
different if a literacy test, fair on its face, were used to
discriminate
Page 666

against a class.[3]/d.
class.[3]1d. at 53. But the Lassiter case does not
govern the result here, because, unlike a poll tax, the
"ability to read and write
write.. . has some relation to
standards designed to promote intelligent use of the
/d. at 51.
ballot." ld.

We conclude that a State violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment
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of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have
·no
'no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or
any other tax.[4] Our cases demonstrate that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains
the States from fixing voter qualifications which
invidiously discriminate. Thus, without questioning the
power of a State to impose reasonable residence
restrictions on the availability of the ballot (see Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621), we

Page 667
held in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, that a State may
not deny the opportunity to vote to a bona fide resident
merely because he is a member of the armed services.
By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the
presumption of non-residence, the Texas Constitution
imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Jd. at 96. And see Louisiana v. United States, 380
!d.
U.S. 145. Previously we had said that neither homesite
nor occupation "affords a permissible basis for
distinguishing between qualified voters within the State."
3 72 U.S. 368, 380. We think the same
Gray v. Sanders, 372
.must be true of requirements of wealth or affluence or
payment of a fee.

Long ago, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
356,370,
370,
the Court referred to "the political franchise of
(86 S.Ct. 1082( voting" as a "fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights." Recently, in Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562, we said,

Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental
Especially since
matter in a free and democratic society. EspeciaIly
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
s·crutinized.
s'crutinized.

There we were considering charges that voters in
one part of the State had greater representation per person
in the State Legislature than voters in another part of the
State. We concluded:
A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so
because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the
,Slear
_Slear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause. This is an essential part of the concept
of a goverrunent oflaws, and not men. This is at the heart
of Lincoln's vision of
"government ofthe
of"govemment
of the people, by the
people, [and] for the people." The Equal Protection
Clause
Page 668
demands no less than substantially equal state legislative
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representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of
all races.
Id. at 568.
!d.

We say the same whether the citizen, otherwise
qualified to vote, has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all,
pays the fee or fails to pay it. The principle that denies
the State the right to dilute a citizen's vote on account of
his economic status or other such factors, by analogy,
bars a system which excludes those unable to pay a fee to
vote or who fail to pay.
It is argued that a State may exact fees from citizens
for many different kinds of licenses; that, if it can
license,[S] it
demand from all an equal fee for a driver's license,[5]
can demand from all an equal poIl
poll tax for voting. But we
must remember that the interest of the State, when it
comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix
qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
inteIligently in the
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently
electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property, like those of race (Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216), are traditionally disfavored. See
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-185 (Jackson,
v. IllinOiS, 351 U.S. 12; Douglas v.
J., concurring); Griffin v.lllinois,
California, 372 U.S. 353. To introduce wealth or
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The
degree of the discrimination is irrelevant. In this context
-- that is, as a condition of obtaining a ballot -- the
requirement of fee paying causes an "invidious"
discrimination (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541)
that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Levy "by
the poll," as stated in
Page 669
Breedlove v. Suttles. supra, at 281, is an old familiar form
of taxation, and we say nothing to impair its validity so
long as it is not made a condition to the exercise of the
franchise. Breedlove v. Suttles sanctioned its use as "a
Id. at 283. To that extent the
prerequisite of voting." !d.
Breedlove case is overruled.
We agree, of course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"
(Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
75). Likewise, the
45,75).
Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are
unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been
confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we
have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I,
5-6. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of
ofthe
the Equal Protection Clause do change. This
Court, in 1896, held that laws providing for separate
public facilities for white and Negro citizens did not
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deprive the latter of the equal protection and treatment
that the Fourteenth Amendment commands. Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163
I63 U.S. 537. Seven ofthe eight Justices then
sitting subscribed to the Court's opinion, thus joining in
expressions of what constituted unequal and
discriminatory treatment that sound strange to a
I954 -- more than a
contemporary ear.[6]
ear. [6] When, in 1954
half-century
later
we
repudiated
the
"separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy
Page 670
education[7] we stated:
as respects public education[?]
..tn
Jn approaching this problem, we cannot tum the clock
back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even
to 1896,
I 896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
483, 492.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,492.
In a recent searching reexamination of the Equal
Protection Clause, we held, as already noted, that "the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the
election of state legislators" is required.[8]
required.[&] Reynolds v.
Sims, supra.
Sims.
supra, at 566. We decline to qualifY that principle
by sustaining this poll tax. Our conclusion, like that, in
Reynolds v. Sims. is founded not on what we think
governmental policy should be, but on what the Equal
Protection Clause requires.
We have long been mindful that, where fundamental
rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or
must be closely scrutinized and carefully
restrain them mllst
e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
confined. See. e.g..
541; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562;
Carrington v. Rash supra; Baxstrom v. Herold.
Herold, ante p.
107;
I07; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 580-581 (BLACK,
JJ.,., concurring).

Those principles apply here. For, to repeat, wealth or
fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting
qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.
Reversed
BLACK, J., dissenting
MR JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, decided
December 6, 1937,
193 7, a few weeks after I took my seat as a
member

P_age 671
of this Court, we unanimously upheld the right of the
State of Georgia
(86 S.Ct. 1084(
10841 to make payment of its state poll tax a
prerequisite to voting in state elections. We rejected at
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that time contentions that the state law violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it put an unequal burden on different groups of people
according to their age, sex, and ability to pay. In rejecting
the contention that the law violated the Equal Protection
Clause the Court noted at p. 281:
28 I:
While possible by statutory declaration to levy a poll
upon every inhabitant of whatsoever sex, age
condition, collection from all would be impossible,
always there are many too poor to pay.

tax
or
for

Believing at that time that the Court had properly
respected the limitation of its power under the Equal
Protection Clause and was right in rejecting the equal
protection argument, I joined the Court's judgment and
opinion. Later, May 28, 1951,
I95I, I joined the Court's
judgment in Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937,
upholding, over the dissent of MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, the Virginia state poll tax law challenged
here against the same equal protection challenges. Since
the Breedlove and Butler cases were decided, the Federal
Constitution has not been amended in the only way it
could constitutionally have been, that is, as provided in
Article V[l] of the
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Constitution. I would adhere to the holding of those
cases. The Court, however, overrules Breedlove in part,
but its opinion reveals that it does so not by using its
limited power to interpret the original meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause, but by giving that clause a new
meaning which it believes represents a better
governmental policy. From this action, I dissent.
It should be pointed out at once that the Court's
decision is to no extent based on a finding that the
Virginia law as written or as applied is being used as a
device or mechanism to deny Negro citizens of Virginia
the right to vote on account of their color. Apparently the
Court agrees with the District Court below and with my
Brothers HARLAN and STEWART that this record
would not support any finding that the Virginia poll tax
law the Court invalidates has any such effect. If the
record could support a finding that the law as written or
applied has such an effect, the law would, of course, be
unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments and also 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a).
l97l(a).
Davis, 336
This follows from our holding in Schnell v. Davis.
U.S. 933, affirming 81 F.Supp. 872 (D.C.S.D.Ala.);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339; United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128; Louisiana v. United States,
MiSSiSSippi,
380 U.S. 145. What the Court does hold is that the Equal
Protection Clause necessarily bars all States from making
payment of a state tax, any tax, a prerequisite to voting.

(I)
(1) I think the interpretation that this Court gave the
Equal Protection Clause in Breedlove was correct. The
mere fact that a law results in treating some groups
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differently from others does not, of course, automatically
amount to
"186
1085/ a violation of the Equal Protection
l86 S.Ct. 1085)
Clause.
Page 673

To bar a State from drawing any distinctions in.
in_ the
application of its laws would practically paralyze the
regulatory power oflegislative bodies. Consequently,
The constitutional command for a state to afford "equal
protection of the laws" sets a goal not attainable by the
invention and application of a precise formula.

Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552,
556. Voting laws are no exception to this principle. All
voting laws treat some persons differently from others in
s.ome respects. Some bar a person from voting who is
s'ome
under 21 years of age; others bar those under 18. Some
bar convicted felons or the insane, and some have
attached a freehold or other property qualification for
voting. The Breedlove case upheld a poll tax which was
imposed on men but was not equally imposed on women
and minors, and the Court today does not overrule that
part of Breedlove which approved those discriminatory
provisions. And in Lassiter v. Northampton Election
Board, 360 U.S. 45, this Court held that state laws which
disqualified the illiterate from voting did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. From these cases and all the
others decided by this Court interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause, it is clear that some discriminatory
voting qualifications can be imposed without violating
the Equal Protection Clause.
A study of our cases shows that this Court has
refused to use the general language of the Equal
Protection Clause as though it provided a handy
instrument to strike down state laws which the Court
feels are based on bad governmental policy. The equal
protection cases carefully analyzed boil down to the
principle that distinctions drawn and even discriminations
imposed by state laws do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause so long as these distinctions and discriminations
are not "irrational," "irrelevant," "unreasonable,"
"arbitrary," or "invidious. "[2]
Page674
Page 674
These vague and indefinite terms do not, of course,
provide a precise formula or an automatic mechanism for
deciding cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause.
The restrictive connotations of these terms, however
(which in other contexts have been used to expand the
Court's power inordinately, see, e.g., cases cited at pp.
728-732 in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726), are a
plain recognition of the fact that, under a proper
the Equal Protection Clause, States are
interpretation of
ofthe
to have the broadest kind ofleeway in areas where they
have a general constitutional competence to act.[3] In
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view of the purpose of the terms to restrain the courts
from a wholesale invalidation of state laws under the
Equal Protection Clause, it would be difficult to say that
the poll tax requirement is "irrational," or "arbitrary," or
works "invidious discriminations." State poll tax
legislation can "reasonably," "rationally" and without an
"invidious" or evil purpose to injure anyone be found to
rest on a number of state policies. including (I) the State's
desire to collect its revenue, and (2) its belief that voters
who pay a poll tax will be interested in furthering the
State's welfare when they vote. Certainly it is rational to
believe that people may be more likely to pay taxes if
payment is a prerequisite
(86 S.Ct. 1086)
ifhistory
[86
1086/ to voting. And if
history can be a factor
in determining the "rationality" of discrimination in a
state law (which we held it could in Kotch v. River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, supra), then whatever may be our
personal opinion, history is
Page 675

on the side of
"rationality" of
ofthe
the State's poll tax policy.
of"rationality"
Property qualifications existed in the Colonies and were
continued by many States after the Constitution was
adopted. Although I join the Court in disliking the policy
ofthe
of the poll tax, this is not, in my judgment, a justifiable
reason for holding this poll tax law unconstitutional. Such
a holding on my part WOUld,
would, in my judgment, be an
exercise of power which the Constitution does not confer
upon me.
[4]
me.[4]
(2) Another reason for my dissent from the Court's
judgment and opinion is that it seems to be using the old
"natural law due process formula"[5] to justifY striking
down state laws as violations of the Equal Protection
Clause. I have heretofore had many occasions to express
my strong belief that there is no constitutional support
whatever for this Court to use the Due Process Clause as
though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of
the Constitution as written, so as to add to it substantive
constitutional changes which a majority of
Page 676
Page676
the Court at any given time believes are needed to meet
present-day problems.[6] Nor is there, in my opinion, any
more constitutional support for this Court to use the
Equal Protection Clause, as it has today, to write into the
Constitution its notions of what it thinks is good
basic changes as to the respective
governmental policy. If
Ifbasic
powers of the state and national governments are needed,
I prefer to let those changes be made by amendment a
Article V of the Constitution provides. For a majority of
this Court to undertake that task, whether purporting to
do so under the Due Process or the Equal Protection
Clause amounts, in my judgment, to an exercise of power
the Constitution makers with foresight and wisdom
refused to give the Judicial Branch of the Government. I
have in no way departed from the view I expressed in
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Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90, decided June 23,
194
1947,
7, that the "natural law due process formula" under
which courts make the Constitution mean what they think
it should at a given time
has been used in the past, and can be used in the future, to
license this Court, in considering regulatory legislation,
to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and
morals and to trespass all too freely on the legislative
domain of the States, as well as the Federal Government.
The Court denies that it is using the "natural law due
process formula." It says that its invalidation of the
10871 Virginia law "is founded not on what we
[86 S.Ct. 1087[
think governmental policy should be, but on what the
·Equal Protection Clause requires." I find no statement in
the Court's opinion, however, which advances even a
plausible argument as to why the alleged discriminations
which might possibly be effected by Virginia's poll tax
law are "irrational," "unreasonable," "arbitrary," or
"invidious,"
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or have no relevance to a legitimate policy which the
State wishes to adopt. The Court gives no reason at all to
discredit the longstanding beliefs that asking the payment
of a tax a prerequisite to voting is an effective way of
collecting revenue, and that people who pay their taxes
are likely to have a far greater interest in their
g9vernment. The Court's failure to give any reasons to
show that these purposes ofthe
of the poll tax are "irrational,"
"unreasonable," "arbitrary," or "invidious" is a pretty
clear indication to me that none exist. I can only conclude
that the primary, controlling, predominant, if not the
exclusive, reason for declaring the Virginia law
unconstitutional is the Court's deep-seated hostility and
antagonism, which I share, to making payment of a tax a
prerequisite to voting.
The Court's justification for consulting its own
notions, rather than following the original meaning of the
Constitution, as I would, apparently is based on the belief
of the majority of the Court that for this Court to be
bound by the original meaning of the Constitution is an
intolerable and debilitating evil; that our Constitution
should not be "shackled to the political theory of a
particular era," and that, to save the country from the
original Constitution, the Court must have constant power
to renew it and keep it abreast of this Court's more
enlightened theories of what is best for our society.
society.[7]
[7]
Page 678
IItt seems to me that this is an attack not only on the great
value of our Constitution itself, but also on the concept of
~-written constitution which is to survive through the
years as originally written unless changed through the
amendment process which the Framers
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[86 S.Ct. 1088[
10881 wisely provided. Moreover, when a
"political theory" embodied in our Constitution becomes
outdated, it seems to me that a majority of the nine
members of this Court are not only without constitutional
power, but are far less qualified, to choose a new
constitutional political theory than the people of this
country proceeding in the manner provided by Article V.
The people have not found it impossible to amend
their. Constitution to meet new conditions. The Equal
Protection Clause itself is the product of the people's
desire to use their constitutional power to amend the
Constitution to meet new problems. Moreover, the
ofthe
people, in § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, designated
the
Page 679
governmental tribunal they wanted to provide additional
rules to enforce the guarantees of that Amendment. The
branch of Government they chose was not the Judicial
Branch, but the Legislative. I have no doubt at all that
Congress has the power under § 5 to pass legislation to
abolish the poll tax in order to protect the citizens of this
country if it believes that the poll tax is being used as a
device to deny voters equal protection of the laws. See
my concurring and dissenting opinion in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach
Katzenbach, ante, p. 355. But this legislative power
which was granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is limited to Congress.[8]
Congress.[&] This Court had
occasion to discuss this very subject in Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 345-346. There, this Court said, referring
to the fifth section of the Amendment:
All of
ofthe
the amendments derive much of
oftheir
their force from
this latter provision. It is not said the judicial power of
the general government shall extend to enforcing the
prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities
guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government
shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State in
violation of
ofthe
Congress
the prohibitions. It is the power of
o/Congress
which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to
enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some
legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully
effective. Whatever legislation is appropriate,
Page 680
that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the
enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of
ofthe
the laws against State denial or invasion, if
not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.
(Emphasis partially supplied.) Thus, § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in accordance with our
constitutional structure of government, authorizes the
Congress to pass definitive legislation to protect
Fourteenth Amendment rights, which it has done many
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U.S.C. § 1971(a). For Congress to do this
times, e.g.. 42 U.S.c.
originally
fits in precisely with the division of powers originalIy
entrusted to the three branches of government -Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. But for us to
·~ndertake
-~ndertake in the guise of constitutional interpretation to
decide the constitutional policy question of this case
amount, in my judgment, to a plain exercise of power
which the Constitution has denied us, but has specifically
granted to Congress. I cannot join in holding
(86 S.Ct. 10891 that the Virginia state poll
poII tax law
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
HARLAN, J., dissenting
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE
STEWART
STEW ART joins, dissenting.
poll taxes, already totalIy
totally
The final demise of state poII
pJoscribed by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment with
Ploscribed
respect to federal elections and abolished by the States
themselves in alI
all but four States with respect to state
elections,[I] is perhaps, in itself, not of great moment.
elections,[1]
But the fact that the coup de grace has been administered
by this Court. instead of being left to the affected States
or to the federal political process,[2] should be a matter
Page 681
-of continuing concern to alI
all interested in maintaining the
·of
proper role of this tribunal under our
OUf scheme of
government.
I do not propose to retread ground covered in my
dissents in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589, and
97, and will
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
89,97,
wiII proceed on
the premise that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment now reaches both state
apportionment (Reynolds) and voter qualification
(Carrington) cases. My disagreement with the present
decision is that, in holding the Virginia poll tax violative
of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has departed
from
long-established
standards governing the
application of that clause.
The Equal Protection Clause prevents States from
arbitrarily treating people differently under their laws.
Whether any such differing treatment is to be deemed
arbitrary depends on whether or not it reflects an
appropriate differentiating classification among those
affected; the clause has never been thought to require
equal treatment of alI
all persons despite differing
circumstances. The test evolved by this Court for
determining whether an asserted justifying classification
·exists is whether such a classification can be deemed to
be founded on some rational and otherwise
constitutionally permissible state policy. See.
constitutionalIy
See, e.g.,
e.g.. Powell
v. Pennsylvania. 127 U.S. 678; Barrett v. Indiana, 229
U.S. 26; Walters v. City of St. LOUiS,
Louis, 347 U.S. 231;
Baxstrom v. Herold. ante p. 107.
I 07. This standard reduces to
a minimum the likelihood that the federal judiciary will
wiII
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judge state policies in terms of the individual notions and
predilections of its
Page 682
own members, and, until recently, it has been folIowed
followed in
all kinds of
of"equal
"equal protection" cases.
cases.[3]
[3]
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, ~T&ong its other breaks ·with
'with
the past, also marked a departure from these traditional
and wise principles. Unless its "one man, one vote" thesis
of state legislative apportionment is to be attributed to the
unsupportable proposition that "Equal Protection" simply
means indiscriminate equality, it seems inescapable that
what Reynolds realIy
really reflected was but this Court's own
views of how modem American representative
government should be run. For it can hardly be thought
that no other method of apportionment may be considered
rational. See the dissenting opinion of

Page 683
STEWART, J., in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General
ofColorado,
Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 744, and my own
Assembly of
dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at pp.
615-624.
Following Reynolds the Court in Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, applied the traditional equal
protection standard in striking down a Texas statute
disqualifying as voters in state elections certain members
of
the Armed Forces of
the United States.[4] But today,
ofthe
ofthe
in holding unconstitutional state poll taxes and property
qualifications for voting and pro tanto overruling
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, and Butler v.
Thompson, 341 U.S. 937, the Court reverts to the highly
subjective judicial approach manifested by Reynolds. In
substance the Court's analysis of the equal protection
issue goes no further than to say that the electoral
p. 670,
franchise is "precious" and "fundamental," ante p.670,
and to conclude that "[t]o introduce wealth or payment of
a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to
introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor," ante p. 668.
These are, of course, captivating phrases, but they are
wholly inadequate to satisfy the standard governing
adjudication of the equal protection issue: is there a
rational basis for Virginia'S
Virginia's poll tax as a voting
qualification? I think the answer to that question is
[ 5]
undoubtedly "yes.
"yes."n [5]
Page 684
(86 S.Ct. 10911 Property qualifications and poll taxes
have been a traditional part of our political structure. In
the Colonies the franchise was generally a restricted
one. [6]
[6] Over the years, these and other restrictions were
gradually lifted, primarily because popular theories of
political representation had changed.[7]
changed.(?] Often restrictions
were lifted only after wide public debate. The issue of
family
woman suffrage, for example, raised questions of
offamily
relationships, of participation in public affairs, of the very

Page 2622 of 2676

nature ofthe type of society in which Americans wished
to live; eventually a consensus was reached, which
culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment no more than
45 years ago.
Similarly with property qualifications, it is only by
fiat that it can be said, especially in the context of
American history, that there can be no rational debate as
to their advisability. Most of the early Colonies had them;
ofthe
the States have had them during much of
oftheir
their
many of
histories;[8] and, whether one agrees or not, arguments
them. For
have been and still can be made in favor of
ofthem.
example, it is certainly a rational argument that payment
Page 685

of some minimal poll tax promotes civic responsibility,
weeding out those who do not care enough about public
affairs to pay $$II .50 or thereabouts year for the exercise of
the franchise. It is also arguable, indeed it was probably
accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage
of Americans through most of our history, that people
with some property have a deeper stake in community
affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of
confidence, than those without means, and that the
community and Nation would be better managed if the
franchise were restricted to such citizens.[9]
Nondiscriminatory and fairly applied literacy tests,
upheld by this Court in Lassiter v. Northampton Election
Board, 360 U.S. 45, find justification on very similar
grounds.
These viewpoints, to be sure, ring hollow on most
contemporary ears. Their lack of acceptance today is
evidenced by the fact that nearly all of
ofthe
the States, left to
their own devices.
devices, have eliminated property or poll tax
qualifications; by the cognate fact that Congress and
three-quarters of the States quickly ratified the
Amendment, and by the fact that rules
Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
such as
Page 686

the "pauper exclusion" in Virginia law, Va.Const. § 23,
Va.Code § 24-18, have never been enforced.[lO]
enforced.(JO]

Property and poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are
not in accord with current egalitarian notions of how a
modern democracy should be organized. It is, of course,
modil)' the law to
entirely fitting that legislatures should modiJY
reflect such changes in popular attitudes. However, it is
all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political
doctrines popularly accepted at a particular moment of
our history and to declare all others to be irrational and
invidious, barring them from the range of choice by
reasonably minded people acting through the political
process. It was not too long ago that Mr. Justice Holmes
felt impelled to remind the Court that the Due Process
Clause of
ofthe
the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact the
laissez-fa ire theory of society, Lochner v. New York, 198
I 98
laissez-faire
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U.S. 45, 75-76. The times have changed, and perhaps it is
appropriate to observe that neither does the Equal
Protection Clause of that Amendment rigidly impose
upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism
.[II]
.[Il]
I would affirm the decision of the District Court.

Notes:
[*] Together with No. 655, Butts v. Harrison, Governor
o/Virginia,
al., also on appeal from the same court.
of
Virginia, et
eta!.,

[I] Section 173
I 73 of Virginia's Constitution directs the
General Assembly to levy an annual poll ta,;
ta'!: not
of the State 2
21I years of
exceeding $1.50
$ 1.50 on every resident ofthe
age and over (with exceptions not relevant here). One
dollar of the tax is to be used by state officials
"exclusively in aid of the public free schools," and the
remainder is to be returned to the counties for general
purposes. Section 18
I 8 of the Constitution includes
payment of poll taxes as a precondition for voting.
Section 20 provides that a person must "personally" pay
all state poll taxes for the three years preceding the year
in which he applies for registration. By § 2 I, the poll
poIl tax
must be paid at least six months prior to the election in
which the voter seeks to vote. Since the time for election
of state officials varies (Va.Code §§ 2136,2160
2136, 2160 -- 2168;
id. at § 222), the six months' deadline will vary, election
from election. The poll tax is often assessed along with
the personal property tax. Those who do not pay a
personal property tax are not assessed for a poll tax, it
responsibility
being their responsibil
ity to take the initiative and request
163. Enforcement of poll
to be assessed. Va.Code §58-I
§ 58-1163.
ofthose
those who
taxes takes the form of disenfranchisement of
do not pay, § 22 of
ofthe
the Virginia Constitution providing
that collection of delinquent poll taxes for a particular
year may not be enforced by legal proceedings until the
tax for that year has become three years delinquent.
(2] Judge Thornberry, speaking for the three-judge court
[2]
which recently declared the Texas poll tax
unconstitutional, said:

If the State of Texas placed a tax on the right to speak at
the rate of one dollar and seventy-five cents per year, no
court would hesitate to strike it down as a blatant
ofthe
the freedom of speech. Yet the poll tax as
infringement of
enforced in Texas is a tax on the equally important right
to vote.
9,1966).
1966).
252 F.Supp. 234,254 (decided February 9,
[3] We recently held in Louisiana v. United States, 380
U.S. 145, that a literacy test which gave voting registrars
"a virtually uncontrolled discretion as to who should vote
and who should not" (id. at 150)
!50) had been used to deter
Negroes from voting and accordingly we struck it down.
While the "Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to
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disenfranchise the Negro" (Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 543), we do not stop to determine whether on
this record the Virginia tax in its modem setting serves
the same end.
end .

one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner
affect the first and fourth clauses in the Ninth Section of
the First Article, and that no State, without its consent,
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

.'[4]
[4] Only a handful of States today condition the franchise
on the payment of a poll tax. Alabama (Ala.Const., §§
178, 194, and Amendments 96 and 207; Ala.Code Tit. 17,
§ il)
i2) and Texas (Tex.Const.,
(Tex.Consi., Art. 6, § 2; Vernon's
Ann.Stat., Election Code, Arts. 5.02, 5.09) each impose a
poll tax of$1.50. Mississippi (Miss.Const., §§241, 243;
Miss.Code §§ 3130, 3160, 3235) has a poll tax of $2.
Vermont has recently eliminated the requirement that poll
taxes be paid in order to vote. Act of Feb. 23, 1966,
amending Vt.Stat.Ann. Tit. 24, § 701.

[2] See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464; Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535; Minnesota v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553; Watson v.
Mmyland, 218 U.S. 173.

As already noted, note 2, supra, the Texas poll tax was
recently declared unconstitutional by a three-judge
United States District Court. United States v. Texas, 252
F.Supp. 234 (decided February 9, 1966). Likewise the
A:labama tax. United States v. Alabama, 252 F.Supp. 95
A1abama
(decided March 3, 1966.)
[5] Maine has a poll tax (Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. Tit. 36, §
1381) which is not made a condition of voting; instead,
its payment is a condition of
ofobtaining
obtaining a motor vehicle
license (Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. Tit. 29, § 108) or a motor
Id. § 584.
vehicle operator's license. !d.

__(6] E.g..
J6]
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.
163 U.S. at 551.
[7] Segregated public transportation, approved in Plessy
v. Ferguson, supra, was held unconstitutional in Gayle v.

[3]
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the
denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justifY it.

Metropolitan Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (Stone,
J.).

[4] The opinion of the Court, in footnote two, quotes
language from a federal district court's opinion which
implies that, since a tax on speech would not be
constitutionally allowed, a tax which is a prerequisite to
voting likewise cannot be allowed. But a tax or any other
regulation which burdens and actually abridges the right
to speak would, in my judgment, be a flagrant violation
of the First Amendment's prohibition against abridgments
of the freedom of speech, which prohibition is made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cj Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105. There is no
Cf
comparable specific constitutional provision absolutely
barring the States from abridging the right to vote.
Consequently States have from the beginning, and do
now, qualifY the right to vote because of age, prior felony
convictions, illiteracy, and various other reasons. Of
course, the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid any
State from abridging a person's right to speak because he
of a felony,
is under 21 years of age, has been convicted ofa
or is illiterate.

Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam).
Browder.

[5] See my dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 90.

[8] Only MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented, while MR.
JYSTICE
J.YSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE STEW ART each
concurred on separate grounds.

[6] See, for illustration, my dissenting opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, and
andcases
cases
cited therein.

[I] Article V of the Constitution provides:

34 7 U.S. 483, the
[7] In Brown v. Board of Education, 347
Court today purports to find precedent for using the
Equal Protection Clause to keep the Constitution up to
date. I did not vote to hold segregation in public schools
unconstitutional on any such theory. I thought when
Brown was written, and I think now, that Mr. Justice
Harlan was correct in 1896 when he dissented from
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, which held that it was
not a discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause for state law to segregate white and colored
people in public facilities, there, railroad cars. I did not
join the opinion of the Court in Brown on any theory that
segregation, where practiced in the public schools, denied

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this
ofthe
the Legislatures of
Constitution, or, on the application of
two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention
for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be
.valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in
three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of
ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided
that no amendment which may be made prior to the year
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equal protection in 1954, but did not similarly deny it in
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. In
my judgment, the holding in Brown against racial
discrimination was compelled by the purpose of the
Framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments completely to outlaw discrimination against
people because of their race or color. See the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71-72; Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541.
!'{or
N.or does Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, stand as
precedent for the amendatory power which the Court
exercises today. The Court in Malloy did not read into the
ofwise
wise criminal procedure,
Constitution its own notions of
but instead followed the doctrine of Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, and made the Fifth Amendment's
unequivocal
protection
against
self-incrimination
applicable to the States. I joined the opinion of the Court
in Malloy on the basis of my dissent in Adamson v.
California. supra,
supra. in which I stated, at p. 89:
California,
If the choice must be between the selective process of the
Palko decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the
States, or the Twining rule applying none of them, I
would choose the Palko selective process.

[8] But § I of the Fourteenth Amendment itself outlaws
any state law which either as written or as applied
discriminates against voters on account of race. Such a
law can never be rational.
States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult
to believe rational, but there are limits, and it is too clear
for extended argument that color cannot be made the
basis of a statutory classification affecting the right [to
vilte]
v_9te] set up in this case.
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (Holmes, J.).
[I] Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.
[2] In the Senate hearings leading to the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, some doubt was expressed
whether state poll taxes could be validly abolished
through the exercise of Congress' legislative power under
..§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hearings on S.
1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong.,
Ist Sess., 194-197 (1965).
Cong .. 1st
(\965). I intimate no view on
that question.
[3] I think the somewhat different application of the
Equal Protection Clause to racial discrimination cases
finds justification in the fact that, insofar as that clause
may embody a particular value in addition to rationality,
the historical origins ofthe Civil War Amendments might
e.g.,
attribute to racial equality this special status. See. e.g..
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, I 18
I 8 U.S. 356; Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. I; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296; cf Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214,216.
214, 216. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
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Protection of the Laws, 37 CalifL.Rev. 341 (\949);
(1949);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1,33
I, 33 (\959).
(1959).
A similar characterization of indigency as a "neutral
oflegislative
fact," irrelevant or suspect for purposes ofiegislative
classification, has never been accepted by this Court. See
Edwardsv. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-185 (Jackson,
liiinois, 351
35 i U.S. 12,
i2, requiring
J., concurring). Griffin v. iiiinois,
free trial transcripts for indigent appellants, and Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, requiring the appointment of
counsel for such appellants, cannot fairly be so
interpreted, for, although reference was made
indiscriminately to both equal protection and due process,
the analysis was cast primarily in terms of the latter.
More explicit attempts to infuse "Equal Protection" with
e.g.. Patsone v.
specific values have been unavailing. See . e.g.,
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (alienage); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (sex); Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 564 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) (consanguinity).
1.,

[[4]
4] So far as presently relevant, my dissent in that case
rested not on disagreement with the equal protection
standards employed by the Court but only on
disagreement with their application in that instance. 380
U.S. at 99-101.
[5] I have no doubt that poll taxes that deny the right to
vote on the basis of race or color violate the Fifteenth
Amendment and can be struck down by this Court. That
question is presented to us in Butts v. Harrison, No. 655,
the companion case decided today. The Virginia poll tax
is on its face applicable to all citizens, and there was no
allegation that it was discriminatorily enforced. The
District Court explicitly found "no racial discrimination.
discrimination .
. . in its application as a condition to voting." 240 F.Supp.
Butts, supra,
supra. argued first, that the
270, 27 I. Appellant in Butts.
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902, which
framed the poll-tax provision, was guided by a desire to
reduce Negro suffrage, and second, that, because of the
generally lower economic standard of Negroes as
contrasted with whites in Virginia the tax does, in fact,
operate as a significant obstacle to voting by Negroes .
The Court does not deal with this Fifteenth Amendment
argument, and it suffices for me to say that, on the record
here, I do not believe that the factors alluded to are
1.50 tax whether under the
sufficient to invalidate this $
$1.50
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

[6] See generally Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South 2
(1958); I Thorpe, A Constitutional History of the
American People, 1776-1850, at 92-98 (1898);
Williamson, American Suffrage From Property to
Democracy, 1760-1860, cc.I-4
cc.l-4 (1960).
[7] See Porter, A History of Suffrage in the United States
77-111 (1918); Thorpe, op. cit. supra at 97, 401;
Williamson, op. cit. supra at 13 8- I 8 I.
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[8] See generally Ogden, op. cit. supra; Porter, op. cit.
supra.
[9] At the Constitutional Convention, for example, there
was some sentiment to prescribe a freehold qualification
for federal elections under Art. IV, § I. The proposed
amendment was defeated, in part because it was thought
·suffrage
See II
'suffrage qualifications were best left to the States. See"
Records of the Federal Convention 201-210 (FaiTfuld
(FaiTfutd
ed.l911 ). Madison's views were expressed as follows:
ed.1911).
Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a
freehold, would with him depend much on the probable
reception such a change would meet with in States where
the right was now exercised by every description of
people. In several of
ofthe
the States a freehold was now the
qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the
freeholders of the Country would be the safest
depositories of Republican liberty.
!d.
Jd. at 203. See also Aristotle, Politics, Bks. III, IV; I
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, c. xiii, at 199-202
(Knopf ed.1948).
ed.l948 ).

[I
[10]
OJ See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 240
F.Supp. 270,271.
270, 271.
[II] Justice
appropriate:

Holmes'

admonition

is

particularly

Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices
which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a
·constitution
-constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissezfaire. It is
made for people of fundamentally differing views, and
the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and
familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to
conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of
the United States.
198 U.S. at 75-76.
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CARRINGTON
v.
RASH ET AL.
No. 82.
Supreme Court of United States.

Aigued January 28, 1965.
Decided March 1, 1965.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS.
Wayne Windle argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was W C. Petico/as.
Peticolas.
Attorney General of Texas, and Mary K. Wall, Assistant
Hawthorne Phillips, First Assistant Attomey
Attomey
Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief was Waggoner
Carr, Attomey General of Texas.
MR JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court

90

91

A provision of the Texas Constitution prohibits "[a]ny member of the Armed Forces of the
United States" who moves his home to Texas during the course of his military duty from ever
voting in any election in that State "so long as he or she is a member of the Armed Forces. ,m
•>ill
'90 The question presented is whether this provision, as construed by the Supreme Court of
Texas in the present case,lZl
case,IZl deprives the petitioner of a right secured by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment The Supreme Court of Texas decided that it does not
and refused to issue a writ of mandamus ordering petitioner's local election officials to permit
him to vote, two Justices dissenting.
dissenting_ 378 S. W 2d 304. We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 812.
The petitioner, a sergeant in the United States Army, entered the service from Alabama in
1946 at the age of 18. '91 The State concedes that he has been domiciled in Texas Since
since
1962, and that he intends to make his home there permanently. He has purchased a house in
EI Paso where he lives with his wife and two children. He is also the proprietor of a small
El
business there. The petitioner's post of military duty is not in Texas, but at White Sands, New
Mexico. He regularly commutes from his home in El
EI Paso to his Army job at White Sands. He
pays property taxes in Texas and has his automobile registered there. But for his uniform, the
State concedes that the petitioner would be eligible to vote in El
EI Paso County, Texas.
Texas has unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the availability
of the ballot Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621. There can be no doubt either of the historic
function of the States to establish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the
Constitution, other qualifications for the exercise of the franchise. Indeed, "[t]he States have
long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of
45. 50. Compare
suffrage may be exercised." Lassiterv. Northampton Election Bd.. 360 U.S.
U. S. 45,50.
United States v.
v_ Classic. 313 U. S. 299; Ex parte Yarbrough. 110 U. S. 651. "In other words,
the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as
the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no
discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution." Pope v.
Williams supra,
supra. at 632.

82

~)3
~13

This Texas constitutional provision, however, is unique.
unique_ill Texas has said that no serviceman
may ever '92
"92 acquire a voting residence in the State so long as he remains in service. It is
true that the State has treated all members of the military with an equal hand. And mere
classification, as this Court has often said, does not of itself deprive a group of equal
protection. Williamson ·93
"93 v.
v_ Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483. But the fact that a State is
dealing with a distinct class and treats the members of that class equally does not end the
judicial inquiry. "The courts must reach and determine the question whether the
purpose.....
___ " McLaughlin v.
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose
Florida 379 U.S.
U. S. 184, 191.
It is argued that this absolute denial of the vote to servicemen like the petitioner fulfills two
purposes. First, the State says it has a legitimate interest in immunizing its elections from the
concentrated balloting of military personnel, whose collective voice may ovelWhelm
overwhelm a small
local civilian community. Secondly, the State says it has a valid interest in protecting the
franchise from infiltration by transients, and it can reasonably assume that those servicemen
who fall within the constitutional exclusion will be within the State for only a short period of
time.

94

The theory underlying the State's first contention is that the Texas constitutional provision is
"takeover" of the civilian community resulting from
necessary to prevent the danger of a "takeover''
concentrated voting by large numbers of military personnel in bases placed near Texas towns
and cities. A base commander, Texas suggests, who opposes local pOlice
police administration or
teaching policies in local schools, might influence his men to vote in conformity with his
predilections. Local bond issues may fail, and property taxes stagnate at low levels because
predilections,
military personnel are unwilling to invest in the future of the area. We stress-and this a
theme to be reiterated -that Texas has the right to require that all military '94 personnel
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enrolled to vote be bona fide residents of the community. But if they are in fact residents, with
the intention of making Texas their home indefinitely, they, as all other qualified residents,
have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation. Cf. Grav v. Sanders. 372 U.
S. 368. "Fencing ouf' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they
may vote is constitutionally impermissible. "[T]he exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions," Schneiderv. State,
U. S. 147
147, 161.
161, cannot
State 308 U.S.
constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular group of
bona fide residents.
reSidents. Yet, that is what Texas claims to have done here.

95

The State's second argument is that its voting ban is justified because of the transient nature
of service in the Armed Forces.~ As the Supreme Court of Texas stated: "Persons in military
reassignment, and hence to a change in their actual
service are subject at all times to reaSSignment,
residence ... they do not elect to be where they are. Their reasons for being where they are
residents," 378 S. W. 2d, at 306. The
. cannot be the same as [those of] the permanent residents."
Texas Constitution provides that a United States citizen can become a qualified elector if he
has "resided in this State one (1) year next preceding an election and the last six (6) months
within the district or county·gS
county ·95 in which such person offers to vote." Article VI, § 2, Texas
Constitution. It is the integrity of this qualification of residence which Texas contends is
protected by the voting ban on members of the Armed Forces.
But only where military personnel are involved has Texas been unwilling to develop more
precise tests to determine the bona fides of an individual claiming to have actually made his
home in the State long enough to vote. The State's law reports disclose that there have been
many cases where the local election officials have determined the issue of bona fide
residence. These officials and the courts reviewing their actions have required a "freely
exercised intention" of remaining within the State, Harrison v. Chesshir. 316 S. W. 2d 909,
909
conceming their intent to reside in the State and in a
915. The declarations of voters concerning
particular county is often not conclusive; the election officials may look to the actual facts and
S. W. 2dB65, 866. By statute,l§l
statute,l§.! Texas deals with
circumstances. Stratton v. Hall, 90
90S.
ilkesoidiers;piesent specialized problems in
categodesofdtiienswh6,i1kesOidiers;iJiesent
particular categodesofdtizenswfio,
determining residence. Students at colleges and universities in Texas, patients in hospitals
and other institutions within the State, and civilian employees of the United States
transient as military personnel. But all of them are given at least an
Government may be as tranSient
opportunity to show the election officials that they are bona fide residents.

CJ6

Indeed, Texas has been able, in other areas, to winnow successfully from the ranks of the
military those whose residence in the State is bona fide. In divorce cases, for example, the
residence requirement for jurisdictional purposes, like the requirement for the vote, is one
year in the State and six months in the forum county. The Texas courts have held that merely
being stationed within the ·s6
'96 State may be insufficient to show residence, even though the
statutory period is fulfilled. Even a declared intention to establish a residence may be not
enough. "However, the fact that one is a soldier or sailor does not deprive him of the right to
change his residence or domicile and acquire a new one." Robinson v. Robinson,
Robinson. 235 S. W.
2d 228 230.
We deal here with matters close to the core of our constitutional system. "The right ... to
U. S. 299,
choose," United States v. Classic,
Classic. 313 U.S.
299. 314, that this Court has been so zealous to
protect, means, at the least, that States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the
vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State. Oyama v. California,
California. 332 U.
S. 633. By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, the Texas
Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"[T]here is no indication in the Constitution that ... occupation affords a permissible basis for
distinguishing between qualified voters within the State." Gravv. Sanders. 372 U.S.
U. S. 368,
380.

97

We recognize that special problems may be involved in determining whether servicemen
have actually acquired a new domicile in a State for franchise purposes. We emphasize that
Texas is free to take reasonable and adequate steps, as have other States,!§] to see that all
applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence. But this
"[T]he presumption here created is ...
constitutional provision goes beyond such rules. "[Tlhe
.,.
definitely conclusive-incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive character."
Donnan. 285 U.S.
Heinerv. Donnan,
U. S. 312 324. All servicemen not residents of Texas before induction
come within the provision's sweep. Not one of them can ever vote in Texas, no matter how
·m
'97 long Texas may have been his true home. "[T]he uniform of our country ... [must not] be
the badge of disfranchisement for the man or woman who wears it. "ill
"!Zl

Reversed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.

I.
Anyone not familiar with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the history of that
Amendment, and the decisions of the Court in this constitutional area, would gather from
today's opinion that it is an established constitutional tenet that state laws governing the
qualifications of voters are subject to the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet any
dispaSSionate
dispassionate survey of the past will reveal that the present decision is the first to so hold.
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In making this holding the Court totally ignores, as it did in last Term's reapportionment cases,
Revnolds v. Sims. 377 U. S. 533 (and companion cases), all the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the course of judicial decisions which together plainly show that the Equal
Protection Clause was not intended to touch state electoral matters. See my dissenting
opinion in Revnolds v. Sims, at 589. If that history does not prove what I think it does, we are
at least entitled to be told why. While I cannot express surprise over today's decision after the
reapportionment cases, which though bound to follow I continue to believe are constitutionally
indefensible, I can and do respectfully, but earnestly, record my protest ·ga
°98 against this
further extension of federal judicial power into the political affairs of the States. The
reapportionment cases do not require this extension. They were concerned
concemed with methods of
constituting state legislatures; this case involves state voter qualifications. The Court is quite
right in not even citing them.ill
them.ill

c;s
'is

I deplore the added impetus which this decision gives to the current tendency of judging
constitutional questions '99 on the basis of abstract "justice" unleashed from the limiting
principles that go with our constitutional system. Constitutionally principled adjudication, high
in the process of which is due recognition of the just demands of federalism, leaves ample
room for the protection of individual rights. A constitutional democracy which in order to cope
with seeming needs of the moment is willing to temporize with its basic distribution and
limitation of governmental powers will sooner or later find itself in trouble.

99

For reasons set forth at length in my dissent in Reynolds, I would dismiss the complaint in this
case for failure to state a claim of federal right.

II.
I also think this decision wrong even on the Court's premise that it is free to extend the Equal
Protection Clause so as to reach state-established voter qualifications. The question here is
simply whether the differentiation in voting eligibility requirements which Texas has made is
founded on a rational classification. In judging this question I think that the dictates of history,
even though the Court has seen fit to disregard them for the purpose of determining whether
it should get into the matter at all, should cause the Court to take a hard look before striking
down a traditional state policy in this area as rationally indefensible.
Essentially the Texas statute establishes a nule that servicemen from other States stationed
at Texas bases are to be treated as transients for voting purposes. No one disputes that in
the vast majority of cases Texas' view of things accords with fact. Although it is doubtless true
that this rule may operate in some instances contrary to the actual facts, I do not think that
the Federal Constitution prevents the State from ignoring that possibility in the overall picture.
In my opinion Texas •;oo
';00 could rationally conclude that such instances would likely be too
minimal to justify the administrative expenditure involved in coping with the "special
problems" (ante, p. 96) entailed in winnowing out the bona fide permanent residents from
among the transient servicemen living off base and sending their children to local schools.

100

Beyond this, I think a legitimate distinction may be drawn between those who come
voluntarily into Texas in connection with private occupations and those ordered into Texas by
military authority. Residences established by the latter are subject to the doubt, not present to
the same degree with the former, that when the military compulsion ends, so also may the
desire to remain in Texas.
And finally, I think that Texas, given the traditional American notion that control of the military
should always be kept in civilian hands, emphasized in the case of Texas by its own special
historical experience,l£1
-101
01 rationally decide to protect state and local politics against
experience,[£] could ·1
the influences of military voting strength by, in effect, postponing the privilege of voting
otherwise attaching to a service-acquired domicile until the serviceman becomes a civilian
domicile.@] Such a
and by limiting Texan servicemen to voting in the counties of their original domicile.Ql
policy on Texas' part may seem to many unduly provincial in light of modern conditions, but it
cannot, in my view, be said to be unconstitutional.

1O:
10:

Thus, whether or not this Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this case, the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Texas should not be disturbed.

ill
I1J Texas Constitution, Art. VI, § 2:
"Any member of the Armed Forces of the United States or component branches thereof, or in the military service of the
United States, may vote only in the county in which he or she resided at the time of entering such service so long as he or
she is a member of the Armed Forces."
The constitutional provision has been implemented by Article 5.02 of the Election Code of Texas which provides, in part:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any member of the Armed Forces of the United States or component
branches thereof who is on active duty in the military service of the United States may vote only in the county in which he or
she resided at the time of entering such service so long as he or she is a member of the Anned Forces. This restriction
time of entering such service' means
applies only to members of the Armed Forces who are on active duty, and the phrase .'time
the time of commencing the current active duty. A re-enlistment after a temporary separation from service upon termination
of a prior enlistment shall not be construed to be the commencement of a new period of service, and in such case the
county in which the person resided at the time of commencing active service under the prior enlistment shall be construed
to be the county of residence at the time of entering service."
In Mabryv.
Mabrvv. Davis 232 F. Supp. 930 <D.
<0. C. W. D. Texas 1964} a three-judge court recently declared this same provision
unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

.0 "The self-evident purpose of the amendment to the Constitution was to prevent a person entering military service as a
resident citizen of a county in Texas from acquiring a different voting residence in Texas during the period of his military
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service, and to prevent a person entering militaty service as a resident citizen of another state from acquiring a voting
residence in Texas during the period of military service." 378 S. W. 2d 304, 305. (Emphasis supplied.)

Ql V\lhife many States
Slates have rules which prescribe special tests for qualifying

military personnel for the vote, none goes so
far as completely to foreclose from the franchise all servicemen who were nonresidents before induction.

One other State, Nevada, has a provision which on its face seems as prohibitory as Art. VI,
VI,§
§ 2, of the Texas Constitution.
The Nevada Constitution provides that
"The right of suffrage shall be enjoyed by all persons, otherwise entitled to the same, who may be in the military or naval
service of the United States; provided,
provided. the votes so cast shall be made to apply to the county and township of which said
voters were bona fide residents at the time of their entry into such service ..
. ...
.. ""Nev.
Nev. Canst.,
Con st., Art. 2, § 3. (Emphasis
supplied.)
But the Attorney General of Nevada has recenUy interpreted this provision to mean that servicemen such as petitioner can
estabiish a voting residence in the State if they snow theIr
Intent to rematn
remain by "clear and unequivocal evidence." Op. Atty.
tne1r 1ntent
Gen. Nev. 194, 197 (1961-1962).
Under the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955,69
1955, 69 Stat. 584, the Department of Defense collects and distributes to
military personnel an analysis of state voter qualifications as applied to servicemen. The 1964 report states:
"For voting purposes the legal residence of members of the Armed Forces is generally the State from which they entered
military service. This home State remains as the only State in which a person in the Armed Forces has the legal right to
vote unless certain conditions are met. Almost all States except Texas will permit persons in the Armed Forces to acquire a
new voting residence within their jurisdiction. When this is accomplished, voting rights in the old State of residence are
lost." Voting Information 1964, Department of Defense, p. x.
Constitutional and statutory provisions of other States which treat the military specially, do not absolutely prohibit any
opportunity to prove residence. The Georgia Constitution, for example, provides that no member of the Armed Forces "shall
acquire the rights of an elector by reason of being stationed on duty in this State." Georgia Canst.,
Canst.,§
§ 2-702; see Indiana
Canst., Art. 2, § 3; Oregon Const.,
Canst., Art. II,§
II, § 5; Alabama Code, Tit. 17, § 17. Other States distinguish between servicemen
who live on the base, and those who have acquired homes in the community. Cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 21,
Comment c.
Commentc.

Iii
IiI The constitutional provision at issue in this case seems designed more as a rule prohibiting a serviceman from ever
acquiring a voting residence than a disqualification from the franchise. Prior to 1954, Art. VI, § 1, of the Texas Constitution
induded among the "classes of persons ... not ... allowed to vote in this State": "5. All soldiers, marines and seamen
employed in the service of the Army or Navy of the United States." This clause was eliminated, according to the annotator's
notes, to "confer the privilege to vote upon members of the regular establishment of the Armed Forces." 9 Vernon's Texas
Civ. Stat. 19 (1964 Supp.). The 1954 constitutional amendment, involved in this case, was added to the section which
establishes residence qualifications for voters.

l2J. 9 Vernon's Tex. Civ.

Stat. (Election Code) Art. 5.08.

1§1
l§1 See note 3, supra.

IZl Message of Governor Ellis Arnall to General Assembly of Georgia, p. 5 (January 3, 1944).
ill None of the cases on which the Court does rely lends any support to its decision.
In Pope v. Williams 193 U. S. 621 the Court upheld a Maryland statute which required voters to have been registered in
for at least a year. The Court said of the right to vote:
the State tor
"It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States .... It may not be refused on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States. In other words, the
privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon
such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the
Federal Constitution [obviously refening to the Fifteenth and not the Fourteenth Amendment}. ... The question whether the
conditions prescribed by the State might be regarded by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a Federal one."
~
one."~
U.S.
U. S. at 632-633.

Lassiterv. Northampton Election Bd. 360 U.S.
U. S. 45 upheld the literacy test applied in North Carolina against an attack
made on its face. The Court noted that:
"Of course a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth
Amendmentwas
Amendment
was designed to uproot." 360 U.S.
U. S. at 53. (Emphasis added.)

Grayv. Sanders 372 U.S.
U. S. 368. struck down Georgia's county~unit system for counting votes in a party primary election for
the nomination of a United States Senator. It did not deal with voter qualifications.
United States v. Classic. 313 U. S. 299 dealt with stuffing ballot boxes, and Ex parte Yarbrough. 110 U. S. 651 with
intimidation of Negroes attempting to vote. Neither dealt with voter qualifications.
None of the other federal cases cited by the Court was concerned in any way with voting.

16J.
l6J. The 1837 election law of the Republic of Texas, § 9, provided ''That regular enlisted soldiers,

and volunteers for during
the war, shall not be eligible to vote for civil officers." 2 Laws of Republic of Texas, p. 8, in 1 Gammel, Laws of Texas, p.
1350. "This provision was no doubt inspired by the mutinous conduct of the nonresident volunteers who had been recruited
in the United States after the Battle of San Jacinto. They had defied the provisional government and on one occasion in
July, 1836, had sent an officer to arrest President David G. Burnett and his cabinet to bring them to trial before the army.
They had continued their rebellious conduct after Sam Houston became the first president under the Constitution of 1836. It
was not until May, 1837, that Houston was able to dissolve the army and eliminate this threat to civil authority. This
provision disfranchising soldiers in the regular army was placed in the 1845 Constitution of the State of
ofT
Texas
exas and has
remained in each succeeding constitution. It was modified in 1932 to exempt the National Guard and reserve and retired
officers and men." McCall, History of Texas Election Laws, 9 Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat., pp. XVll~XVIII
XVII~ XVIII (1952).

Other States which had similar provisions in their early constitutions induded Alabama, Canst. of 1819, Art. III,
Ill, § 5;
Const. of 1836, Art. IV,§
Arkansas, Canst.
IV, § 2; Indiana, Canst.
Const. of 1816, Art. VI,
VI,§
§ 1: Louisiana, Const.
Canst. of 1845, Art. 12; Missouri,
Canst. of 1830, Art.
Canst. of 1820, Art. Ill,§
III, § 10; South Carolina, Const. of 1790 (as amended in 1810},
1810), Art. I,§
I, § 4; Virginia, Const.
Ill,§
III, § 14.
The 1932 amendment to the Texas Constitution was replaced in 1954 by the present provision.

Q.]
Q1 Tex. Canst., Art. VI,§
VI, § 2, quoted in Court's opinion, ante, n. 1
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842 F.Supp. 607 (D. Puerto Rico 1994)
Gregorio !GART(!A
!GARTt!A DE LA ROSA, et al.,
aI., Plaintiffs,

v.
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Article II of the Constitution of the United States
provides that "[e]ach state shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors ... " U.S. Const. Art. II § I (our emphasis). The
Electors appointed by the states, and not the voting
public, are the ones who vote for, and elect, the President
and Vice President of the United States. !d.
Id. The
Constitution further provides that only states and, through
the Twenty-Third Amendment, the District of Columbia,
may cast electoral votes in presidential elections. U.S.
Const. Art. II,§
II, § I; amend. XXIII.

Civ. No. 91-2S06(RLA).
91-2506(RLA).
United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.
Jan.20,
Jan.
20, 1994

In 1974, this District Court faced a similar
constitutional challenge to that now presented by
plaintiffs; the same was rejected as plainly without merit.
Sanchez v. United States, 376 F.Supp. 239, 241
(D.P.R.I974). This Court held:
(D.P.R.1974).

Page 608
Gregorio lgarta
Igarta de la
Ia Rosa, Aguadilla, PR, for
plaintiffs.
Silvia Carreno Col, Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Attorney's
.Office, Hato Rey, PR, Michael J. Haungs, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Washington, DC, for defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER

ACOSTA, District Judge.
This is an action filed by residents of Puerto Rico
who wish to vote for the President and the Vice President
of
ofthe
the United States. Some of
ofthe
the plaintiffs have always
resided in Puerto Rico and have never participated in
presidential elections. Others had exercised their right to
vote while residing in a state of the union but have
become ineligible because of their change of residence to
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The complaint
alleges that the inability to vote in the presidential
elections violates their constitutional rights and seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States.
The Court has before it defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (docket No. 12) [I] alleging,
in essence, that the complaint does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and also that the complaint
impermissibly seeks an advisory opinion from this Court
regarding the constitutionality oflegislation which has
not been enacted. Plaintiffs have filed their Opposition
.(docket
"(docket No. 16), and a Supplementary Motion thereto
(docket No. 24).
Upon careful consideration of the arguments
advanced by the parties, this Court finds that this action
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

SC 38417-2011

Although plaintiff is a U.S. citizen, under the
Constitution of the United States the President is not
chosen directly by the citizens, but by the electoral
colleges in the States and the District of Columbia ...
.. ' The
whole thrust of this is that the Constitution does not by its
terms, grant citizens the right to vote, but leaves the
matter entirely to the States.
!d.
Id

Page 609
A more recent challenge by residents of Guam was,
likewise, rejected. "The right to vote in presidential
elections under Article II inheres not in citizens but in
Territ01y of Guam v.
states." Attorney General of the TerritOlY
United States.
States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied. 469 U.S. 1209, 105 S.Ct. 1174, 84 L.Ed.2d 323
(1985). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Constitution
"does not grant to American citizens the right to elect the
President." Id "Since Guam concededly is not a state, it
can have no electors, and plaintiffs cannot exercise
individual votes in a presidential election. There is no
constitutional violation." !d.
Id.
Therefore, granting U.S. citizens residing in Puerto
Rico the right to vote in presidential elections would
require either that Puerto Rico become a state, or that a
constitutional amendment, similar to the Twenty-Third
Amendment, be adopted. TerritOlY
Territ01y of Guam, 738 F.2d at
1019; Sanchez v. United States, 376 F.Supp. at 242. As of
this date, Puerto Rico has not become a state, neither has
a constitutional amendment been adopted granting Puerto
Rico the right to vote in presidential elections, as was
specifically accorded to the District of Columbia.
THE POLITICAL
POL/TICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

In order to circumvent the constitutional provisions
cited above, plaintiffs contend that "Puerto Rico['s]
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present political status has evolved in such a way from a
Territory in 1898 to that of a 'de facto'state,"
facto' state," and that
consequently, it should be considered a state entitled to
electoral votes. See Opposition at 2. This argument, as
defendant points out, presents a political question not
suitable for judicial resolution.
The political question doctrine, which is an aspect
of the Court's l\,.rticle
i\rticle III jurisdiction, is premised upon

the separation of powers among the three coordinate
branches of goverrunent and the inherent limits of judicial
power. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,210,
186, 210, 82 S.Ct. 691,
706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948);
(1 948); United
rei. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379
States ex reI.
(D.C.Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 999, 102 S.Ct.
71 L.Ed.2d 865 (1982).
1630,
1630,71
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court identified six
"formulations" that signal the presence of issues which
are committed to the political branches:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found [I] a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
4] the impossibility of a court's
discretion; or [[4]
undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
goverrunent; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.

}69 U.S. at217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.
;369
"Implicating anyone
any one of these factors renders a
question 'political' and thus nonjusticiable." United States
v. Mandel. 914 F.2d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 1990). A
nonjusticiable
nonjusticiable case must be dismissed as not presenting a
"case" or "controversy" under Article III
Ill of the
Constitution. See 369 U.S. at 198, 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.
Article III
Ill courts have a limited scope of jurisdiction, and
will only decide upon matters that constitute a case or
controversy. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct.
2197,2204,45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
A complaint must set forth an actual case and
controversy for judicial review. By seeking to obtain
electoral votes for Puerto Rico as if it were a state,
plaintiffs are requesting that this Court disregard the
balance between the three coordinate branches of
government, and the Article 1II
lii courts' inherent limits of
judicial power. Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210,82
210, 82 S.Ct.
at 706.
A determination on whether or not Puerto Rico's
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political status has evolved into "de
Page 610
facto" statehood for purposes of presidential elections
would correspond to Congress. The text of the
Constitution specifically commits the decision to create
new states to Congress: "New States may be admitted by
the Congress into this Union." U.S. Const. Art. !V,
IV, § 3
(our emphasis). In seeking to have Puerto Rico
recognized as a "de facto state," plaintiffs seek to thrust
the Court into a decision the Constitution specifically
entrusts to the legislative branch of government.
Moreover, no standards exist by which a Court can
or should decide what is or is not a "de facto" state.
Whether Puerto Rico should be considered a "de facto"
state for purposes of presidential elections is a question
characterized by "a lack ofjudicially
of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" for its resolution. Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. at 217,
217,82
82 S.Ct. at 710.
Any attempt by this Court to determine whether
Puerto Rico has sufficient attributes of statehood so as to
be a state for purposes of Article II, § I would involve
"an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at217,
82 S.Ct. at 710. Since the question of the political status
of Puerto Rico has been the subject of debate both on the
Island and in Congress, it is up to the legislative branch to
make the initial policy determination regarding this
matter.
Consequently, and pursuant to the political question
doctrine, this Court will not enter into a matter that
clearly pertains to Congress. Article III
Ill courts have
historically avoided altering the balance between the
three branches ofgoverrunent. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2204. If
Ifplaintiffs
plaintiffs wish to obtain a
determination on whether or not Puerto Rico has become
a "de facto" state for the purpose of presidential elections,
they should address their views and concerns to the
Congress of the United States, and not to this Court.
ABSENTEE VOTING
Plaintiffs' second argument for the proposition that
residents of Puerto Rico should be afforded the right to
vote in presidential elections pertains to absentee
balloting. In the complaint, nine of the twelve plaintiffs
allege that although they previously qualified to vote in
presidential elections by virtue of their residence in
various states, they have lost this right upon relocating to
Puerto Rico.
Plaintiffs also contend that "[f]ederal election
qualification of absentee voters are clearly and
unquestionably promulgated by Congress, not states,"
and that federal law alone determines who may vote by
absentee ballot in federal elections. See Opposition at 14.
Plaintiffs further argue that the Uniformed and Overseas
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Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C.
U.S.c. §§ 1973ff to
ff-6 ("the Act") is unconstitutional, as it allows absentee
voting by overseas citizens, but not by state residents
who have relocated in Puerto Rico.
While federal law places some limits on the ability
of states to regulate federal elections, [2] it is primarily
the states, not the federal government, that determine the
manner in which presidential electors are chosen.
Anderson v. Celebrezze,
Ce!ebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 n. 18, 103
S.Ct
S.Ct. 1564, 1573 n. 18,75
18, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983); Sanchez,
376 F.Supp. at 241.
The Act, 42 U.S.C.
U.S.c. §§ 1973ff to ff-6, grants U.S.
citizens living abroad the right to vote in federal
elections, as though they were present in their last place
of residence in the United States. The Act specifically
applies to residents of the fifty states--and to residents of
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands and American
Samoa--who live overseas. 42 U.S.c.§§
U.S.C.§§ 1973ff-1,
1973ff-l, ff-6(6).
The Act does not establish the sole criteria for
absentee voting, but rather leaves states free to allow
additional classes of people to vote by absentee ballot
ballot.
Similarly, the Act recognizes that states may impose
additional requirements on absentee voters as long as
these are not inconsistent with federal law.
Page 611

The Act does not prevent persons who have become
qualified to vote in a particular state from continuing to
vote in that state by absentee ballot during a period of
residence elsewhere in the United States.
As defendant properly brings to our attention,
plaintiffs have not cited any provision of federal law
which prohibits them from voting by absentee ballot.
ballot
Furthermore, plaintiffs have apparently not contacted the
states where they resided prior to relocating to Puerto
Rico to inquire about the absentee ballot provisions at
those states. Were they to be denied the right to vote, they
could seek relief from those states. It would be up to the
states in question to determine whether plaintiffs are
'I!:Ialified voters for the purpose of absentee balloting.
'l!:lalified
Therefore, and contrary to plaintiffs' assertions,
neither the Voting Rights Amendments nor the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
impair the ability of
ofplaintiffs
plaintiffs to continue voting for
President and Vice President
President. The issue of whether they
are qualified voters would be one to be determined by the
states where they previously resided. As this would not
be a matter under federal law, plaintiffs' contention fails
to state a claim against the United States upon which
relief can be granted.

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES

allege that the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act is unconstitutional, since it violates
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
component of the Fifth Amendment.
Amendment Plaintiffs argue that
the Act discriminates against U.S. citizens by denying
those who previously voted in presidential elections the
right to absentee voting. See Opposition at 25.
This Court must only entertain unavoidable
constitutional questions. Commonwealth v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53, 55 (1st Cif.
Cir.
1990). If there are suitable alternative grounds, courts
have the duty to avoid the constitutional issues. Benoni v.
Boston and Maine Corp., 828 F.2d 52 (1st Cif.
Cir. 1987).
Although we have found that the complaint fails to bring
a proper case and controversy before the Court, we will,
nonetheless, briefly address plaintiffs' constitutional
challenge.
Under the Due Process Clause, if a statute has a
"reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
[is] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements
of due process are satisfied.... " Nebbiav. New York, 291
502,537,
S.Ct. 505, 516, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934).
U.S. 502,
537, 54 S.Ct
Likewise, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute not
directed at a suspect or quasi-suspect class must be
if it has a rational basis. Clements v. Fashing, 457
upheld ifit
U.S. 957, 967, 102 S.Ct
S.Ct. 2836, 2845, 73 L.Ed.2d 508
(1982)(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
(l982)(citing
483,489, 75 S.Ct.
483,489,75
S.Ct 461,465,99
461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955)); United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
101 S.Ct
S.Ct. 453, 460, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368
177, 179, !OI
(1980); Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181,185,97
181, 185, 97
S.Ct. 431, 434, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976). Since the
distinction drawn in the Act, between U.S. citizens living
abroad and U.S. citizens living within the United States,
does not implicate any suspect or semi-suspect class of
people, it is evaluated under the "rational basis" test for
Equal Protection purposes.
The Act has a legitimate governmental purpose,
namely "to facilitate absentee voting by United States
citizens, both military and civilian, who are overseas."
H.R.Rep. No. 99-765, 1986 U.S.C.CAN. at 2009. It
should be emphasized that the Act does not grant all
overseas state residents the right to vote in presidential
elections. Instead, it grants U.S. citizens living abroad the
right to vote in federal elections--whether for president or
other federal offices--as though they were present in their
last place of residence in the United States.
That the Act is limited to American citizens who are
absent from the country, rather than Americans who
move from place to place within the United States, is
rational and nondiscriminatory. Americans who move
within the United States lose their voting rights in their
old residence while gaining voting rights in their new
residence, whereas Americans who move overseas do

As part of the absentee voting issue, plaintiffs also
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not acquire new voting rights in the country to which
they move. The Act simply ensures that such overseas
citizens can continue voting in federal elections from
their last place of residence as though they were still
there.

\Vhcn a resident ofl'-Je"v
of1'-Je\v York moves abroad, he or
she will not gain voting rights at the new country. The
Act would allow such a voter to retain his or her New
York voting rights. If this same resident of New York
relocated to Puerto Rico, he or she would no longer
participate in New York federal elections, but would gain
voting rights in Puerto Rico--and vote in federal elections
for the Resident Commissioner. Although plaintiffs
consider this change of voting rights as highly
unfavorable, see Opposition at 12-13, this Court finds
that such changes in voting rights are part of the benefits
and burdens of moving to another jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Act has a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, and has a rational basis. The Act is not
unconstitutional, and plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
on which relief can be granted.
In view of the above, and after careful consideration
of the arguments advanced by the parties in their
pleadings and motions, the Court hereby GRANTS
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and
consequently, hereby DISMISSES the instant action
with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief
rei
ief can be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Notes:
[I] See also, Reply Brief in Support of
ofDefendants'
Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, docket No. 31.

[2] For instance, the Voting Rights Amendments of 1970,
42 U.S.c.§
U.S.C.§ 1973aa-l
1973aa-1 (1988), limits the ability of states to
··impose durational residency requirements on individual
voting in presidential elections, yet leaves other matters
to the discretion of the states. SeeOregon v. Mitchell. 400
260,27
U.S. 112,91 S.Ct. 260,
27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970).
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decisions on which appellants rely in support of their
contention that the denial of the franchise to them can
stand only if justified by a compelling state interest are
inapposite. In those cases, unlike the situation here, the
challenged statutes disfranchised individuals who
physically resided within the geographical boundaries of
the governmental entity concerned. Pp.
pp. 66-70.
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U.S. 60 (1978)
439 u.s.
99 S.Ct. 383, 58 L.Ed.2d 292

Holt Civic Club

(b) Alabama's police jurisdiction statutory scheme is
a rational legislative response to the problems faced by
the State's burgeoning cities, and the legislature has a
legitimate interest in ensuring that residents of areas
adjoining city borders be provided such basic municipal
services as police, fire, and health protection. Nor is it
unreasonable for the legislature to require police
jurisdiction residents to contribute through license fees,
as they do here on a reduced scale, to the expense of such
pp. 70-75.
services. Pp.

v.
Qty of Tuscaloosa
No. 77-515
li
United
nited States Supreme Court
Nov. 28.1978
28, 1978
Argued October 11,
II, 1978
APPEAL FROM THE
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
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UNITED

STATES

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

3. The challenged statutes do not violate due
process, since appellants have no constitutional right to
vote in Tuscaloosa elections. P. 75.
Affirmed.

Syllabus
Appellants, a civic association and certain individual
residents of Holt, Ala., a small unincorporated
community outside the corporate limits of Tuscaloosa but
within three miles thereof, brought this statewide class
action challenging the constitutionality of "police
jurisdiction" statutes that extend municipal police,
sanitary, and business licensing powers over those
residing within three miles of certain corporate
boundaries without permitting such residents to vote in
municipal elections. A three-judge District Court granted
appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
appellees'motion
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Held:
I. The convening of a three-judge court under
then-applicable 28 U.S.C.
U.S.c. §2281 (1970 ed.) was proper,
then-applicable28
since appellants challenged the constitutionality of
··199
··!99 S.Ct. 3851 state statutes that created a statewide
system under which Alabama cities exercise
extraterritorial powers. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97,
distinguished. Pp.
pp. 63-65.

2. Alabama's police jurisdiction statutes do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pp. 66-75.
(a) A government unit may legitimately restrict the
right to participate in its political processes to those who
reside within its borders. Various voting qualification
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REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN,
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post. p. 75. BRENNAN, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and
joined, post, p. 79.
MARSHALL, JJ.,
JJ.,joined,post,
REHNQUIST, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion
ofthe
of
the Court.
Holt is a small, largely rural, unincorporated
community located on the northeastern outskirts of
Tuscaloosa, the fifth largest city in Alabama. Because the
community is within the three-mile police jurisdiction
circumscribing Tuscaloosa's corporate limits, its residents
are subject to the city's "police [and] sanitary
regulations." Ala.Code § 11-40-10 (1975).[1] Holt
residents are also subject to the criminal jurisdiction of
the city's court, Ala.Code § 12-14-1 (1975)[2] and to the
city's
Page 62

power to license businesses, trades, and professions,
Ala.Code § 11-51-91 (175).[3] Tuscaloosa, however,
may collect from businesses in the police jurisdiction
only one-half
(99 S.Ct. 3861 of the license fee chargeable to similar
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businesses conducted within the corporate limits. Ibid.

to restrain

In 1973, appellants, an unincorporated civic
association and seven individual residents of Holt,
brought this statewide class action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama[4]
challenging the constitutionality of these Alabama
statutes. They claimed that the city's extraterritorial
exercise of
ofpolice
police powers over Holt residents, without a
concomitant extension of the franchise on an equal
footing with those residing within the corporate limits,
denies residents

the enforcement, operation or execution of any State
statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute ....

Page 63

of the police jurisdiction rights secured by the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The District Court denied appellants'
request to convene a three-judge court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.) and dismissed the complaint for
U.S.c.
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Characterizing the Alabama statutes as enabling
Acts, the District Court held that the statutes lack the
requisite statewide application necessary to convene a
three-judge District Court. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered the convening of a
three-judge court, finding that the police jurisdiction
statute embodies "'a policy of statewide concern.'"
concern."' Holt
Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 525 F.2d 653, 655 (1975),
quoting Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89,
94 (1935).
A three-judge District Court was convened, but
appellants' constitutional claims fared no better on the
merits. Noting that appellants sought a declaration that
extraterritorial regulation is unconstitutional per se, rather
than ar extension of the franchise to police jurisdiction
residents, the District Court held simply that "[ e]qual
protection has not been extended to cover such
contention." App. to Juris.Statement 2a. The court
rejected appellants' due process claim without comment.
Accordingly, appellees' motion to dismiss was granted.
Unsure whether appellants' constitutional attack on
the Alabama statutes satisfied the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.) for convening a three-judge
U.S.c.
district court, we postponed consideration of the
jurisdictional issue until the hearing of the case on the
merits. 435 U.S. 914 (1978). We now conclude that the
three-judge court was properly convened, and that
appellants' constitutional claims were properly rejected.

U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.)
Before itsrepeal,[5] 28 U.S.c.
required that a three-judge district court be convened in
any case in
Page 64

which a preliminary or permanent injunction was sought
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Our decisions have interpreted § 228 I to require the
convening of a three-judge district court
where the challenged statute or regulation, albeit created
or authorized by a state legislature, has statewide
application or effectuates a statewide policy.

Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project,
404 U.S. 541, 542 (1972). Relying on Moody v. Flowers,
387 U.S. 97 (1967), appellees contend, and the original
single-judge District Court held, that Alabama's police
jurisdiction statutes lack statewide impact.
A
(99 S.Ct. 3871 three-judge court was improperly
convened in Moody because the challenged state statutes
had "limited application, concerning only a particular
county involved in the litigation. . .. " Id.
/d. at 104.
I 04. In
contrast, appellants' constitutional attack focuses upon a
state statute that creates the statewide system under which
Alabama cities exercise extraterritorial powers. In
mandatory terms, the statute provides that municipal
police and sanitary ordinances

shall have force and effect in the limits of the city or
town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any
property or rights-of-way belonging to the city or
town.[6]
Clearly, Alabama's police
Page 65

jurisdiction statutes have statewide application. See, e.g.,
Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 107 (1967).
That the named defendants are local officials is irrelevant
where, as here, those officials are "functioning pursuant
to a statewide policy and performing a state function."
Moody v. Flowers, supra, at 102; Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, supra, at 94-95. The convening of a
three-judge District Court was proper.
II

Appellants' amended complaint requested the
District Court to declare the Alabama statutes
unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement insofar
as they authorize the extraterritorial exercise of municipal
powers. Seizing on the District Court's observation that
"[appellants] do not seek extension of the franchise to
themselves," appellants suggest that their complaint was
dismissed because they sought the wrong remedy.
The unconstitutional predicament in which
appellants assertedly found themselves could be remedied
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In only two ways: (I) the city's extraterritorial power
could be negated by invalidating the State's authorizing
statutes, or (2) the right to vote in municipal elections
could be extended to residents of the police jurisdiction.
We agree with appellants that a federal court should not
dismiss a meritorious constitutional claim because the
complaint seeks one remedy rather than another plainly
appropriate one. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,
every final judgment shall grant the relief
Page 66
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
e!_ltitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
e!.ltitled,
his pleadings.
Rule 54(
c). Thus, although the prayer for relief may
54(c).
be looked to for illumination when there is doubt as to the
substantive theory under which a plaintiff is proceeding,
its omissions are not, in and of themselves, a barrier to
redress of a meritorious claim. See, e.g., 61.
6 J. Moore, W.
Taggart, & 1.
J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ~ 54.62,
pp. 1261-1265 (2d ed.l976).
ed.1976). But while a meritorious
·claim
'claim will not be rejected for want of a prayer for
appropriate relief, a claim lacking substantive merit
obviously should be rejected. We think it is clear from
the pleadings in this case that
[99 S.Ct. 3881
388[ appellants have alleged no claim
cognizable under the United States Constitution.
A

Appellants focus their equal protection attack on §
11-40-10, the statute fixing the limits of municipal police
jurisdiction and giving extraterritorial effect to municipal
police and sanitary ordinances. Citing Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), and cases
following in its wake, appellants argue that the section
creates a classification infringing on their right to
participate in municipal elections. The State's denial of
the franchise to police jurisdiction residents, appellants
urge, can stand only ifjustified by a compelling state
interest.
At issue in Kramer was a New York voter
qualification statute that limited the vote in school district
elections to otherwise qualified district residents who (I)
.either owned or leased taxable real property located
within the district, (2) were married to persons owning or
leasing qualifYing property, or (3)were parents or
guardians of children enrolled in a local district school
for a specified time during the preceding year. Without
deciding whether or not a State may in some
circumstances limit the franchise to residents primarily
interested in or primarily affected by the activities of a
Page 67
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given governmental unit, the Court held that the statute
was not sufficiently tailored to meet that state interest,
since its classifications excluded many bona fide
residents of the school district who had distinct and direct
interests in school board decisions, and included many
residents whose interests in school affairs were, at best,
remote and indirect.
On the same day, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969), the Court upheld an equal protection
challenge to a Louisiana law providing that only
"property taxpayers" could vote in elections called to
approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal
utility system. Operation of the utility system affected
virtually every resident of the city, not just property
owners, and the bonds were in no way financed by
property tax revenue. Thus, since the benefits and
burdens of the bond issue fell indiscriminately on
property owner and nonproperty owner alike, the
challenged classification
impermissibly
excluded
otherwise qualified residents who were substantially
affected by and directly interested in the matter put to a
referendum. The rationale of Cipriano was subsequently
called upon to invalidate an Arizona law restricting the
franchise to property taxpayers in elections to approve
the issuance of general obligation municipal bonds.
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).

Appellants also place heavy reliance on Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). In Evans, the Permanent
Board of Registry of
Montgomery County, Md. ruled that
ofMontgomery
persons living on the grounds of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), a federal enclave located within the
geographical boundaries of the State, did not meet the
residency requirement of the Maryland Constitution.
Accordingly, NIH residents were denied the right to vote
in Maryland elections. This Court rejected the notion that
persons living on NIH grounds were not residents of
Maryland:
Appellees clearly live within the geographical boundaries
ofthe State of Maryland, and they are treated as state
Page 68
residents in the census and in determining congressional
Maryland only
apportionment. They are not residents of
ofMaryland
if the NIH grounds ceased to be a part of Maryland when
the enclave was created. However, that "fiction of a state
within a state" was specifically rejected by this Court in
Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624,
627 (1953), and it cannot be resurrected here to deny
appellees the right to vote.

Id at 421-422. Thus, because inhabitants ofthe NIH
enclave were residents of Maryland and were
[99 S.Ct. 3891
389[
just as interested in and connected with electoral
decisions as the were prior to 1953,
I 953, when the area came
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under federal jurisdiction, and as their neighbors who live
off the enclave,
id. at 426, the State could not deny them the equal
right to vote in Maryland elections.

From these and our other voting qualifications cases,
a common characteristic emerges: the challenged statute
\Vho \vere
\Vere
in each case denied the fra.71chise to individuals \vhe
physically resident within the geographic boundaries of
the governmental entity concerned. See, e.g., Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (invalidating provision of the
Texas Constitution restricting franchise on general
'obligation bond issue to residents who had "rendered" or
·obligation
listed real, mixed, or personal property for taxation in the
election district); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating Virginia statute
conditioning the right to vote of otherwise qualified
residents on payment of a poll tax); cf Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346 (1970) (invalidating Georgia statute
restricting county school board membership to residents
owning real property in the county). No decision of this
Court has extended the "one man, one vote" principle to
individuals residing beyond the geographic confines of
the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its
political subdivisions. On the contrary, our cases have
unifonnly recognized that a government unit may
uniformly
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political
processes to those who reside within its
Page 69

borders. See, e.g.. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
343-344 ((1972);
1972); Evans v. Cornman. supra at 422;
Dist.. 395 U.S. at 625:
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (\965);
(1965); Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (\904).
(1904). Bona fide residence
alone, however, does not automatically confer the right to
'~ote
-~ote on all matters, for at least in the context of special
interest elections the State may constitutionally
disfranchise residents who lack the required special
interest in the subject matter of the election. See Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
To/tee
U.S. 719 (1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec
Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973).
Appellants' argument that extraterritorial extension
of municipal powers requires concomitant extraterritorial
extension of the franchise proves too much. The
imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot
corral the influence of municipal actions. A city's
decisions
inescapably
affect individuals living
immediately outside its borders. The granting of building
permits
penn
its for high rise apartments, industrial plants, and the
like on the city's fringe unavoidably contributes to
problems of
oftraffic
traffic congestion, school districting, and law
enforcement immediately outside the city. A rate change
in the city's sales or ad valorem tax could well have a
significant impact on retailers and property values in
areas bordering the city. The condemnation of real
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property on the city's edge for construction of a municipal
garbage dump or waste treatment plant would have
obvious implications for neighboring nonresidents.
Indeed, the indirect extraterritorial effects of many purely
internal municipal actions could conceivably have a
heavier impact on surrounding environs than the direct
regulation contemplated by Alabama's police jurisdiction
statutes. Yet no one would suggest that nonresidents
likely to be affected by this sort of municipal action have
a constitutional right to participate in the political
processes bringing it about. And unless one adopts the
idea that the
Page 70

Austinian notion of sovereignty, which is presumably
embodied to some extent in the authority of a city over a
police jurisdiction, distinguishes the direct effects of
limited municipal powers over police jurisdiction
residents from the indirect though equally dramatic
extraterritorial effects of
(99 S.Ct. 390( purely internal municipal actions, it makes
little sense to say that one requires extension of the
franchise, while the other does not.

Given this country's tradition of popular sovereignty,
appellants' claimed right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections
is not without some logical appeal. We are mindful,
however, ofMr. Justice Holmes' observation in Hudson
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908):
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their
logical extreme. Yet all, in fact, are limited by the
neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than
those on which the particular right is founded, and which
become strong enough to hold their own when a certain
point is reached. . . . The boundary at which the
conflicting interests balance cannot be detennined
determined by any
formula in advance, but points in the line, or
general fonnula
helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or
that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.
The line heretofore marked by this Court's voting
qualifications decisions coincides with the geographical
boundary of
ofthe
the governmental unit at issue, and we hold
that appellants' case, like their homes falls on the farther
side.
B

Thus stripped of its voting rights attire, the equal
protection issue presented by appellants becomes whether
the Alabama statutes giving extraterritorial force to
certain municipal ordinances and powers bear some
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
I (1973).
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation
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merely because
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In support of heir equal protection claim, appellants
suggest a number of "constitutionally preferable"
governmental alternatives to Alabama' system of
municipal police jurisdictions. For example, exclusive
management of the police jurisdiction by county officials,
appellants maintain, would be more "practical." From a
political science standpoint, appellants' suggestions may
be sound, but this Court does

it is special, or limited in its application to a particular
geographical or political subdivision ofthe state.
Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving Dist., 274 U.S. 387,
(! 927). Rather, the Equal
39! (1927).
Equa! Protection Clause is
offended only if the statute's classification "rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
MGiyland, 366 U.S. 420,
State's objective." McGowan v. MQlyland,
425 (1961);
( 1961 ); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).

[99 S.Ct. 3921
392] not sit to determine whether Alabama has
chosen the soundest or
Page 74

Government, observed Mr. Justice Johnson, "is the
science of experiment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204,
22.6 (1821),
( 1821 ), and a State is afforded wide leeway when
226
experimenting with the appropriate allocation of state
legislative power. This Court has often recognized that
political subdivisions such as cities and counties are
created by the State "as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State
as may be entrusted to them." Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161, 178 (1907). See also e.g.. Sailors v. Board of
Education. 387 U.S. at 108; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 575 (1964). In Hunter v. Pittsburgh, the Court
discussed at length the relationship between a State and
its political subdivisions, remarking:
number, nature and duration of the powers conferred
The number.
(municipal] corporations and the territory over
upon [municipal]
which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute
discretion of the State.

207 U.S. at 178. While the broad statements as to
state control over municipal corporations contained in
Hunter have undoubtedly been qualified by the holdings
oflater cases such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist..
supra, we think that the case continues to have substantial
supra.
constitutional
significance
in
the
emphasizing
extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating
various types of political subdivisions and conferring
them. [7]
authority upon them,
Page 72
(99 S.Ct. 3911
municipal
391( The extraterritorial exercise of
ofmunicipal
powers is a governmental technique neither recent in
origin nor unique to the State of Alabama. See R.
Maddox, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities in the
country, 35 States authorize
,United
(1955). In this country.
,united States (1955),
their municipal subdivisions to exercise governmental
powers beyond their corporate limits. Comment, The
Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterritorial
Powers by Municipalities, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 151 (1977).
Although the extraterritorial municipal powers granted by
these States vary widely, several States grant their cities
more extensive or intrusive powers over bordering areas
than those granted under the Alabama statutes.[8]
statutes. [8]

most practical form of internal government possible.
Authority to make those judgments resides in the state
legislature, and Alabama citizens are free to urge their
e.g.,.. Hunter v. Pittsburgh.
proposals to that body. See, e.g
207 U.S. at 179. Our inquiry is limited to the question
whether "any state offacts
of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justifY" Alabama's system of police jurisdictions,
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. at 732, and, in this case, it takes but
momentary reflection to arrive at an affirmative answer.
The Alabama Legislature could have decided that
municipal corporations should have some measure of
control over activities carried onjust
on just beyond their "city
limit" signs, particularly since today's police jurisdiction
may be tomorrow's annexation to the city proper. Nor
need the city's interests have been the only concern of the
legislature when it enacted the police jurisdiction statutes.
Urbanization of any area brings with it a number of
individuals who long both for the quiet of suburban or
country living and for the career opportunities offered by
the city's working environment. Unincorporated
m<Uor
communities like Holt dot the rim of most m<uor
population centers in Alabama and elsewhere, and state
legislatures have a legitimate interest in seeing that this
substantial segment of the population does not go without
basic municipal services such as police, fire, and health
Establ ished cities are experienced in the
protection. Established
delivery of such services, and the incremental cost of
extending the city's responsibility in these areas to
surrounding environs may be substantially less than the
expense of establishing wholly new service organizations
in each community.
Nor was it unreasonable for the Alabama Legislature
to require police jurisdiction residents to contribute
through license fees to the expense of services provided
them by the city. The statutory limitation on license fees
to half the amount exacted within the city assures that
police jurisdiction residents will not be victimized by the
city government.
Page 75
Viable local governments may need many innovations,
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numerous combination of old and new devices, great
an'angements to meet changing
flexibility in municipal an·angements
urban conditions.

Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. at 110-111.
T-his observation in Sailors was doubtless as true at the
turn of this century, when urban areas throughout the
country were temporally closer to the effects of the
industrial revolution. Alabama's police jurisdiction
statute, enacted in 1907, was a rational legislative
response to the problems faced by the State's burgeoning
cities. Alabama is apparently content with the results of
its experiment, and nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause of
ofthe
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that it try
.~omething new.

cC
Appellants also argue that "governance without the
franchise is a fundamental violation of the due process
clause." Brief for Appellants 28. Support for this
proposition is alleged to come from United States v.
Texas, 252 F.Supp. 234 (WD Tex.) (three-judge District
Texas.
Court), summarilyaffd, 384 U.S. 155 (1966), which held
that conditioning the franchise of otherwise qualified
voters on payment of a poll tax denied due process to
many Texas voters. Appellants' argument proceeds from
the assumption, earlier shown to be erroneous, supra at
66-70, that they have a right to vote in Tuscaloosa
elections. Their conclusion falls with their premise.

Ill
III
[n
In sum, we conclude that Alabama's police
jurisdiction statutes violate neither the Equal Protection
Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the District
Court is

Affirmed.
STEVENS. J., concurring
(99 S.Ct. 3931
393( MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
199

The Court today holds that the Alabama statutes
providing for the extraterritorial exercise of certain
limited powers by
Page 76

municipalities are not unconstitutional. While I join the
opinion of the Court, [I write separately to emphasize that
this holding does not make all exercises of extraterritorial
authority by a municipality immune from attack under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The A[abama
Alabama Legislature, which is elected by all of
the citizens of the State, including the individual
appellants, has prescribed a statewide program pursuant
to which residents of police jurisdictions are subject to
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limited regulation by, and receive certain services from,
adjacent cities. In return, those residents who are engaged
in business are charged [[icense
icense fees equal to one-half
those charged to city businesses. In my view, there is
nothing necessarily unconstitutional about such a system.
Certainly there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to
prevent a suburb from contracting with a nearby city to
provide municipal services for its residents, even though
those residents have no voice in the election of the city's
fonnulation of the city's rules. That is
officials or in the formulation
essentially what Alabama has accomplished here, through
the elected representatives of all its citizens in the state
legislature. [I)
Of course, in structuring a system, neither a
contracting suburb nor an enacting legislature can
consent to a waiver of the constitutional rights of its
constituents in the election process. For
when the State delegates lawmaking power to local
government and provides for the election of local
officials from districts specified by statute, ordinance, or
local charter, it must insure that those qualified to vote
have the right to an equally effective voice in the election
process.

Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 4474,480.
74, 480.
Page 77
But the fact that these appellants are subject to
certain regulations of the municipality does not, itself,
establish that they are "qualified to vote." Unlike the
residents of the National Institutes of Health enclave at
issue in Evansv. Cornman,
Cornman,398
398 U.S. 419, appellants are
not without any voice in the election of the officials who
govern their affairs. They do vote for the county, state,
and federal officials who exercise primary control over
their day-to-day lives. And even as to their interaction
with the government of the city, appellants are not
completely without a voice: through their state
representatives, they participate directly in the process
which has created their governmental relationship with
the city. The question then is whether, by virtue of that
relationship created by state law, the residents of Holt and
all other police jurisdictions in the State are entitled to a
voice "equally effective" with the residents of the
of the officials
municipalities themselves in the election ofthe
responsible for governing the municipalities.

In my judgment, they are not. A State or city is free
under the Constitution to require that "all applicants for
the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide
residence." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96. While it
is not free to draw residency lines which deny the
franchise to individuals who "are just as interested in and
connected with electoral decisions . . . as are their
neighbors" who are entitled to vote, Evans v. Cornman.
supra at 426, the Alabama statutes, at least on their face,
do not do so. The powers of extraterritorial jurisdiction
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granted by the challenged statutes are limited.
Tuscaloosa, for example, does not tax the residents of
Holt, nor does it control the zoning of their property or
.the operation of
(99 S.Ct. 394( their schools. Indeed, many of the powers
--the
traditionally exercised by municipalities -the provision
of parks, hospitals, schools, and libraries and the
construction and repair of bridges and highways -- are
entrusted here to the county government, which is fully
representative of Holt. Nor is

Alabama creates by statute an area of "police
jurisdiction" encompassing all adjoining territory within
three miles of the corporate limits of cities with a
population of 6,00 or more. Within this police jurisdiction
Alabama law provides that
[[0o]rdinances of a city ... enforcing police or sanitary
regulations and prescribing fines and penalties for
violations thereof shall have force and effect. ...
Ala.Code § 11-4010
I 1-4010 (1975).[1] Alabama law
provides in addition that a city

Page 78

there any claim that residency lines have generally been
drawn invidiously, or that residents of the police
jurisdictions have been charged unreasonable costs for
the services they.receive. In sum, appellants have shown
no more than that they and all residents of police
jUrisdictions in Alabama are subject to some -- but by no
means all -- of the regulations and services afforded by
the cities to their residents, in return for which they pay
license fees half as great as those paid by city residents.
Such a showing is plainly insufficient to justify a holding
that the Alabama statutes are unconstitutional and cannot
be applied anywhere in the State.
This is all that the Court decides today. For this suit
~as brought under the then-applicable three-judge court
jurisdiction as a challenge to the constitutionality ofthe
of the
Alabama statutes.[2] Appellants did not merely challenge
the statutes as applied in the Tuscaloosa police
jurisdiction. Rather, they sought to represent all Alabama
residents living in contiguous zones, and to have the
statutes at issue here declared unconstitutional in all their
applications throughout the State. It was for this very
reason that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
concluded that three-judge court jurisdiction was proper
in this case. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa.
Tuscaloosa, 525 F.2d
653, 655 (175).
(I 75). And it is for this reason that our holding
is necessarily a limited one. The statutory scheme created
by the Alabama Legislature is not unconstitutional by its
terms, but it may well be, as the opinion of the Court
recognizes, ante at 72-73, n. 8, that that scheme or
another much like it might sometimes operate to deny the
franchise to individuals who share the interests of their
voting neighbors. No such question, however, is
presented by this appeal from the decision of the
three-judge District Court. See Moody v.
Page 79

Flowers, 387 U.S. 97; Rorick v. Board of Comm'rs, 307
_U.S. 208.
.U.S.208.

BRENNAN, J., dissenting
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR.
JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join,
dissenting.
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may fix and collect licenses for any business, trade or
profession done within the police jurisdiction of such
city ... provided, that the amount of such licenses shall
not be more than one half the amount charged and
collected as a license for like business, trade or profession
done within the corporate limits of such city ....
I 1-51-91 (1975).[2] At the time this
Ala.Code § 11-51-91
lawsuit commenced on August 7, 1973, Alabama vested
jurisdiction of the prosecution of breaches of municipal
ordinances occurring within a police jurisdiction in a
recorder's court,[3] the recorder being elected by a city's
(99 S.Ct. 395( board of commissioners. Ala.Code,
Ala. Code, Tit.
37, § 584 (1958).[4]
Page 80

Appellants are the Holt Civic Club and seven
residents of the unincorporated community of Holt,
which lies within the police jurisdiction of the city of
Tuscaloosa, Ala.[5] Although appellants are thus subject
to Tuscaloosa's police and sanitary ordinances, to the
jurisdiction of its municipal court,[6] and to the
requirements of its licensing fees, appellants are not
permitted to vote in Tuscaloosa's municipal elections, or
to participate in or to initiate Tuscaloosa's referenda or
recall elections. AppeIlants
Appellants claim that this disparity
"infringes on their constitutional right (under the due
process and equal protection clauses) to a voice in their
government." Complaint ~ I II.. The three-judge District
Court below dismissed appellants' equal protection and
due process claims.[7] Without reaching the due process
issue, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court
and hold that appellants' equal protection claim should
have been sustained.
It is, of course, established that, once a

franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
665 ((1966).
1966). Because "statutes distributing the franchise
Page 81
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constitute the foundation of our representative society,"
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969),
( 1969), we have subjected such statutes to "exacting
judicial scrutiny." !d.
Jd. at 628.[8] Indeed,
if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some
citizens and denies the franchise to others, "the Court
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to
promote a compelling state interest." [Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S.] at 627 (emphasis added).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972). The
general rule is that,

whenever a state or local government decides to select
persons by popular election to perform governmental
Junctions, the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be
given an equal opportunity to participate in that election..

Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56
(1970).

Our decisions before today have held that bona fide
residency requirements are an acceptable means of
distinguishing qualified from unqualified voters. Dunn v.
Blumstein. supra at 343. The Court holds today, however,
that the restriction of the franchise to those residing
within the corporate limits of the
199 S.Ct. 3961 city ofTuscaloosa
of Tuscaloosa is such a bona fide
residency requirement. The Court rests this holding on
the conclusion that "a government unit may legitimately
restrict the right to participate in its political processes to
those who reside within its borders." Ante at 68-69. The
Court thus insulates the Alabama statutes challenged in
this case from the strict judicial scrutiny ordinarily
applied to state laws distributing the franchise. In so
doing, the Court cedes to geography a talismanic
significance contrary to the theory and meaning of our
_past voting rights cases.
.past

We have previously held that, when statutes
distributing the franchise depend upon residency
requirements, state law
Page 82

characterizations of residency are not controlling for
purposes of
ofthe
the Fourteenth Amendment. See . e.g., Evans
v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965). Indeed, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,
was careful to exempt from strict judicial scrutiny only
bona fide residency
requirements that were
"appropriately defined and uniformly applied." 405 U.S.
at 343. The touchstone for determining whether a
residency requirement is "appropriately defined" derives
from the purpose of such requirements, which, as stated
in Dunn. is "to preserve the basic conception of a political
community." !d.
Id. at 344. At the heart of our basic
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conception of a "political community," however, is the
notion of a reciprocal relationship between the process of
government and those who subject themselves to that
process by choosing to live within the area of its
application.[9]
Cf Avery v. Midland County,
authoritative application.
[9] Cj
390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). Statutes such as those
challenged in this case, which fracture this relationship
by severing the connection between the process of
government and those who are governed in the places of
their residency, thus undermine the very purposes which
have led this Court in the past to approve the application
of bona fide residency requirements.
There is no question but that the residents of
Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction are governed by the
city.[IO] Under Alabama
Page 83

law, a municipality exercises "governing" and
"lawmaking" power over its police jurisdiction. City of
Nomewood
Homewood v. Wofford Oil Co., 232 Ala. 634,637,
634, 637, 169
So. 288,-290 (1936).
( 1936). Residents ofTuscaloosa's
of Tuscaloosa's police
jurisdiction are subject
Page 84

to license fees exacted by the city, as well as to the city's
police and sanitary regulations, which can be enforced
through penal sanctions effective in the city's municipal
court. See Birmingham v. Lake, 243 Ala. 367, 372, 10
So.2d
SO.2d 24,
24,28
28 ((1942).
1942). The Court seems to imply, however,
that residents of the police jurisdiction are not governed
enough to be included within the political community of
Tuscaloosa, since they are not subject to Tuscaloosa's
powers of eminent domain, zoning,
Page 85

or ad valorem taxation. Ante at 73 n. 8. But this position
is sharply contrary to our previous holdings. In Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist.,
DiS!., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), for
example, we held that residents of a school district who
neither owned nor leased taxable real property located
within the district, or were not married to someone who
did, or were not parents or guardians of children enrolled
in a local district school, nevertheless were sufficiently
affected by the decisions of the local school board to
make the denial of their franchise in local school board
elections a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Houma,, 395
Similarly, we held in Cipriano v. City of Houma
U.S. 701 (1969), that a Louisiana statute limiting the
franchise in municipal utility system revenue bond
referenda to those who were "property taxpayers" was
unconstitutional because all residents of
ofthe
the municipality
were affected by the operation of the utility system. See
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
( 1970).
ofTuscaloosa's
Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction are
The residents of
vastly more affected by Tuscaloosa's decisionmaking
processes than were the plaintiffs in either Kramer or
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Cipriano affected by the decisionmaking processes from
which they had been unconstitutionally excluded. Indeed,
under Alabama law, Tuscaloosa's authority to create and
enforce police and sanitary regulations represents an
-~xtensive reservoir of power "to prevent, an anticipation
'~xtensive
of danger to come, .. and, in so doing, to curb and
restrain the individual tendency." Gilchrist Drug Co. v.
Birmingham, 234 Ala. 204,
204,208,
174 So. 609,
609,612
Birmingham.
208,174
612 (1937).
See Cooper v. Town of Valley Head, 212 Ala. 125, 126,
101 So. 874, 875 (1924). A municipality, for example,
may use its police powers to regulate, or even to ban,
common professions and businesses.
In the exertion and application ofthe
of the police power, there
is to be observed the sound distinction as to useful and
harmless trades, occupations and businesses and as to
businesses, occupations and trades recognized as hurtful
to public morals, public safety,
~age

86

mJunous to public good. In
productive of disorder or InJunous
applying it to the class last mentioned, it may be exerted
to destroy.
Chappell v. Birmingham.
Birmingham, 236 Ala. 363, 365, 181 So.
906,907 (1938). The Court today does not explain why
being subjected to the authority to exercise such
extensive power does not suffice to bring the residents of
.Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction within the political
community of the city. Nor does the Court in fact provide
any standards for determining when those subjected to
extraterritorial municipal legislation will have been
"governed enough" to trigger the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause.

The criterion of geographical residency relied upon
by the Court is of no assistance in this analysis. Just as a
State may not fracture the integrity of a political
community by restricting the franchise to property
taxpayers, so it may not use geographical restrictions on
the franchise to accomplish the same end. This is the
teaching of Evans v. Cornmal1.Evans
Cornman.£vans held, contrary to the
conclusion ofthe
of the Maryland Court of Appeals, that those
who lived on the grounds of the National Institutes of
H-ealth (NIH) enclave within Montgomery County were
residents of Maryland for purposes of the franchise. Our
decision rested on the grounds that inhabitants of the
enclave were "treated as state residents in the census and
in determining congressional apportionment," 398 U.S. at
42 I, and that

of Maryland. True, inhabitants of the enclave lived
"within the geographical boundaries of the State of
Maryland," but appellants in this case similarly reside
within the geographical boundaries of
Tuscaloosa's
ofTuscaloosa's
Page 87
police jurisdiction. They live within the perimeters of the
"iegisiaiive powers." City of Leeds v. Town of
city's "iegisiative
Moody, 294 Ala. 496, 50 I, 319 So.2d 242, 246 (1975).
( 1975).

The criterion of geographical residency is thus
entirely arbitrary when applied to this case. It fails to
explain why, consistently with the Equal Protection
Clause, the "government unit" which may exclude from
the franchise those who reside outside of its geographical
boundaries should be composed of the city of Tuscaloosa,
rather than of the city together with its police jurisdiction.
It irrationally distinguishes between two classes of
citizens, each with equal claim to residency (insofar as
that can be determined by domicile or intention or other
similar criteria), and each governed by the city of
Tuscaloosa in the place of their residency.
The Court argues, however, that, if the franchise
were extended to residents of the city's police
jurisdiction, the franchise must similarly be extended to
all those indirectly affected by the city's actions. This is a
simple non sequitur. There is a crystal-clear distinction
between those who reside in Tuscaloosa's police
jurisdiction, and who are therefore subject to that city's
police and sanitary ordinances, licensing fees, and the
jurisdiction of
ofits
its municipal court, and those who reside
in neither the city nor its police jurisdiction, and who are
thus merely affected by the indirect impact of the city's
decisions. This distinction is recognized in Alabama law,
cf Roberson v. City of Montgomery, 285 Ala. 421, 233
So.2d
SO.2d 69 ((1970),
1970), and is consistent with, ifnot
if not mandated
by, the very conception of a political community
underlying constitutional recognition of bona fide
residency requirements.

Appellants' equal protection claim can be simply
expressed: the State cannot extend the franchise to some
citizens who are governed by municipal government in
the places oftheir
of their residency, and withhold the franchise
from others similarly situated, unless this distinction is
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. No such
interest has been articulated
Page 88

residents of the NIH grounds are just as interested in and
connected with electoral decisions as they were prior to
.-1953,
..1953, when the area came under federal jurisdiction, and
as are their neighbors who live off the enclave.

in this case. Neither Tuscaloosa's interest in regulating
"activities carried on just beyond [its] ·city
'city limit' signs,"
ante at 74, nor Alabama's interest in providing municipal
services to

!d.
Id. at 426. Residents of Tuscaloosa's police
jurisdiction are assuredly as "interested in and connected
with" the electoral decisions of the city as were the
inhabitants of the NIH enclave in the electoral decisions

[99 S.Ct. 399[ the unincorporated communities
surrounding its cities, ibid., are in any way inconsistent
with the extension of the franchise to residents of
Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction. Although a great many
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States may presently authorize the exercise of
municipality,[ll]
extraterritorial lawmaking powers by a municipality,[\
I]
and although the Alabama statutes involved in this case
may be of venerable age, neither of these factors, as
1964), made clear, can
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 ((1964),
serve to justify practices otherwise impermissible under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A.mendment.
Therefore, since the statutes challenged by
appellants distinguish among otherwise qualified voters
without a compelling justification, I would reverse the
judgment of the District Court and hold the challenged
statutes to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

.Notes:

judgment, bear relation to the planning of such
municipality.
Under Ala.Code §§ 11-52-30 and 11-52-31 (1975), also
not contested here, the municipal planning commission is
required to adopt regulations governing the subdivision
of land within its jurisdiction, which includes all land
lying within five miles of the municipality's corporate
bmits and not iocated
iimits
located within the corporate limits of any
other municipality.
[4] This suit was instituted prior to the 1975
recompilation of the Alabama Code. Other than minor
I I 100 and § 11-5
ll-51-91
I -91 are identical to
stylistic changes, § Ill
Ala. Code, Tit. 37, §§ 9 and 733
their predecessors, Ala.Code,
(1958), respectively. Section 12-14-1 abolished the
recorder's courts created under is predecessor, Ala.
Code,
Ala.Code,
Tit. 37, § 585 (1958), and replaced them with municipal
courts having similar extraterritorial jurisdiction.

[\]
[I] The full text of
of§§ 11-40-10 provides:
1976, 90 Stat. 1119.
[5] Pub.L. 9381, § l,
I, Aug. 12, 1976,90
The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or more
inhabitants shall cover all adjoining territory within three
miles of the corporate limits, and in cities having less
than 6,000 inhabitants and in towns, such police
jurisdiction shall extend also to the adjoining territory
within a mile and a half of the corporate limits of such
city or town.
Ordinances ofa
of a city or town enforcing police or sanitary
regulations and prescribing fines and penalties for
violations thereof shall have force and effect in the limits
of the city or town and in the police jurisdiction thereof
and
aiid on any property or rights-of-way belonging to the
city or town.
[2]
The municipal court shall have jurisdiction of all
prosecutions for the breach of the ordinances of the
municipality within its police jurisdiction.
Ala.Code § 12-14-l(b)
12-14-I(b) (1975).
[3] In pertinent part
part§§ 11-51-91 provides:
[3]1n
Any city or town within the state of Alabama may fix and
collect licenses for any business, trade or profession done
within the police jurisdiction of such city or town but
outside the corporate limits thereof; provided, that the
ofsuch
amount of
such licenses shall not be more than one half
the amount charged and collected as a license for like
business, trade or profession done within the corporate
limits of such city or town, fees and penalties excluded.

Although not at issue here, Ala.Code § 11-52-8 (1975)
imposes a duty on the municipal planning commission
to make and adopt a master plan for the physical
development of the municipality, including any areas
outside of its boundaries which, in the commission's
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[6] Ala.Code § 11-40-10 (1975) (emphasis added). The
Alabama Supreme Court has recognized the mandatory
11-40-l 0. In City of Leeds v. Town of Moody.
nature of § 11-40-10.
294 Ala. 496, 319 SO.2d
So.2d 242 (1975),
(I 975), the court rejected
the contention that the city of Leeds had, by
discontinuing police and fire protection in its police
jurisdiction, "waived and relinquished its police
I 9 SO.2d
So.2d at 246.
jurisdiction over the area." !d.
Id. at 502, 3
319
Since a municipality cannot barter away a governmental
power specifically delegated to it by the legislature, ... it
follows that it also cannot waive or relinquish such
power.
lbid.See
Ibid. See also Trailway Oil Co. v. Mobile, 271 Ala. 218,
SO.2d 757, 762 (1960) ("[Section] 9 ofTitIe
ofTitle 37
224, 122 So.2d
[now § 11-40-10],
11-40-1 0], describing the territorial extent of the
municipal police jurisdiction and the incidents thereof,
and § 733 ofTitIe
and§
ofTitle 37 [now
[now§§ 11-51-91], as amended,
authorizing and regulating the fixing and collecting of
licenses within the police jurisdiction of cities and towns,
are general laws, and, as such, they are considered part of
every municipal charter"); Coursey v. City of Andalusia.
24 Ala.App. 247, 247-248, 134 So. 671 (1931) ("Under
the statute [§ 11-40-10] the police jurisdiction extends to
all the adjoining territory within a mile and a half of the
ofthe
the
corporate limits of said city, and ... ordinances of
city enforcing police or sanitary regulations . . . have
force and effect not only in the limits of the city, but also
in the police jurisdiction thereof').
[7] In this case, residents of the police jurisdiction are
excluded only from participation in municipal elections,
since they reside outside of Tuscaloosa's corporate limits.
This "denial of the franchise," as appellants put it, does
not have anything like the far-reaching consequences of
the denial of the franchise in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419 (1970).
( 1970). There, the Court pointed out that,
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[i]n nearly every election, federal, state, and local, for
offices from the Presidency to the school board, and on
the entire variety of other ballot propositions, appellees
have a stake equal to that of other Maryland residents.
'1d.
·Jd. at 426. Treatment of the plaintiffs in Evans as
nonresidents of Maryland had repercussions not merely
with respect to their right to vote in city elections, but
meir right iu
tu vuk
wilh
with resped
respet:l lu iheir
vuie in national,
naiionai, siaie, school
board, and referendum elections.

[8] Municipalities in some States have almost
unrestricted governmental powers over surrounding
unincorporated territories. For example, South Dakota
cities
have power to exercise jurisdiction for all authorized
purposes over all territory within the corporate limits ...
and in and over all places, except within the corporate
limits of another municipality, within one mile of the
c.Qrporate limits or of any public ground or park
belonging to the municipality outside the corporate limits,
for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare ofthe community, and of enforcing
its ordinances and resolutions relating thereto.
S.D.Comp.Laws Ann.§
Ann. § 9-29-1 (1967).
North Dakota's statutory grant
municipal powers is similarly broad:

of extraterritorial

Except as otherwise provided by law, a governing body
of a municipality shall have jurisdiction:

****
2. In and over all places within one-half mile of the
municipal limits for the purpose of enforcing health and
quarantine ordinances and regulations and police
regulations and ordinances adopted to promote the peace,
order, safety, and general welfare of the municipality.
N.D.Cent.Code
ND.Cent.Code § 4001(2) (1968).
Cities in many States are statutorily authorized to zone
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann.
Rev. Stat.Ann. §
extraterritorially, see. e.g.. Ariz.
9-240-B-21(c)
9·240-B-2l(c) (1977); Mich.Comp.Laws § 125.36
a power not
(1970); N.D.Cent.Code § 11-35-02 (1976), apower
afforded Alabama municipalities. See Roberson v. City of
MontgomelY.
SO.2d 69 (1970).
Montgome1y. 285 Ala. 421,233 So.2d
By setting forth these various state provisions respecting
extraterritorial powers of cities, we do not mean to imply
that every one of them would pass constitutional muster.
We do not have before us, of course, a situation in which
a city has annexed outlying territory in all but name, and
"is exercising precisely the same governmental powers
over residents of surrounding unincorporated territory as
it does over those residing within its corporate limits. See
Little Thunder v. South Dakota.
Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253 (CA8
1975). Nor do we have here a case like Evans v.

SC 38417-2011

Cornman, supra, where NIH residents were subject to
such "important aspects of state powers" as Maryland's
authority "to levy and collect [its] income, gasoline,
sales, and use taxes," and were "just as interested in and
connected with electoral decisions as ... their neighbors
who live[d]
423,424,
424, 426.
live[ d) off the enclave." 398 U.S. at 423,

Appellants have made neither an allegation nor a showing
that the authority exercised by the city of Tuscaloosa
within the police jurisdiction is no less than that exercised
by the city within its corporate limits. The minute catalog
of ordinances of the city of Tuscaloosa which have
extraterritorial effect set forth by our dissenting Brethren,
post at 82-84, n. 10,
I 0, is as notable for what it does not
include as for what it does. While the burden was on
appellants to establish a difference in treatment violative
of the Equal Protection Clause, we are bound to observe
that among the powers not included in the "addendum" to
appellants' brief referred to by the dissent are the vital
and traditional authorities of cities and towns to levy ad
valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and
zone property for various types of uses.
[I] I recognize that there is a difference between a
suburb's decision to contract with a nearby city and a
decision by the state legislature requiring all suburbs to
do so. In some situations, that difference might justifY a
holding that a particular extraterritorial delegation of
power is unconstitutional. It does not, however, justifY
the view that all such delegations are invalid.

[2] 28 U.s.c.
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub.L.
§ I, Aug. 12,1976,90
9381, §I,
12, 1976,90 Stat. 1119.
[I] At the time this lawsuit commenced, this statute was
codified at Ala.Code,
Ala. Code, Tit. 37, § 9 (1958).

[2] At the time appellants filed their complaint, this
statute was found at Ala.Code,
Ala. Code, Tit. 37, § 733 (1958).
Minor changes in wording were effected during
recodification.
[3] Alabama Code, Tit. 37, § 585 (1958) provided:
It shall be the duty of the recorder to keep an office in the
city, and hear and determine all cases for the breach of
the ordinances and by-laws of the city that may be
brought before him, and he shall make report, at least
once a month, of all fines, penalties and forfeitures
imposed by him, or by any councilman in his stead. Such
recorder is especially vested with and may exercise in the
city and within the police jurisdiction thereof, full
jurisdiction in criminal and quasi criminal matters, and
may impose the penalties prescribed by ordinance for the
the city, and shall
violation of ordinances and by-laws of
ofthe
have the power of an ex-officio justice of the peace,
except in civil matters ....

[4] On December 27, 1973, recorder's courts were
abolished in Alabama and replaced by municipal courts
having virtually identical jurisdiction. See Ala. Code §
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12-14-1 (1975). Municipal judges "shall be appointed and
vacancies filled by the governing body of the
municipality .... " Ala.Const., Arndt. No. 328, § 6.065.

10-10 regulation of dams
10-21 Southern Standard Building Code adopted

[5] Tuscaloosa contains 65,773 residents, while the police
jurisdiction surrounding the city contains between 16,000
and 17,000residents.SeeApp.l7-19.
17,000 residents. See App. 17-19.

10-25 building permits

[.6]
[.6J See 11.
II. 4, supra.

14-23
!4-23 Fire Prevention Code adopted

[7] The court granted appellants leave

14-65 regulation of incinerators

to further amend within 45 days to specifY particular
ordinances of
ofthe
the City of
ofTuscaloosa
Tuscaloosa which are claimed
to deprive plaintiffs ofliberty or property.

14-81 discharge of cinders

[8]
,[S]tatutes structuring local government units receive no
.[S]tatutes
less exacting an examination merely because the state
legislature is fairly elected. See Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474,
474,481
481 n. 6 (1968).

Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. at 628 n.
10.
[9] The Court apparently accepts this proposition by
strongly implying, ante at 73 n. 8, that

13-3 National Electrical Code adopted

Chapter 21 A mobile home parks
25-1 Southern Standard Plumbing Code adopted
33-79 disposal of human wastes
33-114, 118 regulation of wells

Public Health:
5-4 certain birds protected
5-4C, 42, 55 dogs running at large and bitches in heat
prohibited
14-4 no smoking on buses

a situation in which a city has annexed outlying territory
in all but name, and is exercising precisely the same
governmental powers over residents of surrounding
unincorporated territory as it does over those residing
within its corporate limits

14-15 no self-service gas stations
15-2 regulation of sale of produce from trucks
15-4 food establishments to use public water supply

would not "pass constitutional muster."
15-16 food, meat, milk inspectors
[10] Appellants have included in their brief an
unchallenged addendum listing the ordinances of the city
of Tuscaloosa, Code of
ofTuscaloosa
Tuscaloosa (1962,
( 1962, Supplemented
1975), that have application in its policejurisdiction:
police jurisdiction:

Licenses:
-4-1 ambulance
9-4, 9-18, 9-33 bottle dealers
19-1 junk dealers
20-5 general business license ordinance
20-6 7 florists
20-67
20-102 hotels, motels, etc.
20-163 industry

Buildings:
19-1 inspection service enforces codes

15-37 thru 40 regulates boardinghouses
15-52 milk code adopted
17-5 mosquito control

Traffic Regulations:
22-2 stop & yield signs may be erected by chief of police
22-3 mufflers required
22-4 brakes required
22-5 inspection of vehicle by police
22-6 operation of vehicle
22-9 hitchhiking in roadway prohibited
22-9 .I permit to solicit funds on roadway
22-9.1
22-11 impounding cars
22- I 4 load limit on bridges
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22-15 police damage stickers required after accident
22-25 driving while intoxicated
22-26 reckless driving
},2-27
_?,2-27 driving without consent of owner
22-33 stop sign
22-34 yield sign
22-38 driving across median
22-40 yield to emergency vehicle
22-42 cutting across private property
22-54 general speed limit
22-72 thru 7788 truck routes
Criminal Ordinances:

23-1 adopts all state misdemeanors
23-7.1 no wrecked cars on premises
23-15 nuisances
23-17 obscene literature
23-20 destruction of plants
23-37 swimming in nude
23-38 trespass to boats
26-51 no shooting galleries in the police jurisdiction or
outside
fire limits (downtown area)
28-31 thru 39 obscene films
Miscellaneolls:
Miscellaneous:

20-120 thru 122 cigarette tax
2~-31 public parks and recreation
2_:1-31

26-18 admission tax
Chapter 29 regulates public streets
30-23 taxis must have meters.
[11] See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise
of Extraterritorial Powers by Municipalities, 45
y.Chi.L.Rev. 151 (1977).
Y.Chi.L.Rev.
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Page 621
193 U.S.
u.s. 621 (1904)

2j S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817

making it necessary for a person coming into the state,
with the intention of residing therein, to register his name
with the clerk of the circuit court of the proper county,
and thereby to indicate the intent of such person to
become a citizen and resident ofthe state.
The act in question was passed March 29, 1902, as
chapter 133 of the laws of
ofthat
that

Pope
v.
Williams

No. 603
United States Snpreme
Supreme Conrt
Court
April4,
April
4, 1904
Argued March 8-9, 1904
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND
Syllabus
While the privilege to vote may not be abridged by a
state on account of race, color and previous condition of
servitude, the privilege is not given by the federal
Constitution or by any of its amendments, nor is it a
privilege springing from citizenship of the United States.
.~1inor v. Happersett.
Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.
While the right to vote for members of Congress is
not derived exclusively from the law of the state in which
they are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution
and laws of the United States, the elector must be one
entitled to vote under the state statute.
An act ofthe legislature of a state providing that all
persons who shall thereafter remove into the state from
·;ny
-;ny other state, district or territory shall make declaration
of their intent to become citizens and residents of the
state a year before they have the right to be registered as
voters is not violative of the federal Constitution as
against a citizen of another state moving into the enacting
state after the passage of the act.

This is a writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the
State of Maryland to review its judgment affirming that
of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which
affirmed the proceedings of the Board of Registry of
Election District No.
NO.77 of that county
Page 622
rGfusing to register petitioner as a legal voter on the
ground of his noncompliance with the Maryland law
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[24 S.Ct. 5741 year, and as an amendment and
supplement to the Public General Laws of the state, title
Elections, subtitle Registration, as § 25B, and it is
reproduced in the margin. *
Plaintiff in error on September 29, 1903, presented
his application
Page 623

No. 7,
to the Board of Registry of Election District No.7,
Montgomery County, Maryland, then sitting at a place
within such district, to be registered and entered as a
qualified voter on the registry of
voters of that election
ofvoters
district, which application the board refused and declined
to comply with for the sole reason that he had not
complied with this law of Maryland. Thereafter the
plaintiff
plainti ff presented a sworn petition to the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, in the State of Maryland,
praying that court to enter an order to revise the action of
the board of
ofregistry,
registry, and to order and direct that the
name of the petitioner should be entered as a qualified
voter on the registry of voters of the election district
already named. In that sworn petition, he alleged that he
had, on June 7, 1902, with his wife and child, removed
from the City of Washington, District of Columbia, into
Montgomery County, in the State of Maryland,
having then had, and ever since and now having, the
ofmaking
making the State of Maryland the permanent
intention of
domicil of
ofhimself
himself and his family, and of
ofbecoming
becoming a
citizen of said state, and ever since said June 7, 1902,
petitioner has resided in the subdivision ofOtterboume,
near Chevy Chase, in said Montgomery County, and in
the seventh election district of said county.

The petitioner further showed in his petition that he
had made application to the proper board of registry in
the election district mentioned, and the board had refused
to enter his name as a qualified voter on the ground
ofnoncompliance
already stated, of
noncompliance with the Maryland
statute.
The petitioner admitted
that he did not, within a year prior to said application for
registration as a qualified voter, or at any time during the
year 1902, in any manner make or register, in the office
of or before the Clerk of
ofMontgomery
Montgomery County, Maryland,
or in a record book kept by said clerk, a declaration of
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intention to become a citizen and resident of Maryland,
such as is required by the aforesaid law to be made by
ofMaryland
persons who remove into the State of
Maryland after
March 29, 1902, as a condition precedent to subsequent
registration
Page 624

of such persons as qualified voters. Petitioner, ho\vever,
claims and asserts that said section 258 of article 33 of
the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland affords no
justification for said refusal to register your petitioner as
a qualified voter, because said alleged law contravenes
and is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of Maryland, and is therefore null
and void.
The petitioner then asserts and sets forth in his
petition several grounds which, as he therein alleges,
render the state law a violation of the Constitution of the
Maryland, and he also specially sets up and claims that
the law is a violation of the Constitution of the United
States in the particulars named by him, and which are as
follows:
Said law is repugnant to that portion of section I of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States which declares that, "all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside," because by said law it is
ofthe
in effect ordained that male citizens of the United States
of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, removing
into the State of Maryland after March 29, 1902, with the
intention of making

of, into, and settlement within, the confines of any state,
district, or territory within the United States.
To this petition there was a general demurrer, which
was sustained by the court, which thereupon entered
judgment dismissing the petition, with costs to the
defendants.

J., lead opinion
PECKHAM, 1.,

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the above
statement of facts, delivered the opinion ofthe Court.
This is not a case of a statute of the state having
been passed subsequently to the time when the individual
had removed from another state or from a territory or
from the District of Columbia into the State of Maryland.
There is therefore no alteration of any possible rights
which the plaintiff in error might have already acquired
and which he might claim were taken from him by the
passage of such statute. On the contrary, this statute took
effect on March 29,
1902, more than two months prior to
29,1902,
the removal of the plaintiff in error from Washington in
the District of Columbia to Montgomery County, within
the State of Maryland. The objections of a federal nature
which are made by the plaintiff in error to the validity of
the statute are set out in his petition, and are
Page 632
also contained in the above statement of facts, and are
substantially reproduced in his assignment of errors.

Page 625

We are of opinion that the statute does not violate
any federal right of the plaintiff in error which he seeks to
assert in this proceeding. The statute, so far as it concerns
him and the right which he urges, is one making
regulations and conditions for the registry of persons for
the purpose of voting. It was only for the purpose of
thereafter voting that the plaintiff in error sought to be
registered, and it was the denial of that right only which
he can now review. His application for registry as a voter
was denied by the board of registry solely because of his
failure to comply with the statute. Whatever other right
he may have as a citizen of Maryland by reason of his
removal there with an intent to become such citizen is not
now in question. So far as appears no other right, if any
he may have, has been infringed by the statute. The
simple matter to be herein determined is whether, with
reference to the exercise of the privilege of voting in
Maryland, the legislature of
ofthat
that state had the legal right
to provide that a person coming into the state to reside
should make the declaration of intent a year before he
should have the right to be registered as a voter of the
state.

of citizens ofthe
of the United States,
States. which deny to a state the
power to attach unreasonable or burdensome conditions
to the free movement of citizens of the United States out

The privilege to vote in any state is not given by the
federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is
not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United

124 S.Ct.
S-Ct. 5751 said state their permanent domicil, shall
not be treated as citizens or residents of Maryland, or
given the rights and privileges of citizens of Maryland,
until they have been natural
ized in the mode prescribed
naturalized
by said law.

Said law is also repugnant to that portion of section I of
said Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States which prohibits a state from denying any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, because said law operates an unjust and
unreasonable discrimination against citizens of the United
States coming into the State of Maryland to permanently
reside therein after March 29, 1902, who may desire to
become qualified voters therein.
Said law is also repugnant to the general spirit of the
Constitution of the United States and the fundamental
rights
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States. Minor v. Happersett. 21 Wall. 162. It may not be
refused on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship
ofthe
of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote
in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be
exercised as the state may direct, and upon such terms as
to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no
discrimination is made between individuals, in violation
ofthe
of
the federal Constitution. The state might provide that
~rsons of foreign birth could vote without being
naturalized, and, as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in
Miner v. Happersett, supra, such persons were allowed to
vote in several of the

Page 633
states upon having declared their intentions to become
of the United States. Some states permit women
citizens ofthe
to vote; others refuse them that privilege. A state, so far
'as the federal Constitution is concerned, might provide by
·as
its own constitution and laws that none but native-born
citizens should be permitted to vote, as the federal
Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage upon
any one, and the conditions under which that right is to be
anyone,
exercised are matters for the states alone to prescribe,
subject to the conditions of the federal Constitution
already stated. although it may be observed that the right
to vote for a member of Congress is not derived
[24 S.Ct. 576[ exclusively from the state law. See Federal
Constitution, Art. I, Section 2; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S.
58. But the elector must be one entitled to vote under the
(!d.) See also Swafford
Sll'ajford v. Templeton, 185
state statute. (Id.)
U.S. 487,
487. 491. In this case, no question arises as to the
right to vote for electors of President and Vice President,
and no decision is made thereon. The question whether
the conditions prescribed by the state might be regarded
by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a federal
one. We do not wish to be understood, however, as
intimating that the condition in this statute is
unreasonable or in any way improper.

We are unable to see any violation of the federal
Constitution in the provision of the state statute for the
"declaration of the intent of a person coming into the state
before he can claim the right to be registered as a voter.
The statute, so far as it provides conditions precedent to
the exercise of the elective franchise within the state, by
persons coming therein to reside (and that is as far as it is
necessary to consider it in this case), is neither an
unlawful discrimination against any
anyone
one in the situation
of the plaintiff in error nor does it deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, nor is it repugnant to any
fundamental or inalienable rights of citizens of the United
States, nor a violation of any implied guaranties of the
federal Constitution. The right of a state to legislate upon
the subject of the elective franchise as to it may seem
good, subject
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to the conditions already stated, being, as we believe,
unassailable, we think it plain that the statute in question
violates no right protected by the federal Constitution.
The reasons which may have impelled the state
legislature to enact the statute in question were matters
entirely for its consideration, and this Court has no
concern with them.
It is unnecessary in this case to assert that under no
conceivable state of facts could a state statute in regard to
voting be regarded as an infringement upon or a
discrimination against, the individual rights of a citizen of
the United States removing into the state, and excluded
from voting therein by state legislation. The question
might arise if an exclusion from the privilege of voting
were founded upon the particular state from which the
person came,
carne, excluding from that privilege, for instance,
a citizen of
ofthe
the United States coming from Georgia and
allowing it to a citizen of the United States coming from
New York or any other state. In such case, an argument
might be urged that, under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the federal Constitution, the citizen from Georgia was, by
the state statute, deprived of the equal protection of the
laws. Other extreme cases might be suggested. We
neither assert nor deny that, in the case supposed,
supposed. the
claim would be well founded that a federal right of a
citizen of the United States was violated by such
legislation, for the question does not arise herein. We do,
however, hold that there is nothing in the statute in
question which violated the federal rights ofthe plaintiff
in error by virtue of the provision for making a
of his intention to become a citizen before he
declaration ofhis
can have the right to be registered as a voter and to vote
in the state.

The plaintiff in error has no ground for complaint in
regard to the decision of the courts below, and the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is
therefore
Affirmed.

Notes:
[*]
[*J

SEC. 258. All persons who, after the passage of this act,
shall remove into any county of
ofthis
this state or into the City
of Baltimore from any other state, district, or territory,
shall indicate their intent to become citizens and residents
of this state by registering their names in a suitable record
book, to be procured and kept for the purpose by the clerk
of the circuit court for the several counties, and by the
ofBaltimore
Baltimore City; such
clerk of the Superior Court of
record to contain their names, residence, age, and
occupation, and the intent of such persons to become

Page 2650 of 2676

citizens and residents of this state shall date from the day
on which such registry shall be so entered in such record
book by the clerk of the circuit court for the county, or of
the superior court of Baltimore City, as the case may be,
into which county or city such person shall so remove
from any other state, district, or territory. And no person
coming into this state from any other state, district, or
.territory shall be entitled to registration as a legal voter of
this state until one year after his intent to become such
legal voter shall be thus evidenced by such entry in such
record book, and such entry or a duly certified copy
thereof shall be the only competent and admissible
evidence of such intent. And the clerk of the Superior
Court ofBaltimore
of Baltimore City and of
ofthe
the several courts of
ofthe
the
several counties shall immediately, upon the passage of
this act, procure a suitable record book for the recording
therein of such entries, arranged alphabetically under the
names of such persons. For every person so registered
under the provisions of this section they shall be entitled
to demand and receive the sum of twenty-five cents, to be
paid to said clerks by the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore and the county commissioners, respectively. A
C?PY
C?py of such record, duly certified by said clerk, shall be
evidence of the right of such person to registration as
legal voters according to law, and each person so
registered shall be entitled to such certified copy upon
demand, without charge.
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01:44:15 PM!Judge
PM1Judge
!i Hosack 1
1

··a2·:·0"9.:0"{fF>Ml.'JLiCiiie········--r-·ar;e;"i1s:···r;a·itre·s···p·;:e;59nC.sfart:··with
. M"ofra·r;···tor
. N.ew
. friaTfi"rst:".. .. . . . . .
··02·:·0"9·:O"E3"""pMl·'
judiie········""!"·Ope"i's:···pa·iti"e·s"'p'resenC'Start"with"Moti"o'
n"'for"N'
ew"frIaT"fi"rst:
~~Hosack
Hosack ~
··a2:·0"~f:2·3···F>M·f·sta·;:r:
·············!··rili"atio·n···is. set".torih. i.n. ihe. hriar·rhere···a·;:e;··some···c:r:iticafihin9s. .· .· .· .· .·.
··02:·0"~j":2·3···pM·f·Sta·rr . ·············!··rilj"otio·n"'is"set"'fort"h"'i'n"ihe"hrIef"'fhere"'a're"some'··critIcafihings
Kelso
that jump out. Sec'y of State Tim Hurst testimony is clear, the
changes to the database were four peopie. if you add that to
the vote count, Hurst checked the changes and there were
four. He also testified, page 23 of his transcript, the envelopes
only show the ballts received, has nothing to do with valid
ballots. He testified that the daily reports would equal the exh 5
reports. To get 2041 it would have all the inputs. Judge Marano
,,did
did not testify he counted 2051 ballots. He counted 2027 valid
absentee ballots, not 2051.The error I'd like to address
~ regarding the law is UOCAVA. State law is different than
~~federal,
federal, also municipal is different. We provided extensive
~ research as to cases on point. US Supreme Court cases. There
~ is no US Constitutional right to vote. States can set the
~~requirements.
requirements. States have the power to require voters meet
~~requirements,
requirements, clerk has to verify the residence, they have to
~~follow
follow up and verify. The evidence shows beyond any doubt
that in excess of five illegal ballots were counted. They are not
eligible voters - but for federal elections.

!

.

!

I

··a2·:··f£3":""3T. i=iMTFiete·;:··············O·fn. tii·e;··Pcsriefifle·;:e;··was
. me.niion··c;rt>u·;:a·e·r;···arr;r:a·a-r··rdt:e
. tha······
··o2·:··ff3":""3T··j:)"MTPete·r··············'
·"j"n··th·e··PCSrIefihe're"was"me'
ntion"o(bu'rd'e'n"'ofpro'o"("j"""die··the······

!Erbland
~

,'

Noble case. Not necessary for DF to put on evidence after
close of case. That is cited in our brief. We addressed the
standards for a new trial. The Memo Decision of the Court
addresses the contentions presented by the PL. There was a
call made by the Court, a decison made by the Court, on
UOCAVA will have to be decided by Id
ld Supreme Court on
appeal. We have specific Idaho statutes, statutes that
. incorporate UOCAVA, people made application under
UOCAVA. The decision this Court made, on UOCAVA, is
~ something courts are called on to make. It doesn't
~ disinfranchize a voter. I submit a new trial should not be
~~granted,
granted, ask the court to deny the motion.

!

··a2:·2:~r2"3···i=iMlr\A"ichaai·······;·rhe
. me·m·a···s"l:ih·;:n·itie·c:rad"d"re.sses. ihe. dhis. stanCiiil·9···an. this:···iT········
"02:'2~r2"3"'j:)"Mlr\jfichaei"""';'fhe"me'm'o"'s"l:ih'm'itte'cf"addre'sses"the"dhis"standIn'g"'on"this:···iT········
~ Haman
we presume what the PL is saying is true, is there evidence
~
that WOUld,
would, not could, but would change the findings? This
~
Court listened to Hurst testimony, he clearly went through the
~
voter qualifications that the Court considered when entering its
~
decision. There is no evidence submitted the findings of the
court would change.

I

)·-1~/~
)'-1~i~
12/7/2010
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.·As
As the Court points out it was unable to locate case law on
UOCAVA. There are 5-6 cases submitted that shows it does
not apply. Also, the form the voters fill out, it is not a form for
municipal elections, it is a form for state and county elections.
Municipal elections are different. Hurst testified they don't even
have jurisdiction over municipal elections. The absentee
envelopes don't prove anything. It doesn't prove they were
valid. Judge Marano testified 2027 valid absentee ballots
. counted. Obligation in this case is not to the litigants, it is to the
;' citizens of COA.
CDA. UOCAVA is clear under US Supreme Court
cases. I think with the clarified record of Hurst and Marano, this
Court should bypass a new trial and order a new election. It
serves no prupose to drag this to the Id
ld Sup Court.
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; I appreciate the submissions. So the record is clear, I'm not
reopening the record. If someone submits an Affd that could
have been put in at trial - law doesn't work that way. This can
be no surprise to parties. The database is interesting
information, the Sec of State said it was by no means the
record, and was only as good as the entries. It's not the record,
and not intended to be the record. The changes in the
database are irrelevant. You can argue Judge Marano's
testimony any way you want. There are 2051 absentee ballots
counted. There were 4 UOCAVA voters the court made a
determination on, the Court said they were legal but no
indication as to how they voted. I addressed the UOCAVA
issue because I thought it was important. I did study that and
made a ruling, I found it wasn't an irregularity. There isn't a
case anybody cited to me that says UOCAVA cannot be
extended to citizens in municipal elections. If the legislature
wants to make an exception they can do that, then there would
be a law. I'm not going to do that. At the trial level, there wasn't
anything wrong how the County applied it. They're doing the
best they can. UOCAVA wouldn't be relevant to the excess
ballot issue. The issue raised on the new trial, is the burden of
proof argument. There isn't any legal basis for this Court to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant. I can't find a case that
allows shifting the burden of proof. There is no legal basis for
this Court to shift the burden of proof. I'm not going to order a
new election because it's a close election. The legislature can
order that, but that isn't the current law.
There was never a hint, suggestion as to preparing a ballot out
of thin air and putting them into a machine. A complete
absence of proof as to excess ballots. There is one ballot that
doens't have an absentee return envelope. That fact that there
is one missing envelope is probably explained by that it got lost.
There was not testimony, but using logic. One excess ballot is
less than three. Then you're down to two. We don't know it
voted. It wouldn't change the outcome of the election. You have
no proof as to how they were voted. Out of over 6,000 votes,
2051 absentee votes, you have ten votes you don't know
anything about. There is a request to have a new election, that
is absurd.
On the burden of proof, the burden would always be on the PL.
Would the excess ballots have made a difference? The burden
never shifts. We only found one excess ballot. There isn't legal
support for shifting burden of proof. It would change the result
given the findings of the Court. Deny the Moiton for New Trial.
We also have pending Motions on Costs/Atty fees. We can
start with the city, however you want to present your argument.
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!i The city was not in on this, just proper party. This court
~~reinstated
reinstated

the city and the city clerk in official capacity. The

!i claim on canvassing went forward, the city if the prevailing
!i party. So costs as a matter of right should be granted. The

Il dispute is on the atty fees incurred in defending and

!i discretionary costs. When this was first filed the suit included all
~~the
the city and county in official capacity. Then county and their
~~officials
officials were dismissed. The suit continued on for Kennedy in

~~capacity
capacity of Seat 2, on the claims. Then this Court brought the
~~city
city back inin - under the statute. The PL pressed forward. There
~~was
was nothing to support a claim against the city. Claims were

~~dismissed
dismissed by the Court then five days of trial testimony. Claims
:' has no basis or merit against the city. The PI subpoened most
of the city to be here for the whole trial, we asked to be let out,
they had to stay here at public expense. The county was not a
party, they conducted the election. We do believe this case was
54 E. My brief set forth
frivilous. I'm seeking fees under 54E.
elements for A-F. Atty fees and costs are proper and should be
awarded. Then discretionary fees should be awarded .

................................................
.................................................;.
,a. .................................
................................. ~ ................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.
03:04:01 PM
PM~~ Peter
i Mr Kennedy is the holder of seat 2 and had to defend this case,

.· Erbland

12nl2010
12n1201o
SC 38417-2011

CDA is a nominal defendant. The case was tried against the
County. All the proof was against the County. Mr Kennedy was
simply a target, Mr Brannon was challenging seat 2. I think the
decision says 6-7 times there was probably reason to
challenge. I cannot say the action was taken friviously. I can
say it was tried against an empty chair. Mr Kennedy had no say
in how the election was run. There were steps Mr Kennedy had
to take to invesitgate and prove his case. We've asked for an
award of discretionary costs incurred by Kennedy. It would not
have been appropriate to not invesitgate the elections. There is
a bond in this case of 5,000.00. Costs total
total5,700.00.
5,700.00. We
believe the Court should find they were necessary.
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I want to step back and say "Whose election was this?" It was a
city election. The County supplied witnesses as to what
happened in the city election. It was the city election. The city
was in charge. Who canvasses the votes, the city does. Under
Title 50 and 34 there is requirement of a city record. The record
was not maintained according to state law. The city clerk could
have maintained the record, the county could have maintained
the record then there wouldn't be a dispute, they didn't. Mr
Kennedy is required to be a defendant. There was no allegation
he did anything wrong. Just as the city is required to be a
defendant. That's just the law. Mr Kennedy didn't have anything
to prove. It was never a burden for a public servant interested
in a fair election. I don't recall him ever sitting at counsel table.
We've objected to discretionary costs because contacting
witnesses is what is done in litigation. Bill Moreland LLC and his
company are not licensed in CDA. There is no foundation for
that.
The original bond was set at $40,000. The statute with regard
. to bond requirements is $500.00 because that's what costs are.
The 5,000 bond was wrong, the costs are what we agreed to.
Regarding Mr Kennedy's claim for costs, there is a fee for
serving Mr McCrory for a contempt proceeding, that has
nothing to do with this case.
As costs of right - they are clear. They didn't attend the
deposition of two witnesses, they ordered a transcript, they're
entitled to that.

:

··O":f22·:·2-£fF>rvf!""rJfichaai""···-r::rfie
. city··w:a·s···ir;···atte.ild"iiil.ce···c;nt19··aepas:···$s60":·0"c>""was··wr:iite·n···in.
"6:3":"22':'2'ff"PfvfnJfichasj"""'TThs"city"wa's"'iri"'atte'i1d"iiil'ce"'of""ths"depos:"'$s"66:'6e)""was"writte'i1'"in'
l Haman lthe 1890's. It's for the courts discretion. What's to prevent this
1

l

1from happening again and again. Especially when the loosing

lparty chooses not to seek a recount.

l·Ths··cas·s"'agai"ri'si"ths"dty"was"frivi"ious:"';f"hs'dty"co'u"iCf"cont"ract······
··63:·2·3·:ss···F>rvfl..F>efe·r··············f·::rfi
e. cas·e···a9ai"i1.sfthe. dty. was. trivHolis:···:r-he.dty. ca.u"iCfconfract:······
··63:·2·3·:5S···Pfv,.Lpet"s·r··············
Erbland 1for elections. The
1has to be named.
1 days. There were
ask for the award

i

12/7/2010
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statute requires that the holder of the seat
The statute requires this to be tried within 30
a myraid of challenges. It was exceptional,
of costs.
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As the Court has said, this litigation has proved difficult. The
way modern day litigation works - you're not going to get many
cases to trial in 30 days. You have a problematic statute in area
of fees/costs. The city was brought back in. The county was not
an indispensable party, nobody brought them back in. This isn't
spelled out in the law. In terms of determining frivilous against
the city, I don't know I can make a finding against the city. The
city could do nothing or defend, comments. There's any
number of things that could be done, it's completly unclear.
These claims are few and far between. The city was in only for
a remedy. But you have a duty to the public to defend. The city
did take an active roll here, that's a cost to the taxpayer. Very
valid fees incurred. If the city had chosen to stand back - would
that have been frivilous? What they did was reasonable. The
case got tried on the merits, the case got resolved. I can't make
the finding of frivilous. There are taxpayer costs in this type of
IIitigation
llitigation - that's how things work. That's not to say the fees
aren't reasonable, but I don't think appropriate to award those
fees. As to costs, the cost of right is the service fee, service on
McCrory - that was a seperate action and dismissed by the
court. RE: transcript, it's not exceptional, don't find an issue
with investigation. Claim of right, awarded. Discretionary costs,
award. Prepare an Order, either together or separate. Counsel
for defense prepare Order for denial.
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Arthur B. Macomber, State Bar No. 7370
73 70
Jonathan A. Burky, State Bar No. 8043
Macomber Law, PLLC
408 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 2IS
215
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: 208·664·4700
208-664-4700
Facsimile: 208-664-9933
AtTorney
Atrorney for William L. McCrory

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
JIMBRANNON;
JIM
BRANNON;

) Case No: CV-09-10010
CV·09·}OOIO
)

Plaintiff, )
) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF
NON·
vs.
) ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR NON) PARTY WILLIAM L. MCCRORY
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity )
as the City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene City Clerk; )
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the )
incumbent candidate for the City of
)
)
Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene Council Seat #2;
)

Defendants. )

TO:

PLAINTIFF JIM BRANNON AND DEFENDANTS SUSAN K. WEATHERS
AND MIKE KENNEDY THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD,
AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE·ENTITLED
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
Macomber Law, PLLe,
PLLC, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2),
ll(b)(2}, gives notice of Macomber

Law, PLLC's and attorney Arthur B. Macomber's withdrawal as attorney of record for
William 1.
L. McCrory ("McCrory"), a non-party
non·party in this action, who appeared in the matter
specifically and solely to address the contempt proceeding initiated against hjm.
him.
Macomber Law, PLLC requests to be removed from the service list in this matter.
SC 38417-2011
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Macomber Law PLLC

P. 2/3

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(b)(2)
U(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that:
[A]t the time judgment is entered in any action, or at any time thereafter,

an attorney who desires to withdraw as attorney of record for a party may .
. . file a notice of withdrawal at the time of entry of the judgment, or at any
time thereafter, but such notice of withdrawal shall not become effective
until the time for appeal from the final judgment has expired and there are
no proceedings pending. The attorney shall provide the last known address
of the client in any notice of withdrawal.
On October2l,
October21, 2010, the Court issued an Order ofDisrnissal
of Dismissal (of Contempt
.

.

Proceeding) wherein it ordered that the "contempt proceeding [against McCrory] is
hereby dismissed."
dismissed... There are, therefore, no unresolved matters concerning non-party
William L. McCrory currently penrung before the Court. Although there is no specific
rule for withdrawing as attorney of record for a non-party, because no issues remain
related to non-party McCrory, no further representation is required for McCrory in this
matter.
The last known address of non-party McCrory is as follows: 6065 N. Harcourt
Drive, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83815. A copy of this notice is being mailed to McCrory at
such address.

. "'*

. ",-tk

this .,
Dated this'/

day of December 2010.
MACOMBER LAW, PLLC

Arthur B. Macomber
Attorney for William L. McCrory
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11h.
l1h.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December 2010, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing:
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
FOR NON-PARTY
NON·PARTY WILLIAM L. MCCRORY

Peter Erbland
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101
P.O. BoxE
83816-0328
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816·0328
664-8115
664·8115
Main Phone:
664-6338
664·6338
FAX:
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy
Michael Haman
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
676-1683
FAX:

[ ]
[ ]

[ ]

kf

[ )
( ]
[ ]

M

[ ]

Scott Reed
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Main Phone:
664-2161
FAX:
765-5117
7,65-5117
ATtorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy
Starr Kelso
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
FAX:
664-6261
Attorney for Plaintif!
PlaintiffJim Brannon
William L. McCrory
6065 N. Harcourt Drive
Coeur d'Alene.
d'Alene, ID 83
83815
81 5

[ ]
[ ]

M
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
~

kt
[ ]

[ ]
[ ]

SC 38417-2011

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 664-6338

U,S,
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 676·1683
676-1683
U,S,
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 765·5117
765-S 117
U.S. Mail.
Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 664-6261
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile:
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Fax 208-676-8903
Toll Free 888-894-CDAR (2327)
110 'Wallace Jl.-venue,
}l:venue, Lower Leve(
Lever
It: 38 CoeuraJIJene,
Coeura}l1ene, Idaho 83814

www.cdareporting.com
CLERK SISTRICT
BISTRICT COURT

December 6, 2010
District Court Clerk
Kootenai County Courthouse
324 West Garden Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene, et at.al. - No. CV 09-10010
9/15/2010 Testimony of Timothy Hurst
Dear District Court Clerk:
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 50 pages, entitled Testimony
of Timothy Hurst in Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene dated 9/15/2010, has
been delivered to the District Court of the State of Idaho.
A certified copy has been delivered to:
Starr Kelso
Law Office of Star Kelso
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Suite 600
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1312

If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Coeur d'Alene
Reporting at 208-765-3666.

cc: Original transcript
Court Clerk
All Counsel

Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible
TranscriptDepositions - CourtCourt - Conference Room - EE-Transcript
- Video --Realtime
Realtime Hookup
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Cl
COURT

December 6,2010
6, 2010
District Court Clerk
Kootenai County Courthouse
324 West Garden Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, 1083814
ID 83814

Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene, et al.al. - No. CV 09-10010
9/15/2010 Testimony of Eugene Marano
Dear District Court Clerk:
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT

41· pages, entitled Testimony
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 41of Eugene Marano in Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene dated 9/15/2010, has
been delivered to the District Court of the State of Idaho.
A certified copy has been delivered to:
Starr Kelso
Law Office of Star Kelso
P.O. Box 1312
1621 N. Third Street, Suite 600
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1312

If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Coeur d'Alene
Reporting at 208-765-3666.

cc: Original transcript
Court Clerk
All Counsel

Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible
Depositions~
Depositions ~

SC 38417-2011
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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

12086646338

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAl. DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,

Plaintiff,

09-10010
) Case No. CV 09.10010
)

~ ORDER ON APPLICA
nON FOR
APPLICATION
) COSTS AND FEES

vs.

)
)

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, a
municipal corporation; et aI.,
al.,

)

Defendants.

)

)
)

The Motions for an award of
offees
fees and costs and objections thereto came beforc
before tho court

fbr bearing on
aD Dccombc;r 7,2010.
7, 2010. Plaintiff, lim Brannon, was l'epresented.
tepresented. by Attorney Starr
Kelso. Defendant Susan K. Weathers and City of Coeur d'Alene were represented by Attorney

Michael L. Haman. Defendant Mike Kennedy was represented by Attorney Peter C. Erbland.
Whereupon,
Whereupon., the court having considered the argument and submissions of the parties, and
having considered the files and records in this case,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant City of
ofeoeur
Coeur d'Alene's Motion for An Award
of Anomey Fees and Discretionary Costs is hereby dcnic:d. Defendant City of Co
cur d'Alene is
Coeur
~warded

total costs incurred as aama.tter
matter of
ofrigh.t
right in the amount of$167.20.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Mike Kennedy's Motion for An Award of

costs as a matter of right in
Discretionary Costs is denied. Defendant Mike Kennedy is awarded oosts
of$58.00.
the amount ofSS8.00.

ORDER
APPLICATION FOR COSTS AND FEES-I
SCON
38417-2011
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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

12086646338

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
) Case No. CV 09-10010
09·10010
)
) ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW

JIM BRANNON,

Plaintiff.

vs.

)
)
)
)

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, a

)

municipal corporation; et al.,

)
)

TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT

Defendants,
Defendants.
_____________________________
)

----------------------------)

Plaintiffs Motion for a 1\ew Trial, or in the alternative,
alternatjve, to Alter or Amend the Judgment,
came on for hearing on December 7.2010.
7, 2010. Plaintiff.
Plaintiff, Jim Brannon, was represented by Attorney
Starr Kelso. Defendant Susan K. Weathers and City of Coeur d'Alene were represented by
Attorney Michael L. Haman. Defendant Mike Kennedy was r~rQ5Qntc.d
r~rQ5QntQd by Attorney Pctt;r
Peter C.
Erbland.

Whereupon., the court having considered the argument and submissions of the parties.
parties, and

having considered
consjdered the files and records in this case.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial or in the alternativc~
alternative~
Motion to AJter or Amend the Judgment be and hereby is denied.

DATEDthis---f--dayof~~/DATEDthi.+dayOf~~---

J,
J
'

,201.1
,201_L

strict Judge

OaDER
O&DER DENYING MonON
MOTION FOR NEW TRlAL
01\
J1JDGM~· 1
011 TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGM~·
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In the Supreme Court of the State oiiua-JNjTENAlt
oiiiftt-)NjrENAJ}ssSS
2UIIJ!iN21
AHII:
2UII
J!iN 21 AH
II: 28
28

c
JIM BRANNON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

)
)
)
)

)

CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, a
municipal corporation; SUSAN K.
WEATHERS, in her capacity as the City of
Coeur d'
d'Alene
Alene City Clerk; and MIKE
KENNEDY, in his capacity as the incumbent
candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene
Counsel Seat #2,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 38417-2011
Kootenai County Docket No. 2009-10010

The Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter filed in this Court January 4,
2011, requested that a Reporter's Transcript be prepared. However, the Notice of Appeal failed to
17(o)( S)(b)
5)(b) and 2S(
25(a) in that it did not specifically list the
comply with Idaho Appellate Rules 17(0)(
date(s) and title(s) of the hearing(s) required to be transcribed for purposes of this Appeal:
therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF
APPEAL which complies with Idaho Appellate Rules 17(0)(S)(b)
17(o)(5)(b) and 2S(a),
25(a), and shall specify the
date(s) and title(s) title of the hearing(s) required to be transcribed for purposes of this Appeal.
IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter(s) with a copy of
the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal which
reporter(s) was served.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED the Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with the
District Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. In the event an Amended
Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONLY.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal is SUSPENDED until further notice.

ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL
- Docket No. 38417-2011
APPEAL-
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law #2445
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'
Alene, Idaho 83816
d'Alene,
83 816
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261

P{)f ~G INA L
ERK DISTRICT CO R
I '"

lOll FEB -/

~~~.g~-/(Yl(\l:J~Q__

Attorney for Appellant Brannon

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST runICIAL
mDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JIM BRANNON,
Appellant

Case No. CV-09-10010
CV-09-1001O
*** AMENDED***
***AMENDED***
NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
CITY OF COEUR D'
ALENE, IDAHO
D'ALENE,
a municipal corporation, et.al.
Respondents.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS CITY OF COEUR D'
ALENE; SUSAN K.
D'ALENE;
WEATHERS in her capacity as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; AND MIKE KENNEDY
in his capacity as the incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat#
Seat # 2; and
THE PARTIES RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS MICHAEL HAMAN, SCOTT REED, AND
PETER ERBLAND
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant, Jim Brannon appeals against the above named respondents to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered on November 4, 2010 and the
post judgment order denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternative
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Senior District Court Judge Charles W. Hosack
presiding and all interlocutory orders entered by the Court prior thereto, simultaneously
therewith, and subsequent thereto.
2. That the appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1)
I.A.R. and Idaho Code section 34-2025 (b).

1

AMENDED--NOTICE OF APPEAL

SC 38417-2011

Page 2671 of 2676

3. Preliminary Issues on Appeal:
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the City and City Clerk were permitted
in 2009 to enter into a contract with Kootenai County and the Clerk of the Court
the City's election, and duties of the City
ofthe
whereby all responsibility for the conduct of
Clerk, were delegated to the County and Clerk.
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint to set aside the entire 2009
Alene General Election and only retaining the contest for Seat 2?
City of Coeur d'
d'Alene
3. Whether UOCAVA
VA residency statutes are applicable to municipal elections?
I.C. SO504. Whether the failure of the County and Clerk to maintain an I.C. 34-1011 and I.e.
4S1 absentee ballot record constitutes misconduct.
451
5. Whether the district court erred in holding that mere return envelopes, some of which
S.
or marked "void" and some of which have no date and time stamp recording their
receipt, is compliance with the absentee ballot record required to be kept by the Clerk
pursuant to I.
I.C.
C. 34-1011 and/or I.C. SO-4Sl.
50-451.
6. Whether the district court erred by not adopting the November 6, 2009 absentee ballot
record (Exhibit S)
5) as being prima facie proof that more absentee ballots were counted
than were actually received by the Clerk by the close of the polls?
7. Whether the district court erred in holding, without any evidence in the record, that the
2050 return envelopes counted by Judge Marano each contained a legal and valid
20S0
absentee ballot when the absentee ballot record printed on November 6, 2009 (Exhibit
S)
5) documents that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received prior to the close of
the polls.
8. Whether the district court erred by only requiring that the board of canvassers accept a
print-out of machine vote totals to meet their responsibility to "count votes" pursuant to
I.e.
I.C. 34-2001 (6)?
9. Whether the district court erred by not entering its order requiring voters that cast
absentee ballots, who were not able to located within the city or the county for service
of process, to appear at the trial as permitted by I.C.
I.C. 34-2013?

2
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10. Whether the district court erred in not considering prior recorded statements of voters
as substantive proof of who they cast their respective ballots for when they testified at
trial that, at that time, they can not remember who they voted for in the election?
11. Whether the district court erred in holding that Denise Dobslaff, a landed immigrant in
Canada, was a resident for the purpose of voting in the City's municipal election?
12. Whether the district court erred in hoiding that the Cierk does not have an obiigation
under I.
I.C.
C. 50-445 to determine whether an applicant for an absentee ballot is registered
and lawfully entitled to vote as requested by the applicant. (e.g. a resident of the city)?
13. Whether the district court erred in holding that Kimberly Gagnon, who has never
resided in the city, was a qualified voter simply because she is the spouse of a current
member of the military?
14. Whether the district court erred in holding that Alan Friend, who listed his residence as
a commercial building and whose internet advertising claims he is a permanent resident
of Canada, was a qualified voter?
15. Whether the district court erred by not requiring, under I.C. 50-402 "residence", that a
voter living outside of the city must have a "fixed" principal or primary home or place
of abode within the city, to which he intends to return to as opposed to a general intent
to possibly someday return to the City?
16. Whether erred, when the evidence establishes that at least two voters were provided the
wrong ballots at polling places, by holding that in a "combined" election where more
than one ballot is to be voted and the poll books are to document which type of ballot a
person receives, that the fifty three "in-person" voters, for whom there are no records
documenting which ballot they were respectively given, that the each were provided
the correct ballot to cast their vote on when they appeared at the polls.
17. Whether there is substantial competent evidence that supports the district court's
holding that Judge Marano counted 2051 absentee ballots as being received.
18. Whether the district court erred by not shifting that the burden of proof to Defendants,
once the Plaintiff established that the only reliable absentee ballot record database
documented that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received by the Clerk and the
machine reflects 2051 absentee ballots were counted which difference in number is

3 AMENDED--NOTICE OF APPEAL
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five more than the difference in the vote totals attributed to Appellant Brannon and
Defendant Kennedy?

19. Whether the district court judge erred in not disqualifying himself given his pretrial
statements in open court, on the record, that election challenges established is bias if
election challenges were permitted would cause anarchy reign?

hoiding that the proposed, but previously denied,
20. Whether the district court erred in hoMing
I.C.
requested amended complaint failed to state a claim for malconduct under I.
C. 342001?
d' Alene General
21. Whether the district court erred in confirming the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene

Election?
22. Whether the district court erred in declaring Defendant Kennedy as duly elected to Seat
Alene General Election?
d'Alene
2 in the 2009 City of Coeur d'
23. Whether the district court (Judge Simpson) erred in requiring Plaintiff to file a
$5,000.00 bond.
24. Whether the district erred in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial or in the

alternative to alter or amend the judgment.
4. An order has not been issued sealing all or a part of the record.
JAR Rule 25, in hard copy,
5. (a) The entire reporter's standard transcript pursuant to IAR
supplemented by the following:

1. The following pre-trial hearings:

a

1128/2010 Status Conference Hearing, Reporter JoAnn Schaller

b. 3/02/10 Entire Hearing, Reporter JoAnn Schaller
c. 5/14/2010 Entire Hearing, Reporter Ann McManus
d. 6/14/2010 Entire Hearing, Reporter Byrl Cinnamon
e. 8/31/2010 Entire Hearing, Reporter Valerie Nunemacher
f.

9/13/10 pre-trial hearings on motions on Kennedy motion in Limine and
Plaintiff Motion to

Disqualify

Judge

Hosack,

Reporter

Valerie

Nunemacher
g. 9/13/10 Opening statements of counsel
h. 9/18/10 Closing arguments of counsel, Reporter Allison Stovall

4
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1.

12/07/10 Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or in alternative
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Reporter Byrl Cinnamon

6. The appellant selects the "scan" option under Idaho Appellate Rule 27 (b), effective as

of July 1,2010,
1, 2010, and requests the clerk of the district court to "scan the entire
Heu of the appellant designating certain docwuents
docwllents to
district court fiie as the record in iieu
be included in the record."
7.
7 . I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested:

(b) The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of
the reporter's transcript.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.-.

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that a copy of the foregoing was faxed on the 11stst day of
February, 2011 to:

ATTORNEYS
Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office
P.O. Box 2155
Coeur d'
Alene, Idaho 83816
d'Alene,
FAX:208-676-1683
FAX :208-676-1683
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB#2456
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
FAJ{:208-664-6338
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box A
Coeur d'
d'Alene,
Alene, Idaho 83816
FAJ{: 208-765-5117

COURT REPORTERS
Coeur d' Alene Reporting
Valerie Nunemacher
Keri Veare
Allison Stoval
100 Wallace Avenue
A venue
d'Alene
Alene ill
ID 83814
Coeur d'
Fax 208-676-8903
JoAnn Schaller
Anne MacManus
Via fax: 446-1188
CinnamfskJon
Byrl CinnamfskJ0n
753-3581
II.~
. ~ /1
/J

lJI.YVlfi.Yv-

Starr Kelso
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JIM BRANNON,

)

)
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,

CITY OF COEUR D' ALENE, IDAHO
a municipal corporation, et a1

)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT

)
)

VS.

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 38417-2011

)

I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause
was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I further certify that exhibits were offered in this case and have been included with the Clerk's Record.
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record was
complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed by U.S. mail,
postage prepaid on the 17TH day of May. 2011.
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County,
Idaho this 17 TH day May. 2011.
CLIFFORD T. HAYES
Clerk of the District Court

